

# Collecting Simulator Data for Human Reliability Analysis

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# Recent HRA Research

- Developing an integrated HRA method (Ongoing)
  - Work with the EPRI
  - Address method-to-method variability issue
- HRA data collection (Ongoing)
  - Topic of this presentation
- Benchmarking HRA methods with simulator exercises
  - International and domestic benchmark studies
  - Research work completed; reports to be generated
- Fire HRA
  - EPRI 1019196/NUREG-1921, “EPRI/NRC Fire Human Reliability Analysis Guidelines” – Spring 2012
- Spent fuel handling
  - NUREG/CR-7016, “Human Reliability Analysis-Informed Insights on Cask Drops”, 2/2012
  - NUREG/CR-7017, “Preliminary, Qualitative Human Reliability Analysis for Spent Fuel Handling”, 2/2012

# HRA Data Program Goal

**Bridging human performance data and HRA applications of the NRC's risk-informed programs**

Human  
Performance Data

HRA  
Applications



# Focused HRA Applications and Data

- Applications:
  - Baseline PRA models
  - Significance Determination Process (SDP)
  - Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP)

SDP and ASP have more specific context information than the baseline PRA. It implies that data needs to have different levels of granularity.
- Data:
  - Licensed operator simulator training
  - Operating experience
  - Operator performance studies (e.g., Halden simulator exercises)
  - Initial licensing exams

# Objectives and Tools

## Two different tools to address two different objectives

- Objectives 1: Inform Human Error Probability (HEP) estimates
  - For data of licensed operators simulator training and simulator-based research studies
  - Piloting the tool scheduled in April, 2012
- Objective 2: Improve understanding of operators' behavior in responding to plant malfunction(s)
  - An enhanced timeline tool capturing the scenario progress and the What's and Why's that affect the progress
  - For data of events that mobilize the NRC's inspection teams and simulator-based research studies

# Tool for Informing HEP Estimates

- A web-based tool
  - Data stored in the Idaho National Laboratory
- Collect licensed operator simulator training data
  - Under an MOU with an NRC licensee
- Data supports HEP estimates and human performance improvements
  - Support risk, operations, and training departments
- Welcome industry's collaboration


# Approach to Data-Informed HEP Estimates

- Based on counting the number of failure and response opportunities
- Context specific HEPs

$$\text{HEP (Context)} = \frac{\text{\# of Failure (Context)}}{\text{\# of Response Opportunities (Context)}}$$

# Counting the Response Opportunities


## Malfunctions (Response Opportunities)



Loss of ECW 1A	
POSITION	EXPECTED RESPONSE
CREW	Recognize loss of EW flow to A train.
Crew	Secure ECW pump 1A
CT	Manually trip Diesel Generator prior to any of the following occurring:
CT	Diesel Generator tripping
Crew	Ensure CCP 1A is in service
Crew	Verifies Natural Circulation
SM	Determines need to cooldown
SM	Declare an Alert HA1/EAL2 due to damage to EW structure or notify ED that escalation is appropriate.



# Framework for Data-Informed HEP Estimates



# Key Information of a Response Opportunity

- Context
  - The human performance challenges in responding to each malfunction
  - Characterized by a set of factors classified according to human information processing in crew context
- Performance results
  - SAT, SAT $\Delta$ , or UNSAT (including human error recovery)
- Types of inappropriate acts
- Causes of inappropriate acts

# Context

- Characterized by seven classes of factors
  - Detecting, understanding, deciding, action, communication/teamwork, supervision, and workload managing
  - Each class consists of less than 10 specific factors
- E.g., Detecting class consists of
  - Large number of simultaneous alarms
  - Missing/Degraded information
  - Misleading information
  - Unfamiliar/unrecognizable alarm pattern
  - Small or gradual change
  - Status of automatic control system/automatic control actions not clearly indicated (e.g., complex interlocks)
  - No reason to check
  - Others

# Types of Inappropriate Acts

- Characterized by 4 classes of factors
  - Failure to detect
  - Failure to understand
  - Planning/decision failure
  - Action failure
- E.g., “Failure to Detect” class consists of
  - Key alarms not detected
  - Key parameter value not detected
  - Automated system status/change not detected
  - Critical data not checked with appropriate frequency
  - Decided to stop collecting critical data
  - Wrong data source attended to
  - Other

# Causes of Inappropriate Acts

- Characterize by 6 classes of factors
  - Monitoring, Diagnosis, Procedure, Manipulation, Communication, and Supervision
- E.g., Procedure class consists of
  - Procedural adherence less than adequate (LTA)
  - Procedure / reference document technical content LTA
  - Procedure / reference document format/design LTA
  - Procedure / reference document development and maintenance LTA
  - No procedure / reference documents
  - Others
- Factors are hierarchically structured

# Data Collection in Two Levels of Detail

Function

←

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Tasks

- Context and Performance Results are collected for every Task and Function
  - The function's context is aggregated from the tasks' contexts
- The types and causes of inappropriate acts are collected only when SAT $\Delta$  or UNSAT
  - Could be in either function or task level
- Can inform human failure events modeled with various levels of detail

# A Prototype Screen

Interface for  
quick identification of  
the factors

Pace | **Alarms** | Procedure | Monitoring | Manipulating | Communicating | Leadership

Error  
Choose the item which most accurately characterizes the reason for the error:

- Key alarm not detected or responded to (for example, an unexpected alarm silenced along with multiple expected alarms but not really noticed as being unexpected)
- Significance of the alarm not noted (for example, alarm specifically noted as being unexpected but the crew failed to properly prioritize the response to the alarm)
- Alarm Response Procedure had guidance that was applicable but it was not entered
- Alarm Response Procedure was entered but not correctly followed
- Alarm Response Procedure was entered but guidance was not directly applicable to the scenario's circumstances and the operators were unable to adapt the guidance to the task at hand.

Alarm Type

- Main Control Board upper alarm
- Main Control Board indicating panel
- Other audible alarm
- Other alarm

Alarm: [ Gray out the Procedure area AND Save/Next until something is entered in this field. ]

Alarm: [ Gray out the Procedure area AND Save/Next until something is entered in this field. ]

Noteworthy Items  
Use these buttons to record noteworthy instances of when a Human Performance tool either had a definitive positive effect on the scenario outcome or failed to prevent an error when the opportunity arose.

Near Miss | Recovery | Human Performance

Optional Items  
Use these buttons to record positive and negative performance which your crew wishes to capture. To be useful, all items marked as plusses or deltas should have short explanations written in the scenario narrative.

Operator Fundamentals  
Performance Assessment Worksheet

Back / Cancel | Save / Next

# Benefits To Industry

- Risk department
  - HEPs with stronger data support
  - Based on plant-specific and/or aggregated (generic) data
- Operations and Training departments
  - Systematic trending analysis for effective human performance improvement
  - Systematically and electronically track individuals' performance



# Summary

- NRC is developing tools for collecting human performance data
  - For improving HRA and human performance
- Seek more collaboration with industry
  - Review the tools – April 2012
  - Collaborate with NRC on data collection
  - Prefer signing a MOU

# Key MOU Items (ML110730582)

- NRC funds the method and tool development
  - Solicit input from the licensee
- The licensee enters data
  - Data stored in the Idaho National Lab with controlled access
  - Data are proprietary to the licensee
- NRC can access the data and publish results
  - Solicit input from the licensee
  - No plant and individual identifications will be revealed
- The licensee is protected from regulatory action due to nonwillful violations identified under the MOU

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