Official Transcript of Proceedings

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Title: 10 CFR 2.206 Petition RE St. Lucie

Docket Number: (n/a)

Location: (teleconference)

Date: Thursday, July 7, 2011

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| 1 | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA |
| 2 | NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION |
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| 4 | 10 CFR 2.206 PETITION REVIEW BOARD (PRB) |
| 5 | CONFERENCE CALL |
| 6 | RE |
| 7 | ST. LUCIE PLANT |
| 8 | + + + + |
| 9 | THURSDAY |
| 10 | JULY 7, 2011 |
| 11 | + + + + |
| 12 | The conference call was held, Sam Lee |
| 13 | Chairperson of the Petition Review Board, presiding. |
| 14 | |
| 15 | PETITIONER: THOMAS SAPORITO |
| 16 | |
| 17 | PETITION REVIEW BOARD MEMBERS |
| 18 | SAMSON LEE, Deputy Division Director, Division of Risk |
| 19 | Assessment, NRR |
| 20 | MARILEE BANIC, PRB Coordinator, NRR |
| 21 | TRACY ORF, Project Manager for St. Lucie Plant, NRR |
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| 25 | NRC HEADQUARTERS STAFF |
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|----|--|---|
| 1 | DOUG BROADDUS, Branch Chief, NRR | |
| 2 | GERALD PURCIARELLO, Balance-of-Plant Branch, NRR | |
| 3 | DAN RICH, Branch Chief | |
| 4 | STEVEN ROSE, Senior Project Engineer | |
| 5 | MARCIA SIMON, Office of General Counsel | |
| 6 | | |
| 7 | ON BEHALF OF THE LICENSEE | |
| 8 | STEVEN HAMRICK, Florida Power and Light | |
| 9 | ERIC KATZMAN, Florida Power and Light | |
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PROCEEDINGS

2:30 p.m.

MR. ORF: I would like to thank everybody for attending this meeting. My name is Tracy Orf, and I'm the St. Lucie Project Manager. We are here today to allow the petitioner, Thomas Saporito, to address the Petition Review Board regarding the 10 CFR 2.206 petition dated May 12, 2011. I am the Petition Manager for the petition, and the Petition Review Board Chairman is Sam Lee.

As part of the Petition Review Board's, or PRB's review of this petition, Thomas Saporito has requested this opportunity to address the PRB. This meeting is scheduled from 2:30 to 3:30 p.m. Eastern Time. The meeting is being recorded by the NRC Operations Center, and will be transcribed by a court reporter. The transcript will become a supplement to the petition. The transcript will also be made publicly available.

I'd like to open this meeting with introductions, and as we go around the room, please be sure to clearly state your name, your position, and the office that you work for within the NRC for the record. I'll start it off; my name is Tracy Orf, I'm the Project Manager for St. Lucie in the Office of

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| 1 | Nuclear Reactor Regulations. |
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| 2 | MR. PURCIARELLO: Jerry Purciarello, in |
| 3 | the Balance-of-Plant Branch in NRR. |
| 4 | MS. SIMON: Marcia Simon, from the Office |
| 5 | of General Counsel. |
| 6 | MR. LEE: Samsom Lee, I'm the Deputy |
| 7 | Division Director, Division of Risk Assessment, NRR. |
| 8 | MS. BANIC: Lee Banic, back up Petition |
| 9 | Coordinator, NRR. |
| 10 | MR. BROADDUS: Doug Broaddus, Branch Chief |
| 11 | in NRR. |
| 12 | MR. ORF: Okay, we've completed |
| 13 | introductions at the NRC Headquarters. At this time, |
| 14 | are there any NRC participants from Headquarters on |
| 15 | the phone? Are there any NRC participants from the |
| 16 | Regional Office on the phone? |
| 17 | MR. ROSE: Yes, this is Steven Rose, I'm |
| 18 | the Senior Project Engineer for the Southern Nuclear |
| 19 | Company sites, and I was the Lead Inspector for the |
| 20 | Component Design Basis Inspection at St. Lucie. |
| 21 | MR. RICH: And I'm Dan Rich, Branch Chief |
| 22 | for the Florida sites. |
| 23 | MR. ORF: Are there any representatives |
| 24 | for the licensee on the phone? |
| 25 | MR. HAMRICK: Yes, this is Steven Hamrick |

with Florida Power and Light.

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MR. KATZMAN: And this is Eric Katzman from Florida Power and Light.

MR. ORF: Okay. Mr. Saporito, would you please introduce yourself for the record?

MR. SAPORITO: Yes, my name is Thomas Saporito, I'm the Senior Consulting Associates with Saprodani Associates in Jupiter, Florida; I'm the petitioner in this proceeding.

Okay, it is not required for MR. ORF: members of the public to introduce themselves for this call; however, if there are any members of the public on the phone who wish to do so at this time, please state your name for the record. I'd like to emphasize that we each need to speak clearly and loudly to ensure the court reporter can accurately transcribe If you do have something that you would this meeting. like to say, please first state your name for the record. For those dialing into the meeting, please remember to phones minimize mute your to background noise or distractions. If you do not have a mute button, this can be done by pressing the keys To un-mute, press the star, six keys star, six. Thank you. At this time, I'll turn it over to aqain. the PRB Chairman, Samson Lee.

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MR. LEE: Good afternoon. Welcome to this teleconference, regarding the 2.206 petition submitted by Mr. Saporito. I would like to first share some background on our process. Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations describes the petition process--the primary mechanism for the public to request enforcement actions by the NRC in a public This process permits anyone to petition NRC enforcement-type action related to licensees or licensed activities. Depending on the results of its evaluation, NRC could modify, suspend or revoke an NRC-issued license or take any other appropriate enforcement action to resolve a problem. The NRC staff's quidance for the disposition of 2.206 petition requests is in Management Directive 8.11, which is publicly available.

The purpose of today's teleconference is to give the petitioner an opportunity to provide any additional explanation or support for the petition Petition Board's before the Review initial consideration and recommendation. This teleconference is not a hearing, nor is it an opportunity for the petitioner to question or examine the PRB on the merits the issues presented in the petition orNo decisions regarding the merits of this request.

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petition will be made at this teleconference. Following this teleconference, the Petition Review Board will conduct its initial deliberations. The outcome of this internal meeting will be discussed with the petitioner.

Petition Review Board typically consists of a Chairman, usually a manager at the senior executive service level at NRC. It has a Petition Manager and a PRB Coordinator. Other members of the Board are determined by the NRC staff based on information in the the content of the petition At this time, I would like to introduce the Petition Review Board. I'm Sam Lee, the Petition Review Board Chairman. Tracy Orf is the Petition Manager for the petition under discussion today. Banic is filling in as the office PRB Coordinator, and our technical staff includes Jerry Purciarello from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation's Balance-of-Plant Branch; Steven Rose from NRC's Region ΙI Division of Reactor Projects.

As described in our process, the NRC staff may ask clarifying questions in order to better understand the petitioner's presentation and to reach a reasoned decision whether to accept or reject the petitioner's request for review under the 2.206

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process. I would like to summarize the scope of the petition under consideration, and the NRC activities to date.

On May 12, 2011, Mr. Saporito submitted to the NRC a petition under 2.206 regarding the St. Lucie Plant. In this petition request, Mr. Saporito's area of concern was with the design of the component cooling water system at St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2. Mr. Saporito requests that the NRC suspend or revoke the NRC licenses granted to the licensee for operation of the St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2; issue a notice of violation with a proposed civil penalty against the licensee; and order the immediate shutdown of St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2.

Please allow me to discuss the **NRC** activities to date. On May 25, the Petition Manager contacted you to discuss the 10 CFR 2.206 process and to offer the opportunity to address the PRB by phone or in person. You requested to address the PRB by phone prior to its internal meeting to make initial recommendation to accept or reject the petition for review. Because you requested the immediate shutdown of the St. Lucie plant, the PRB met on June 2 to discuss those actions to determine if immediate actions were required. The PRB denied the

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request for immediate action because there was no immediate safety concerns to the plant and to the health and safety of the public. The Petition Manager informed you of this decision on June 8.

As a reminder for the phone participants, please identify yourself if you make any remarks, as this will help us in the preparation of the meeting transcript that will be made publicly available. Thank you. Mr. Saporito, I will turn it over to you now to allow you to provide what you believe the PRB should consider as part of this petition.

MR. SAPORITO: All right. Thank you, Chairman, and good afternoon to everyone. Again, my is Thomas Saporito, I'm a Senior Consulting name Associate with Saprodani Associates in Jupiter, Florida, and we're the petitioner in this proceeding saprodanimaintain a website at and we associates.com; there's a hyphen between those two words. Before I get into the substance of these today, I would like to first correct this The NRC has several times public record. afternoon stated on this record that the petition filed in this matter was dated May 12, 2011. of the matter is the petition was filed on April 3, So let the record be corrected in that respect; 2011.

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that brings a concern to me of exactly which documents the NRC Petition Review Board has reviewed in these circumstances, in the fact that they have the wrong dated document.

Anyway, continuing on, I have several years' experience working in the nuclear industry, and I've been following the actions of the NRC over the better part of 22 years; in fact, I was actually an employee of the Florida Power and Light Company, St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. I worked with both units, but I was actively involved in the start up on Unit 2. So I am pretty familiar with the overall plant and its operation.

Alright. April 3, 2011, So, on enforcement petition was filed with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, or NRC, requesting that the Agency take escalated enforcement action against the Florida Power and Light Company, or FP&L, St. Lucie Nuclear Plant, in connection with a very serious safety violation that occurred at the nuclear plant, resulting in a notice of violation and a yellow finding by the NRC against FPL on April 19, 2010. yellow finding by the NRC identified an issue with substantial safety significance which will require additional NRC inspections, and was determined to have

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a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance.

October Specifically, in 2008, intrusion from the containment instrument air system to the component cooling water system occurred, which affected both redundant trains of the component The troubleshooting cooling water system. and subsequent corrective actions that were implemented by the licensee failed to identify the source of the air in-leakage, and ensure that the component cooling water system maintained--excuse me--remained capable of delivering adequate cooling to essential equipment mitigate design basis accidents used to contributed to a similar air intrusion event into the component cooling water system in November 2009. The references NRC EA-09-321--it's petitioner an enforcement action -- for the record.

On November 3, 2010, the NRC issued a letter to Florida Power and Light Company's Executive Vice President, Mano Nazar, M-A-N-O, N as in Nancy, Awhich stated in relevant part Z-A-R, that 2010, United September 30, the States Nuclear Regulatory Commission's staff completed a supplemental inspection at your St. Lucie Nuclear Plant, Unit 1. The objectives of the supplemental inspection were to

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provide assurance that 1) the root causes and the contributing causes for the risk-significant issues were understood; 2) the extent of condition and extent cause of the issues were identified; and corrective actions were or will be sufficient to address and preclude repetition of the root contributing causes." The inspection also included an independent NRC review of the extent of condition and the Yellow finding, extent of cause, SO assessment of whether any safety culture component caused or significantly contributed to the issue.

Florida Power and Light Company's staff evaluation identified root causes of the issue to be: 1) decision-making by the organization was insufficient due to inadequate knowledge and skills related to risk-significant decisions, conservative timely communication assumptions, and between departments; and 2) the organization missed several opportunities to promptly identify, fully analyze and resolve in a timely manner the air intrusion event; and 3) inadequate fleet site procedures resulted in the failure to recognize the condition and significance of the event in a timely manner; and 4) management did not effectively implement policies and procedures, which reluctance resulted in а to

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challenge issues and recognize the significance of the 2008 event, and a repeat of the event in 2009; and 5) less than adequate design of the containment air compressor system resulted in recurrent air intrusion events; and 6) less than adequate maintenance resulted in a similar 2009 component cooling water system air intrusion event.

The NRC inspection team further determined FP&L's organization failed to recognize understand the significance of the 2008 gas intrusion event and its impact on the component cooling water system, and that there were inadequacies in operating, alarm response, maintenance, operability determination and corrective action procedures. Overall, the NRC inspectors determined that the components of safety culture at the St. Lucie nuclear plant contributed to the Yellow finding associated with the licensee's implement adequate corrective actions failure to associated with the 2008 component cooling water air intrusion event. Petitioners reference NRC's November 3, 2010 letter to FP&L Executive Vice President Mano Nazar in connection with EA-09-321 for the record.

Now before I continue with further discussion, let this public record reflect the following issues, which should be of grave concern to

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the NRC Office of the Inspector General. Issue number 1, what are the root causes and the contributing causes for the NRC's failure to timely require the licensee, FP&L, to affirmatively and definitively identify and resolve the 2008 air in-leak event associated with the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant component cooling water system in 2008, which resulted in a repetitive violation of NRC safety regulations for the issue in 2009? Issue number 2, verv same corrective actions will be sufficient to address and preclude repetition of the root cause and contributing causes of the NRC's failure, in these circumstances, and when will they be implemented to protect public health and safety?

Issue number 3, why did the NRC wait until April 19, 2010, to take any enforcement action against FPL and the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant for a serious nuclear safety violation that initially occurred in 2008? Next issue, what role, if any, did the NRC resident inspectors at the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant play to identify the air in-leak intrusion event in the licensee's corrective 2008, and to oversee actions, if any, at that time? And finally, why didn't the NRC inspect the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, for a similar design problem associated with

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its component cooling water systems?

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Considering that the NRC first issued an operating license for the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Unit 1 on March 1, 1976, it strains the mind of a reasonable person that the NRC continues to allow FP&L to operate their nuclear reactors at full power with so many broad-based failures in management, training, worker knowledge, failed plant procedures, system based flaws, inadequate safety design culture, repetitive serious violations for the very problem, et cetera.

It is reasonable to believe that after some 31 years of operating the St. Lucie Nuclear that FP&L management would have excellent station procedures and accurate station procedures, and seasoned managers who take personal responsibility for plant operations and an impeccable work safety culture, where all nuclear workers are free, and feel free, to raise nuclear safety concerns to anyone, and a corrective action program of sufficient use and prevent repetitive, serious design to safety violations of NRC requirements, and proper supervision of craft workers effecting repairs and conducting surveillance maintenance activities, and a viable training program, et cetera.

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Clearly, the record of evidence to date shows exactly the opposite at the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant, a nuclear plant that the NRC issued a 20-year license extension, allowing operation of the nuclear reactor until March 1, 2036. In consideration of these grave concerns in connection with the NRC's oversight and inspection activities and enforcement activities associated with the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant, the petitioner requests that a copy of the record transcripts be provided to the NRC Office of the Inspector General to enable that agency to make an informed decision as to whether the NRC should be investigated for improper activities in these circumstances, and whether public health and safety was at any time jeopardized in connection with licensed activities at the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant in connection with the events outlined in NRC EA-09-321, dated November 3, 2010.

With respect to the instant enforcement petition, the licensee apparently admitted to the NRC that when the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 was licensed, the facility was not required to incorporate a single failure design capability for a non-safety system. And FPL concluded that a violation of 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion 3 did not occur as

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found by NRC inspectors. Petitioners contend here that the licensee's admission supports a finding that the licensee is operating the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant well outside the NRC's nuclear safety regulations under 10 CFR, Part 50, and that the component cooling water system employed at the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 and Unit 2 is a nuclear safety-related system to the extent that it serves to remove heat from the in various modes reactor core manners and of operation.

Petitioner further contends that since the licensee admitted to the NRC that the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 was licensed by the NRC for operations not requiring the incorporation of a single failure design capability for the component cooling water system, that the licensee's NRC operational licenses for Unit 1 and Unit 2 are invalid, and that the NRC should order the licensee to immediately bring the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 and Unit 2 to a cold shut down mode of operation to protect public health and safety in these circumstances.

Petitioner further contends that the metal in the nuclear reactor vessels at the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 and Unit 2 have become dangerously brittle from bombardment of high-level

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neutron radiation during normal operations over years and years of operation, and that neither the licensee nor the NRC has any accurate and meaningful data measurements of just how brittle the nuclear reactor vessels have become at the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant. Petitioners are concerned that should one or both of the nuclear vessels at the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant crack or shatter, that a full core melt down would immediately occur, similar to the ongoing melt down of three nuclear reactors in Japan. Such an event at the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant would rapidly release abundant amount of hydrogen, which would inundate any action mitigation systems designed to dissipate such gaseous buildup, and that a dangerous explosion of the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant containment buildings would occur and spew high level nuclear particles directly the environment and adversely affect public into health and safety, just like what happened in Japan.

Petitioners further contend that the NRC improperly granted FP&L and the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 and Unit 2 a 20-year license extension under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and its relevant subsections, where such authority to grant license extensions by the NRC was misinterpreted by the NRC, as the language contained in the Act was

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meant to deal with NRC licensed activities at medical facilities or at medical research facilities, and not at commercial nuclear reactors, such as those operating at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant.

For these reasons, Petitioner supplements the Original Petition filed in the instant action to request that the NRC order FP&L and the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant to immediately, or within a reasonably short period of time, bring the Unit 1 and Unit 2 cold nuclear reactors а shut down mode to operation, until such time as the licensee can have the Unit 1 and Unit 2 nuclear reactor vessel metal tested to determine exactly how brittle the metal has become, and to determine how many years, if any, that the nuclear reactors can be safely operated.

the extent that the Petitioner engaging United States Nuclear Regulatory the Commission Petition Review Board with respect issues initially brought up on April 3, 2011 in a Executive petition to the Director Operations for the NRC, all the comments made today on this public record are to be considered and to be construed and to be implemented as a supplement to the Original Petition dated April 3, 2011, just the same as if they were placed in writing and submitted to the

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NRC along with the initial petition.

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With respect to the previously stated instant concerns encompassed in the petition, Petitioner states that, in general, the major secondary systems of a pressurized water reactor are the main steam system and the condensate feed water system. Since the primary and secondary systems are physically separated from each other by the steam generator tubes, the secondary system should contain little or no radioactive material. During normal operation at the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant, the heat produced by the fission process is removed by the reactor coolants, and transferred to the secondary The coolant in the steam generators. coolant is boiled into steam and sent to the main turbine.

Even after the nuclear reactor has been brought to a cold shut down mode of operation, there is a significant amount of heat produced by the decay of fission products, which is called decay heat. amount of heat produced by decay heat is sufficient to cause fuel damage if not removed. Thus, nuclear and safety related systems must be designed and installed in the plant to remove the decay heat from the nuclear transfer the reactor and that heat to core,

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environment. The very same concerns for decay heat removal are relevant when performing maintenance activities on a reactor coolant system component at the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant, where the temperature and pressure of the reactor coolant system must be reduced low enough to allow personnel access to the equipment.

The auxiliary feed water system and the steam dump system or turbine bypass valves work together to allow the plant operators at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant to remove the decay heat from the nuclear reactor. The auxiliary feed water system pumps water from the condensate storage tank to the steam generators, where the water boils to make steam. The steam can then be dumped to the main condenser though the steam dump's valves. The circulating water will condense then the steam--excuse me--the circulating water will then condense the steam and take the heat to the environment. If the steam dump system is not available, the steam can be directly to the atmosphere through the atmospheric release valves. By using either method, the heat is being removed from the nuclear reactor coolant system, and the temperature of the reactor coolant system can be reduced to the desired level.

At some point, the decay heat being

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produced will not be sufficient to generate enough steam in the steam generators to continue the cool When the reactor coolant system pressure and temperature have been reduced to within the operational limits, the residual heat removal system, or RHR, will be used to continue the cool down by removing heat from the core and transferring it to the environment. This is accomplished by routing some of the reactor coolant through the residual heat removal heat exchanger, which is cooled system component cooling water system, or CCW.

The heat removed by the component cooling water system is then transferred to the service water system in the component cooling water heat exchanger. The heat picked up by the service water system will be transferred directly to the environment from the service water system. The residual heat removal system can be used to cool the plant down to a low enough temperature that personnel can perform any maintenance activities and refueling activities.

For the reasons stated, it is abundantly clear that the component cooling water system at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant serves to remove heat from the nuclear reactor core, and is therefore a nuclear safety-related system. Thus, to the extent

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that the component cooling water system at the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant is a nuclear safety-related system, the operating licenses issued by the NRC to Florida Power and Light Company and the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant are required to incorporate a single failure design capability for the component cooling water system at Unit 1 and at Unit 2.

the extent that the licensee has To apparently admitted to the NRC that the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Unit 1 was licensed by the NRC, not requiring the incorporation of a single failure design capability for the component cooling water system, the NRC must find that the licensee's operation of the St. Lucie nuclear reactors at the Plant is in violation of NRC federal safety regulations, standards and requirements under 10 CFR Part 50, and issue a confirmatory order requiring the licensee to bring the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Unit 1 and Unit 2 to a cold shut down mode of operation to protect public health and safety in these circumstances.

Petitioners further request that the NRC issue a notice of violation and a civil penalty in a monetary amount of \$500,000 to insure for the protection of public health and safety by emphasizing the severity of the licensee's violation and need for

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prompt remedial corrective action, and long-lasting corrective action to prevent a repetitive violation with respect to the component cooling water system.

As everyone at this meeting is surely aware, there are currently three nuclear reactors in a full melt down scenario in the country of Japan, where the containment buildings have exploded and various levels of nuclear radiation and radioactive particles have spewed into the environment, and continue to spew into the environment, where the reactor fuel--fuel inside the reactor core has melted through the containing pipes, the fuel assemblies, through the the reactor vessel, bottom of and through containment structure itself into the environment, contaminating drinking water in the country of Japan, and spreading the contamination by air, land and sea throughout the world.

There's been radioactive iodine-131 monitored here in various states within the continental United States, and bу some accounts, there is actual radioactive contamination on food products. The events in Japan cannot understated, and it is doubtful that the government and the plant operator will ever gain control of those nuclear reactor vessels to bring them to a cold shut

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down mode of operation, and I fear that the situation was out of control within hours of the earthquake and tsunami, and that it continues to be completely out of control, and the severity of that accident is only going to grow and become greater, and harm more and more people, not only in the country of Japan, but around the United States.

Here, in our country, we have 104 nuclear reactors that are licensed for operation by the United States NRC, and are operating in this country. those reactors are at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power A recent media release by Associated Press, it spoke very broad, encompassing and pervasive terms about how the NRC as a regulator is failing to protect public health and safety over the years concerning the commercial operation of these nuclear reactors. And I won't go into any length of discussing that report, because it's a matter of public record. The video part of that is posted on our website if anyone wants to view it. But it shows time and time again that the NRC has relaxed their safety margins, their safety requirements and their safety standards to allow these nuclear reactors to continue in operation.

And my concern here is that the NRC over the years and over the life span of the two nuclear

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reactors operating at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, that the NRC has relaxed its safety margins with respect to the degree of embrittlement that those nuclear reactor vessels are allowed to have and continue to operate. So what was once a safety standard early on when the reactors were licensed by the NRC, it is my belief and understanding, and fully supported by the Associated Press investigative findings, that the NRC over the years has relaxed those safety requirements with respect embrittlement of the reactor vessels, and that those reactor vessels are dangerously brittle and could shatter, and if that event occurred, that would be a LOCA, what's called a loss of coolant accident.

There is no way to recover from that accident, and I don't care how many fire trucks you back up to the St. Lucie Plant; I don't care how much sea water you dump in there; those reactors are going to melt down because the water is not going to be cooling the core of that reactor; that fuel will melt immediately and the containment buildings will explode because it'll be such huge amount of hydrogen released from the heat generated in that melt down, they will explode. And the public will be harmed exactly the same way as the public in Japan is being harmed from

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those three reactors that are still melting down and still spewing high level radiation in the environment.

The public has no alternative but to turn to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in this country to bring these issues to light, to get them resolved, and to insure for public protection from a nuclear disaster comparable to what's going on in Japan. the public have no other agency to turn to. that--Congress in 1974, through the Energy Organization Act, the NRC is responsible; in fact, it is their mandate to protect public health and safety in the environment with respect to commercial nuclear plant operations and with respect to medical radiation usage also.

So that's why we're here today. That's why myself, as a member of the public, filed an enforcement petition under NRC's own regulations, to get the attention of the NRC that there's something very, very wrong going on at the Florida Power and Light Nuclear Power Plant. And apparently, the NRC has some very experienced and very qualified people who went in on these special inspection teams and made the determinations that they did in their enforcement documents. But that's not enough. You know, the public should have had the benefit of those inspection

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findings back in 2008, and the corrective actions should have been taken then.

When I worked at the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant years ago, believe me, it was very professional attitude, high-quality managers there, high-quality technicians; I was an instrument control technician; I even went to Reactor Operator School for a short time there. And we had station procedures to work with to do our maintenance activities, to do our surveillance testing, to do refueling outage activities and the like, and to operate the power And with the skill level of the instrument plant. control people and the maintenance electricians and other craft in the plant, the mechanics and such, was such a high level that we weren't required by the NRC what's called verbatim compliance have procedures, meaning if you had a procedure that had 20 steps in it, you had to go from step one, step two, step three, all the way down, verbatim, word for word, you had to accomplish what that written procedure said on whatever maintenance activity you were working on.

And we didn't have to do that because the NRC was so confident in our capabilities and our work attitude, and the management at the time, that we operated the plant in a safe manner. But since, over

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the years, that--I am just shocked in my monitoring of the inspection reports coming from the NRC, and how the physical plant operations have degraded over the years. I mean, they have degraded pervasively across the board. You have poor management there, poor management oversight of licensed activities at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. You have a very poor safety-conscious work environment.

NRC--I read the investigative the findings by the NRC, and they said oh you know, we talked to these number of people, and we asked them these questions, and from our interviews, you know, we feel that people believe they can raise nuclear safety concerns without fear of retaliation. But that's a subjective investigation, and it didn't go quite far enough. You have to have your resident NRC inspectors monitoring that plant more thoroughly on a daily basis, and following up. You know, those inspectors that wrote these reports should have went to corrective action program to follow through a number of these instances where concerns were raised that had some aspect of nuclear safety, and see how they were How timely were they dealt with? dealt with. they dealt it, were some ignored, or is there a type of--and who raised backlog of these these

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concerns, and what happened to these employees after they raised these concerns?

There's none of that follow up. There was no inspection activities in those areas whatsoever. So, I've been complaining to the NRC for the better 20 some years; there's a hostile environment, a poor safety culture at the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant, and it's a Turkey Point nuclear power plant, which Florida Power and Light Company also operates. So over the years, the overall performance has degraded in that area also, and it's degraded in maintenance activities, where you have this intrusion event occur over two years ago, you know, and the NRC has just now in 2010 taken enforcement action, and even then, in the NRC's own inspection activity reports say what measures the licensee plans to take or will take, it doesn't mean--they haven't even any corrective actions yet. And why, after all these years of operation, is the NRC still finding that significant problems with there are licensee's station procedures, which are part of their technical specifications, which are encompassed in the plant's license within the final safety analysis review?

These are significant safety issues that

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have a very far reach, and could cause a very significant nuclear accident at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. And obviously, you have a training issue here, and you have a work force that isn't very technically competent, and management which don't properly oversee the work force. So you have to take a broad look at these nuclear power plants, the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant, and a broad look at the licensee, and we need--the public needs to have more enforcement action, more aggressive enforcement action.

A Yellow finding is great; but where's the civil penalty? How do you get the licensee's attention to change, to improve, to enhance and to correct, and then correct in a timely manner these serious safety violations? They were identified in 2008; no penalties, you know. We're just giving you this little write up, this little warning; go ahead and operate your nuclear reactors at full power nonetheless. So they did. FPL went right ahead, because they get million a \$1 day per reactor, approximately, for keeping those reactors on line.

And in 2009, same problem, same system, same violation, and it's a safety-related system which serves to mitigate a nuclear accident, like what happened in Japan. And the NRC takes no enforcement

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action in 2009; and it's only until 2010 before the NRC gets around to issuing a Yellow finding, but no enforcement. No monetary fine. So it's like me driving my car down Interstate 95 here and speeding, and the state trooper pulls me over, Mr. Saporito, you know you were doing 100 miles an hour, and the speed limit's 65. You know, I'm going to give you this written warning, and don't let me catch you doing it again. Do you think that's going to be a deterrent to me for speeding? Of course not. I'm going to speed again.

But if that state trooper would have said Mr. Saporito, you were doing 100 miles an hour, and the speed limits here are 65, I'm going to have to suspend your license and I'm going to have to give you a fine of \$350, and you have to go to court. what? That police officer got my attention. I've got to pay a \$300 fine; I have to go to court; my license is suspended; I've got to go ride a bike to get to work now. I'm not going to speed again. Well that's what the public wants the NRC to do. The public needs to see the NRC show some teeth when it takes enforcement action.

This Reactor Oversight Process is a sham, because it's a haphazard way of inspecting a nuclear

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power plant where you go in there on a quarterly basis only inspect certain systems and certain and this process, processes. Prior to there was systematic assessment of licensee performance, or the SALP program, and that's the program that was in force when I worked at the Florida Power and Light Company, the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant. And that was a very thorough inspection by the NRC. I've read those reports, and you can be confident that every system, operations, maintenance, procedures, health physics, everything was looked at. And the NRC made some very specific findings back then, and the NRC took enforcement action back then; they issued hundreds of thousands of dollars in fines.

But something happened. When that program ended, and the ROP program came into being, and the enforcement actions, it just went off the chart. There was no more enforcement actions. It went off the radar, so to speak. Then, the NRC through a change of politics in Washington, the new President was elected, and Chairman Greg Jaczko got appointed there as the Chairman, and his position is that you know, well, we're just going to increase inspection activities if we find a violation. That's not going to serve the purpose; it's not going to protect public

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health and safety; the NRC needs to wake up and start issuing heavy monetary fines.

Just recently, the NRC issued a Red finding for the Browns Ferry Plant; it was an improper situation there where a valve wasn't working properly, and the licensee should have picked it up on their surveillance buzzers, and they didn't, and they denied the violations, fought kicking and screaming at the enforcement conference there should be no penalty whatsoever. And it's just outrageous. But then--so there's a Red finding, but there was no monetary fine assessed against the licensee.

So while it's fine and dandy they got a Red finding, because that's the highest level there is, there has to be a fine attached to that to get their attention, and it has to be six or seven figures. In that situation, there should have been a suspension of the license also. You want to get their attention, escalate an enforcement action. And that's why I'm here today. That's why I'm asking for escalated enforcement actions. We're talking about Florida Power and Light Company, repetitive violations, same violation occurred over more than one year, a couple of years. And they admit they have problems in management, they have problems with their

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procedures. They have a design problem with the system itself. There's a problem with the work culture out there, there's a problem with training and the maintenance activities that are going on out there.

obviously a problem with performance of the NRC's site resident inspectors. mean, my goodness, what are these people doing out there? Are they grabbing a cup of coffee and shooting the breeze with the operators in the control room every day? Is that the extent of their activities? Aren't they going around with a note pad, taking system notes, looking at line ups, looking equipment operations, watching maintenance workers as they perform surveillance testing, monitoring activities during refueling outages. You know, where is all of their reports?

You if know, Ι was regional administrator Region II, and I understand there's a new fellow there, Mr. McCree, and thank God that they replaced the old fellow, and hopefully this new fellow will take more aggressive enforcement action, but should be demanding that McCree all resident inspectors under his authority under Region II--

MR. ORF: Excuse me--

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MR. SAPORITO: --provide him a written response of what the hell they're doing every--

MR. ORF: Mr. Saporito?

MR. SAPORITO: Yes sir?

MR. ORF: We're coming up on 3:30 if you'd like to start summarizing.

MR. SAPORITO: Well okay, that's fine. I'll just summarize in saying that we want enforcement action from the NRC with respect to the license activities that are going on at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, where the licensee has, on more than one occasion, been found to have violated NRC federal safety standards and regulations under 10 CFR Part 50. And we believe that the NRC's conduct in circumstances is outrageous and cannot be corrected in the manner which will preserve protect public health and safety if these nuclear reactors are allowed to continue operation at full power, and that the NRC should order their immediate shut down so the licensee can take the corrective actions needed on the broad spectrum of problems that have been identified by the Agency, and so those reactor vessels can be properly tested to see how brittle they are. And at this time, I'll stay on the answer any questions from the NRC, line to the

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licensee, or the public who may be attending this 2 conference. MR. ORF: Thank you, Mr. Saporito. MR. LEE: At this point, does the staff headquarters have any questions for Mr. here 6 Saporito? How about the Region? MR. ROSE: No questions from the Region. 8 MR. LEE: Does the licensee have any 9 questions? 10 MR. HAMRICK: No. 11 MR. LEE: Mr. Saporito, thank you for 12 taking time to provide the NRC staff with clarifying information on the petition you have submitted. 13 Before close, does the 14 court reporter teleconference 15 additional information for the transcript? 16 Mr. Chair, this is Mr. 17 MR. SAPORITO: Saporito, I'm sorry to interrupt, but I would ask if 18 19 you would please ask if there are any members of the public who might want to ask a question. 20 21 Okay, thank you for reminder. MR. LEE: Before I conclude the teleconference, members of the 22 23 public may provide comments regarding the petition and ask questions about the 2.206 petition process. 24 25 However, as stated at the opening, the purpose of this

teleconference is not to provide an opportunity for the petitioner or the public to question or examine the PRB regarding the merits of the petition request. Is there any member of public that wants to ask a question or make a comment? Okay, I think that's a no. So with that, this teleconference is concluded, and we will be terminating the telephone connection. Thank you.

(The telephone conference was concluded at $3:26 \ p.m.$)

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