UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257

June 13, 2011

Mr. R. M. Krich
Vice President, Nuclear Licensing
Tennessee Valley Authority
1101 Market Street, LP 3R-C
Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801

SUBJECT: PUBLIC MEETING SUMMARY – CATEGORY 1 PUBLIC MEETING, BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT, DOCKET NOS. 50-259, 50-260 AND 50-296

Dear Mr. Krich:

This refers to the meeting conducted at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant on May 31, 2011 at 1:00 p.m. (CDT). The meeting's purpose was to present the annual assessment of the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant performance and to provide opportunities to discuss with the public the NRC Reactor Oversight Process. Enclosed are a list of attendees, responses to some of the questions received by the NRC staff at the meeting, and the presentation handouts.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Should you have any questions concerning this meeting, please contact me at (404) 997-4662.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Eugene F. Guthrie, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 6
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos.: 50-259, 50-260, 50-296
License Nos.: DPR-33, DPR-52, DPR-68

Enclosures:
1. Attendee List
2. NRC Response to Questions
3. Handouts

cc w/encl.: (See page 2)

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X PUBLICLY AVAILABLE ☐ NON-PUBLICLY AVAILABLE ☐ SENSITIVE X NON-SENSITIVE
ADAMS: ☐ Yes ACCESSION NUMBER: ML111640463 ☐ SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE

OFFICE	RII:DRP	RII:DRP					
SIGNATURE	JDH /RA/	EFG /RA/					
NAME	JHamman	EGuthrie					
DATE	06/13/2011	06/13/2011					
E-MAIL COPY?	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DRPII\RPB6\BROWNS FERRY\MEETINGS\BROWNS FERRY 2010 EOC MTG SUMMARY.DOCX

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Letter to R. M. Krich from Eugene Guthrie dated June 13, 2011

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Distribution w/encl:
C. Evans, RII
L. Douglas, RII
OE Mail
RIDSNRRDIRS
PUBLIC
RidsNrrPMBrownsFerry Resource

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257

BROWNS FERRY ANNUAL ASSESSMENT MEETING
May 31, 2011

NAME	TITLE
Gerard J Doyle	ASST SR VP - BFN
CHARLIE STANCIL	NRC - RESIDENT INSPECTOR
JAMES EMENS	TVA - BFN SITE LIC MGR
Thomas Matthews	TVA - Corporate Licensing Manager - Browns Ferry
Scott Vance	TVA OGC
B. Michael Brown	WD Associates
Craig Oxford	WD Associates
GARY MORGAN	BREDL/BEST/MATR
Stewart Hoon	Concerned Citizen
GRETEL JOHNSTON	BREDL/BEST/MATER
KATHLEEN FERRIS	CITIZENS TO ENDIT
Mike Lee	NUCOR
CHRIS LOCKE	NUCOR
Brian Avery	Nucor
[illegible]	
Frank Marano	
DOUG RHODES	BRADFORD HEALTH SERVICES
[illegible]	Pulaski Electric System
[illegible]	FAYETTEVILLE PUBLIC UTILITIES
Phillip C. Niebaum	NRC
Teresa Ashworth	TVA
Walter Haynes	TVA
Vicki Baker	NAI Chase Commercial
JEFF MORRIS	SITE TRAINING DIRECTOR
Lance Brown	PACE

Enclosure 1

No.	Name	Organization
	Bill Thomison	Morgan Co EMA
	JEFF WOOD	Sen. Sessions Office
	JACK W SIMMONS	TENNESSEE VALLEY PUBLIC POWER ASSOCIATION
	Thomas Evans	MM&-BFN
	Art McCall	TVA BFN OPS
	Bonnie Marks	City of Athens
	Gary Scroggins	Athens Utilities
	Jackie Posey	Shoals Econ. Alliance
	DAVID MALINOWSKI	TVA
	Adam Smith	News-Courier
	Deanna Hart	
	Doug G McFadden	TEC

NRC Response to Questions Received During the Public Meeting on May 31, 2011

1. What is the design basis tornado that BFN was designed to withstand?

   Response – The Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant is designed to withstand the effects of a tornado that produces 300 mile per hour winds. In addition to wind effects on structures, the plant is also evaluated to withstand missiles generated from the tornado, such as:

   - A 2-inch x 4-inch x 12-foot board of considerable weight, end on.
   - A cross-tie, 7 inches x 9 inches x 8-1/2 feet of considerable weight, end on.
   - A compact car weighing 1800 pounds with a large impact area.
   - Pieces of concrete 6-1/2 inches x 12 inches x 2 inches thick, end on.

   Each missile is assumed to be traveling 300 mph at impact.

2. What if a tornado sucked water out of a cooling pool or flung radioactive fuel rods into our neighborhoods?" Is this tested, analyzed or evaluated in some way?

   Response – Fuel rods that have been removed from the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant reactor are stored in spent fuel pools that are built into the plant structure. The structure around the pool is designed to withstand seismic events and high winds from tornados. The water in the pool is greater than 20 feet deep, in order to provide shielding and cooling to the spent fuel. Part of the reactor building structure provides blowout panels used to equalize pressure between the refueling room and the atmosphere. Equalizing pressure, along with the depth of the pool, and the length and weight of the fuel rods, ensures that the fuel will remain in the pool during a tornado. Some damage may occur to the building peripheral structures; however, the integrity of the fuel pool is designed to be maintained. Additionally, water can be added to the spent fuel pools through several redundant means, including the normal supply from the condensate storage system, and backup supply from the emergency equipment cooling water system and manual fire hose connections. The spent fuel pools are analyzed in the plant's Final Safety Analysis Report and fuel pool operation is monitored via routine plant inspections by the NRC resident inspectors.

3. What would happen if a commercial plane flew into the reactor building sheet metal roof that encloses the SFPs?

   Response - After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC first issued Advisories and then Orders that required nuclear power plant licensees to provide specific enhanced capabilities to respond to a terrorist attack. The NRC then began an accelerated security and engineering review based on the September 11 events. The review looked at what could possibly happen if terrorists used an aircraft to attack a nuclear power plant. Additionally, NRC reviews assessed the potential consequences of other types of terrorist attacks. The NRC analyzed what might happen as a result of such attacks and what other factors might affect the possibility or magnitude of a radiation release.

As part of this security review, the NRC conducted detailed engineering studies of a number of nuclear power plants. These studies assessed the capabilities of these plants to withstand deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft. The NRC studies included national experts from Department of Energy laboratories, who used state-of-the-art experiments, structural analyses, and fire analyses. The studies at the specific facilities confirmed that the plants are robust. In addition, the studies found that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to a terrorist attack, there would be time to implement the required offsite planning strategies already in place to protect public health and safety.

In a series of three phases (namely, Phase 1, Phase 2, and Phase 3), the NRC and the nuclear industry have analyzed the ability of nuclear power plants to withstand damage to or loss of large areas of the plant. This damage may be caused by a range of deliberate attacks that result in large fires and explosions (e.g. aircraft crash).

Congress asked the National Academy of Science (NAS) to independently assess the nation's nuclear power plant spent fuel pools' vulnerability to an aircraft attack. The NRC worked with the NAS to develop a public version of the report. The NRC believes this is very important. The NRC is giving the results and recommendations of the study serious consideration and is continuing to work with the NAS on this subject. In March 2005, the NRC provided Congress with a report on actions the NRC has taken to ensure the safety and security of spent nuclear fuel storage. The report also responds to the recommendations contained in the NAS study. The NRC's Phase 1 and Phase 2 efforts address a number of issues raised by the NAS study. This report is available at the following link: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/congress-docs/correspondence/2005/domenici-03142005.pdf

The NRC ordered nuclear power plant licensees to develop specific plans and strategies to respond to a wide range of events, including the impact of an aircraft. Licensees have taken actions as a result of the NRC Advisories and Orders to mitigate the effects of a September 11-type aircraft attack. The NRC considers the list of specific actions taken to be information that potentially would benefit terrorists if released publically. More information on this subject is available for public review, and can be found at the following link: http://www.nrc.gov/security/faq-security-assess-nuc-pwr-plants.html#2

4. What are the specific emergency plans/evacuation routes for residents in the Emergency Planning Zones (EPZ) surrounding BFN?

   Response – Federal regulations require that primary evacuation routes within a ten mile radius of an NRC licensed nuclear reactor be identified, and made known to the general public. These routes, for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Station, have been identified for planning purposes and are explicitly specified in the State and local government Radiological Emergency Response Plans, which have been approved by the U. S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency. Evacuation information is available on line at the following link: http://www.tva.gov/power/nuclear/pdf/bfn_2011_emergencyinfo.pdf

U.S.NRC
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Protecting People and the Environment

Browns Ferry Nuclear Annual Performance Assessment Meeting

Assessment Period 2010

Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region II

Athens, AL

May 31, 2011

Enclosure 3

Agenda

- Introduction
- Overview of NRC Mission
- Review of Reactor Oversight Process
- National Summary of Plant Performance
- Discussion of Plant Performance Results
- TVA Comment
- NRC Closing Remarks
- NRC available to address public questions

Region II Organization



Protecting People and the Environment

Our Mission



- License and regulate:
  - Civilian Reactors
  - Radioactive Materials (e.g. medical and industrial)
  - Byproducts
- Protect public health and safety
- Promote the common defense and security
- Protect the environment

What NRC Regulates

- Nuclear reactors - commercial power reactors, research and test reactors, new reactor designs
- Nuclear materials - nuclear reactor fuel, radioactive materials for medical, industrial, and academic use
- Nuclear waste – transportation, storage and disposal of nuclear material and waste, decommissioning of nuclear facilities
- Nuclear security – physical security of nuclear facilities and materials from sabotage or attacks

What We Do – Nuclear Waste



NRC regulates:

- Storage of spent reactor fuel in fuel pools or dry storage casks
- National spent fuel storage sites and reprocessing facilities

Protecting People and the Environment

What We Do – Nuclear Security

NRC Requires:

- Well-armed and well-trained security forces,
- Surveillance and perimeter patrols,
- State-of-the-art site access equipment and controls,
- Physical barriers and detection zones, and
- Intrusion detection systems and alarm stations.

What NRC Doesn't Do

- Regulate nuclear weapons, military reactors, or space vehicle reactors
- Own or operate nuclear power plants
- Regulate some radioactive materials, such as X-rays and naturally occurring radon

How NRC Regulates

- Establish rules and regulations
- Issue licenses
- Provide oversight through inspection, enforcement, and evaluation of operational experience
- Conduct research to provide support for regulatory decisions
- Respond to events and emergencies

Some Nuclear Facts

- 104 nuclear power plants supply about 20 percent of the electricity in the U.S.

- Nuclear materials are used in medicine for diagnosis and cancer treatment

- Nuclear materials are widely used in industry, such as in density gauges, flow measurement devices, radiography devices, and irradiators

Protecting People and the Environment

NRC Performance Goals

- **Safety: Ensure adequate protection of public health and safety and protect the environment.**
- **Security: Ensure adequate protection in the secure use and management of radioactive materials.**

Protecting People and the Environment

Reactor Oversight Process



Protecting People and the Environment

Examples of Baseline Inspections

• Equipment Alignment	~80 hrs/yr
• Triennial Fire Protection	~250 hrs (every 3 yrs)
• Operator Response	~125 hrs/yr
• Emergency Preparedness	~80 hrs/yr
• Rad Release Controls	~110 hrs (every 2 yrs)
• Worker Radiation Protection	~95 hrs/yr
• Corrective Action Program	~250 hrs (every 2 yrs)
• Corrective Action Case Reviews	~60 hrs/yr
• Browns Ferry Total	~9000 hrs (2010)

Significance Threshold

Performance Indicators

Green: Only Baseline Inspection
White: Increases NRC oversight
Yellow: Increases NRC oversight
Red: Increases NRC oversight

Inspection Findings

Green: Very low safety issue
White: Low to moderate safety issue
Yellow: Substantial safety issue
Red: High safety issue

National Summary of Plant Performance

As of 5/31/2011

Licensee Response	93
Regulatory Response	6
Degraded Cornerstone	4
Multiple/Repetitive Deg. Cornerstone	1
Unacceptable	0
Total	104

Action Matrix Concept



Increasing Safety Significance

Increasing NRC Inspection Efforts

Increasing NRC/Licensee Management Involvement

Increasing Regulatory Actions

Protecting People and the Environment

Assessment Results - Units 1,2 & 3

- 1st, 2nd & 3rd Quarters within Degraded Cornerstone Column of the Action Matrix
  - One Yellow Violation in the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone
  - One White Violation in the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone
- 4th Quarter Unit 2 and 3
  - Follow-up inspection per IP 95002 was completed in October 2010
  - Assessment following closure of One Yellow Violation and one White Finding in the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone determined that performance returned to the Licensee Response Column as of November 2010.
- 4th Quarter Unit 1
  - Finding of Red risk significance identified on October 23, 2010
  - Assessment for a red finding is Multiple/Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone on the NRC Action Matrix
  - Supplemental Inspection is warranted

Operating Assessment for Browns Ferry

	Q4 2009	Q1 2010	Q2 2010	Q3 2010	Q4 2010	
Unit 1	Degraded Cornerstone	Degraded Cornerstone	Degraded Cornerstone	Degraded Cornerstone	Multiple Repetitive/ Degraded Cornerstone	
Finding	Yellow Violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R III.G.1 & III.G.2	Yellow Violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R III.G.1 & III.G.2	Yellow Violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R III.G.1 & III.G.2	Yellow Violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R III.G.1 & III.G.2	Low Pressure Coolant Injection Valve Failure	
Unit 2	Degraded Cornerstone	Degraded Cornerstone	Degraded Cornerstone	Degraded Cornerstone	Degraded Cornerstone	Licensee Response
Finding	Yellow Violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R III.G.1 & III.G.2	Yellow Violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R II.G.1 & III.G.2	Yellow Violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R III.G.1 & III.G.2	Yellow Violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R III.G.1 & III.G.2		
Unit 3	Degraded Cornerstone	Degraded Cornerstone	Degraded Cornerstone	Degraded Cornerstone	Degraded Cornerstone	Licensee Response
Finding	Yellow Violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R III.G.1 & III.G.2	Yellow Violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R III.G.1 & III.G.2	Yellow Violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R III.G.1 & III.G.2	Yellow Violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R III.G.1 & III.G.2		

Finding of Red Risk Significance

What Happened?

- Residual heat removal (RHR) system flow control valve failed
  - would not pass flow when the subsystem was attempted to be placed in service for core cooling at the beginning of a refueling outage on October 23, 2010
  - the flow control portion of the valve, called the disc, was found stuck in the seat of the valve
  - the disc had become separated from the stem and could no longer be controlled by the valve motor operator
- The residual heat removal system is primarily used for low pressure coolant injection during accident conditions and cooling while the reactor is shutdown

RHR Low Pressure Coolant Injection System Overview



Protecting People and the Environment

Flow Control Valve Cross Sectional View



Protecting People and the Environment

Finding of Red Significance

Why is it significant?

- Two residual heat removal system loops are normally available.
  - A failure of this specific valve would normally effect only one of the two loops
- Automatic valve functions were lost
  - including the ability of plant operators to manually use this loop of the subsystem
- TVA's fire mitigation strategy resulted in a significant increase in the core damage frequency
  - This strategy limits the availability of alternative sources of reactor coolant inventory makeup

Finding of Red Significance

Why is it significant?

- TVA failed to implement an In-Service Testing program in accordance with the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)
  - this precluded the timely identification that the RHR loop II subsystem was unable to fulfill its safety function
  - the NRC concluded that an adequate testing program would have identified this failure
- NRC characterized this finding as Red, a finding of high safety significance
  - thoroughly considered all available information when analyzing the risk significance

Finding of Red Significance

What happens next?

- Red significance will warrant further NRC inspection
  - Supplemental Inspection Procedure 95003, Supplemental Inspection For Repetitive Degraded Cornerstones, Multiple Degraded Cornerstones, Multiple Yellow Inputs Or One Red Input
- Most comprehensive, diagnostic supplemental inspection conducted
- Review of programs and processes not inspected as part of the baseline inspection program

Finding of Red Significance

- **Results aid the NRC in deciding whether additional regulatory actions are necessary**

- **Assessment of safety culture**
  - **Validation of TVA's root cause evaluation**
  - **Validation of TVA's third party safety culture assessment**

Safety Culture Assessment

- Safety Culture is assessed semi-annually at all licensee's
- Integrated into the ROP
  - Each finding documents related safety culture issues
- Three areas manifest themselves as root causes of performance problems (cross-cutting):
  - Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R)
  - Human Performance (HU)
  - Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE)

Safety Culture Assessment

- **Cross-Cutting Theme**
  - four or more findings are assigned the same cross-cutting aspect within the past 12 months
  - Only one aspect is required to have a theme in SCWE
- **Substantive Cross-Cutting Issue (SCCI)**
  - cross-cutting theme(s) in the cross-cutting areas exists
  - and the staff has concerns with the licensee's scope of efforts or progress in addressing the cross-cutting theme(s)

Safety Culture Assessment

Browns Ferry Performance in 2010

- **Two SCCIs currently open**
  1. **Problem Identification and Resolution (opened on March 3, 2010)**
     a. **Cross-cutting aspect of :**
     "thorough evaluation of identified problems"
  2. **Problem Identification and Resolution**
     a. **Cross-Cutting aspect of:**
     “appropriate and timely corrective actions”

Safety Culture Assessment

Detailed Information on Open SCCI #1

- **Problem Identification and Resolution** (opened on March 3, 2010)
  - Cross-cutting aspect of "thorough evaluation of identified problems“

- **Basis for SCCI remaining open:**
  - Cross-cutting theme was identified based on four Green inspection findings for the 2009 assessment period
  - Dec 2010, an inspection was performed to assess the progress in addressing the SCCI
  - TVA root cause actions have proven to be ineffective over the long term
  - history of unsustainable corrective actions to address weaknesses in the Problem Identification and Resolution area
  - not able to conclude whether actions will achieve sustainable and effective corrective actions.

Safety Culture Assessment

Detailed Information on Open SCCI #2

- **Problem Identification and Resolution**
  - Aspect of "appropriate and timely corrective actions"
- **Basis for opening SCCI:**
  - Cross-cutting theme identified for four Green inspection findings during the 2010 assessment period
  - Concern with the scope of effort and progress in addressing the cross-cutting theme
  - TVA identified and implemented a range of actions to address the cross-cutting theme
  - TVA actions had not yet proven effective in substantially mitigating the cross-cutting theme, even though a reasonable duration of time had passed
  - Unable to assess the effectiveness of the completed and open corrective actions due to the number of open corrective actions and the limited time since implementation of the completed corrective actions

Safety Culture Assessment

Browns Ferry Performance in 2010

- One Cross-Cutting Theme was not determined to be SCCI
  1. Human Performance
     a. cutting aspect of :
     "Human Performance & Error Prevention"

- SCWE Theme continued followup

Safety Culture Assessment

Detailed Information on Cross-Cutting Theme

- Cross-Cutting Theme Human Performance
  - Cross-cutting aspect of :

    "Human Performance & Error Prevention"
- SCCI was **not** opened
- Basis:
  - Theme established based on four Green findings for the 2010 assessment period
  - Did not have a concern with the scope of effort and progress in addressing the cross-cutting theme
  - TVA's common cause, root cause analysis implementing a range of actions to address the cross-cutting theme
  - Scope and content of actions were reasonable and a reasonable time had not passed to implement the corrective actions

Safety Culture Assessment

- **Cross-cutting theme in the area of Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE)**
  - **Based on Confirmatory Order for Office of Investigation report numbers 2-2006-025 and 2-2009-003 involving two instances of discrimination.**
  - **The NRC conducted follow up inspections in accordance with IP 92702, Follow up On Traditional Enforcement Actions Including Violations, Deviations, Confirmatory Action Letters, Confirmatory Orders, And Alternative Dispute Resolution Confirmatory Orders as necessary.**

Browns Ferry Nuclear Annual Performance Assessment Summary

- Overall performance for Unit 1
  - Multiple/Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone of the NRC's Action Matrix, beginning the 4th Qtr CY 2010
- Overall performance for Units 2 and 3
  - Licensee Response Column of the NRC's Action Matrix for Units 2 and 3

TVA Comments

- TVA Management Comments

Protecting People and the Environment

Fukushima – NRC Response

NRC Response to Fukushima Event

- Direct technical support to the Japanese
- Additional inspection of US reactors
- Comprehensive NRC review of the event (Task Force)

- NRC Fukushima FAQ's: http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1110/ML11103A063.pdf

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  - Read NRC testimony, speeches, press releases, and policy decisions; and
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- Report an emergency
  - (301) 816-5100 (call collect)
- Report a safety concern
  - (800) 695-7403
  - Allegation@nrc.gov
- General information or questions
  - www.nrc.gov
  - Select “What We Do” for Public Affairs

NRC Representatives

- Victor McCree, RII, Regional Administrator
- Eugene Guthrie, Branch Chief, PB-6
- Thierry Ross, Senior Resident Inspector
- Charles Stancil, Resident Inspector
- Phillip Niebaum, Resident Inspector
- Lundy Pressley, Resident Inspector
- Joey Ledford, Public Affairs Officer
  (404) 997-4417

Reference Sources

- **Reactor Oversight Process**
  http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/index.html

- **Public Electronic Reading Room**
  http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm.html

- **Public Document Room**
  1-800-397-4209 (Toll Free)