




## Fuel Cycle Oversight Enhancements



# Draft Enhanced FCOP



Yellow blocks indicate new elements that might be present in the revised fuel cycle oversight process  
**Bolded text** in yellow blocks indicate current efforts to revise the fuel cycle oversight process

CAP = Corrective Action Program

Inspection finding = a non-compliance with NRC regulations or license conditions that is greater than minor  
 (see Section 2.3.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy for more information on minor violations)

Cross cutting areas = Human Performance, CAP, and Safety Conscious Work Environment

\* Placing the Severity Level IV violation in the CAP is not the only criterion to disposition it as a Non Cited Violation (NCV). Criteria similar to those in Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy must be met.



# CAP Criteria Implementation Results

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- ▶ **Policies, Programs, and Procedures**

  - Licensee staff, supervisors, and managers identify, report, assess, and correct safety and security issues in a timely and effective manner

- ▶ **Identification and Reporting**

  - Safety and security issues are recognized and promptly reported in a comprehensive manner that results in the timely and effective assessment of issues and communication of status to appropriate staff





# CAP Criteria Implementation Results

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- ▶ **Significance Assessment & Causal Evaluation**

Actual and potential significance of issues are appropriately assessed to determine the timing and scope of response; causal evaluations effectively identify issue causes and contributing factors

- ▶ **Development & Implementation of Corrective Actions**

Timely and effective identification and implementation of corrective actions that prevent recurrence of the same or similar issues





# CAP Criteria Implementation Results

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## ▶ Assessment of Effectiveness

Assessment processes confirm that licensee staff, supervisors and managers identify, report, assess, and correct safety and security issues in a timely and effective manner



# CAP Criteria Clarifications

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- ▶ Part C, Significance Assessment and Causal Evaluation of Safety and Security Issues revised to clarify need to consider reportability of an issue or related condition, fact or circumstance per 10 CFR 20, 21, 30, 40, 70, 76, etc.
- ▶ A regulatory compliance issue is a safety issue



# CAP Criteria Clarification

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- ▶ Routine assessment of CAP implementation performed within current baseline inspection procedures; additional biennial CAP comprehensive inspection.
- ▶ Implementation of CAP that complies with criteria is one element that may be considered in a decision to change the baseline inspection program as part of the Licensee Performance Review process.
- ▶ Development of cornerstones is expected to have a direct impact on the baseline inspection program.





# CAP Acceptance Process

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## ▶ Option I

- ▶ Licensee submits CAP that meets criteria in license amendment application
- ▶ When amendment is issued, NRC will implement revised Enforcement Policy that will allow inspectors to non-cite SL IV violations as described
- ▶ NRC will assess CAP adequacy during routine, reactive, and special inspections and biennial comprehensive CAP inspection





# CAP Acceptance Process

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- ▶ Option I (continued)
  - ▶ Conduct of first comprehensive CAP inspection within 12 months of amendment
  - ▶ Other issues with Option I
    - ▶ Implementation mid to late FY12
    - ▶ Develop inspection and enforcement guidance for CAP violations to ensure CAP program performance that impacts its effectiveness is corrected





# CAP Acceptance Process

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## ▶ Option 2

- ▶ Licensee informs NRC that they have implemented CAP that meets criteria and is ready for inspection
- ▶ NRC inspects CAP to confirm that licensee's CAP meets established criteria
- ▶ If inspection results indicate CAP is effective, NRC will implement revised Enforcement Policy that will allow inspectors to non-cite SL IV violations as described (revised NCV policy)





# CAP Acceptance Process

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- ▶ Option 2 (continued)
  - ▶ NRC will confirm continued CAP adequacy during routine, reactive and special inspections
  - ▶ Other issues with Option 2
    - ▶ Inspect CAPs in CY12 as licensee's assert readiness
    - ▶ No violations based on inspection results.
    - ▶ Identify CAP inspection results that would preclude initial or continued application of revised NCV policy
    - ▶ Identify process to reinstate application of revised NCV policy



# CAP Inspection Program

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- ▶ Initial, comprehensive inspection to assess implementation of CAP criteria and CAP effectiveness; results determine if revised NCV policy is implemented.
- ▶ Review of CAP data and trends during routine reviews and inspections
- ▶ Assessment of CAP performance associated with specific events or escalated enforcement
- ▶ Periodic (biennial) comprehensive assessment





# CAP Adequacy Determination

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- ▶ NRC would cease to apply the revised NCV policy if CAP inspection results cause the NRC to conclude that the licensee CAP is ineffective
- ▶ This conclusion could be based on a failure to implement one or more of the five CAP criteria that results in a failure to adequately identify, report, assess, evaluate or correct numerous or significant safety and security issues.
- ▶ NRC would apply revised NCV policy if CAP implementation is improved and determined effective by NRC inspection





# CAP Adequacy Determination

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- ▶ Licensee insights on
  - ▶ How to assess CAP performance
  - ▶ How to characterize inadequate performance in the five CAP criteria



# Enforcement Policy Revision

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## ▶ Objectives of Revision

- ▶ Per Commission's directive, "propose revisions to provide fuel cycle licensees with credit for effective corrective action programs".
- ▶ Credit (NCV Enforcement Policy) for effective CAP similar to that applied to power reactors
- ▶ Keep it simple






# Enforcement Policy Revision

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- ▶ In keeping with objectives and for consistency and clarity, staff recommend:
  - ▶ Modify Policy by changing title of section 2.3.2.a to include certain fuel cycle facilities as defined in footnotes
  - ▶ Footnotes would clarify that the fuel facilities to which this policy would be applied are those which have a CAP program that the NRC has independently determined by inspection to be effective as described in NMSS inspection manual



# Cornerstones





# Criticality Safety Cornerstone

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
- ▶ Objective - ensure that nuclear criticality safety (NCS) controls and items relied on for safety (IROFS) protect worker and public health and safety by preventing criticalities. This includes ensuring adequate NCS analyses and ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of NCS controls and IROFS.
- ▶ Desired results - demonstration that there is reasonable assurance that inadvertent nuclear criticality events will be prevented.
- ▶ Key Attributes and Scope of inspection – see diagram.
- ▶ Metrics – regulations, license, ISA , or safety analysis.






# Criticality Safety

CAP – Corrective Action Program  
 IROFS – Items Relied on for Safety  
 ISA – Integrated Safety Analysis  
 MM – Management Measures  
 NCS – Nuclear Criticality Safety



# Criticality Safety

CAP – Corrective Action Program  
 IROFS – Items Relied on for Safety  
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 NCS – Nuclear Criticality Safety



# Chemical Process Safety Cornerstone




- ▶ Objective - ensure that chemical process safety IROFS or controls protect worker and public health and safety by preventing and or controlling chemical releases (for those chemicals under NRC jurisdiction per the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA)) that could cause intermediate or high consequences (as defined in 10 CFR Part 70). This includes ensuring adequate chemical process safety analyses and ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of chemical process safety controls or IROFS.
- ▶ Desired results - demonstration that there is reasonable assurance that chemical process upsets do not affect the safe handling of licensed materials, and that workers, members of the public, and the environment are protected from chemical and radiological effects of licensed materials, hazardous chemicals produced from processing licensed materials, and plant conditions which affect the safety of licensed materials (those areas under the NRC/OSHA MOU). Chemical impacts and any resultant radiological impacts from accidents are less than those defined in 10 CFR Part 70 or the safety analysis.
- ▶ Key Attributes and Scope of inspection – see diagram.
- ▶ Metrics – regulations, license, ISA or safety analysis.




# Chemical Process Safety

CAP – Corrective Action Program  
CPS – Chemical Process Safety  
IROFS – Items Relied on for Safety  
ISA – Integrated Safety Analysis  
MM – Management Measures



# Chemical Process Safety

CAP – Corrective Action Program  
 CPS – Chemical Process Safety  
 IROFS – Items Relied on for Safety  
 ISA – Integrated Safety Analysis  
 MM – Management Measures



# Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone

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
- ▶ Objective - ensure that the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect public health and safety in the event of a radiological or chemical emergency (for those chemicals under NRC jurisdiction).
- ▶ Desired results - demonstration that there is reasonable assurance that the licensee can effectively implement its emergency plan to adequately protect the public health and safety in the event of a radiological or chemical emergency.
- ▶ Key Attributes and Scope of inspection – see diagram.
- ▶ Metrics – regulations, license, and Emergency Plan.





ANS – Alert Notification System  
 CAP – Corrective Action Program  
 EP – Emergency Preparedness  
 ERO – Emergency Response Organization  
 PAR – Protective Action Recommendation

# Emergency Preparedness



# Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone

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
- ▶ Objective - ensure adequate protection of public health and safety from exposure to radioactive effluents from normal (non-accident) plant operations.
- ▶ Desired results - demonstration that there is reasonable assurance that members of the public and the environment are protected from exposure to radioactive material (for non-accident situations) such that the requirements in 10 CFR Parts 20, 61, and 71 and license conditions are met and that doses are as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA).
- ▶ Key Attributes and Scope of inspection – see diagram.
- ▶ Metrics – regulations and license.





# Public Radiation Safety

ALARA – As Low As Reasonably Achievable  
 CA – Controlled Area  
 CAP – Corrective Action Program  
 G, L, and S – Gaseous, liquid, and solid  
 QC – Quality Control



# Worker Radiation Safety Cornerstone

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
- ▶ Objective - ensure adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation and radioactive materials during normal (non-accident) fuel cycle facility operation.
- ▶ Desired results - demonstration that there is reasonable assurance that workers are protected from exposure to radiation and radioactive materials (for non-accident situations) such that the limits in 10 CFR Part 20 and in license conditions are met and that such doses are ALARA.
- ▶ Key Attributes and Scope of inspection – see diagram.
- ▶ Metrics – regulations and license.





ALARA – As Low As Reasonably Achievable  
 CAP – Corrective Action Program  
 QC – Quality Control  
 RWP – Radiation Work Permit

# Worker Radiation Safety





# Integrated Schedule

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- ▶ Integrated schedule under development
- ▶ Development of significance evaluation process and associated thresholds of performance, cross cutting areas, and regulatory response tool.
- ▶ Considerations for Pilot
  - ▶ Two cornerstones
    - ▶ Criticality safety and any other deterministic cornerstone
    - ▶ Consideration of facilities
  - ▶ Benchmark of significance evaluation process and associated thresholds of performance with past and hypothetical violations.

