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NL-09-108

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555-0001

SUBJECT: Report on Inoperable Core Exit Thermocouples
Indian Point Unit Number 3
Docket No. 50-286
License No. DPR-64

Dear Sir or Madam:

The purpose of this letter is to submit a report pursuant to Technical Specification (TS) 5.6.7. Two channels of Core Exit Thermocouples (CET), each channel consisting of two CETs in the same train, are required by TS 3.3.3, Table 3.3.3-1, for each reactor quadrant. Each reactor quadrant is considered a separate function. CET K-13 is in reactor quadrant IV, Train A, and is required to satisfy the function of Post Accident Monitoring. CET R-10 is in reactor quadrant IV, Train A, and is also required to satisfy the function of Post Accident Monitoring. These CETs were declared inoperable on July 1 and July 3, 2009, respectively, and TS 3.3.3, Condition B was entered. The 30 day allowed outage time expired on July 31 and August 2, 2009. TS 3.3.3, Condition B requires a report in 14 days pursuant to TS 5.6.7. The report is to outline the alternate method of monitoring, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the instrument to operable status.

- Alternate method of monitoring

Quadrant IV Train A has one operable qualified CET and Train B has two operable qualified operable CETs. With the single channel failure of Train B in quadrant IV there are additionally 5 non qualified operable CETs, that for non accident conditions, can help to provide indications for unit stabilization, cool down and channel check capability for the one operable qualified Train A CET P13.

- Cause

These failures were entered into the IPEC Corrective Action Program in CR-IP3-2009-02964. Troubleshooting and evaluation of the failure has identified that an electrical fault is present somewhere in the Containment Building in the cabling between a connection panel

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and the connection at the Reactor Vessel Head. However, the precise nature of the fault is not determinate at this time. The boundary described above is not accessible during power operation and as such further investigation as well as repair is not practical at this time.

- Plans and schedule for restoring

Repair plans have been entered into the IPEC Corrective Action Program in CR-IP3-2009-03041, CA-001. Work Orders 200238 and 200239 have been issued and coded as a Forced Outage activity to be implemented in the first Forced Outage of sufficient duration. If an opportunity does not present itself, repairs will be implemented no later than the next Refueling Outage in the spring of 2011.

There are no new commitments being made in this submittal.

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. Robert Walpole, Licensing Manager.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'RW' followed by a stylized flourish.

RW/sp

cc: Mr. John P. Boska, Senior Project Manager, NRC NRR
Mr. Samuel J. Collins, Regional Administrator, NRC Region I
NRC Senior Resident Inspectors Office
Mr. Francis J. Murray, Jr., President and CEO, NYSERDA
Mr. Paul Eddy, New York State Dept. of Public Service