

Mr. Charles G. Pardee
Chief Nuclear Officer (CNO) and Senior Vice President
Exelon Generation Company, LLC
200 Exelon Way
Kennett Square, PA 19348

SUBJECT: OYSTER CREEK GENERATING STATION - NRC LICENSE RENEWAL
FOLLOW-UP INSPECTION REPORT 05000219/2008007

Dear Mr. Pardee

On November 14, 2008, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Oyster Creek Generating Station. The enclosed report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on December 23, 2008, with Mr. T. Rausch, Site Vice President, Mr. M. Gallagher, Vice President License Renewal, and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. In addition, this inspection also examined the plant activities and documents that supported proposed license renewal commitments of Oyster Creek Generating Station. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection,

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C. Pardee

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Sincerely,

Richard Conte, Chief
Engineering Branch 1
Division of Reactor Safety

Docket No. 50-219
License No. DPR-16

Enclosure: Inspection Report No. 05000219/2008007

C. Pardee

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Docket No.: 50-219

License No.: DPR-16

Report No.: 05000219/2008007

Licensee: Exelon, LLC

Facility: Oyster Creek Generating Station

Location: Forked River, New Jersey

Dates: October 27 - November xxx, 2008

Inspectors: J. Richmond, Lead
M. Modes, Senior Reactor Engineer
G. Meyer, Senior Reactor Engineer
T. O'Hara, Reactor Inspector
J. Heinly, Reactor Engineer

Approved by: Richard Conte, Chief
Engineering Branch 1
Division of Reactor Safety

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000219/2008007; 10/27/2008 - 11/14/2008; Exelon, LLC, Oyster Creek
Generating Station; License Renewal Follow-up

The report covers a 3 week inspection of license renewal follow-up items. It was conducted by five region based engineering inspectors. The inspection was conducted in accordance with Inspection Procedure 71003 "Post-Approval Site Inspection for License Renewal." Because a renewed license has not been granted for Oyster Creek, the standards used to judge the adequacy of selected IP 71003 inspection samples do not apply. The report records the inspector's observations, absent any conclusions of adequacy, pending the final decision of the Commissioners on the appeal of the renewed license.

REPORT DETAILS

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)

4OA2 License Renewal Follow-up (IP 71003)

1. Inspection Sample Selection Process

This inspection was conducted in order to observe AmerGen's continuing license renewal activities during the last refueling outage prior to Oyster Creek (OC) entering the extended period of operation. The inspection team selected a number of inspection samples for review, using the NRC accepted guidance based on their importance in the license renewal application process, in order to gauge the plant's state-of-readiness to enter the extended period of operation.

Because a renewed license has not been granted for Oyster Creek, the standards used to judge the adequacy of selected IP 71003 inspection samples do not apply. The inspectors recorded important observations, and reported them absent any conclusions of adequacy, pending the final decision of the Commissioners on the appeal of the renewed license.

- Observed selected activities described in SER Appendix-A, "Commitments for LR"
- Because the application for a Renewed License remains under Commission review for final decision -- With respect to proposed SER commitments:
 - No assessment of implementation or effectiveness will be documented
 - Factual Based Observations of activities will be documented
- Inspection observations were considered, in light of:
 - Part 50 existing requirements (e.g., CLB)
 - Pending Part 54 commitments
 - Programmatic performance under on-going implementation of Part 50 requirements
- The conclusions of PNO-1-08-012 remain unchanged

The reviewed commitments were selected based on the several attributes including: the risk significance using insights gained from sources such as the NRC's "Significance Determination Process Risk Informed Inspection Notebooks," Revision 2; the extent and results of previous license renewal audits and inspections of aging management programs; the extent of a commitment; and the extent that baseline inspection programs will inspect an SSC or commodity group.

For each commitment and on a sampling basis, the inspectors reviewed supporting documents including completed surveillances, conducted interviews, performed visual inspection of structures and components including those not accessible during power operation, and

observed selected activities described below. The inspectors also reviewed selected corrective actions taken as a consequence of previous license renewal inspections.

2. Detailed Reviews

2.1 Drywell Floor Trench Inspections

a. Scope of Inspection

Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 27, ASME Section XI, Subsection IWE Enhancements (5, 16, & 20), stated:

Perform visual (VT) and ultrasonic (UT) examinations of the drywell shell inside the drywell floor inspection trenches in bay 5 and bay 17 during the 2008 refueling outage, at the same locations that were examined in 2006. In addition, monitor the trenches for the presence of water during refueling outages.

The inspectors independently performed direct field observations of the conditions in the trenches on multiple occasions during the outage and reviewed selected VT and UT examination records. The inspectors compared UT data results to licensee established acceptance criteria in Specification IS-318227-004, revision 14, Functional Requirements for Drywell Containment Vessel Thickness Examinations."

The inspectors reviewed Technical Evaluation 330592.27.43, "Evaluation of 2008 UT Data of the Sand Bed Trenches," dated 11/8/08. The Evaluation determined that the UT thickness values satisfied minimum wall thickness values for general uniform thickness (e.g., average thickness of an area) and for locally thinned areas (e.g., areas 2 inches or less in diameter), as applicable. For UT data sets, such as 7x7 arrays (i.e., 49 UT readings in a 6 inch by 6 inch grid), the Evaluation calculated mean values, standard deviation, standard error, skewness, and kurtosis and determined that the data sets had a normal distribution. The Evaluation also compared the data set values to the corresponding 2006 values and concluded there were no significant differences and no observable on-going corrosion. The inspectors independently compared the UT data to the corresponding 2006 data values and to minimum thickness values established by design analysis and calculations.

The inspectors reviewed Exelon UT examination procedures, interviewed nondestructive examination (NDE) technicians, reviewed NDE technician qualifications and certifications, and reviewed records of trench inspections performed during two forced plant outages during the last operating cycle.

b. Observations

- Remove & reinstall lower 6" of grout at bottom of Bay 5 trench
- Inspect caulk sealant (trench edge where concrete meets shell)
- Verify no water accumulation

2.2 Reactor Cavity Liner Strippable Coating

a. Scope of Inspection

Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 27, ASME Section XI, Subsection IWE Enhancement (2), stated:

A strippable coating will be applied to the reactor cavity liner to prevent water intrusion into the gap between the drywell shield wall and the drywell shell during periods when the reactor cavity is flooded. Refueling outages prior to and during the period of extended operation.

The inspectors reviewed work order R2098682-06, "Coating application to cavity walls and floors."

b. Observations

Strippable Coating De-lamination

- From October 29 to November 6, the strippable coating limited leakage into the cavity trough drain at less than 1 gallon per minute (gpm)
- On November 6, the observed leakage rate in the cavity trough drain took a step change to 4 to 6 gpm
- Water puddles were subsequently identified in 4 sand bed bays
- AmerGen identified several likely or contributing causes:
 - A portable water filtration unit was improperly placed in the reactor cavity, which resulted in flow discharged directly on the strippable coating
 - An oil spill into the cavity may have affected the coating integrity
 - No post installation inspection of the coating had been performed
- AmerGen stated follow-up UTs will re-evaluate the drywell shell next outage

2.3 Reactor Cavity Trough Drain Inspection for Blockage

a. Scope of Inspection

Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 27, ASME Section XI, Subsection IWE Enhancement (13), stated:

The reactor cavity concrete trough drain will be verified to be clear from blockage once per refueling cycle. Any identified issues will be addressed via the corrective action process. Once per refueling cycle.

The inspectors reviewed a video recording record of a boroscope inspection of the cavity trough drain line.

b. Observations

See observations in section 2.4 below.

2.4 Reactor Cavity Trough Drain Monitoring

a. Scope of Inspection

Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 27, ASME Section XI, Subsection IWE Enhancement (3), stated:

The reactor cavity seal leakage trough drains and the drywell sand bed region drains will be monitored for leakage. Periodically.

In addition, the inspectors reviewed AmerGen's drain flow monitoring plan and pre-approved Action Plan. The plan was based on a calculation that determined cavity trough drain flow of less than 60 gpm would not result in trough overflow into the gap between the drywell concrete shield wall and the drywell steel shell. The plan had pre-established actions at various cavity drain flow rates, as follows:

- If drain flow exceeds 5 gpm, then monitor the flow every 8 hours.
- If drain flow exceeds 12 gpm, then monitor the sand bed poly bottles every 4 hours.
- If drain flow exceeds 12 gpm and water is found in a sand bed poly bottle, then enter and inspect the sand bed bays.

b. Observations

Cavity Trough Drain Line Found Isolated On Oct. 27, the cavity drain line was isolated to install a tygon hose to allow drain flow to be monitored. On Oct. 28, the reactor cavity was filled. Drain line flow was monitored frequently during cavity flood-up, and daily thereafter. On Oct. 29, a boroscope examination of the drain line identified that the isolation valve had been left closed. When the drain line isolation valve was opened, about 3 gallons of water drained out, then the drain flow subsided to about an 1/8 inch stream (less than 1 gpm).

Water Found in Sand Bed Bays On Nov. 6, the reactor cavity liner strippable coating started to de-laminate. The cavity trough drain flow took a step change from less than 1 gpm to approximately 4 to 6 gpm. AmerGen increased monitoring of the trough drain to every 2 hours and sand bed poly bottles to every 4 hours. On Nov. 8, NDE technicians inside sand bed bay 11 identified dripping water. Subsequently, water puddles were identified in 4 sand bed bays. After cavity was drained, all sand bed bays were inspected; no deficiencies identified. The sand bed bays were originally scheduled to have been closed by Nov. 2. In addition, on Nov. 15, after cavity was drained, water was found in the sand bed bay 11 poly bottle.

2.5 Drywell Sand Bed Region Drains Monitoring

a. Scope of Inspection

Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 27, ASME Section XI, Subsection IWE Enhancement (3), stated:

The sand bed region drains will be monitored daily during refueling outages.

There is one drain line for each two sand bed bays (five total). A poly bottle was attached via tygon tubing to a funnel hung below each drain line. AmerGen performed the drain line monitoring by checking the poly bottles.

The inspectors independently checked the poly bottles during the outage, and accompanied AmerGen personnel during routine daily checks. The inspectors also reviewed the written monitoring logs.

b. Observations

The sand bed drains were not directly observed and were not visible from the outer area of the torus room, where the poly bottles were located. After the reactor cavity was drained, 2 of the 5 tygon tubes were found disconnected, laying on the floor. In addition, sand bed bay 11 drain poly bottle was empty during each daily check until Nov. 15 (cavity was drained on Nov 12), when it was found full (greater than 4 gallons). Bay 11 was entered within a few hours, visually inspected, and found dry.

2.6 Moisture Barrier Seal Inspection (inside sand bed bays)

a. Scope of Inspection

Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 27, ASME Section XI, Subsection IWE Enhancements (12 & 21), stated:

Inspect the [moisture barrier] seal at the junction between the sand bed region concrete [sand bed floor] and the embedded drywell shell. During the 2008 refueling outage and every other refueling outage thereafter.

The inspectors performed the following:

- Independently inspected portions of the moisture barrier in 7 sand bed bays
- Reviewed VT-1 examination records for each sand bed bay
- Observed AmerGen's activities to evaluate the moisture barrier seals

b. Observations

- AmerGen identified deficiencies in 7 of the 10 sand bed bays, including
 - Surface cracks
 - Partial separation of the seal from the shell, or the floor
- AmerGen determined the moisture barrier function was not impaired, because no cracks or separation fully penetrated the seal. All deficiencies were repaired.

Sand Bed Bay 3 Seal Crack and Rust Stain

- Observed activities to evaluate and repair the moisture barrier seal in Bay 3
- The seal had rust stains on the surface, below the identified crack
- When the seal was excavated, some drywell shell surface corrosion was identified
- Seal crack and surface rust were repaired
- Laboratory analysis determined there was inadequate epoxy cure, an original 1992 installation issue

2006 Inspection Did Not Identify Any Seal Cracks

- During 2006 seal inspections, no deficiencies were identified

2.7 Drywell Shell External Coatings Inspection (inside sand bed bays)

a. Scope of Inspection

Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 27, ASME Section XI, Subsection IWE Enhancements (4 & 21), stated:

Perform visual inspections of the drywell external shell epoxy coating in all 10 sand bed bays. During the 2008 refueling outage and every other refueling outage thereafter.

The inspectors performed the following:

- Independently inspected portions of the epoxy coating in 7 sand bed bays
- Reviewed VT-1 examination records for each sand bed bay
- Observed AmerGen's activities to evaluate the epoxy coating in bay 11

b. Observations

Sand Bed Bay 11 Blisters

- Observed activities to evaluate and repair blisters found in Bay 11
 - 1 small 1/4 inch broken blister identified, with a 6" rust stain
 - 3 smaller unbroken blisters were identified by the NRC, during initial investigation
 - All 4 blisters were within a 1-2 inches square area, and all were evaluated and fixed
- For extent of condition, 4 bays re-inspected by different NDE level-II
 - -- AmerGen reported that No deficiencies were identified
- AmerGen estimated corrosion of ~ 3 mils had occurred over about a 16 year period

Sand Bed Bay 9 Coating Deficiency

- AmerGen identified and re-coated a area approximately 8" x 8" area because of a difference in epoxy color which could have been indicative of only 2 layers instead of 3.

2006 Inspection Did Not Identify the Bay 11 Rust Stain or the Bay 9 Coating Deficiency

- AmerGen reviewed a 2006 video and identified the same 6" rust stain in the 2006 video of Bay 11
- CR 844815 stated the Bay 9 coating deficiency was most probably an original 1992 installation issue
- During the 2006 coatings inspection, these 2 deficiencies were not identified

2.8 Drywell Shell Thickness Measurements

a. Scope of Inspection

Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 27, ASME Section XI, Subsection IWE Enhancements (1, 9, 14, and 21), stated:

Perform full scope drywell inspections, including UT thickness measurements of the drywell shell, from inside and outside the drywell. During the 2008 refueling outage and every other refueling outage thereafter. This included:

- 19 locations inside the drywell, at the sand bed region elevation
- UT examinations in all 10 sand bed bays (drywell external, total 106 locations)

Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 27, ASME Section XI, Subsection IWE Enhancements (7, 10, and 11) stated:

Conduct UT thickness measurements in the upper regions of the drywell shell. Prior to the period of extended operation and two refueling outages later. This included:

- 9 locations inside the drywell, at elevations between 50 to 87 foot
- 4 locations inside the drywell, at 23 foot elevation (bottom to middle spherical plate transition)
- 4 locations inside the drywell, at 71 foot elevation (knuckle area)

- Observed actions to evaluate primary containment structural integrity
- Observed AmerGen perform drywell shell UT thickness measurements
- Observed field collection and recording of UT data
- Observed AmerGen evaluate the UT data (2000 separate UT readings)
- Reviewed UT examination records
- Reviewed AmerGen's Technical Evaluations of the UT data

b. Observations

- AmerGen determined that all of the UT data satisfied acceptance criteria, based on current

licensing basis design requirements, for the thickness of the steel plate

- AmerGen did not identify any significant conditions affecting the drywell shell structural integrity
- AmerGen did not identify any on-going corrosion or corrosion trend, based on the UT examinations
- AmerGen did not identify any statistically significant deviations from 2006 UT data values

2.9 Moisture Barrier Seal Inspection (inside drywell)

a. Scope of Inspection

Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 27, ASME Section XI, Subsection IWE Enhancement (17), stated:

Perform visual inspection of the moisture barrier seal between the drywell shell and the concrete floor curb, installed inside the drywell during the October 2006 refueling outage, in accordance with ASME Code.

The inspectors reviewed xxx

b. Observations

None.

2.10 "B" Isolation Condenser Shell Inspection

a. Scope of Inspection

Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 24, One Time Inspection Program Item (2), stated:

To confirm the effectiveness of the Water Chemistry program to manage the loss of material and crack initiation and growth aging effects. A one-time UT inspection of the "B" Isolation Condenser shell below the waterline will be conducted looking for pitting corrosion. Perform prior to the period of extended operation.

The inspectors observed NDE examinations performed on the interior of the "B" isolation condenser shell (work order C2017561-11). The inspectors observed a visual inspection of the shell interior, UT thickness measurements in two locations that were previously tested in 1996 and 2002, additional UT testing in areas of identified pitting and corrosion, and spark testing of the final interior shell coating. The inspectors reviewed the UT data records, and compared the UT data results to the established minimum wall thickness criteria for the isolation condenser shell, and compared the UT data results with previously UT data measurements from 1996 and 2002

b. Observations

None.

2.11 Periodic Inspections

a. Scope of Inspection

Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 41, Periodic Inspection Program, stated:

Activities consist of a periodic inspection of selected systems and components to verify integrity and confirm the absence of identified aging effects. Perform prior to the period of extended operation.

The inspectors observed the following activities:

- Condensate system pipe expansion joint inspection
- Switchgear fire barrier inspection

b. Observations

None.

2.12 Circulating Water Intake Tunnel & Expansion Joint Inspection

a. Scope of Inspection

Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 31, Structures Monitoring Program Enhancement (1), stated:

Buildings, structural components and commodities that are not in scope of maintenance rule but have been determined to be in the scope of license renewal. Perform prior to the period of extended operation.

The inspectors observed the following activity:

- Structural inspection of the circulating water intake tunnel and expansion joints

b. Observations

None.

2.13 Buried ESW Pipe Replacement

a. Scope of Inspection

Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 63, Buried Piping, stated:

Replace the previously un-replaced, buried safety-related ESW piping prior to the period of extended operation. Perform prior to the period of extended operation.

The inspectors observed the following activities:

-
-
-
-

b. Observations

None.

2.14 Electrical Cable Inspection inside Drywell

a. Scope of Inspection

Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 34, Electrical Cables and Connections, stated:

A representative sample of accessible cables and connections located in adverse localized environments will be visually inspected at least once every 10 years for indications of accelerated insulation aging. Perform prior to the period of extended operation.

The inspectors directly observed xxx

b. Observations

None.

2.15 Drywell Shell Internal Coatings Inspection (inside drywell)

a. Scope of Inspection

Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 33, Protective Coating Monitoring and Maintenance Program, stated:

The program provides for aging management of Service Level I coatings inside the primary containment, in accordance with ASME Code.

The inspectors reviewed xxx

b. Observations

None.

2.16 Inaccessible Medium Voltage Cable Test

a. Scope of Inspection

Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 36, Inaccessible Medium Voltage Cables, stated:

In addition, the cable circuits will be tested using a proven test for detecting deterioration of the insulation system due to wetting, such as power factor or partial discharge, as described in EPRI TR-103834-P1-2, or other testing that is state of the art at the time the test is performed. Perform prior to the period of extended operation.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's activities to implement commitment item number xxx, of the NRC Safety Evaluation Report related to the Oyster Creek License Renewal. This commitment added medium-voltage cables M0089 and M0108 into the scope of OC license renewal. In addition, it required the licensee to develop an aging management program consistent with NUREG-1801, "Generic Aging Lessons Learned," Section XI.E3.

NUREG-1801 Section XI.E3, Inaccessible Medium-Voltage Cables Not Subject To 10 CFR 50.49 Environmental Qualification Requirements, recommended the licensee determine a specific type of test to be performed prior to the initial test [at the time just prior to or at the time of the period of extended operations], and that it should be a proven test for detecting deterioration of the insulation system due to wetting, such as power factor, partial discharge, or polarization index, as described in EPRI TR-103834-P1-2. NUREG-1801 also recommended that the first test be completed before the period of extended operation.

The inspectors observed field testing (work order xxx) of electrical cable xxx, 4 kV feeder cable to Bus xxx transformer xxx, and independently reviewed the test results. A Doble test of the transformer, with the cable connected to the transformer secondary, was performed, in part, to detect deterioration of the cable insulation. In addition, the inspectors interviewed plant electrical engineering and maintenance personnel.

b. Observations

None.

2.17 Fatigue Monitoring Program

a. Scope of Inspection

On the basis of a projection of the number of design transients, the licensee concluded, during the license renewal application process, the existing fatigue analyses of the RCS components remain valid for the extended period of operation (See NRC Safety Evaluation Report NUREG 1728 Section 4.3). Constellation however indicated that, prior to the expiration of the current operating license, a Fatigue Monitoring Program will be implemented as a confirmatory program as discussed in Section B.3.2 of their original license renewal application.

The licensee proposed using the Fatigue Monitoring Program to provide assurance that the number of design cycles will not be exceeded during the period of extended operation. It was on this basis that the staff found licensee's Fatigue Monitoring Program provided an acceptable basis for monitoring the fatigue usage of reactor coolant system components, in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii).

Subsequent to the application, the NRC staff became aware of a simplified assumption used in the EPRI program for fatigue monitoring called FatiguePro. The inspectors reviewed the current status of the fatigue monitoring program for the licensee. The inspectors also determined if the computational shortcut was present in the program and what response the licensee was planning to the NRC's concern that the simplified assumption might result in a non-conservative prognosis of fatigue. The inspectors interviewed the responsible engineer staff and reviewed the results of the fatigue program in place at the facility. The inspectors reviewed the procedures and computational methodology to determine the status of current fatigue limits on reactor coolant system components.

b. Observations

None.

3. Commitment Management Program

a. Scope of Inspection

The inspectors evaluated Exelon procedures used to manage and revise regulatory commitments to determine whether they were consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59, NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2000-17, "Managing Regulatory Commitments," and the guidance in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-04, "Guidelines for Managing NRC Commitment Changes." In addition, the inspectors reviewed the procedures to assess whether adequate administrative controls were in-place to ensure commitment revisions or the elimination of commitments altogether would be properly evaluated, approved, and reported to the NRC. The inspectors also reviewed Exelon's current licensing basis commitment tracking program to evaluate its effectiveness. In addition, the following commitment change evaluation packages were reviewed:

- Commitment Change 08-003, OC Bolting Integrity Program
- Commitment Change 08-004, RPV Axial Weld Examination Relief

b. Observations

None.

4. NRC Unresolved Item

- An Unresolved Item (URI) will be opened to evaluate whether existing current licensing basis commitments were adequately performed and; if necessary, assess the safety significance for any related performance deficiency.

- The issues for follow-up include the strippable coating de-lamination, reactor cavity trough drain monitoring, and sand bed drain monitoring.
- The commitment tracking, implementation, and work control processes will be reviewed, based on corrective actions resulting from AmerGen's review of deficiencies and operating experience, as a Part 50 activity.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit Meeting

Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the results of this inspection to Mr. T. Rausch, Site Vice President, Mr. M. Gallagher, Vice President License Renewal, and other members of Exelon's staff on December 23, 2008.

No proprietary information is present in this inspection report.

ATTACHMENT

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

P. Tamburro, Site License Renewal Lead
C. Albert,
J. Kandasamy, Manager Regulatory Affairs
C. Taylor, Regulatory Affairs
C. Hawkins, NDE Level III Technician
R. Pruthi, Electrical Design Engineer
R. McGee,
S. Schwartz, System Engineer
J. Cavallo, Corrosion Control Consultants & labs, Inc.
M. Gallagher, Vice President License Renewal
F. Polaski, Exelon License Renewal
J. hufnagel, Exelon License Renewal

NRC Personnel

S. Pindale, Acting Senior Resident Inspector, Oyster Creek
J. Kulp, Resident Inspector, Oyster Creek
L. Regner, License Renewal Project Manager, NRR
D. Pelton, Chief - License Renewal Projects Branch 1
M. Baty, Counsel for NRC Staff
J. Davis, Senior Materials Engineer, NRR

Observers

R. Pinney, State of New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection
R. Zak, State of New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection
R. Leski, Nine Mile Point License Renewal Manager
M. Fallin, Constellation License Renewal Manager

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened/Closed

None.

Opened

05000219/2008007-01 URI xxx

Closed

None.

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

License renewal Program Documents

Drawings

Plant Procedures

LS-AA-104-1002, 50.59 Applicability Review, Rev 3
LS-AA-110, Commitment Change management, Rev 6

Condition Reports (CRs)

* = CRs written as a result of the NRC inspection

Maintenance Requests & Work Orders

Miscellaneous Documents

NRC Documents

Industry Documents

* = documents referenced within NUREG-1801 as providing acceptable guidance for specific aging management programs

LIST OF ACRONYMS

EPRI	Electric Power Research Institute
NDE	Non-destructive Examination
NEI	Nuclear Energy Institute
SSC	Systems, Structures, and Components
SDP	Significance Determination Process
TR	Technical Report
UFSAR	Updated Final Safety Analysis Report