

RS-08-061

RA-08-047

June 9, 2008

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Clinton Power Station, Unit 1
Facility Operating License No. NPF-62
NRC Docket No. 50-461

Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3
Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-19 and DPR-25
NRC Docket Nos. 50-237 and 50-249

LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2
Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18
NRC Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-374

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Facility Operating License No. DPR-16
NRC Docket No. 50-219

Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3
Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56
NRC Docket Nos. 50-277 and 50-278

Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2
Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-29 and DPR-30
NRC Docket Nos. 50-254 and 50-265

Subject: Application for Technical Specification Change Regarding Revision of Control Rod Notch Surveillance Test Frequency, Clarification of SRM Insert Control Rod Action, and Clarification of a Frequency Example Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process

- References:
1. TSTF-475, Revision 1, "Control Rod Notch Testing Frequency and SRM Insert Control Rod Action," dated May 22, 2007
 2. Federal Register Notice 72 FR 63935, published November 13, 2007

In accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.90, "Application for amendment of license or construction permit," Exelon Generation Company, LLC, (EGC) and AmerGen Energy Company, LLC (AmerGen) are submitting a request for an amendment to the Technical Specifications (TS), Appendix A, to the Facility Operating Licenses listed above.

The proposed amendment would:

- (1) (a) Revise the TS surveillance requirement (SR) frequency in TS 3.1.3, "Control Rod OPERABILITY" (except for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station).
(b) Revise the TS surveillance requirement in TS 4.2, "Reactivity Control," Specification D (for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station).
- (2) Clarify the requirement to fully insert all insertable control rods for the limiting condition for operation (LCO) in TS 3.3.1.2, Required Action E.2, "Source Range Monitoring Instrumentation" (Clinton Power Station only).
- (3) Revise Example 1.4–3 in Section 1.4 "Frequency" to clarify the applicability of the 1.25 surveillance test interval extension (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station excluded).

Attachment 1 provides a description of the proposed changes, the requested confirmation of applicability, and plant-specific verifications. Attachment 2 provides the existing TS pages marked up to show the proposed changes. Attachment 3 provides the existing TS Bases pages marked up to reflect the proposed changes (for information only). Attachment 4 provides a summary of the regulatory commitments made in this submittal.

The proposed changes have been reviewed by the Plant Operations Review Committee at each of the stations and approved by their respective Nuclear Safety Review Boards in accordance with the requirements of the EGC and AmerGen Quality Assurance Programs.


EGC and AmerGen request approval of the proposed License Amendments by June 9, 2009, with the amendments being implemented within 60 days of issuance.

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91(b)(1), "Notice for public comment; State consultation," EGC and AmerGen are notifying the States of Illinois and New Jersey, and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania of this application for changes to the TSs by transmitting a copy of this letter and its attachments to the designated State Officials.

Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact Mr. Frank Mascitelli at (610) 765-5512.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on the 9th day of June 2008.

Respectfully,



Pamela B. Cowan
Director, Licensing & Regulatory Affairs
Exelon Generation Company, LLC
AmerGen Energy Company, LLC

- Attachments:
1. Description and Assessment
 2. Proposed Technical Specification Changes
 3. Proposed Technical Specification Bases Changes (For Information Only)
 4. List of Regulatory Commitments

cc: Regional Administrator, Region I, USNRC
Regional Administrator, Region III, USNRC
NRC Project Manager, NRR - Clinton Power Station
NRC Project Manager, NRR - Dresden Nuclear Power Station
NRC Project Manager, NRR - LaSalle County Station
NRC Project Manager, NRR - Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
NRC Project Manager, NRR - Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station
NRC Project Manager, NRR - Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station
Senior Resident Inspector – Clinton Power Station
Senior Resident Inspector – Dresden Nuclear Power Station
Senior Resident Inspector – LaSalle County Station
Senior Resident Inspector – Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Senior Resident Inspector – Peach Bottom Atomic Generating Station
Senior Resident Inspector – Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station
Illinois Emergency Management Agency - Division of Nuclear Safety
Director, Bureau of Radiation Protection - Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources
Director, Bureau of Nuclear Engineering, New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection
Mayor of Lacey Township, Forked River, NJ
S. T. Gray, State of Maryland

ATTACHMENT 1
Description and Assessment

**Application for Technical Specification Change Regarding
Revision of Control Rod Notch Surveillance Test Frequency, Clarification of SRM
Insert Control Rod Action, and Clarification of a Frequency Example Using the
Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process**

1.0 DESCRIPTION

2.0 ASSESSMENT

2.1 Applicability of Published Safety Evaluation

2.2 Optional Changes and Variations

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4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL EVALUATION

5.0 REFERENCES

1.0 DESCRIPTION

In accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.90, "Application for amendment of license or construction permit," Exelon Generation Company, LLC, (EGC) and AmerGen Energy Company, LLC (AmerGen) hereby request the following amendment to the Technical Specifications (TS), Appendix A, for the following Facility Operating Licenses:

EGC

Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3	Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-19 and DPR-25
LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2	Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3	Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56
Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2	Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-29 and DPR-30

AmerGen

Clinton Power Station, Unit 1	Facility Operating License No. NPF-62
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station	Facility Operating License No. DPR-16

The proposed amendment would:

- (1) (a) Revise the TS surveillance requirement (SR) frequency in TS 3.1.3, "Control Rod OPERABILITY" (except for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station).
- (b) Revise the TS surveillance requirement in TS 4.2, "Reactivity Control," Specification D (for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station).
- (2) Clarify the requirement to fully insert all insertable control rods for the limiting condition for operation (LCO) in TS 3.3.1.2, Required Action E.2, "Source Range Monitoring Instrumentation" (Clinton Power Station only).
- (3) Revise Example 1.4–3 in Section 1.4 "Frequency" to clarify the applicability of the 1.25 surveillance test interval extension (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station excluded).

The changes are consistent with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved Industry/Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Standard Technical Specification (STS) change TSTF– 475, Revision 1 (Reference 5.1). The Federal Register Notice (Reference 5.2) published on November 13, 2007 announced the availability of these TS improvements through the consolidated line item improvement process (CLIP). The proposed changes are consistent with Reference 5.1, with the only exceptions being specified in Section 2.2.

2.0 ASSESSMENT

2.1 Applicability of Published Safety Evaluation

EGC and AmerGen have reviewed the safety evaluation dated November 13, 2007, as part of the CLIIP. This review included a review of the NRC staff's evaluation, as well as the supporting information provided to support TSTF-475, Revision 1. EGC and AmerGen have concluded that the justifications presented in the TSTF proposal and the safety evaluation prepared by the NRC staff are applicable to Clinton Power Station, Unit 1; Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3; LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2; Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station; Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3; and Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 and justify this amendment for the incorporation of the changes to the aforementioned stations' TS.

2.2 Optional Changes and Variations

EGC and AmerGen are not proposing any significant variations or deviations from the TS changes described in the TSTF-475, Revision 1 and NRC staff's model safety evaluation dated November 13, 2007.

Four minor variations are described as follows:

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station is a custom technical specification BWR/2 plant and, therefore, the applicable TSs and associated bases sections and wording are different from the BWR/4 and BWR/6 STSs. The minor variations are grammatical and administrative in nature and do not change the technical intent of the changes proposed for control rod operability surveillance frequency requirements for SR 3.1.3.2. The proposed SR frequency does not deviate from the TSTF-proposed 31-day frequency. In addition, since the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station technical specifications are not STSs, the SRM Insert Control Rod Action clarification and the Example 1.4-3 Section 1.4, "Frequency" clarification are not required for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station.

Due to the large number of procedure changes that would be required to be revised due to the renumbering of the subsequent SRs following SR 3.1.3.2 deletion, SR 3.1.3.2 will be reflected as deleted and the subsequent SRs will not be renumbered as described in the approved TSTF-475, Revision 1. As a result, the associated administrative reference changes due solely to the renumbered SRs are not required.

For Clinton Power Station, the NOTE associated with SR 3.1.3.3 is being revised to be consistent with the STS and the changes associated with Example 1.4-3 included in this amendment request.

The proposed amendment does not adopt the clarification of Source Range Monitor (SRM) TS action for inserting control rods for Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3; LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2; Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3; and Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2. These station's TS and

associated TS Bases concerning TS Section 3.3.1.2 required Action E.2 currently have the clarification to fully insert all insertable control rods for the limiting condition for operation.

3.0 REGULATORY ANALYSIS

3.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination

EGC and AmerGen have reviewed the proposed no significant hazards consideration determination (NSHCD) published in the Federal Register as part of the CLIP. EGC and AmerGen have concluded that the proposed NSHCD presented in the Federal Register Notice on November 13, 2007, is applicable to Clinton Power Station, Unit 1; Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3; LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2; Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station; Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3; and Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 and is hereby incorporated by reference to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 50.91(a).

3.2 Verification and Commitments

As discussed in the notice of availability published in the Federal Register on November 13, 2007, for this TS improvement, EGC and AmerGen verified the applicability of TSTF-475, Revision 1 to Clinton Power Station, Unit 1, Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3, LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2, Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3, and Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 and commits to establishing Technical Specification Bases for TS as proposed in TSTF-475, Revision 1.

These changes are based on TSTF change traveler TSTF-475 (Revision 1), that proposes revisions to the STS by: (1) Revising the frequency of SR 3.1.3.2, notch testing of fully withdrawn control rod, from "7 days after the control rod is withdrawn and THERMAL POWER is greater than the LPSP of RWM ["8 days 18 hours after the control rod is fully withdrawn and THERMAL POWER is greater than the LPSP of RPCS" (Clinton Power Station) and "Each partially or fully withdrawn control rod shall be exercised at least once each week" (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station)]" to "31 days after the control rod is withdrawn and THERMAL POWER is greater than the LPSP of RWM ["31 days after the control rod is withdrawn and THERMAL POWER is greater than the LPSP of the RPCS" (Clinton Power Station) and "Each withdrawn control rod shall be exercised at least once each month" (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station)]," (2) adding the word "fully" to LCO 3.3.1.2 Required Action E.2 to clarify the requirement to fully insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies when the associated SRM instrument is inoperable (Clinton Power Station only), and (3) revising Example 1.4-3 in Section 1.4 "Frequency" to clarify that the 1.25 surveillance test interval extension in SR 3.0.2 is applicable to time periods discussed in NOTES in the "SURVEILLANCE" column in addition to the time periods in the "FREQUENCY" column (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station excluded).

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL EVALUATION

EGC and AmerGen have reviewed the environmental evaluation included in the model safety evaluation dated November 13, 2007, as part of the CLIP. EGC and AmerGen have concluded that the NRC staff's findings presented in that evaluation are applicable to Clinton Power Station, Unit 1; Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3; LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2; Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station; Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3; and Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 and the evaluation is hereby incorporated by reference for this application.

5.0 REFERENCES

- 5.1 TSTF-475, "Control Rod Notch Testing Frequency and SRM Insert Control Rod Action," Revision 1.
- 5.2 "Notice of Availability of Model Application Concerning Technical Specification Improvement To Revise Control Rod Notch Surveillance Frequency, Clarify SRM Insert Control Rod Action, and Clarify Frequency Example," published in Federal Register/ Vol. 72, No. 218, November 13, 2007.

ATTACHMENT 2

Proposed Technical Specification Changes

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES (Mark-ups)

Clinton Power Station, Unit 1

Technical Specification

Pages

1.0-27

1.0-28

3.1-7

3.1-9

3.1-10

3.3-11

1.4 Frequency

EXAMPLES

EXAMPLE 1.4-2 (continued)

"Thereafter" indicates future performances must be established per SR 3.0.2, but only after a specified condition is first met (i.e., the "once" performance in this example). If reactor power decreases to < 25% RTP, the measurement of both intervals stops. New intervals start upon reactor power reaching 25% RTP.

EXAMPLE 1.4-3

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>-----NOTE----- Not required to be performed until 12 hours after ≥ 25% RTP. -----</p>	
<p>Perform channel adjustment.</p>	<p>7 days</p>

The interval continues whether or not the unit operation is < 25% RTP between performances.

As the Note modifies the required performance of the Surveillance, it is construed to be part of the "specified Frequency." Should the 7 day interval be exceeded while operation is < 25% RTP, this Note allows 12 hours after power reaches ≥ 25% RTP to perform the Surveillance. The Surveillance is still considered to be within the "specified Frequency." Therefore, if the Surveillance were not performed within the 7 day interval (plus the extension allowed by SR 3.0.2), but operation was < 25% RTP, it would not constitute a failure of the SR or failure to meet the LCO. Also, no violation of SR 3.0.4 occurs when changing MODES, even with the 7 day Frequency not met, provided operation does not exceed 12 hours with power ≥ 25% RTP.

(continued)

(PLUS THE EXTENSION ALLOWED BY SR 3.0.2)

(PLUS THE EXTENSION ALLOWED BY SR 3.0.2)

1.4 Frequency

EXAMPLES

EXAMPLE 1.4-3 (continued)

Once the unit reaches 25% RTP, 12 hours would be allowed for completing the Surveillance. If the Surveillance were not performed within this 12 hour interval, there would then be a failure to perform a Surveillance within the specified Frequency, and the provisions of SR 3.0.3 would apply.

EXAMPLE 1.4-4

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>-----NOTE----- Only required to be met in MODE 1. -----</p>	
<p>Verify leakage rates are within limits.</p>	<p>24 hours</p>

Example 1.4-4 specifies that the requirements of this Surveillance do not have to be met until the unit is in MODE 1. The interval measurement for the Frequency of this Surveillance continues at all times, as described in Example 1.4-1. However, the Note constitutes an "otherwise stated" exception to the Applicability of this Surveillance. Therefore, if the Surveillance were not performed within the 24 hour (plus the extension allowed by SR 3.0.2) interval, but the unit was not in MODE 1, there would be no failure of the SR nor failure to meet the LCO. Therefore, no violation of SR 3.0.4 occurs when changing MODES, even with the 24 hour Frequency exceeded, provided the MODE change was not made into MODE 1. Prior to entering MODE 1 (assuming again that the 24 hour Frequency were not met), SR 3.0.4 would require satisfying the SR.

3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

3.1.3 Control Rod OPERABILITY

LCO 3.1.3 Each control rod shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTIONS

-----NOTE-----
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each control rod.

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME	
<p>A. One withdrawn control rod stuck.</p>	<p>-----NOTE----- A stuck rod may be bypassed in the Rod Action Control System (RACS) in accordance with SR 3.3.2.1.9 if required to allow continued operation. -----</p>		
	<p>A.1 Disarm the associated control rod drive (CRD).</p>		<p>2 hours</p>
	<p><u>AND</u></p> <p>A.2 Perform <u>SR 3/1.3.2</u> and SR 3.1.3.3 for each withdrawn OPERABLE control rod.</p>		<p>24 hours from discovery of Condition A concurrent with THERMAL POWER greater than the low power setpoint (LPSP) of the Rod Pattern Control System (RPCS)</p>
	<p><u>AND</u></p> <p>A.3 Perform SR 3.1.1.1.</p>		<p>72 hours</p>

(continued)

ACTIONS (Continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
E. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, C, or D not met. <u>OR</u> Nine or more control rods inoperable.	E.1 Be in MODE 3.	12 hours

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.1.3.1 Determine the position of each control rod.	24 hours
SR 3.1.3.2 <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; display: inline-block;"> <p style="text-align: center;">-----NOTE----- Not required to be performed until 8 days 18 hours after the control rod is fully withdrawn and THERMAL POWER is greater than the LPSP of the RPCS. -----</p> <p>Insert each fully withdrawn control rod at least one notch.</p> </div>	7 days

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(continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>SR 3.1.3.3 -----NOTE-----</p> <p>Not required to be performed until <u>38</u> days <u>18 hours</u> after the control rod is withdrawn and THERMAL POWER is greater than the LPSP of the RPCS.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Insert each <u>partially</u> withdrawn control rod at least one notch.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">(31)</p> <p>31 days</p>
<p>SR 3.1.3.4 Verify each control rod scram time from fully withdrawn to notch position 13 is ≤ 7 seconds.</p>	<p>In accordance with SR 3.1.4.1, SR 3.1.4.2, SR 3.1.4.3, and SR 3.1.4.4</p>
<p>SR 3.1.3.5 Verify each control rod does not go to the withdrawn overtravel position.</p>	<p>Each time the control rod is withdrawn to "full out" position</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>Prior to declaring control rod OPERABLE after work on control rod or CRD System that could affect coupling</p>

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
D. One or more required SRMs inoperable in MODE 3 or 4.	D.1 Fully insert all insertable control rods.	1 hour
	<u>AND</u> D.2 Place reactor mode switch in the shutdown position.	1 hour
E. One or more required SRMs inoperable in MODE 5.	E.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS except for control rod insertion.	Immediately
	<u>AND</u> E.2 Initiate action to insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies.	Immediately

FULLY

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES (Mark-ups)

Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3

Technical Specification

Pages

1.4-4

3.1.3-2

3.1.3-4

1.4 Frequency

EXAMPLES
(continued)

EXAMPLE 1.4-3

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>-----NOTE----- Not required to be performed until 12 hours after $\geq 25\%$ RTP. -----</p>	
<p>Perform channel adjustment.</p>	<p>7 days</p>

The interval continues whether or not the unit operation is < 25% RTP between performances.

As the Note modifies the required performance of the Surveillance, it is construed to be part of the "specified Frequency." Should the 7 day interval be exceeded while operation is < 25% RTP, this Note allows 12 hours after power reaches $\geq 25\%$ RTP to perform the Surveillance. The Surveillance is still considered to be within the "specified Frequency." Therefore, if the Surveillance were not performed within the 7 day interval (plus the extension allowed by SR 3.0.2), but operation was < 25% RTP, it would not constitute a failure of the SR or failure to meet the LCO. Also, no violation of SR 3.0.4 occurs when changing MODES, even with the 7 day Frequency not met, provided operation does not exceed 12 hours with power $\geq 25\%$ RTP.

Once the unit reaches 25% RTP, 12 hours would be allowed for completing the Surveillance. If the Surveillance were not performed within this 12 hour interval, there would then be a failure to perform a Surveillance within the specified Frequency, and the provisions of SR 3.0.3 would apply.

(continued)

(PLUS THE EXTENSION ALLOWED BY SR 3.0.2)

ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. (continued)	A.3 Perform <u>SR 3/1.3.2</u> and SR 3.1.3.3 for each withdrawn OPERABLE control rod.	24 hours from discovery of Condition A concurrent with THERMAL POWER greater than the low power setpoint (LPSP) of the RWM
	AND A.4 Perform SR 3.1.1.1.	72 hours
B. Two or more withdrawn control rods stuck.	B.1 Be in MODE 3.	12 hours
C. One or more control rods inoperable for reasons other than Condition A or B.	C.1 -----NOTE----- RWM may be bypassed as allowed by LCO 3.3.2.1, if required, to allow insertion of inoperable control rod and continued operation. -----	3 hours
	AND C.2 Disarm the associated CRD.	

(continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.1.3.1 Determine the position of each control rod.	24 hours
<p>SR 3.1.3.2</p> <p>-----NOTE----- Not required to be performed until 7 days after the control rod is withdrawn and THERMAL POWER is greater than the LPSP of RWM.</p> <p>Insert each fully withdrawn control rod at least one notch.</p>	7 days
<p>SR 3.1.3.3</p> <p>-----NOTE----- Not required to be performed until 31 days after the control rod is withdrawn and THERMAL POWER is greater than the LPSP of the RWM.</p> <p>Insert each (partially) withdrawn control rod at least one notch.</p>	31 days
SR 3.1.3.4 Verify each control rod scram time from fully withdrawn to 90% insertion is ≤ 7 seconds.	In accordance with SR 3.1.4.1, SR 3.1.4.2, SR 3.1.4.3, and SR 3.1.4.4

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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES (Mark-ups)

LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2

Technical Specification

Pages

1.4-4

3.1.3-2

3.1.3-4

1.4 Frequency

EXAMPLES
(continued)

EXAMPLE 1.4-3

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>-----NOTE----- Not required to be performed until 12 hours after \geq 25% RTP. -----</p>	
<p>Perform channel adjustment.</p>	<p>7 days</p>

The interval continues whether or not the unit operation is < 25% RTP between performances.

As the Note modifies the required performance of the Surveillance, it is construed to be part of the "specified Frequency." Should the 7 day interval be exceeded while operation is < 25% RTP, this Note allows 12 hours after power reaches \geq 25% RTP to perform the Surveillance. The Surveillance is still considered to be within the "specified Frequency." Therefore, if the Surveillance were not performed within the 7 day interval (plus the extension allowed by SR 3.0.2), but operation was < 25% RTP, it would not constitute a failure of the SR or failure to meet the LCO. Also, no violation of SR 3.0.4 occurs when changing MODES, even with the 7 day Frequency not met, provided operation does not exceed 12 hours with power \geq 25% RTP.

Once the unit reaches 25% RTP, 12 hours would be allowed for completing the Surveillance. If the Surveillance were not performed within this 12 hour interval, there would then be a failure to perform a Surveillance within the specified Frequency, and the provisions of SR 3.0.3 would apply.

(continued)

(PLUS THE EXTENSION ALLOWED BY SR 3.0.2)

ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. (continued)	A.3 Perform <u>SR 3.1.3.2</u> and SR 3.1.3.3 for each withdrawn OPERABLE control rod.	24 hours from discovery of Condition A concurrent with THERMAL POWER greater than the low power setpoint (LPSP) of the RWM
	<u>AND</u> A.4 Perform SR 3.1.1.1.	72 hours
B. Two or more withdrawn control rods stuck.	B.1 Be in MODE 3.	12 hours
C. One or more control rods inoperable for reasons other than Condition A or B.	C.1 -----NOTE----- RWM may be bypassed as allowed by LCO 3.3.2.1, if required, to allow insertion of inoperable control rod and continued operation. ----- Fully insert inoperable control rod.	3 hours
	<u>AND</u> C.2 Disarm the associated CRD.	4 hours

(continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.1.3.1 Determine the position of each control rod.	24 hours
<p>SR 3.1.3.2</p> <p>-----NOTE----- Not required to be performed until 7 days after the control rod is withdrawn and THERMAL POWER is greater than the LPSP of the RWM. -----</p> <p>Insert each fully withdrawn control rod at least one notch.</p>	7 days
<p>SR 3.1.3.3</p> <p>-----NOTE----- Not required to be performed until 31 days after the control rod is withdrawn and THERMAL POWER is greater than the LPSP of the RWM. -----</p> <p>Insert each <u>partially</u> withdrawn control rod at least one notch.</p>	31 days
SR 3.1.3.4 Verify each control rod scram time from fully withdrawn to notch position 05 is ≤ 7 seconds.	In accordance with SR 3.1.4.1, SR 3.1.4.2, SR 3.1.4.3, and SR 3.1.4.4

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(continued)

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES (Mark-ups)

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station

Technical Specification

Page

4.2-1

4.2 REACTIVITY CONTROL

Applicability: Applies to the surveillance requirements for reactivity control.

Objective: To verify the capability for controlling reactivity.

Specification:

- A. SDM shall be verified:
1. Prior to each CORE ALTERATION, and
 2. Once within 4 hours following the first criticality following any CORE ALTERATION.
- B. The control rod drive housing support system shall be inspected after reassembly.
- C. The maximum scram insertion time of the control rods shall be demonstrated through measurement and, during single control rod scram time tests, the control rod drive pumps shall be isolated from the accumulators:
1. For all control rods prior to thermal power exceeding 40% power with reactor coolant pressure greater than 800 psig, following core alterations or after a reactor shutdown that is greater than 120 days.
 2. For specifically affected individual control rods following maintenance on or modification to the control rod or control rod drive system which could affect the scram insertion time of those specific control rods in accordance with either "a" or "b" as follows:
 - a.1 Specifically affected individual control rods shall be scram time tested with the reactor depressurized and the scram insertion time from the fully withdrawn position to 90% insertion shall not exceed 2.2 seconds, and
 - a.2 Specifically affected individual control rods shall be scram time tested at greater than 800 psig reactor coolant pressure prior to exceeding 40% power.
 - b. Specifically affected individual control rods shall be scram time tested at greater than 800 psig reactor coolant pressure.
 3. On a frequency of less than or equal to once per 180 days of cumulative power operation, for at least 20 control rods, on a rotating basis, with reactor coolant pressure greater than 800 psig.
- D. Each (partially or fully) withdrawn control rod shall be exercised at least once each week. This test shall be performed within 24 hours in the event power operation is continuing with two or more inoperable control rods or in the event power operation is continuing with one fully or partially withdrawn rod which cannot be moved and for which control rod drive mechanism damage has not been ruled out. The surveillance need not be completed within 24 hours if the number of inoperable rods has been reduced to less than two and if it has been demonstrated that control rod drive mechanism collet housing failure is not the cause of an immovable control rod.

MONTH

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES (Mark-ups)

Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit 2

Technical Specification

Pages

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1.4 Frequency

EXAMPLES

EXAMPLE 1.4-2 (continued)

"Thereafter" indicates future performances must be established per SR 3.0.2, but only after a specified condition is first met (i.e., the "once" performance in this example). If reactor power decreases to < 25% RTP, the measurement of both intervals stops. New intervals start upon reactor power reaching 25% RTP.

EXAMPLE 1.4-3

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>-----NOTE----- Not required to be performed until 12 hours after \geq 25% RTP. -----</p> <p>Perform channel adjustment.</p>	<p>7 days</p>

The interval continues whether or not the unit operation is < 25% RTP between performances.

As the Note modifies the required performance of the Surveillance, it is construed to be part of the "specified Frequency." Should the 7 day interval be exceeded while operation is < 25% RTP, this Note allows 12 hours after power reaches \geq 25% RTP to perform the Surveillance. The Surveillance is still considered to be within the "specified Frequency." Therefore, if the Surveillance were not performed within the 7 day interval (plus the extension allowed by SR 3.0.2), but operation was < 25% RTP, it would not constitute a failure of the SR or failure to meet the LCO. Also, no violation of SR 3.0.4 occurs when changing MODES, even with the 7 day Frequency not met, provided operation does not exceed 12 hours with power \geq 25% RTP.

(continued)

(PLUS THE EXTENSION ALLOWED BY SR 3.0.2)

1.4 Frequency

EXAMPLES

EXAMPLE 1.4-3 (continued)

Once the unit reaches 25% RTP, 12 hours would be allowed for completing the Surveillance. If the Surveillance were not performed within this 12 hour interval, there would then be a failure to perform a Surveillance within the specified Frequency, and the provisions of SR 3.0.3 would apply.

(PLUS THE EXTENSION ALLOWED BY SR 3.0.2)

EXAMPLE 1.4-4

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>-----NOTE----- Only required to be met in MODE 1. -----</p>	
<p>Verify leakage rates are within limits.</p>	<p>24 hours</p>

Example 1.4-4 specifies that the requirements of this Surveillance do not have to be met until the unit is in MODE 1. The interval measurement for the Frequency of this Surveillance continues at all times, as described in Example 1.4-1. However, the Note constitutes an "otherwise stated" exception to the Applicability of this Surveillance. Therefore, if the Surveillance were not performed within the 24 hour interval (plus the extension allowed by SR 3.0.2), but the unit was not in MODE 1, there would be no failure of the SR nor failure to meet the LCO. Therefore, no violation of SR 3.0.4 occurs when changing MODES, even with the 24 hour Frequency exceeded, provided the MODE change was not made into MODE 1. Prior to entering MODE 1 (assuming again that the 24 hour Frequency were not met), SR 3.0.4 would require satisfying the SR.

ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. (continued)	<p>A.3 Perform <u>SR 3.1.3.2</u> and SR 3.1.3.3 for each withdrawn OPERABLE control rod.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>A.4 Perform SR 3.1.1.1.</p>	<p>24 hours from discovery of Condition A concurrent with THERMAL POWER greater than the low power setpoint (LPSP) of the RWM</p> <p>72 hours</p>
B. Two or more withdrawn control rods stuck.	B.1 Be in MODE 3.	12 hours
C. One or more control rods inoperable for reasons other than Condition A or B.	<p>C.1 -----NOTE----- RWM may be bypassed as allowed by LCO 3.3.2.1, if required, to allow insertion of inoperable control rod and continued operation. -----</p> <p>Fully insert inoperable control rod.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>C.2 Disarm the associated CRD.</p>	<p>3 hours</p> <p>4 hours</p>

(continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.1.3.1 Determine the position of each control rod.	24 hours
<p>SR 3.1.3.2</p> <p><i>DELETED</i></p> <p>-----NOTE----- Not required to be performed until 7 days after the control rod is withdrawn and THERMAL POWER is greater than the LPSP of the RWM. -----</p> <p>Insert each fully withdrawn control rod at least one notch.</p>	7 days
<p>SR 3.1.3.3</p> <p>-----NOTE----- Not required to be performed until 31 days after the control rod is withdrawn and THERMAL POWER is greater than the LPSP of the RWM. -----</p> <p>Insert each <i>partially</i> withdrawn control rod at least one notch.</p>	31 days
<p>SR 3.1.3.4 Verify each control rod scram time from fully withdrawn to notch position 06 is ≤ 7 seconds.</p>	In accordance with SR 3.1.4.1, SR 3.1.4.2, SR 3.1.4.3, and SR 3.1.4.4

(continued)

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES (Mark-ups)

Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit 3

Technical Specification

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1.4-4

1.4-5

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1.4 Frequency

EXAMPLES

EXAMPLE 1.4-2 (continued)

"Thereafter" indicates future performances must be established per SR 3.0.2, but only after a specified condition is first met (i.e., the "once" performance in this example). If reactor power decreases to < 25% RTP, the measurement of both intervals stops. New intervals start upon reactor power reaching 25% RTP.

EXAMPLE 1.4-3

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p style="text-align: center;">-----NOTE----- Not required to be performed until 12 hours after \geq 25% RTP. -----</p>	
<p>Perform channel adjustment.</p>	<p>7 days</p>

The interval continues whether or not the unit operation is < 25% RTP between performances.

As the Note modifies the required performance of the Surveillance, it is construed to be part of the "specified Frequency." Should the 7 day interval be exceeded while operation is < 25% RTP, this Note allows 12 hours after power reaches \geq 25% RTP to perform the Surveillance. The Surveillance is still considered to be within the "specified Frequency." Therefore, if the Surveillance were not performed within the 7 day interval (plus the extension allowed by SR 3.0.2), but operation was < 25% RTP, it would not constitute a failure of the SR or failure to meet the LCO. Also, no violation of SR 3.0.4 occurs when changing MODES, even with the 7 day Frequency not met, provided operation does not exceed 12 hours with power \geq 25% RTP.

(continued)

(PLUS THE EXTENSION ALLOWED BY SR 3.0.2)

1.4 Frequency

EXAMPLES

EXAMPLE 1.4-3 (continued)

Once the unit reaches 25% RTP, 12 hours would be allowed for completing the Surveillance. If the Surveillance were not performed within this 12 hour interval, there would then be a failure to perform a Surveillance within the specified Frequency, and the provisions of SR 3.0.3 would apply.

EXAMPLE 1.4-4

(PLUS THE EXTENSION ALLOWED BY SR 3.0.2)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>-----NOTE----- Only required to be met in MODE 1. -----</p>	
<p>Verify leakage rates are within limits.</p>	<p>24 hours</p>

Example 1.4-4 specifies that the requirements of this Surveillance do not have to be met until the unit is in MODE 1. The interval measurement for the Frequency of this Surveillance continues at all times, as described in Example 1.4-1. However, the Note constitutes an "otherwise stated" exception to the Applicability of this Surveillance. Therefore, if the Surveillance were not performed within the 24 hour interval (plus the extension allowed by SR 3.0.2), but the unit was not in MODE 1, there would be no failure of the SR nor failure to meet the LCO. Therefore, no violation of SR 3.0.4 occurs when changing MODES, even with the 24 hour Frequency exceeded, provided the MODE change was not made into MODE 1. Prior to entering MODE 1 (assuming again that the 24 hour Frequency were not met), SR 3.0.4 would require satisfying the SR.

ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. (continued)	<p>A.3 Perform <u>SR 3/1.3.2</u> and SR 3.1.3.3 for each withdrawn OPERABLE control rod.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>A.4 Perform SR 3.1.1.1.</p>	<p>24 hours from discovery of Condition A concurrent with THERMAL POWER greater than the low power setpoint (LPSP) of the RWM</p> <p>72 hours</p>
B. Two or more withdrawn control rods stuck.	B.1 Be in MODE 3.	12 hours
C. One or more control rods inoperable for reasons other than Condition A or B.	<p>C.1 -----NOTE----- RWM may be bypassed as allowed by LCO 3.3.2.1, if required, to allow insertion of inoperable control rod and continued operation. -----</p> <p>Fully insert inoperable control rod.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>C.2 Disarm the associated CRD.</p>	<p>3 hours</p> <p>4 hours</p>

(continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE		FREQUENCY
SR 3.1.3.1	Determine the position of each control rod.	24 hours
SR 3.1.3.2	<p>-----NOTE----- Not required to be performed until 7 days after the control rod is withdrawn and THERMAL POWER is greater than the LPSP of the RWM. -----</p> <p>Insert each fully withdrawn control rod at least one notch.</p>	7 days
SR 3.1.3.3	<p>-----NOTE----- Not required to be performed until 31 days after the control rod is withdrawn and THERMAL POWER is greater than the LPSP of the RWM. -----</p> <p>Insert each <u>partially</u> withdrawn control rod at least one notch.</p>	31 days
SR 3.1.3.4	Verify each control rod scram time from fully withdrawn to notch position 06 is ≤ 7 seconds.	In accordance with SR 3.1.4.1, SR 3.1.4.2, SR 3.1.4.3, and SR 3.1.4.4

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(continued)

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES (Mark-ups)

Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2

Technical Specification

Pages

1.4-4

3.1.3-2

3.1.3-4

1.4 Frequency

EXAMPLES
(continued)

EXAMPLE 1.4-3

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>-----NOTE----- Not required to be performed until 12 hours after \geq 25% RTP. -----</p> <p>Perform channel adjustment.</p>	<p>7 days</p>

The interval continues whether or not the unit operation is < 25% RTP between performances.

As the Note modifies the required performance of the Surveillance, it is construed to be part of the "specified Frequency." Should the 7 day interval be exceeded while operation is < 25% RTP, this Note allows 12 hours after power reaches \geq 25% RTP to perform the Surveillance. The Surveillance is still considered to be within the "specified Frequency." Therefore, if the Surveillance were not performed within the 7 day interval (plus the extension allowed by SR 3.0.2), but operation was < 25% RTP, it would not constitute a failure of the SR or failure to meet the LCO. Also, no violation of SR 3.0.4 occurs when changing MODES, even with the 7 day Frequency not met, provided operation does not exceed 12 hours, with power \geq 25% RTP.

Once the unit reaches 25% RTP, 12 hours would be allowed for completing the Surveillance. If the Surveillance were not performed within this 12 hour interval, there would then be a failure to perform a Surveillance within the specified Frequency, and the provisions of SR 3.0.3 would apply.

(continued)

(PLUS THE EXTENSION ALLOWED BY SR 3.0.2)

Control Rod OPERABILITY
3.1.3

ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. (continued)	A.3 Perform <u>SR 3/1.3.2</u> and SR 3.1.3.3 for each withdrawn OPERABLE control rod.	24 hours from discovery of Condition A concurrent with THERMAL POWER greater than the low power setpoint (LPSP) of the RWM
	<u>AND</u> A.4 Perform SR 3.1.1.1.	72 hours
B. Two or more withdrawn control rods stuck.	B.1 Be in MODE 3.	12 hours
C. One or more control rods inoperable for reasons other than Condition A or B.	C.1 -----NOTE----- RWM may be bypassed as allowed by LCO 3.3.2.1, if required, to allow insertion of inoperable control rod and continued operation. ----- Fully insert inoperable control rod.	3 hours
	<u>AND</u> C.2 Disarm the associated CRD.	4 hours

(continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.1.3.1 Determine the position of each control rod.	24 hours
<p>SR 3.1.3.2</p> <p>-----NOTE----- Not required to be performed until 7 days after the control rod is withdrawn and THERMAL POWER is greater than the LPSP of RWM. -----</p> <p>Insert each fully withdrawn control rod at least one notch.</p>	7 days
<p>SR 3.1.3.3</p> <p>-----NOTE----- Not required to be performed until 31 days after the control rod is withdrawn and THERMAL POWER is greater than the LPSP of the RWM. -----</p> <p>Insert each <u>partially</u> withdrawn control rod at least one notch.</p>	31 days
SR 3.1.3.4 Verify each control rod scram time from fully withdrawn to 90% insertion is ≤ 7 seconds.	In accordance with SR 3.1.4.1, SR 3.1.4.2, SR 3.1.4.3, and SR 3.1.4.4

(continued)

ATTACHMENT 3

**Proposed Technical Specification Bases Changes
(For Information Only)**

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES PAGES (Mark-ups)

Clinton Power Station, Unit 1

Technical Specification Bases

Pages

B 3.1-16

B 3.1-19

B 3.1-20

B 3.3-35

BASES

ACTIONS A.1, A.2, and A.3 (continued)

manner. Isolating the control rod from scram prevents damage to the CRDM. The control rod can be isolated from scram by isolating the hydraulic control unit from scram and normal drive and withdraw pressure, yet still maintain cooling water to the CRD.

Monitoring of the insertion capability for each withdrawn control rod must also be performed within 24 hours.

~~SR 3.1.3.2~~ and SR 3.1.3.3 perform periodic tests of the control rod insertion capability of withdrawn control rods. Testing each withdrawn control rod ensures that a generic problem does not exist. The allowed Completion Time of 24 hours provides a reasonable time to test the control rods, considering the potential for a need to reduce power to perform the tests. Required Action A.2 has a modified time zero Completion Time. The 24 hour Completion Time for this Required Action starts when the withdrawn control rod is discovered to be stuck and THERMAL POWER is greater than the actual low power setpoint (LPSP) of the rod pattern controller (RPC), since the notch insertions may not be compatible with the requirements of rod pattern control (LCO 3.1.6) and the RPC (LCO 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation").

To allow continued operation with a withdrawn control rod stuck, an evaluation of adequate SDM is also required within 72 hours. Should a DBA or transient require a shutdown, to preserve the single failure criterion an additional control rod would have to be assumed to have failed to insert when required. Therefore, the original SDM demonstration may not be valid. The SDM must therefore be evaluated (by measurement or analysis) with the stuck control rod at its stuck position and the highest worth OPERABLE control rod assumed to be fully withdrawn.

The allowed Completion Time of 72 hours to verify SDM is adequate, considering that with a single control rod stuck in a withdrawn position, the remaining OPERABLE control rods are capable of providing the required scram and shutdown reactivity. Failure to reach MODE 4 is only likely if an additional control rod adjacent to the stuck control rod also fails to insert during a required scram. Even with the postulated additional single failure of an adjacent control

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.1.3.2 and SR 3.1.3.3 (continued)

immovable, a determination of that control rod's trippability (OPERABILITY) must be made and appropriate action taken.

SR 3.1.3.4

Verifying the scram time for each control rod to notch position 13 is ≤ 7 seconds provides reasonable assurance that the control rod will insert when required during a DBA or transient, thereby completing its shutdown functions. This SR is performed in conjunction with the control rod scram time testing of SR 3.1.4.1, SR 3.1.4.2, SR 3.1.4.3, and SR 3.1.4.4. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," and the functional testing of SDV vent and drain valves in LCO 3.1.8, "Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) Vent and Drain Valves," overlap this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function. The associated Frequencies are acceptable, considering the more frequent testing performed to demonstrate other aspects of control rod OPERABILITY and operating experience, which shows scram times do not significantly change over an operating cycle.

With regard to scram time values obtained pursuant to this SR, as read from plant indication instrumentation, the specified limit is considered to be a nominal value and therefore does not require compensation for instrument indication uncertainties (Ref. 9).

SR 3.1.3.5

Coupling verification is performed to ensure the control rod is connected to the CRDM and will perform its intended function when necessary. The Surveillance requires verifying that a control rod does not go to the withdrawn overtravel position when it is fully withdrawn. The overtravel position feature provides a positive check on the coupling integrity, since only an uncoupled CRD can reach the overtravel position. If the control rod goes to the withdrawn overtravel position, the control rod drive mechanism can be inserted to attempt recoupling, within the limitations of Condition C. This verification is required

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

E.1 and E.2

With one or more required SRMs inoperable in MODE 5, the capability to detect local reactivity changes in the core during refueling is degraded. CORE ALTERATIONS must be immediately suspended, and action must be immediately initiated to insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies. Suspending CORE ALTERATIONS prevents the two most probable causes of reactivity changes, fuel loading and control rod withdrawal, from occurring. Inserting all insertable control rods ensures that the reactor will be at its minimum reactivity, given that fuel is present in the core. Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS shall not preclude completion of the movement of a component to a safe, conservative position.

FULLY

Action (once required to be initiated) to insert control rods must continue until all insertable rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies are inserted.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

The SRs for each SRM Applicable MODE or other specified condition are found in the SRs column of Table 3.3.1.2-1.

SR 3.3.1.2.1 and SR 3.3.1.2.3

Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to the same parameter indicated on other similar channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.

(continued)

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES PAGES (Mark-ups)

Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3

Technical Specification Bases

Pages

B 3.1.3-4

B 3.1.3-8

BASES

ACTIONS A.1, A.2, A.3, and A.4 (continued)

RWM is bypassed to ensure compliance with the CRDA analysis. With one withdrawn control rod stuck, the local scram reactivity rate assumptions may not be met if the stuck control rod separation criteria are not met. Therefore, a verification that the separation criteria are met must be performed immediately. The stuck control rod separation criteria are not met if: a) the stuck control rod occupies a location adjacent to two "slow" control rods, b) the stuck control rod occupies a location adjacent to one "slow" control rod, and the one "slow" control rod is also adjacent to another "slow" control rod, or c) if the stuck control rod occupies a location adjacent to one "slow" control rod when there is another pair of "slow" control rods elsewhere in the core adjacent to one another. The description of "slow" control rods is provided in LCO 3.1.4 "Control Rod Scram Times." In addition, the associated control rod drive must be disarmed in 2 hours. The allowed Completion Time of 2 hours is acceptable, considering the reactor can still be shut down, assuming no additional control rods fail to insert, and provides a reasonable time to perform the Required Action in an orderly manner. The control rod must be isolated from both scram and normal insert and withdraw pressure. Isolating the control rod from scram and normal insert and withdraw pressure prevents damage to the CRDM or reactor internals. The control rod isolation method should also ensure cooling water to the CRD is maintained.

Monitoring of the insertion capability of each withdrawn control rod must also be performed within 24 hours from discovery of Condition A concurrent with THERMAL POWER greater than the low power setpoint (LPSP) of the RWM. SR 3.1/3.2 and SR 3.1.3.3 perform periodic tests of the control rod insertion capability of withdrawn control rods. Testing each withdrawn control rod ensures that a generic problem does not exist. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." The Required Action A.3 Completion Time only begins upon discovery of Condition A concurrent with THERMAL POWER greater than the actual LPSP of the RWM since the notch insertions may not be compatible with the requirements of rod pattern control (LCO 3.1.6) and

(continued)

SR 3.1.3.2 DELETED

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

~~SR 3.1.3.2~~ and SR 3.1.3.3

Control rod insertion capability is demonstrated by inserting each partially or fully withdrawn control rod at least one notch and observing that the control rod moves. The control rod may then be returned to its original position. This ensures the control rod is not stuck and is free to insert on a scram signal. ~~These~~ Surveillances ~~are~~ not required when THERMAL POWER is less than or equal to the actual LPSP of the RWM, since the notch insertions may not be compatible with the requirements of the analyzed rod position sequence (LCO 3.1.6) and the RWM (LCO 3.3.2.1).

The 7 day Frequency of SR 3.1.3.2 is based on operating experience related to the changes in CRD performance and the ease of performing notch testing for fully withdrawn control rods. Partially withdrawn control rods are tested at a 31 day Frequency, based on the potential power reduction required to allow the control rod movement and considering the large testing sample of SR 3.1.3.2. Furthermore, the

31 day Frequency takes into account operating experience related to changes in CRD performance. At any time, if a control rod is immovable, a determination of that control rod's trippability (OPERABILITY) must be made and appropriate action taken.

These SRs are modified by Notes that allow 7 days and 31 days respectively, after withdrawal of the control rod and increasing power to above the LPSP, to perform the Surveillance. This acknowledges that the control rod must be first withdrawn and THERMAL POWER must be increased to above the LPSP before performance of the Surveillance, and therefore, the Notes avoid potential conflicts with SR 3.0.3 and SR 3.0.4.

SR 3.1.3.4

Verifying that the scram time for each control rod to 90% insertion is ≤ 7 seconds provides reasonable assurance that the control rod will insert when required during a DBA or transient, thereby completing its shutdown function. This SR is performed in conjunction with the control rod scram time testing of SR 3.1.4.1, SR 3.1.4.2, SR 3.1.4.3, and

(continued)

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES PAGES (Mark-ups)

LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2

Technical Specification Bases

Pages

B 3.1.3-4

B 3.1.3-8

BASES

ACTIONS A.1, A.2, A.3, and A.4 (continued)

control rod separation criteria are not met. Therefore, a verification that the separation criteria are met must be performed immediately. The separation criteria are not met if: a) the stuck control rod occupies a location adjacent to two "slow" control rods, b) the stuck control rod occupies a location adjacent to one "slow" control rod, and the one "slow" control rod is also adjacent to another "slow" control rod, or c) if the stuck control rod occupies a location adjacent to one "slow" control rod when there is another pair of "slow" control rods elsewhere in the core adjacent to one another. The description of "slow" control rods is provided in LCO 3.1.4, "Control Rod Scram Times." In addition, the associated control rod drive must be disarmed within 2 hours. The allowed Completion Time of 2 hours is acceptable, considering the reactor can still be shut down, assuming no additional control rods fail to insert, and provides a reasonable amount of time to perform the Required Action in an orderly manner. The control rod must be isolated from both scram and normal insert and withdraw pressure. Isolating the control rod from scram and normal insert and withdraw pressure prevents damage to the CRDM or reactor internals. The control rod isolation method should also ensure cooling water to the CRD is maintained.

Monitoring of the insertion capability for each withdrawn control rod must also be performed within 24 hours from discovery of Condition A concurrent with THERMAL POWER greater than the low power setpoint (LPSP) of the RWM. SR 3.1/3.2 and SR 3.1.3.3 perform periodic tests of the control rod insertion capability of withdrawn control rods. Testing each withdrawn control rod ensures that a generic problem does not exist. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." The Required Action A.3 Completion Time only begins upon discovery of Condition A concurrent with THERMAL POWER greater than the actual LPSP of the RWM, since the notch insertions may not be compatible with the requirements of rod pattern control (LCO 3.1.6) and the RWM (LCO 3.3.2.1). The allowed Completion Time provides a reasonable time to test the control rods, considering the potential for a need to reduce power to perform the tests.

(continued)

SR 3.1.3.2 DELETED

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR ~~3.1.3.2~~ and SR 3.1.3.3

Control rod insertion capability is demonstrated by inserting each partially or fully withdrawn control rod at least one notch and observing that the control rod moves. The control rod may then be returned to its original position. This ensures the control rod is not stuck and is free to insert on a scram signal. ~~These~~ Surveillances ~~are~~ not required when THERMAL POWER is less than or equal to the actual LPSP of the RWM since the notch insertions may not be compatible with the requirements of the analyzed rod position sequence (LCO 3.1.6) and the RWM (LCO 3.3.2.1).

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The 7 day Frequency of SR 3.1.3.2 is based on operating experience related to the changes in CRD performance and the ease of performing notch testing for fully withdrawn control rods. Partially withdrawn control rods are tested at a 31 day Frequency, based on the potential power reduction required to allow the control rod movement, and considering the large testing sample of SR 3.1.3.2. Furthermore, the

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31 day Frequency takes into account operating experience related to changes in CRD performance. At any time, if a control rod is immovable, a determination of that control rod's trippability (OPERABILITY) must be made and appropriate action taken.

THIS

~~These~~ SRs ~~are~~ modified by Notes that allow 7 days and 31 days respectively, after withdrawal of the control rod and increasing power to above the LPSP, to perform the Surveillance. This acknowledges that the control rod must be first withdrawn and THERMAL POWER must be increased to above the LPSP before performance of the Surveillance, and therefore, the Notes avoid potential conflicts with SR 3.0.3 and SR 3.0.4.

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(continued)

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES PAGES (Mark-ups)

Oyster Creek Generating Station

Technical Specification Bases

Page

4.2-4

MONTHLY

MONTHLY

The weekly control rod exercise test serves as a periodic check against deterioration of the control rod system. Experience with this control rod system has indicated that weekly tests are adequate, and that rods which move by drive pressure will scram when required as the pressure applied is much higher. The requirement to exercise the control rods within 24 hours of a condition with two or more control rods which are valved out of service or one fully or partially withdrawn control rod which can not be moved provides assurance of the reliability of the remaining control rods.

AND ANALYSIS PERFORMED FOR AN INDUSTRY-WIDE BWR INITIATIVE THAT WAS APPROVED BY NRC (S) HAVE

Pump operability, boron concentration, solution temperature and volume of standby liquid control system⁽⁴⁾ are checked on a frequency consistent with instrumentation checks described in Specification 4.1. Experience with similar systems has indicated that the test frequencies are adequate. The only practical time to functionally test the liquid control system is during a refueling outage. The functional test includes the firing of explosive charges to open the shear plug valves and the pumping of demineralized water into the reactor to assure operability of the system downstream of the pumps. The test also includes recirculation of liquid control solution to and from the solution tanks.

Pump operability is demonstrated on a more frequent basis. This test consists of recirculation of demineralized water to a test tank. A continuity check of the firing circuit on the shear plug valves is provided by pilot lights in the control room. Tank level and temperature alarms are provided to alert the operator to off-normal conditions.

Figure 3.2.1 was revised to reflect the minimum and maximum weight percent of sodium pentaborate solution, and the minimum atom percent of B-10 to meet 10 CFR 50.62(c)(4). Since the weight percent of sodium pentaborate can change with water makeup or water evaporation, frequent surveillances are performed on the solution concentration, volume and temperature. The sodium pentaborate is enriched with B-10 at the chemical vendor's facility to meet the minimum atom percent. Preshipment samples of batches are analyzed for B-10 enrichment and verified by an independent laboratory prior to shipment to Oyster Creek. Since the B-10 enrichment will not change while in storage or in the SLCS tank, the surveillance for B-10 enrichment is performed on a 24 month interval. An additional requirement has been added to evaluate the solution's capability to meet the original design shutdown criteria whenever the Boron-10 enrichment requirement is not met.

The functional test and other surveillance on components, along with the monitoring instrumentation, gives a high reliability for standby liquid control system operability.

References

- (1) FDSAR, Volume II, Figure III-5-11
- (2) FDSAR, Volume I, Section VI-3
- (3) FDSAR, Volume I, Section III-5 and Volume II, Appendix B
- (4) FDSAR, Volume I, Section VI-4

(5) TSTF/CLIP-475, REVISION 1, PUBLISHED IN FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICE 72 FR 63935, DATED NOVEMBER 13, 2007

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES PAGES (Mark-ups)

Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit 2

Technical Specification Bases

Pages

B 3.1-16

B 3.1-19

B 3.1-20

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1, A.2, A.3, and A.4 (continued)

location adjacent to one "slow" control rod when there is another pair of "slow" control rods adjacent to one another. The description of "slow" control rods is provided in LCO 3.1.4, "Control Rod Scram Times." In addition, the associated control rod drive must be disarmed in 2 hours. The allowed Completion Time of 2 hours is acceptable, considering the reactor can still be shut down, assuming no additional control rods fail to insert, and provides a reasonable time to perform the Required Action in an orderly manner. The control rod must be isolated from both scram and normal insert and withdraw pressure. Isolating the control rod from scram and normal insert and withdraw pressure prevents damage to the CRDM. The control rod should be isolated from scram and normal insert and withdraw pressure, while maintaining cooling water to the CRD.

Monitoring of the insertion capability of each withdrawn control rod must also be performed within 24 hours from discovery of Condition A concurrent with THERMAL POWER greater than the low power setpoint (LPSP) of the RWM. SR 3.1/3.2 and SR 3.1.3.3 perform periodic tests of the control rod insertion capability of withdrawn control rods. Testing each withdrawn control rod ensures that a generic problem does not exist. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." The Required Action A.3 Completion Time only begins upon discovery of Condition A concurrent with THERMAL POWER greater than the actual LPSP of the RWM, since the notch insertions may not be compatible with the requirements of rod pattern control (LCO 3.1.6) and the RWM (LCO 3.3.2.1). The allowed Completion Time of 24 hours from discovery of Condition A concurrent with THERMAL POWER greater than the LPSP of the RWM provides a reasonable time to test the control rods, considering the potential for a need to reduce power to perform the tests.

To allow continued operation with a withdrawn control rod stuck, an evaluation of adequate SDM is also required within 72 hours. Should a DBA or transient require a shutdown, to preserve the single failure criterion, an additional control rod would have to be assumed to fail to insert when required. Therefore, the original SDM demonstration may not be valid. The SDM must therefore be evaluated (by measurement or analysis) with the stuck control rod at its

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

E.1 (continued)

inoperable control rods could be indicative of a generic problem, and investigation and resolution of the potential problem should be undertaken. The allowed Completion Time of 12 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.1.3.1

The position of each control rod must be determined to ensure adequate information on control rod position is available to the operator for determining control rod OPERABILITY and controlling rod patterns. Control rod position may be determined by the use of OPERABLE position indicators, by moving control rods to a position with an OPERABLE indicator, or by the use of other appropriate methods. The 24 hour Frequency of this SR is based on operating experience related to expected changes in control rod position and the availability of control rod position indications in the control room.

SR 3.1.3.2 DELETED

SR 3.1.3.2/and SR 3.1.3.3

Control rod insertion capability is demonstrated by inserting each partially or fully withdrawn control rod at least one notch and observing that the control rod moves. The control rod may then be returned to its original position. This ensures the control rod is not stuck and is free to insert on a scram signal. ~~These~~ Surveillances ~~are~~ safe ~~is~~ THIS IS not required when THERMAL POWER is less than or equal to the actual LPSP of the RWM, since the notch insertions may not be compatible with the requirements of the analyzed rod position sequence (LCO 3.1.6) and the RWM (LCO 3.3.2.1).

The 7 day Frequency of SR 3.1.3.2 is based on operating experience related to the changes in CRD performance and the ease of performing notch testing for fully withdrawn control rods. Partially withdrawn control rods are tested at a 31 day Frequency, based on the potential power reduction required to allow the control rod movement and considering the large testing sample of SR 3.1.3.2. Furthermore, the 31 day Frequency takes into account operating experience related to changes in CRD performance. At any time, if a control rod is immovable, a

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(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.1.3/2 and SR 3.1.3.3 (continued)

determination of that control rod's trippability (OPERABILITY) must be made and appropriate action taken. For example, the unavailability of the Reactor Manual Control System does not affect the OPERABILITY of the control rods, provided SR 3.1.3/2 and SR 3.1.3.3 are current in accordance with SR 3.0.2.

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SR 3.1.3.4

Verifying that the scram time for each control rod to notch position 06 is ≤ 7 seconds provides reasonable assurance that the control rod will insert when required during a DBA or transient, thereby completing its shutdown function. This SR is performed in conjunction with the control rod scram time testing of SR 3.1.4.1, SR 3.1.4.2, SR 3.1.4.3, and SR 3.1.4.4. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," and the functional testing of SDV vent and drain valves in LCO 3.1.8, "Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) Vent and Drain Valves," overlap this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function. The associated Frequencies are acceptable, considering the more frequent testing performed to demonstrate other aspects of control rod OPERABILITY and operating experience, which shows scram times do not significantly change over an operating cycle.

SR 3.1.3.5

Coupling verification is performed to ensure the control rod is connected to the CRDM and will perform its intended function when necessary. The Surveillance requires verifying a control rod does not go to the withdrawn overtravel position. The overtravel position feature provides a positive check on the coupling integrity since only an uncoupled CRD can reach the overtravel position. The verification is required to be performed any time a control rod is withdrawn to the "full out" position (notch position 48) or prior to declaring the control rod OPERABLE after work on the control rod or CRD System that could affect coupling (CRD changeout and blade replacement or complete cell disassembly, i.e., guide tube removal). This includes control rods inserted one notch and then returned

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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES PAGES (Mark-ups)

Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit 3

Technical Specification Bases

Pages

B-3.1-16

B 3.1-19

B 3.1-20

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1, A.2, A.3, and A.4 (continued)

location adjacent to one "slow" control rod when there is another pair of "slow" control rods adjacent to one another. The description of "slow" control rods is provided in LCO 3.1.4, "Control Rod Scram Times." In addition, the associated control rod drive must be disarmed in 2 hours. The allowed Completion Time of 2 hours is acceptable, considering the reactor can still be shut down, assuming no additional control rods fail to insert, and provides a reasonable time to perform the Required Action in an orderly manner. The control rod must be isolated from both scram and normal insert and withdraw pressure. Isolating the control rod from scram and normal insert and withdraw pressure prevents damage to the CRDM. The control rod should be isolated from scram and normal insert and withdraw pressure, while maintaining cooling water to the CRD.

Monitoring of the insertion capability of each withdrawn control rod must also be performed within 24 hours from discovery of Condition A concurrent with THERMAL POWER greater than the low power setpoint (LPSP) of the RWM. SR 3/1.3.2/and SR 3.1.3.3 perform periodic tests of the control rod insertion capability of withdrawn control rods. Testing each withdrawn control rod ensures that a generic problem does not exist. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." The Required Action A.3 Completion Time only begins upon discovery of Condition A concurrent with THERMAL POWER greater than the actual LPSP of the RWM, since the notch insertions may not be compatible with the requirements of rod pattern control (LCO 3.1.6) and the RWM (LCO 3.3.2.1). The allowed Completion Time of 24 hours from discovery of Condition A concurrent with THERMAL POWER greater than the LPSP of the RWM provides a reasonable time to test the control rods, considering the potential for a need to reduce power to perform the tests.

To allow continued operation with a withdrawn control rod stuck, an evaluation of adequate SDM is also required within 72 hours. Should a DBA or transient require a shutdown, to preserve the single failure criterion, an additional control rod would have to be assumed to fail to insert when required. Therefore, the original SDM demonstration may not be valid. The SDM must therefore be evaluated (by measurement or analysis) with the stuck control rod at its

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BASES

ACTIONS E.1 (continued)

inoperable control rods could be indicative of a generic problem, and investigation and resolution of the potential problem should be undertaken. The allowed Completion Time of 12 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.1.3.1

The position of each control rod must be determined to ensure adequate information on control rod position is available to the operator for determining control rod OPERABILITY and controlling rod patterns. Control rod position may be determined by the use of OPERABLE position indicators, by moving control rods to a position with an OPERABLE indicator, or by the use of other appropriate methods. The 24 hour Frequency of this SR is based on operating experience related to expected changes in control rod position and the availability of control rod position indications in the control room.

SR 3.1.3.2 DELETED

SR 3.1.3.2/and SR 3.1.3.3

Control rod insertion capability is demonstrated by inserting each partially or fully withdrawn control rod at least one notch and observing that the control rod moves. The control rod may then be returned to its original position. This ensures the control rod is not stuck and is free to insert on a scram signal. These surveillances are not required when THERMAL POWER is less than or equal to the actual LPSP of the RWM, since the notch insertions may not be compatible with the requirements of the analyzed rod position sequence (LCO 3.1.6) and the RWM (LCO 3.3.2.1).

The 7 day Frequency of SR 3.1.3.2 is based on operating experience related to the changes in CRD performance and the ease of performing notch testing for fully withdrawn control rods. Partially withdrawn control rods are tested at a 31 day Frequency, based on the potential power reduction required to allow the control rod movement and considering the large testing sample of SR 3.1.3.2. Furthermore, the

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31 day Frequency takes into account operating experience related to changes in CRD performance. At any time, if a control rod is immovable, a

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.1.3.2 and SR 3.1.3.3 (continued)

determination of that control rod's trippability (OPERABILITY) must be made and appropriate action taken. For example, the unavailability of the Reactor Manual Control System does not affect the OPERABILITY of the control rods, provided SR 3.1.3.2 and SR 3.1.3.3 are current in accordance with SR 3.0.2.

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SR 3.1.3.4

Verifying that the scram time for each control rod to notch position 06 is ≤ 7 seconds provides reasonable assurance that the control rod will insert when required during a DBA or transient, thereby completing its shutdown function. This SR is performed in conjunction with the control rod scram time testing of SR 3.1.4.1, SR 3.1.4.2, SR 3.1.4.3, and SR 3.1.4.4. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," and the functional testing of SDV vent and drain valves in LCO 3.1.8, "Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) Vent and Drain Valves," overlap this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function. The associated Frequencies are acceptable, considering the more frequent testing performed to demonstrate other aspects of control rod OPERABILITY and operating experience, which shows scram times do not significantly change over an operating cycle.

SR 3.1.3.5

Coupling verification is performed to ensure the control rod is connected to the CRDM and will perform its intended function when necessary. The Surveillance requires verifying a control rod does not go to the withdrawn overtravel position. The overtravel position feature provides a positive check on the coupling integrity since only an uncoupled CRD can reach the overtravel position. The verification is required to be performed any time a control rod is withdrawn to the "full out" position (notch position 48) or prior to declaring the control rod OPERABLE after work on the control rod or CRD System that could affect coupling (CRD changeout and blade replacement or complete cell disassembly, i.e., guide tube removal). This includes control rods inserted one notch and then returned

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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES PAGES (Mark-ups)

Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2

Technical Specification Bases

Pages

B 3.1.3-4

B 3.1.3-8

BASES

ACTIONS A.1, A.2, A.3, and A.4 (continued)

RWM is bypassed to ensure compliance with the CRDA analysis. With one withdrawn control rod stuck, the local scram reactivity rate assumptions may not be met if the stuck control rod separation criteria are not met. Therefore, a verification that the separation criteria are met must be performed immediately. The stuck control rod separation criteria are not met if: a) the stuck control rod occupies a location adjacent to two "slow" control rods, b) the stuck control rod occupies a location adjacent to one "slow" control rod, and the one "slow" control rod is also adjacent to another "slow" control rod, or c) if the stuck control rod occupies a location adjacent to one "slow" control rod when there is another pair of "slow" control rods elsewhere in the core adjacent to one another. The description of "slow" control rods is provided in LCO 3.1.4 "Control Rod Scram Times." In addition, the associated control rod drive must be disarmed in 2 hours. The allowed Completion Time of 2 hours is acceptable, considering the reactor can still be shut down, assuming no additional control rods fail to insert, and provides a reasonable time to perform the Required Action in an orderly manner. The control rod must be isolated from both scram and normal insert and withdraw pressure. Isolating the control rod from scram and normal insert and withdraw pressure prevents damage to the CRDM or reactor internals. The control rod isolation method should also ensure cooling water to the CRD is maintained.

Monitoring of the insertion capability of each withdrawn control rod must also be performed within 24 hours from discovery of Condition A concurrent with THERMAL POWER greater than the low power setpoint (LPSP) of the RWM. SR 3.1.3.2 and SR 3.1.3.3 perform periodic tests of the control rod insertion capability of withdrawn control rods. Testing each withdrawn control rod ensures that a generic problem does not exist. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." The Required Action A.3 Completion Time only begins upon discovery of Condition A concurrent with THERMAL POWER greater than the actual LPSP of the RWM since the notch insertions may not be compatible with the requirements of rod pattern control (LCO 3.1.6) and

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SR 3.1.3.2 DELETED

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.1.3.2 and SR 3.1.3.3

Control rod insertion capability is demonstrated by inserting each partially or fully withdrawn control rod at least one notch and observing that the control rod moves. The control rod may then be returned to its original position. This ensures the control rod is not stuck and is free to insert on a scram signal. ~~These~~ Surveillance ~~are~~ not required when THERMAL POWER is less than or equal to the actual LPSP of the RWM, since the notch insertions may not be compatible with the requirements of the analyzed rod position sequence (LCO 3.1.6) and the RWM (LCO 3.3.2.1).

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The 7 day Frequency of SR 3.1.3.2 is based on operating experience related to the changes in CRD performance and the ease of performing notch testing for fully withdrawn control rods. Partially withdrawn control rods are tested at a 31 day Frequency, based on the potential power reduction required to allow the control rod movement and considering the large testing sample of SR 3.1.3.2. Furthermore, the

THE

31 day Frequency takes into account operating experience related to changes in CRD performance. At any time, if a control rod is immovable, a determination of that control rod's trippability (OPERABILITY) must be made and appropriate action taken.

THIS

~~These~~ SRs ~~are~~ modified by Notes that allow 7 days and 31 days respectively, after withdrawal of the control rod and increasing power to above the LPSP, to perform the Surveillance. This acknowledges that the control rod must be first withdrawn and THERMAL POWER must be increased to above the LPSP before performance of the Surveillance, and therefore, the Notes avoid potential conflicts with SR 3.0.3 and SR 3.0.4.

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SR 3.1.3.4

Verifying that the scram time for each control rod to 90% insertion is ≤ 7 seconds provides reasonable assurance that the control rod will insert when required during a DBA or transient, thereby completing its shutdown function. This SR is performed in conjunction with the control rod scram time testing of SR 3.1.4.1, SR 3.1.4.2, SR 3.1.4.3, and SR 3.1.4.4. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS)

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**ATTACHMENT 4
List of Regulatory Commitments**

**Application for Technical Specification Change Regarding
Revision of Control Rod Notch Surveillance Test Frequency, Clarification of SRM Insert
Control Rod Action, and Clarification of a Frequency Example Using the**

The following table identifies those actions committed to by Exelon Generation Company, LLC (EGC) and AmerGen Energy Company, LLC (AmerGen) in this document. This commitment applies to Clinton Power Station, Unit 1; Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3; LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2; Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station; Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3; and Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2. Any other statements in the submittal are provided for information purposes and are not considered to be regulatory commitments.

COMMITMENT	COMMITTED DATE	COMMITMENT TYPE	
		ONE-TIME ACTION (Yes/No)	PROGRAMMATIC (Yes/No)
EGC and AmerGen will establish the Technical Specifications Bases for TS Bases 3.1.3 and 3.3.1.2 consistent with those shown in TSTF-475, Revision 1, "Control Rod Notch Testing Frequency and SRM Insert Control Rod Action." [Note: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station TS Bases differ from the STS]	Implement with amendment	Yes	No