

3.1 Conformance with NRC General Design Criteria

The information in this section of the reference ABWR DCD, including all subsequent subsections, is incorporated by reference with the following departures and supplement.

STP DEP 8.2-1

STP DEP 1.1-2

STD DEP T1 2.4-1

STP DEP T1 5.0-1

3.1.2.1.2.2 Evaluation Against Criterion 2

STP DEP T1 5.0-1

The first paragraph in this subsection of the reference ABWR DCD is replaced in its entirety with the following text.

The ABWR design is designated as a standard plant. The bases for safety-related (Subsection 3.1.2.1.1.2) structures, systems, and components are based upon site parameters that envelop the majority of potential sites in the contiguous United States, as defined in the reference ABWR DCD Chapter 2. The design bases for these structures, systems, and components reflect this envelope of natural phenomena, including appropriate combinations of the effects of normal and accident conditions. The site characteristics for STP 3 & 4 are bounded by those site parameters, with the exception of flood level and maximum probable precipitation. With respect to flood level and maximum probable precipitation, the ABWR design for STP 3 & 4 has been modified as appropriate to reflect the STP 3 & 4 flood level and maximum probable precipitation. Therefore, the ABWR safety-related structures, systems, and components for STP 3 & 4 are designed to withstand the most severe of the natural phenomena that have been historically reported for STP and the surrounding area and comply with Criterion 2. The STP 3 & 4 flood level and maximum probable precipitation are discussed in more detail in FSAR Table 2.0-2.

STP 3 & 4 also have safety-related site-specific structures, systems, and components that are not within the ABWR Standard Plant scope. As a minimum, these structures, systems, and components have been designed to withstand the natural phenomena that are applicable to the ABWR safety-related structures, systems, and components for STP 3 & 4. Therefore, those structures, systems and components are designed to withstand the most severe of the natural phenomena that have been historically reported for STP and the surrounding area and comply with Criterion 2.

3.1.2.1.5.2 Evaluation Against Criterion 5

STP DEP 1.1-2

The information in this Subsection of the reference ABWR DCD is replaced in its entirety with the following text.

STP 3 & 4 is a dual-unit station. GE Licensing Topical Report NEDO-33325, Class 1, dated May 1, 2007, titled “Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) Common Equipment and Structures,” addresses the sharing of specified structures, systems and components important to safety for any dual unit ABWR station, including STP 3 & 4. This LTR demonstrates that the sharing of the specified systems does not impair their ability to perform their safety functions.

In addition, the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) is a common safety-related structure that is shared by STP 3 & 4. The UHS has a separate basin for each unit with a common wall that separates the STP 3 & 4 basins. Safety-related systems within the UHS structure are not shared and each unit has a separate Reactor Service Water System. The UHS structural design is described in detail in Appendix 3H.6. The design basis functions of the UHS are described further in Section 9.2.5.

Based on the LTR and the discussion of the UHS, it is concluded that GDC 5 is met.

3.1.2.2.8.2.2 Offsite Electric Power System

STP DEP 8.2-1

The information in this subsection of the reference ABWR DCD is replaced in its entirety with the following text.

Offsite power is transmitted to the plant switchyard via multiple 345kV circuits on several rights-of-way. Each unit has three separate 345kV circuits from the switchyard that tie into reserve auxiliary transformer (RAT) A, RAT B and the main power transformer, respectively. Each transformer provides a feed to each of the Class 1E buses. The main power transformer feed is via three unit auxiliary transformers (UAT). In normal operation, two Class 1E buses are fed by the UATs and the remaining safety bus is fed by a RAT. This configuration provides two separate paths of power that are immediately accessible, without bus transfers, to the offsite power system. The transmission circuits are sized sufficiently to meet the Class 1E load requirements.

The offsite electric power systems are designed to meet the requirements of Criterion 17. For further discussion see the following section:

Chapter/Section	Title
8.1.1	Offsite Transmission Network
8.1.2	Electric Power Distribution System
8.2	Offsite Power Systems

3.1.2.4.16.2 Evaluation Against Criterion 45

The following site-specific supplemental information is provided in the first sentence of the first paragraph of this subsection.

All important components in the ~~ABWR Standard Plant scope~~ STP 3 & 4 Cooling Water Systems, including important components within the ABWR Standard Plant are located in accessible locations to facilitate periodic inspection during normal plant operation.

3.1.2.6.4.2 Evaluation Against Criterion 63

STD DEP T1 2.4-1

The following change is made in the second sentence of the first paragraph of this subsection.

In addition ~~two~~ three loops of the RHR System can provide additional cooling of the spent fuel pool, as required.

