DIGITAL INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS

DI&C-ISG-03

Task Working Group #3:
Review of New Reactor Digital Instrumentation and Control
Probabilistic Risk Assessments

Interim Staff Guidance
Revision 0
(Initial Issue for Use)


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DI&C-ISG-03

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* = concurrence via e-mail

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INTRODUCTION

This Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) provides acceptable methods for evaluating digital instrumentation and control system risk assessments. The primary purpose of this document is to provide clear guidance on how NRC reviewers should evaluate digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) system probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs), including common cause failures in PRAs and uncertainty analysis associated with new reactor digital systems. This guidance is consistent with current NRC regulations (10 CFR Part 52) on the performance of risk assessments for new reactors, and the NRC policy on Safety Goals and PRAs, and is not a substitute for NRC regulations, but rather clarifies how a licensee or applicant may satisfy those regulations and policies.

This ISG also clarifies the criteria the staff will use to evaluate whether a digital system design is consistent with Safety Goal guidelines. The staff intends to continue interacting with stakeholders to refine DI&C ISGs and to update associated guidance and generate new guidance where appropriate.

Except in those cases in which a licensee or applicant proposes or has previously established an acceptable alternative method for complying with specified portions of NRC regulations, the NRC staff will use the criteria and methods described in this ISG to evaluate compliance with NRC requirements.
1. **SCOPE**

This ISG document provides general guidance on how NRC staff should perform reviews of DI&C system risk assessments for new reactors (portions may be applicable to operating reactors). It discusses the background of DI&C review guidance and also identifies currently available risk insights for DI&C systems from the Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) and the AP1000 design certification reviews (see Appendix A).

The ISG document does not support nor is it intended to provide guidance on the scope, level of detail, and technical acceptability of DI&C system risk assessments for risk-informed decision making that involves either changes to plant design that increase plant risk or modification of deterministic requirements. This is true for current and new reactors. The staff considers it premature to risk-inform DI&C regulatory matters. The uncertainties associated with DI&C system risk assessments currently are large enough to reinforce the need for diversity, defense-in-depth, and adequate safety margins, and the retention of deterministic requirements designed to assure their continued existence. An advance in the state-of-the-art may be needed to permit a comprehensive risk-informed decision-making framework in licensing reviews of DI&C systems for future and current reactors. Therefore, the use of risk-informed decision making is beyond the scope of this ISG, although it may be addressed in future regulatory guidance.

2. **RATIONALE**

In order to prepare this ISG document, the NRC primarily considered the following:

A. Regulatory Guide 1.200, Revision 1, January 2007, which addresses the technical adequacy of PRAs.


C. Regulatory Guide 1.174, Revision 1, on using PRA in making risk-informed decisions.

D. Final Safety Evaluation Report (FSER) of the AP1000 Standard Design.

E. FSER of the Advanced Boiling Water Reactor Design.

3. **BACKGROUND**

   DI&C systems are combinations of hardware components and software (i.e., computer programs). This combination of hardware and software can result in the presence of faults and failure modes unique to DI&C systems (see DI&C-ISG-2, “Diversity and Defense-in-Depth Issues,” Section 5, “Common Cause Failure Applicability”). For DI&C systems, failures arise from the combination of a fault in the system in conjunction with a set of circumstances (e.g., a plant transient or accident) that satisfies the conditions necessary for the fault to be exercised. When exercised, the fault may result in a DI&C system failure. Excitation of these system faults can cause significant system failures.
For new reactors, the nuclear industry has purposed to design and implement DI&C systems that have a low probability of containing significant faults. In particular, the designers have attempted to reduce the likelihood of DI&C common cause failure (CCF). There is uncertainty as to the actual CCF rate in these DI&C systems, and the NRC considers it prudent to be cautious as it is extremely difficult to either accurately predict or verify such failure rates. It has been demonstrated by Knight and Leveson and others that it is not possible to develop redundant software (with common specifications) that does not have any dependencies, nor is it possible to determine how two software designs will differ in their failure behavior. Experience shows that one cannot eliminate all faults in complex DI&C systems that can cause a system failure when the system is exposed to an operating environment or profile for which it was not designed, tested, or used. Exposure to such an operating environment or profile is possible for nuclear power plants because there are a large number of possible states and inputs for a DI&C system. When trying to estimate DI&C system reliability, it must be remembered that each DI&C system, including software, is unique, and extrapolation of statistical data from one system to another may not necessarily be meaningful. Likewise, extrapolation of statistical data of the same system used in a different operating environment or profile is not necessarily meaningful. Future research is planned to identify the various fault modes and respective causal chains more completely, including corresponding risk evaluation and safety assessment approaches.

Systems consisting of combined hardware and software may not fail the way hardware alone fails due to wear-out. Therefore, commonly used hardware redundancy techniques may not improve software reliability. It generally is accepted that high reliability can be achieved for DI&C systems by following formal and disciplined methods during the system development process. Such methods include software and hardware design techniques known to limit digital system failures combined with a testing program based on expected use, and by controlling operational use.

To reduce the probability and consequences of significant faults, comprehensive deterministic guidance was developed by the NRC and industry for new as well as operating nuclear power plants to address the unique failure modes of DI&C systems, specifically common cause failures and their effects. DI&C system CCFs were recognized as having the potential to simultaneously affect systems, channels, divisions, or trains. These failures could negate the defense-in-depth features assumed to be adequate in the traditional analog systems that the DI&C systems are replacing. The deterministic guidance is based, in part, on digital system development processes, and methods recognized for producing quality software and known to avoid, remove, detect, or tolerate the effects of faults including those leading to DI&C software CCF. Other parts of the process include the use or development of highly reliable hardware. Because these processes and methods have not been shown to be fully effective, acceptance guidelines or metrics are needed to establish a DI&C system's overall quality and reliability.

Current deterministic guidance is designed to ensure adequate defense-in-depth such that the effects of a DI&C system CCF are appropriately limited. Defense-in-depth is judged to be adequate if the acceptance criteria of NUREG-0800, “Standard Review Plan [SRP] for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants,” Chapter 7, “Instrumentation and Controls,” BTP 7-19 are met.
The current methodology for a deterministic defense-in-depth and diversity (D3) assessment considers a DI&C system CCF as a beyond design basis event, and, therefore, DI&C CCFs are not required to be included as part of a traditional single failure analysis. Consequently, the methodology uses best estimate analysis and acceptance criteria to evaluate the effect of each single postulated CCF coincident with each design basis accident and anticipated operational occurrence. Therefore, in addition to a traditional single failure criterion evaluation, the staff also evaluates DI&C system defense-in-depth and diversity with respect to beyond design basis DI&C system CCFs. Attributes of the above guidance and methodology include Commission policy (SRM 93-087), conclusions, and direction that:

- A DI&C system CCF (particularly of software), although credible, is expected to be relatively rare.
- DI&C system CCFs are analyzed as beyond design basis events.
- The assessment may be performed using best-estimate (realistic assumptions) analyses.
- For a postulated DI&C system CCF that could disable a safety function, a diverse means to accomplish the safety function (i.e., a method unlikely to be subject to the same CCF) should be provided.
- The diverse means may be a different function and may be performed by a non-safety system of sufficient quality to perform the necessary function under the associated event conditions.
- A set of displays and controls independent and diverse from the computer-based safety systems should be provided in the control room for manual actuation and monitoring of critical safety functions. These displays need not be safety related.

Experience with implementation of the above deterministic guidance has shown that significant NRC effort has been necessary in the evaluation of whether D3 is adequate. Although issues have been identified with operating reactors as well as with 10 CFR Part 52 new reactor design certification (DC) and combined operating license (COL) applications, the review of DI&C systems is more challenging for operating reactors. One of the main reasons for the additional challenge is that with a DI&C retrofit of an operating plant, the same degree of defense-in-depth may not be available for each event in the safety analysis for the DI&C system that was provided by the analog system prior to the retrofit.

The first advanced reactor design applicants submitted limited information about their proposed DI&C systems in part because the DI&C technology was changing rapidly and it was determined that it was not prudent to freeze the DI&C designs years prior to plant construction. The proposed DI&C designs for the Advanced Boiling Water Reactor, System 80+, AP600, and AP1000 reactors were submitted to the NRC. Each of the vendors developed design-specific PRAs that modeled the DI&C systems at a high level. High-level modeling was necessary since DI&C design details were postponed until the COL stage.
New reactors licensed under 10 CFR Part 52 are required to have a PRA (a design-specific PRA at the DC stage as well as site-specific PRA at the COL stage) and are reviewed using NUREG-800, “Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants,” Chapter 7, “Instrumentation and Controls,” for deterministic guidance and Chapter 19, “Severe Accidents,” and Section 19.0, “Probabilistic Risk Assessment and Severe Accident evaluation for New Reactors,” for PRA review guidance.

However, due to data limitations and the lack of consensus in the technical community on appropriate modeling tools, the assessment of DI&C system risk for new plants has been limited to examining assumptions, performing sensitivity studies, and evaluating importance measure values. The resulting plant risk then is assessed against the Commission’s Safety Goals.

While a variety of methods might be acceptable for some applications, the NRC is not yet confident in how specific decisions should be mapped to levels of PRA detail. While bounding PRA analyses may provide needed insights in very specific cases, the Commission has made it clear that it believes that realistic risk assessments should be performed whenever possible because bounding analyses may mask important safety insights and can distort a plant’s risk profile, and bounding analysis may not adequately address unique digital system failure modes. NRC reviewers should be aware that bounding risk analyses may alter or cover up safety insights in areas such as importance measure values and sequences identified as dominant and may not be capable of modeling or bounding unique digital failure modes.

Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.200, “An Approach for Determining the Technical Adequacy of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results for Risk-Informed Activities,” provides guidance on evaluating the technical adequacy of PRAs. The RG itself only provides limited guidance on how to model and evaluate DI&C systems. It does not address completeness issues, level of modeling detail needed, or how to address the uncertainties associated with DI&C system modeling and data. Guidance as to what risk metrics are appropriate for evaluating the acceptability of DI&C systems also may be needed. In addition, RG 1.206, “Combined License Applications for Nuclear Power Plants (LWR Edition),” Section C.I.19.5, Technical Adequacy, states, “... that special emphasis should be placed on PRA modeling of novel and passive features in the design, as well as addressing issues related to those features, including but not limited to digital I&C system hardware and software, explosive (squib) valves, and the issue of thermal hydraulic (T-H) uncertainties.” Although there is a lack of consensus in the technical community on whether methods normally employed when performing PRAs are adequate for the purpose of making comprehensive risk-informed decisions for DI&C, the NRC and industry recognize that current PRA methods can provide useful,

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1 Software normally is developed by a team of people who implement the software’s design requirements. Specific software is tailored to those specific requirements, and thus, it is functionally and structurally different from any other software. Accordingly, if a technically sound method or process was employed to obtain a probabilistic parameter of a software, such as its probability of failure, in general this probability cannot be applied to any other software. Therefore, substantial technical justification must be given for assuming a probabilistic parameter from one set of software can be used for different software.
high-level risk information about DI&C systems (e.g., insights on what aspects of, or assumptions about, the DI&C systems are most important, and approximation of the degree to which the risk associated with operation of these systems is sensitive to failure rate assumptions).

The NRC established the Risk-Informing Digital Instrumentation and Control Task Working Group (TWG # 3) to address issues related to the risk assessment of DI&C systems. The TWG # 3’s efforts are consistent with the NRC’s policy statement on PRA, which states in part that the NRC supports the use of PRA in regulatory matters “to the extent supported by the state-of-the-art in PRA methods and data and in a manner that complements the NRC’s deterministic approach and supports the NRC’s traditional defense-in-depth philosophy.” One aspect of the charter of TWG # 3 is to resolve the following problem statement:

Existing guidance does not provide sufficient clarity on how to use current methods to properly review models of DI&C systems in PRAs for design certificate applications or COL applications under Part 52. The issue includes addressing CCF modeling and uncertainty analysis associated with DI&C systems.

This ISG clarifies the criteria the staff will use to evaluate new reactor DI&C risk assessments.

4. STAFF POSITION

The difficulties and limitations associated with performing a risk assessment of DI&C systems are discussed in the Background section of this guidance document. The PRA reviewer should work closely with the I&C reviewer in the evaluation process. The DI&C risk assessment methods have the potential to disclose design problems in DI&C systems that are significant. The level of uncertainty associated with DI&C risk assessment results and insights (in part due to a lack of consensus in the technical community over acceptable PRA models for DI&C risk assessments and limited applicable data) is high.

To date, the reviews of risk assessments for the ABWR, AP600, and AP1000 designs and more recent work conducted by the NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research have provided limited but important insights into DI&C systems, in particular in identifying assumptions and parameters that must be assured to be valid in the as-built, as-operated nuclear power plant. To ensure confidence in the validity of the insights drawn from PRAs, the NRC staff normally would evaluate the PRA against the guidance outlined in RG 1.200. However, RG 1.200 provides limited information on how to review the DI&C system portion of the PRA model. As a result, the NRC has developed guidance on how to review DI&C system risk assessments based on the lessons learned from previously accepted new reactor DI&C system PRA reviews.

The attributes outlined here should help a reviewer identify the areas of the DI&C design and operation that warrant additional regulatory attention and should help identify whether there are high-level, risk-significant problems, including the existence of risk outliers in a DI&C system. Potential challenges that might be identified include the following three examples:
• Installation of the system would raise the frequency of low risk contributors to an unacceptable level.

• Installation of the system would introduce significant new failure modes not previously analyzed.

• Areas of the DI&C system design (i.e., hardware or software) are in need of additional regulatory attention (e.g., coverage under Technical Specifications, enhanced treatment, or improved reliability goals under the Maintenance Rule).

Based on PRA reviews the NRC has previously performed on new reactor DI&C systems and recent research activities, the following 12 review guidelines are provided. The review should consider the following steps, as applicable, to ensure that the risk contributions from DI&C, including software, are reflected adequately in the overall plant risk results:

1. Review the DI&C portion of the PRA as an integrated part of the overall PRA review. Perform all the normal aspects of a PRA review including evaluation of the quality of the PRA. The level of review of the DI&C portion of the PRA may be limited due to limitations such as the lack of design details, lack of applicable data, and the lack of consensus in the technical community regarding acceptable modeling techniques for determining the risk significance of the DI&C system. The level of review should be proportional to the use of results and insights from the applicant’s DI&C risk assessment.

2. The modeling of DI&C systems should include the identification of how DI&C systems can fail and what these failures can affect. The failure modes of DI&C systems are often identified by the performance of failure modes and effects analyses (FMEA). It is difficult to define DI&C system failure modes especially for software because they occur in various ways depending on specific applications. Also, failure modes, causes, or effects often are intertwined or defined ambiguously, and sometimes overlap or are contradictory. The reviewer should review the depth of the FMEA or other hazard analysis techniques employed by the applicant to ensure the process employed is systematic and comprehensive in its identification of failure modes. The reviewer should work with the I&C reviewer to evaluate the methodology and results provided by the applicant. Examine applicant documentation to ensure that the most significant failure modes of the DI&C risk assessment are documented with a description of the sequence of events that need to take place to fail the system. The sequence of events should realistically represent the system’s behavior at the level of detail of the model.

3. The DI&C CCF events should be identified by the applicant and the bases provided for grouping of CCFs. Review the discussion of how the applicant determined the probabilities associated with CCFs. The reviewer should work closely with the I&C reviewer to evaluate the applicant’s justifications.
4. Uncertainties in DI&C modeling and data should be addressed in the DI&C risk assessment. It is expected that the DI&C risk assessment will address uncertainties by at least performing a number of sensitivity studies that vary modeling assumptions, reliability data, and parameter values both at the component and system level. The reviewer should evaluate the sensitivity studies performed by the applicant on the PRA models and data to assess the effect of uncertainty on CDF, risk, and PRA insights. Sensitivity studies may be particularly helpful in assessing the effectiveness of design attributes such as a diverse actuation system (DAS) or defensive measure in limiting DI&C uncertainties, including that of software.

As with any risk assessment, a reviewer should determine if the applicant has performed a balanced assessment of prevention and mitigation, and has considered the need to increase regulatory attention to aspects of the design or operation based on the sensitivity studies and other risk insights. If a risk outlier challenges the Safety Goals, the reviewer should document this determination, evaluate whether the scenario or set of failure events is very unlikely, and submit the reviewer’s analysis to the reviewer’s management.

Although this ISG does not support, nor is it intended to provide, guidance on risk-informed decision making, additional support for the review and treatment of uncertainties is provided by NUREG-1855, “Guidance on the Treatment of Uncertainties Associated with PRAs in Risk-Informed Decision making,” dated November 2007.

5. The reviewer should confirm that DI&C system equipment is capable of meeting its safety function for the environment assumed in the PRA.

6. The reviewer should confirm that the impact of external events (i.e., seismic, fire, high winds, flood and others) has been addressed with regard to DI&C. A specific concern is the impact of fire on DI&C systems.

7. Evaluate the acceptability of how the failure of control room indication is modeled. Coordinate with the I&C reviewer.

8. Important scope, boundary condition, and modeling assumptions need to be determined and evaluated. Verify that the assumptions made in developing the PRA model and data are realistic, and that the associated technical justifications are sound and documented. The reviewer should pay attention to assumptions about the potential effects from failure of defensive measures. A DI&C defensive measure may have the unintended consequence of causing spurious trips or spuriously failing functional capabilities. The applicant should describe the segregation process that prevents this from occurring. The reviewer should work with the I&C reviewer to evaluate the process discussed by the applicant.

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2 i.e., measures that provide DI&C fault prevention, removal, and tolerance, e.g., memory allocation, network/bus design features, automatic tester system, diagnostics, and DAS.
9. The reviewer should evaluate the acceptability of the recovery actions taken for loss of DI&C functions, referring to RG 1.200 and HRA Good Practices NUREGs for additional guidance. Coordinate the review with staff evaluating areas such as main control room design, and minimum alarms and controls inventory. If recovery actions are modeled, they should consider loss of instrumentation and the time available to complete such action.

10. Verify that a method for quantifying the contribution of software failures to DI&C system reliability was used and documented.

11. Systems and components necessary to ensure that the DI&C system remains highly reliable and available should be in an implementation and monitoring program. It is important to evaluate claims by applicants regarding the credit that should be given for defensive design features. Verify that key assumptions from the DI&C PRA are captured under the applicant’s design reliability assurance program (D-RAP), which is described in SRP Chapter 17, Section 17.4. The applicant should describe adequately where and how the D-RAP captures the DI&C system key assumptions, such as how future software and hardware modifications will be conducted to ensure that high reliability and availability are maintained over the life of the plant.

12. Resources expended to review an application regarding DI&C data should be proportional to the intended use of the PRA results. If limited use is made, limited review is more appropriate.

Additional Steps:

The following 10 additional steps, as applicable, are included if a more detailed review is needed (e.g., through field audits):

1. Verify that physical and logical dependencies are identified and their bases provided in the DI&C PRA. The probabilistic model should encompass all relevant dependencies of a DI&C system on its support systems. For example, if the same DI&C hardware is used for implementing several DI&C systems that perform different functions, a failure in the hardware, software, or system of the DI&C platform may adversely affect all these functions. Should these functions be needed at the same time, they would be affected simultaneously. This impact should be explicitly included in the probabilistic model. The DI&C probabilistic model should be fully integrated with the probabilistic model of other systems. Coordinate with the I&C reviewer.

2. Ensure that spurious actuations of diverse backup systems or functions are evaluated and the overall risk impact documented.

3. Common cause failures can occur in areas where there is sharing of design, application, or functional attributes, or where there is sharing of environmental challenges. Review the extent to which the DI&C systems were examined by the applicant to determine the existence of such areas.
Each of the areas found to share such attributes should be evaluated in the DI&C analysis to determine where CCF should be modeled and to estimate their contribution. Based on the results of this evaluation, D&IC software and/or hardware/software dependent CCFs may need to be applied in several areas within subsystems (e.g., logic groups), among subsystems of the same division, across divisions or trains, and across systems. For example, CCF assignments should be based on similarity in design and function of component or system modules.

The CCF events should be identified and modeled by the applicant. The CCF probabilities and their bases should be evaluated and provided based on an evaluation of coupling mechanisms (e.g., similarity, design defects, external events, and environmental effects) combined with an evaluation of defensive measures meant to protect against CCF (e.g., separation/independence, operational testing, maintenance, diagnostics, self-testing, fault tolerance, and software/hardware design/development techniques and processes). Failures of system modules common across multiple applications should be identified (e.g., CCF of common function modules). If the safety functions of a DI&C system (and the redundancy within safety functions) use common software, dependency should be identified for software faults. That is, when common software is used for different safety functions (or in the redundancy within a safety function) it may fail each function. Hardware CCF between different safety functions using the same hardware should be identified. Dependencies between hardware and software should be identified. The applicant should provide the rationale for the degree of dependency assumed for DI&C CCF.

An important expectation is that the applicant included sufficient equipment in the CCF groups. The evaluation should address why various channels, trains, systems, etc. were or were not placed in each CCF group. The justification should discuss common software/hardware among the equipment considered and the level(s) of dependency among them. The reviewer should work with the I&C reviewer to evaluate the applicant’s justifications.

4. It is important to evaluate claims by applicants regarding the credit that should be given for defensive design features. Design features such as fault tolerance, diagnostics, and self testing are intended to increase the safety of DI&C systems, and therefore are expected to have a positive effect on the system’s safety.

However, these features also may have a negative impact on the safety of DI&C systems if they are not designed properly or fail to operate appropriately. The potentially negative effects of these features should be included in the probabilistic model. The PRA should account for the possibility that after a failure is detected, the system may fail to reconfigure properly, may be set up into a configuration that is less safe than the original, may fail to mitigate the failure altogether, or the design feature itself may contain the fault. The benefits of these features also may be credited in the PRA. Care should be taken to ensure that design features intended to improve safety are modeled correctly (e.g., ensuring
that the beneficial impacts of these features are only credited for appropriate failure modes and that the limitations, including failure of the design feature itself, is considered in the model).

An issue associated with including a design feature such as fault-tolerance in a DI&C system modeled in a PRA is that its design may be such that it can only detect, and hence mitigate, certain types of failures. A feature may not detect all the failure modes of the associated component, but just the ones it was designed to detect. The PRA model should only give credit to the ability of these features to automatically mitigate these specific failure modes; it should consider that all remaining failure modes cannot be automatically tolerated. Those failure modes that were not tested should not be considered in the fault coverage, and should be included explicitly in the logic model.

When a specific datum from a generic database, such as a failure rate of a digital component, is used in a DI&C risk assessment, the risk analyst, in conjunction with the I&C reviewer, should assess whether the datum was adjusted for the contribution of design features specifically intended to limit those postulated failures. If so, the failure rate may be used in the PRA, but no additional fault coverage should be applied to the component, unless it is demonstrated that the two fault coverages are independent. Otherwise, applying the same or similar fault coverages would generate a non-conservative estimate of the component’s failure rate. A fault-tolerant feature of a DI&C system can be explicitly included either in the logic model or in the PRA data, but not both.

With respect to the above design features, the concept of fault coverage is used to express the probability that a failure will be tolerated for the types of failures that were tested. Fault coverage is a function of the failures that were used in testing. It is essential that the reviewer be aware of the types of failures that were used in testing to apply a value of fault coverage to a PRA model.

How fault coverage is measured and defined should be evaluated by the risk analyst in conjunction with the I&C reviewer.

5. If a DI&C system shares a communication network with other DI&C systems, the effects on all systems due to failures of the network should be modeled jointly. The impact of communication faults on the related components or systems should be evaluated, and any failure considered relevant should be included in the probabilistic model.

6. If hardware, software, and system CCF probabilities are treated together in the PRA and if the applicant uses standard methods such as the multiple Greek letter method, alpha factor method, or beta factor method to model DI&C system CCFs, an NRC audit of these calculations, their bases, and the modeling assumptions may be warranted.

7. The data for hardware failure rates (including CCF) will likely be more robust than the software failure data. Review of applicant claims
regarding data should be proportional to the use made of the PRA results. If limited use is made, limited review is necessary. If the applicant claims extremely low CCF rates (especially for software), an NRC audit of data calculations may be warranted. Data (either public or system-specific) have been a limiting factor in the evaluation of risk for DI&C systems. The guidelines in Subsection 4.5.6, “Data analysis,” of the ASME standard for PRA, ASME RA-S-2002 and Addenda, for nuclear power plant applications should be satisfied consistent with the clarifications and qualifications of RG 1.200. Determine if the process used to determine basic event probabilities is reasonable. Check the assumptions made in calculating the probabilities of basic events (unavailabilities). Confirm that the data used in the PRA are appropriate for the hardware and software version being modeled, or that adequate justification is provided.

Note that a fault-tolerant feature of a DI&C system (or one of its components) can be explicitly included either in the logic model or in the probabilistic data of the components in the model. It should not be included in both because this would result in double-counting the feature’s contribution.

8. If the values of the data used appear to be skewed and use of different values might change the insights drawn from the DI&C risk assessment, confirm that the data meet the following criteria:

a. The data are obtained from the operating experience of the same equipment as that being evaluated, and preferably in the same or similar applications and operating environment. Uncertainty bounds should appropriately reflect the level of uncertainty. (Applies to both component-specific and generic data)

b. The sources for raw data or generic databases are provided. (Applies to both component-specific and generic data)

c. The method used in estimating the parameters is documented, so that the results can be reproduced. (Applies to component-specific data)

d. If the system being modeled is qualified for its environment but the data obtained are not drawn from systems qualified for that environment, the data should account for the differences in application environments. (Applies to both component-specific and generic data)

e. Data for CCF meet the above criteria in 8a to 8d. (Applies to both component-specific and generic data, as appropriate)

f. Data for fault coverage meet the above criteria in 8a to 8d. (Applies to both component-specific and generic data, as appropriate)
g. Documentation is included on how the basic event probabilities are calculated in terms of failure rates, mission times, and test and maintenance frequencies. (Applies to both component-specific and generic data)

9. The use of DI&C systems in nuclear power plants raises the issue of dynamic interactions, specifically:
   a. The interactions between a plant system and the plant's physical processes, (i.e., the value of process variables), and
   b. The interactions within a DI&C system (e.g., communication between different components, multi-tasking, multiplexing, etc.).

The reviewer should confirm that interactions have been addressed in the PRA model for DI&C systems or should evaluate the rationale for not modeling them.

10. Target reliability and availability specifications should be described adequately for the operational phase of D-RAP (details of the operational phase are provided in SRP Section 17.6). If the PRA lacks sufficient quantitative results to determine target values, the applicant should describe adequately how expert judgment will establish reliability and availability goals. How the applicant will carry out performance monitoring for diverse backup systems (if necessary) and DI&C systems should be clearly explained. These specified values should be defined to help ensure that no safety conclusions based on review of the risk analysis of the DI&C are compromised once the plant is operational. Coordinate this review with NRC staff evaluating the DI&C system's D3 capabilities. An implementation and monitoring program should address how the applicant will ensure that the design continues to reflect the assumed reliability of the systems and components during plant operation.
5. **ACRONYMS**

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<tr>
<td>ABWR</td>
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<tr>
<td>AP600</td>
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<td>CDF</td>
<td>core damage frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFR</td>
<td>Code of Federal Regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL</td>
<td>combined operating license</td>
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<tr>
<td>D3</td>
<td>defense-in-depth and diversity</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>design acceptance criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAS</td>
<td>diverse actuation system</td>
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<td>DC</td>
<td>design certification</td>
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<td>DI&amp;C</td>
<td>digital instrumentation and control</td>
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<td>ESF</td>
<td>engineered safeguards feature</td>
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<td>FMEA</td>
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<td>General Electric Company</td>
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<td>HRA</td>
<td>human reliability assessment</td>
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<td>I&amp;C</td>
<td>instrumentation and control</td>
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<td>large early release frequency</td>
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<td>NRC</td>
<td>Nuclear Regulatory Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLS</td>
<td>plant control system</td>
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<td>PMS</td>
<td>protection and safety monitoring system</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRA</td>
<td>probabilistic risk assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAW</td>
<td>risk achievement worth</td>
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<td>RG</td>
<td>regulatory guide</td>
</tr>
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<td>RTNNS</td>
<td>regulatory treatment of non-safety systems</td>
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<tr>
<td>SYSTEM 80+</td>
<td>a new nuclear reactor design from the former Combustion Engineering Company</td>
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<td>TWG-3</td>
<td>Task Working Group # 3</td>
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6. REFERENCES


Insights from Risk Assessments Performed for the ABWR and AP1000 DI&C Systems

The following are insights drawn from previously reviewed new reactor DI&C system risk assessments (i.e., from the ABWR and AP1000 design certification reviews).

1. The absolute value of the contribution to CDF and risk from failure of DI&C systems is low for these designs, as modeled.

2. The estimated CDF is not very sensitive to changes in single DI&C component failure probabilities or in initiating event frequencies.

3. The Risk Achievement Worth (RAW) values for CCF of DI&C components are very high (i.e., the RAW values for DI&C CCFs reported by reactor vendors in their PRAs were the highest of all structures, systems, and components modeled in the PRA). Note that high RAW values may be driven by other assumptions used in the sensitivity assessment.

4. The inclusion of a diverse backup system (e.g., DAS) in the AP1000 design (which automatically or manually actuates selected safety systems) is intended to reduce the probability of a severe accident resulting from a postulated DI&C CCF coincident with a postulated transient or accident. The DAS helps compensate for uncertainties in DI&C system CCF assumptions (i.e., failure rates and failure modes and their effects), especially software.

5. Most of the dominant contributors to CDF and risk normally found in a risk assessment for operating reactors have been “designed away” for these designs. One result of this is that human errors associated with DI&C system failures have become more important contributors to CDF, although the expected frequency of these failures leading to core damage is low.

6. There are significant uncertainties in the data used to estimate DI&C system contributions to CDF and risk.

For the AP1000 design, the following specific six important insights were gained from the risk assessment performed for the DI&C systems:

1. The use of two redundant and diverse systems with automatic and manual actuation capability (one is safety related and the other non-safety related, e.g., DAS) reduces the likelihood of actuation failures, including beyond design basis DI&C common-cause DI&C failures. The non-safety-related DAS is
projected to be a reliable system capable of providing a reactor trip and engineered safeguards features (ESF) actuation along with operator indications that are all diverse from the protection and safety monitoring system (PMS). The DAS also provides manual reactor trip and manual ESF capabilities. The DAS receives signals directly from dedicated sensors and uses redundant signal processing units that use hardware and software diverse from the PMS. The redundant and diverse actuation capabilities reduce the probability of a severe accident that potentially results from the unlikely coincidence of postulated transients and postulated DI&C CCF in the AP1000 design.

2. The DI&C-related systems and components with the highest RAW values are as follows:
   a. Software for the PMS and plant control system (PLS) logic cards
   b. PMS ESF software components, such as input logic software, output logic software, and actuation logic software
   c. PMS ESF manual input multiplexer software
   d. PMS ESF hardware components, such as output drivers and input logic groups
   e. PMS reactor trip logic hardware.

3. No CCF of software has high Fussell-Vesely importance measure values (i.e., a measure of how important a failure is including its likelihood of occurrence, or a measure of the importance of a component being down including its likelihood of being down) in the AP1000 PRA because software was assumed to be highly reliable. When the NRC’s review performed sensitivity studies, it became clear that these assumptions were very important. Requirements were imposed on the AP1000 design to help ensure that software will be built with processes recognized to result in highly reliable software (i.e., at least as highly reliable as assumed in the sensitivity studies).

4. Major contributors to uncertainty associated with CCF of DI&C include the following:
   a. CCF probability of hardware in the PMS ESF input logic groups
   b. CCF probabilities of several sensor groups
   c. CCF of the automatic reactor trip portion of the PMS (hardware and software)
   d. Failure probabilities of the automatic DAS function (hardware and software).

5. The plant risk is sensitive to the “hot short” failure assumptions in the fire risk analysis. The AP1000 design incorporates features to minimize the consequences of hot shorts. Examples include the use of a valve controller
circuit for which multiple hot shorts need to occur before a valve position will change, physical separation of potential hot short locations (e.g., routing of Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) cables in low-voltage cable trays and the use of “arm” and “fire” signals from separate PMS cabinets), and provisions for operator action to remove power from the fire zone to prevent spurious actuation of the ADS valves. Current guidance on hot shorts can be found in NUREG/CR-6850.

6. DAS reduced uncertainties for the decision of what equipment should go into regulatory treatment of non-safety systems (RTNSS).

The AP1000 PRA shows that the AP1000 design is significantly less dependent on human actions for assuring safety than are operating reactors. Even so, because the estimated CDF for the AP1000 design is so low and the risk from so many initiating events has been designed away, certain operator errors become significant contributors relative to the estimated AP1000 CDF from internal events. These errors include the following:

- Failure of the operator to manually actuate safety systems through DAS, given failure to do so through PMS.
- Failure of the operator to manually actuate containment sump recirculation (when automatic actuation fails).
- Failure of the operator to manually trip the reactor via PMS or DAS within one minute (given automatic trip failed).