

## 4.2.2.2. Somervell County Emergency Operations Center and Traffic/Access Control Point

Criterion 1.a.1: The Somervell County Sheriff's Dispatch Communications Center (911 Communications Center) in Glen Rose, Texas received the Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) from the Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP) over a dedicated hotline at 0755. A facsimile (fax) of the message arrived immediately, which verified the notification as part of the local and plant procedures. Subsequent Emergency Classification Level (ECL) notifications and changes were made in a similar manner; however, the 911 Communications Center transferred these responsibilities to the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) when it was declared operational at 0844.

The initial information was given to the County Judge, who served as the Emergency Management Director (EMD). He requested that the EOC be activated and staff mobilized using the Code Red Emergency Communication Network callout system at 0803. The 911 Communications Center maintained the Somervell County EOC Staff Log-In for all staff, observers, controllers, and evaluators during the event. Key staff emergency personnel arrived at the EOC, and the EMD declared the facility operational at 0844. The EMD called to have his backup placed on standby and made coordination calls with the Hood County EOC to verify communications and status.

The Unusual Event (NOUE) and ALERT ECL notifications were received by the 911 Communications Center at 0755 and 0829, respectively, using the dedicated hotline and faxes. The EOC received the Site Area Emergency (SAE) at 1009 and the General Emergency (GE) at 1056 using the dedicated hotline and faxes. A second shift roster was provided to assure that enough staff was available to support two 12-hour shifts for continuous 24-hour operation, if needed. The County Judge conducted briefings for the EOC staff following receipt of these ECL changes.

Criterion 1.c.1: Following the notification from the Code Red Emergency Communications Network via cell phone, the Somervell County Judge arrived at the county Emergency Operations Center (EOC) at 0803. Once there, the County Judge took the role as the Emergency Management Director (EMD) and was identified as the individual in charge of the overall operation within the county jurisdiction as indicted in the Emergency Management Plan for Somervell County. From 0803 to 0829, the County Judge directed the communications staff in the dispatch center to initiate the calldown procedures for the essential staff members to report to the EOC. The other

staff members were directed by the County Judge to be on standby. Throughout the operations, the County Judge worked and coordinated with the other essential staff members at the EOC to ensure that all the necessary functions were carried out accurately and in a timely fashion. Other avenues used by the County Judge included coordination between the Texas Department of Transportation (TXDot) for traffic impediment removal and Texas Department of State Health Services (DSHS) for the administration of potassium iodide (KI). The evacuation of the schools within the Glen Rose Independent School District (ISD) and the Glen Rose Medical Center nursing facility and the implementation of traffic and access control points were all carried out by the other members at the county EOC with little or no problems through the entire operations. All members present at the county EOC were kept up-to-date with the overall response due to the several briefings made by the County Judge on scheduled intervals or following a major change in the plant's Emergency Classification Level (ECL). The County Judge also had the members at the county EOC report directly to him when an assigned task had been completed. The assistant to the County Judge recorded all of the completed tasks for operational purposes as well as for documentation. The assistant would then ensure that all of the completed task information was posted and updated on the dry erase boards in the county EOC.

Criterion 1.d.1: The primary communications systems at the 911 Communications Center and the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) worked effectively and without disruption. The EOC demonstrated that primary and backup systems were available and operational. The EOC maintained successful communications with local exercise players, the Hood County EOC, and with State of Texas supporting agencies. These communications included telephone lines, dedicated hard-lines, cell phones, dispatch radios, and dedicated radio frequencies to the plant.

The EOC and 911 Communications Center used NORSTAR Multiline telephones, which had a dedicated line for the plant. These telephones were used for exercise and real-world communications received by the dispatch center. A Brother Intellifax 2800 machine was located in the 911 center where faxes from the plant were received, recorded, and delivered to the staff.

The radio used for communications with the Somervell County Sheriff's Office, Somervell County Volunteer Fire Department, the Department of Public Safety Waco Office, and the affected medical facilities was the ZETRON 4010 (40-100 watts) model dispatch radio. Although no staff was assigned handheld radios, they were available to augment pagers and cell phones if necessary should staff need to exit the facility.

These Kenwood Radios were operational.

The Code Red Emergency Communication Network system used by the EOC and 911 Communications Center was effectively programmed to notify specific or identified groups for notification or information sharing. This system was used for initial EOC staff activation, but mass notification to the public was simulated during the exercise.

The EOC staff had commercial telephone lines and many had cell phones for contact with plant, State and county officials, and exercise participants. No local email communications were observed during the exercise. There were no communications or equipment failures that occurred during this exercise.

Criterion 1.e.1: The Somervell County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) had sufficient maps, displays, copiers, computers, printers, fax machines, and supplies to support the exercise.

Maps displayed included a large MAPSCO map of the State of Texas, plus several 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) maps showing the evacuation routes, population distribution, waterways, and one with an overlay and moveable arrow indicating changes in wind direction. This map also had tags affixed which identified the number of special needs persons in each sub-zone. The evacuation status board tracked start and finish times for evacuation of schools, special needs population facilities, and zones. Dry-erase boards were available to document additional information. The EOC was also equipped with a projection screen and an overhead projector linked to a computer equipped with a Code Red Emergency Communication Network system. This computer projector setup allowed various forms, injects, chronological events tracking, and communications to be displayed on the screen.

Dosimetry and potassium iodide (KI) for the EOC emergency workers were stored in the EOC supply cabinet. There were 40 Panasonic thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs), 17 Merlin Gerin Model DMC100 electronic dosimeters (DRDs) that were set to alarm at 200mR. The electronic dosimeters had been calibrated on 08/06. A Thermo Surveyor 50, Model 1911 Survey Meter with a range of 0-500 thousand counts per minute (CPM) was stored in the EOC. The meter had a calibration date of 08/31/06 and a due date of 08/31/07. A CS-137 test source was used to check the instrument. There were 260 KI kits with instructions and an expiration date of August 2013. The survey equipment and dosimetry used during the exercise were operationally checked prior to using.

Criterion 2.a.1: Somervell County adopts a radiation exposure control plan promulgated in the Texas Department of State Health Services Emergency Management Plan. A copy of the plan was present in the EOC. The Radiological Officer (RO) directs the county's administration of that plan.

The plan consists of exposure guidelines for emergency workers, the administration of potassium iodide (KI), the issuance of dosimeters, and the use of survey instruments. A Sheriff's Deputy was called to the EOC and those simulated elements of the plan were satisfactorily demonstrated or satisfied by interview of the Deputy and the RO. The RO was familiar with the exposure guidelines in the plan, and he had procedures in place to control the monitoring and recordkeeping of exposures to ensure compliance. The RO demonstrated the issuance of dosimetry and KI to the Sheriff's Deputy. He instructed the Sheriff's Deputy on the exposure turnback limits and on how to wear his issued TLD and Merlin Gerin alarming dosimeter. Issuance of KI was simulated, but the RO provided thorough instructions on the drug's purpose, dosages, and potential side effects.

A decision was made to do a precautionary evacuation of zone 2A at the Site Area Emergency classification before there was any radioactivity released from the site. Therefore, no dose impediments were present for consideration, and the traffic and access control point locations established were upwind. This decision was predicated upon the proximity of zone 2A to the Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP) and the evacuation of non-essential personnel from the CPNPP.

Criterion 2.b.2: Once the Somervell County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) received the Site Area Emergency (SAE) notification from the Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP) at 1009, the decision was made to evacuate the county population within zone 2A, the Glen Rose Independent School District (ISD), and the Glen Rose Medical Center Nursing facility as a precautionary action. This decision was derived from coordination between the County Judge, the Director of Administration for Glen Rose ISD, the Glen Rose Medical Center representative, Somervell County Sheriff's Office, and the CPNPP representative. This type of coordination helped the County Judge gather input from the subject matter experts on hand to make the most accurate decision for the situation. Upon each change in the plant's emergency status or weather condition, this same coordination occurred with the County Judge and the staff member that contained the expertise needed to help produce a sound decision. Dose projections from the plant were always discussed between the CPNPP Liaison at

the county EOC and the County Judge as to what the projected levels offsite were and how that would affect the population downwind. Once the plant notified the Somervell County EOC that a radiological release had occurred at 1056, the County Judge again consulted with the subject matter experts on-hand to develop their approach for evacuating the affected zones. At 1109, Zones 2B, 2D, and 2E were evacuated with Zones 2F and 2G sheltering-in-place.

Following the radiological release at the plant, the Texas Department of State Health Services (DSHS) Liaison informed the County Judge that the State was issuing potassium iodide (KI) for State emergency workers, but noted that this was just information only and not a recommendation. At 1142, after consulting the County Sheriff's representative and the Emergency Management Coordinator, it was agreed that since no emergency workers would be directly affected by the release, the administration of KI was not needed.

The Somervell and Hood County Judges showed evidence of coordination with the protective action decisions ranging from the siren activation to the broadcasting of the EAS message to the public. The first EAS message was sent by the Hood County EOC to notify the population for both counties at 1038. The supplemental information pertaining to Somervell County was sent separately to the broadcasting radio station since it contained actions that affected different zones. The County Judges were continually aware of the evacuation and shelter-in-place orders that were directed to the affected population in the other contiguous county.

Criterion 2.c.1: The initial notification was made to the Glen Rose Independent School District (ISD) principals after the ALERT notification was received from the Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP) at 0829 by the Code Red Emergency Communication Network system. Once the emergency classification level reached the Site Area Emergency (SAE) the County Judge, in consultation with the Director of Administration for Glen Rose ISD, made the precautionary decision at 1015 to evacuate zone 2A and the Glen Rose ISD to the Stephenville Relocation Center. The Director of Administration was tasked to notify the school principals and initiate the notification of the bus drivers per their procedures. The County Judge and the Director of Administration demonstrated effective decision making techniques that provided prompt notification to the schools. Although the decision to evacuate the schools was precautionary for the SAE level, consideration was taken by the County Judge from the other members present, such as the County Sheriff, on how this would impact the traffic flow from the area. With this coordination, additional traffic access and control points

were established.

Because of the current wind direction and a vehicle accident at SR-144 and US-67, the County Judge directed the Director of Administration to send the students to the Stephenville Relocation Center instead of to Cleburne. The evacuation was recorded as being completed at 1034.

Criterion 3.a.1: The Radiological Officer (RO) set up a table in the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) lobby for dosimetry and potassium iodide (KI) distribution. At 1040, thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) were issued to EOC personnel. A tracking form was initiated for each person. At 1045, the decision was made not to issue KI. It was noted that the decision was subject to change depending on changing conditions of the emergency.

The RO and a Deputy Sheriff were interviewed and demonstrated dosimetry and KI distribution. The Deputy Sheriff was issued a TLD and an electronic dosimeter (DRD) that was set to alarm at 200 mR. A simulated issue of a KI packet was demonstrated with detailed instructions including reason for taking, possible side effects, and doses/times of ingestion. The RO briefed the Deputy Sheriff on dosimetry use and KI ingestion.

The RO recorded and tracked all entries (name, agency, equipment issued, and KI ingestion) on a form that was maintained in the EOC. Both the RO and Deputy Sheriff demonstrated basic knowledge of dosimetry and KI distribution, reading a DRD, and KI ingestion.

The RO maintained a Thermo Surveyor 50 survey meter with a pancake probe at his station to monitor any possibly contaminated personnel desiring to enter the EOC. The instrument was functionally checked with a CS 137 source and remained in ready status throughout the exercise. The RO was well versed in the monitoring process using the survey meter.

Criterion 3.d.1: Three events during the exercise required establishment of traffic and access control. First was the inject at 0949 of a multi-vehicle, fatal traffic accident at SH 144 and Highway 67 intersection just east of Glen Rose, Texas. The second was the precautionary evacuation of zone 2A adjacent to the Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant. The third was the protective action decision to evacuate zones 2B, 2D, and 2E. The Sheriff's office in coordination with the Fire Department and the Texas Department

of Transportation (TXDOT), used the primary roadblocks identified in Somervell County Annex W Attachment G, Evacuation Tab 4 and a well-presented wall chart of the county's roads and highways to help identify, staff, and establish Traffic/Access Contamination Control Points (T/ACPs). These locations were identified, times verified, and posted on a wall board for EOC reference.

The Sheriff's representative in the EOC reported that TXDOT was on scene at the accident assisting with traffic control as the first responders were dealing with the injured and the associated fire from the fuel truck involved in the accident. At 1004 the Sheriff's office relieved TXDOT with the establishment of a T/ACP on SH 144, rerouting traffic back northbound, and two T/ACPs were established on Highway 67 to control eastbound and westbound traffic and offer access to responders as required.

Six pre-identified T/ACP locations were immediately established at 1025 to support the precautionary decision by the County Judge. Additionally, resources for longterm support, use of mutual aid, and Texas Department of Safety augmentation were discussed with the EOC and forwarded to the State.

The protective active decision to evacuate zones 2B, 2D, and 2E was made by the County Judge at 1109. Five T/ACPs were identified and established at 1123 and reported to the EOC by the Sheriff's Office and confirmed by the field.

The Sheriff's office was asked to deploy a T/ACP officer to the EOC to discuss with the evaluator the procedures for restricting and controlling access to the affected areas, associated instruction for the public as to the location of reception centers and decontamination centers when established. This action was taken at 1220 and the interview was completed at 1250.

The law enforcement officer described the equipment requirements and communications procedures at the T/ACP. Also, the officer was knowledgeable about the ongoing exercise and instructions necessary to direct and assist evacuees. He described the verification process for access and how to resolve questions of access to the EOC through the dispatch radio. The officer did not have handouts for the public identifying reception centers but was familiar with roads, the accident inject, and would be able to assist as these are identified and communicated through dispatch and in coordination with the EOC. The officer did have a master copy of the overview EPZ map with the pre-identified reception center locations to show evacuees, but not to handout. He discussed Emergency Worker Decontamination Center locations and how

they would be established and communicated to the T/ACP during activation, as well as any Emergency Classification Level (ECL) changes or expanding protective action decisions.

Criterion 3.d.2: The exercise scenario provided the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) with an early impediment to evacuation with two injects reporting a major accident with 6 confirmed fatalities, 5 burn injuries, and a major gasoline truck fire with hazardous materials considerations. This event closed the intersection of Highway 67 and SH 144 east of Glen Rose. These highways served as evacuation corridors for eastbound evacuees. Complicating this was the bridge removal on Highway 312 that would normally serve as a bypass to the intersection. The Sheriff's Office implemented roadblocks at 1004 and 1006 on Highway 67 east and west of the intersection as well as north on SH 144.

The EOC worked with the State Department of Transportation, Texas Council on Environmental Quality, and on reports from the medical evacuation teams to assist in reopening the highway. The EOC received information that the medical evacuations were completed; however, the EOC formally confirmed at 1122 that the road surface was destroyed and no bypass was feasible at that site. During this time, efforts were unsuccessful at removing this impediment.

Decisions on how to evacuate schools westbound to the Stephenville Relocation were made at 1015 and new routes were chosen. No other impediments were identified during the exercise, but the scenario for removal of impediments was discussed in an interview with one of the Sheriff's officers assigned to traffic control.

During a solicited interview, the law enforcement officer described the potentially available resources to hypothetically move the wreckage should the road surface be useable. These included positioning of wreckers, use of law enforcement vehicles if necessary, and solicitation of tractor or crane services. He discussed the communications available to discuss these options with the EOC staff for further considerations. He understood the HAZMAT conditions that could impact the removal and understood the coordination necessary to complete the task.

Criterion 5.a.1: The County Judge was clearly identified as the protective action decision (PAD) making authority for Somervell County. Direct communication and coordination between the Judge, the Public Information Officer (PIO), and the 911 Communications Center was evident throughout the exercise. When notification of the



public was necessary, the primary method available was sounding of the sirens, which were placed in specific locations within the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ). It was explained by the County Judge that if the situation arose that a siren fails, route alerting by the Sheriff's Office personnel served as the secondary method. The Code Red Emergency Communications Network was also noted as an alternate form of communication to the public, but it was used as primary during the exercise to notify the emergency personnel for the EOC, schools, and relocation centers. Although the sirens were not activated from the Somervell County EOC, the 911 Communications Center staff demonstrated the ability to activate the SS 2000D Federal Signal System for the evaluation. It was explained to the evaluator that the system can be selectively activated for designated zones or county-wide area, as required.

The first and only Emergency Alert System (EAS) message sent to the WBAP was coordinated at 1019 with both County Judges. The message sent from the Hood County EOC was observed to have the basic information required to properly inform the public, with one recommendation. The initial EAS message only contained Hood County in the message as the effected jurisdiction. When there is a joint EAS message, the development of a pre-scripted message with both county jurisdictions noted in the body of the message would better inform the public of the affected area. The first sounding of the sirens was accomplished in the same time and fashion as the EAS message. Since Somervell County completed precautionary actions independent from Hood County, a prescribed special news broadcast message (S-2A-SAE) was sent to WBAP by the Somervell County PIO at 1102 to supplement the initial EAS message. Prior to this action, the PIO made sure to get the Judge's approval and signature before sending the message out to the radio station. This same approval process was initiated and completed by the County Judge and PIO at 1109 for the second prescribed special news broadcast (S-6), which listed protective action decision information concerning the evacuation of zones 2B, 2D, and 2E and shelter-in-place for zones 2F and 2G. The final step for the PIO was the process of faxing the broadcast message to WBAP and the Joint Information Center (JIC) at 1113. The PIO completed a follow-up phone call to each location to confirm the receipt and verification of information. The coordination of joint siren activation between the County Judges occurred at 1113 and was sounded at 1120 followed by the simulated broadcast of the special news broadcast.

Criterion 5.b.1: The Somervell County Public Information Officer (PIO) issued two prescribed special news broadcasts to supplement the initial joint Emergency Alert System (EAS) message sent from the Hood County Emergency Operations Center (EOC). The special news broadcast (S-2A-SAE) was sent to inform the public of the

precautionary actions that had been completed by the Somervell County EOC. Information concerning the precautionary action to evacuation zone 2A was included in the body of this broadcast, but the Glen Rose ISD school evacuation information was not mentioned on the prescribed format. This lack of information concerning school evacuation could have led to traffic impediments from parents trying to drive to the schools to pick-up their children instead of meeting them at the relocation center.

The second special news broadcast (S-6) listed the specific protective action decisions initiated by the County Judge for the affected jurisdiction. This broadcast message included the General Emergency Classification Level (ECL), the evacuation of zones 2B, 2D, 2E, and shelter-in-place for 2F and 2G. This special news broadcast message contained all the basic requirements to properly inform the public.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: 5.b.1.

ISSUE NO.: 14-07-5b1-A-03

ISSUE: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, E.5., 7., G.3.a, G.4.a.b.c)

CONDITION: The Somervell County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and the Hood County EOC coordinated and designated Hood County to release the EAS message which was intended to contain information on both counties. No reference or specific information on Somervell County was contained in the message. The Somervell County EOC released a supplemental special news broadcast message following the EAS message. The supplemental message did not contain required information concerning the precautionary action decision to evacuate the Glen Rose Independent School District schools.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: There was a failure to follow the plan. The EOC staff failed to communicate critical information to the public and/or parents about the precautionary evacuations of the Glen Rose ISD schools utilizing the "Special News Advisory – School & Public Facilities" pre-scripted message contained in the Somervell County Plan, Annex A.

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654 Planning Standard E.5 and E.7; Memorandum from Kay C. Goss to Regional Directors, I-X, dated 2/2/99, on "Guidance for Providing Emergency Information and Instructions to the Public for Radiological Emergencies Using the New Emergency Alert System (EAS)"; Emergency Management Plan for Somervell County Annexes A and I.

EFFECT: Possible confusion, additional traffic flow and overloaded telephone circuits could have been caused due to parents and/or caregivers trying to pick-up students at evacuated schools instead of meeting them at the reception centers.

RECOMMENDATION: Review training and procedures to ensure that the EOC staff address all actions required when Precautionary Action Decisions and Protective Action Decisions are made. Update the Emergency Management Plan prescribed messages to reference both Hood and Somervell County and related information when one county is designated to release messages to the public.

- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### 4.2.2.3. Glen Rose Independent School District

Criterion 3.a.1: By interview, the Glen Rose Independent School District (ISD) demonstrated its ability to provide appropriate exposure control for emergency workers. Bus drivers would be instructed as to where to meet Emergency Operations Center (EOC) personnel for issue of direct-reading dosimeters. Drivers would be issued dosimetry and instructed on exposure limits and turnback values. The Glen Rose ISD has sufficient busses to evacuate the entire student population in one trip. The bus driver was aware that he would not be returning to the district unless specifically instructed to do so.

Criterion 3.c.2: The Glen Rose Independent School District (ISD) demonstrated its ability to implement protective actions for students by both demonstration and interview

at the Glen Rose High School. The Assistant Principal indicated that since the school was in the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) of the Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP) that upon notification of a threat, classes would be cancelled and students evacuated as necessary and as instructed by the Somervell County Emergency Operations Center (EOC). Evacuation capability was demonstrated by the school bus facility supervisor and one bus driver. The demonstration was enacted out-of-sequence on August 29, 2007 at the Glen Rose High School. A simulation phone call from the Somervell County EOC was received at 0835, following the ALERT, advising school evacuation. The supervisor immediately contacted a bus driver by radio and informed him of the evacuation and to report to the loading area. A Transportation Evacuation Plan was present in the supervisor's office that contained detailed information on bus identification and assignment, driver identification, and capacity. The evaluator and a CPNPP controller accompanied the driver on a bus to an elementary school which was his evacuation assignment. When questioned en route, the driver was aware of evacuation routes and procedures including the Cleburne High School and Stephenville Middle School relocation sites. The driver was aware of designated reception centers, the Cleburne Civic Center and the Stephenville Recreation Center, which would be his destination in the event of suspected exposure. The bus driver would also have maps available if an alternate situation arose. The bus used in the demonstration was one of three special needs buses in the fleet of 33 buses operated by the Glen Rose ISD. These buses have the capacity to evacuate the entire student population of the Glen Rose ISD without repeat trips. The bus was equipped with a two-way radio and the driver carried a cell phone as a back-up means of communication. Operation of the radio was successfully demonstrated. When questioned, the driver was aware of the procedure to obtain exposure control dosimetry if necessary. If necessary, the driver would be given instructions on where to meet with EOC personnel to receive dosimetry and instructions. In the event of an actual evacuation, a roster of students being transported on each bus would be given to the bus driver. The driver would provide that information to the relocation site. In addition to the Emergency Alert System (EAS) messages, the Code Red Emergency Notification System would be used to notify the parents of the school evacuation and the relocation center where the students were being held. Release authority records are on file at the school administration building and would be made available to the relocation sites in the event of an evacuation.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 3.a.1, 3.c.2.

- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

## 4.2.3. Private Jurisdictions

### 4.2.3.1. EAS Radio Station WBAP

Criterion 5.a.1: WBAP Radio Station is the primary Emergency Alert System (EAS) station for both Hood and Somervell counties and all the areas surrounding the Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant. The broadcast studio is located at 2221 E. Lamar St., Arlington, Texas. WBAP operates at 820 AM and is a 50,000 watt, clear-channel station. The newsroom operates 24/7 and is staffed with a crew of professional engineers and news anchors.

The Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant EAS plan is similar to the stations “Amber Alert Plan” through the use of a dedicated fax equipped with a visual indicator to expedite immediate action. The staff has access to the written procedures and a binder of prescribed messages.

At 1032 Hood County sounded the sirens for both Hood and Somervell Counties. The initial EAS message (H-1) was received from Hood County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) at 1034 on the dedicated “Amber” fax located in the control room. At 1036, after reviewing the message, the News Director contacted the Hood County EOC to verify receipt of the message, which was clearly marked as a drill, without any requirement for a password. At 1038, the News Anchor on duty simulated the broadcast of the EAS message while the control room staff auto-recorded the message to the EAS control box and simulated the transmission of the message. WBAP is an EAS transmitter and has the capability to retransmit the recorded EAS messages to the media outlets that are in the Hood and Somervell Counties immediately after the broadcast is aired.

At 1057, an incoming fax was received on the dedicated fax; however, one blank page was received. The News Director immediately contacted the Hood County EOC, and

personnel were unable to confirm or verify a message had been faxed. At 1105, a supplemental message (S-2A-SAE) with protective action decisions was received from Somervell County on the backup fax located in the 24-hour newsroom. The News Director contacted the Somervell EOC to confirm receipt and verified the information. The special broadcast of the protective action decisions was simulated and auto recorded at 1111. Again, the control room staff demonstrated recording the simulated broadcast and the transmission of the EAS message.

At 1114, another incoming fax was received on the dedicated "Amber" fax from Somervell County. The county called the News Director to confirm receipt of the supplemental message (S-6) which included the protective action decisions. The special news broadcast was simulated at 1128. Again, EAS transmission process was simulated by the control room staff.

The last supplemental message (H-6) was received on the "Amber" fax at 1129. The receipt of the message was confirmed and the information was verified. The News Director demonstrated the broadcast process in a timely manner while coordinating with the control room staff on the EAS transmission process. All messages received were clearly marked with an EAS message number, EOC authorization name, callback number, date and time sent.

In summary, all objectives for the EAS demonstration were met at this location.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 5.a.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None