## Pressurized Water Reactor Owners Group (PWROG)

# Meeting with NRC on Staggered Integrated ESF/LOOP Testing Topical Report (WCAP-15830, Revision 01)

September 5, 2007

White Flint - Rockville, MD

Dennis Buschbaum Vice Chairman PWROG (TXU)

Joe Congdon (WEC)

Dave Finnicum (WEC)

Dr. Seyavash Karimian (Consultant)

### Staggered Integrated ESF/LOOP Testing, WCAP-15830 **Agenda**

- Introductions and Opening Remarks
- Overview of Methodology and Approach
- Overview of Changes
- Questions and Comments
- Review Schedule
- Summary and Closing

### Staggered Integrated ESF/LOOP Testing, WCAP-15830 WCAP-15830 History

•	04/2003	Submitted WCAP-15830 Revision 0
•	04/0005	Responded to RAIs
•	03/0006	Notified by NRC of intention to not approve
•	08/2006	OG submitted response to NRC concerns (additional RAIs)
•	01/2007	NRC and OG reached agreement on response and a path forward (meeting and conference call)
•	02/2007	Withdrew Revision 0
•	07/2007	Submitted Revision 1

### Staggered Integrated ESF/LOOP Testing, WCAP-15830 Introduction

### Purpose of Meeting

- Provide overview of WCAP-15830-P, Revision 1,
- Re-confirm scope of the review and schedule.

#### Meeting Format

- Overview of Methodology and Approach,
- Overview of Changes,
- Question and Answers,
- Review scope and schedule.

#### Meeting Goals

- Brief reviewers on new revision of WCAP-15830,
- Outline a plan to complete NRC review process

### Staggered Integrated ESF/LOOP Testing, WCAP-15830 **Program Objectives**

- Develop a generic methodology that individual plants may use as a model to apply staggering ESF/LOOP testing at their plant,
  - Extend the test interval of Surveillance Requirements typically addressed by the Integrated ESF/LOOP test to every other refueling outage on a staggered basis.
- Provide plant specific demonstrations as a proof of principle,
- Obtain NRC approval of the Generic Methodology and Approach.

### Staggered Integrated ESF/LOOP Testing, WCAP-15830 Industry Benefits

- Dose / radiation exposure reduction
- Reduced human performance challenges
- Reduction in safety-related equipment wear and tear
- Reduction in RCS mass addition challenges
- Reduced outage time

### Staggered Integrated ESF/LOOP Testing, WCAP-15830 Approach

- Applies a Risk-Informed approach, based on RG 1.174 to demonstrate that any change in risk will be negligible.
- Uses a balanced approach between Risk-Informed and Deterministic assessments
- Consistent with the methodology described in NEI 04-10, Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 5b Risk-Informed Method for Control of Surveillance Frequencies

### Staggered Integrated ESF/LOOP Testing, WCAP-15830 **Assumptions**

- Proposed change for use at plants with 18 month refueling cycle. (Note 1)
- Once approved, this methodology will be applied to similar generic methodology being developed for W-NSSS units (WCAP-16354).
- Utilities desiring to adopt a staggered integrated ESF/LOOP test program must;
  - submit a plant specific risk analysis and defense-in-depth evaluation,
  - request a change to the affected TS surveillance intervals

#### Note 1:

Methodology may also be applied to 24 month refueling cycle plants, but additional analyses would be required.

- 1. Review TS Surveillance procedures (for demonstration plants) to identify overlap in component and functional testing with the integrated ESF/LOOP test
- 2. Categorize components (A, B and C)

#### Component Categories:

- Category A (Further divided into sub-categories)
  - Component/function tested solely by IESF test
  - Risk significant and addressed (or should be addressed) by PSA model
- Category B
  - Component/function tested solely by IESF test
  - Not Risk significant and not addressed by PSA model
- Category C
  - Component/function not tested solely by IESF test
  - Other equivalent testing performed within the RO interval

- 3. Perform a Risk analysis to quantify the associated change in plant risk
  - Analyze Category A components

#### Category A Sub-categories:

• Category A-1:

Components, which are used to verify the tested functions, are modeled explicitly.

• Category A-2:

Components, which are used to verify the tested functions, are not modeled explicitly, but the model does include another component which subsumes the tested component.

#### Category A Sub-categories continued:

#### • Category A-3:

Components/functions have a potential adverse indirect impact on a modeled component, where this indirect effect is covered appropriately in the PRA model but the specific Category A-3 component has not been subsumed into the model.

#### • Category A-4:

Components that have a potential adverse indirect impact on a modeled component. Unlike the Category A-3 components, this indirect effect is not covered in the PRA model.

- 4. Adjust Risk Model as necessary
  - Category A-3 and A-4 components
  - Recalculate CDF and LERF for Base Model
- 5. Recalculate and evaluate the change in risk
  - Requantify Model with Extension
  - Evaluate the change in CDF and LERF against acceptance criteria
  - If acceptance criteria is exceeded:
    - Determine dominate contributors
    - Evaluate alternate or separate effects tests
    - Repeat the process and reevaluate the change in risk

- 6. Perform a Deterministic Analysis
- Objective:
  - Show that there are no failures for Category A components that have a non-constant failure rate and a Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) greater than test interval (36 months),
  - Show that the change in test interval will not degrade the performance of either train of the ESF system and will not invalidate any assumptions in the plant licensing basis.
- Consists of:
  - Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA),
  - Significant Hazards Analysis.
- Reinforces the conclusions of the corresponding risk-informed analysis
- Provides the necessary balance between risk and deterministic arguments required by RG 1.174.

- 7. Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
- Plant specific Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA) of systems/equipment that are only be tested by the integrated ESF/LOOP test (Category A components)
- Considerations:
  - Failure Mode,
  - Failure Mechanism (cause),
  - Failure Effects and Consequences,
  - Safety Significance and impact on margin of safety.

- 8. Significant Hazards Analysis
- Evaluation of the impact of the failure modes identified by the FMEA on the overall performance of an ESF train in response to an actuation signal,
- Analysis of how the operation of the ESF train, that has not been tested during the refueling outage, will be impacted if a time dependent failure occurs,
- Questions to be considered:
  - Will the effect of a failure on the ESFAS create a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
  - Will it create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
  - Will the failure result in a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

- 9. Evaluate Analyses results per RG 1.174 criteria.
- The change in risk must be less than 1.0E-6/yr for CDF and less than 1.0E-7/yr for LERF,
- Evaluate Quantitative and Qualitative Results,
- Conclusions and Recommendations

### Staggered Integrated ESF/LOOP Testing, WCAP-15830 Changes in Revision 1

- Incorporated changes identified in new RAI responses
- Expanded Deterministic Assessment significantly
- Ensured consistency with NEI-04-10
- Added new section on Implementation
- Go to 'Summary of Changes' Handout
  - Review change details

### Staggered Integrated ESF/LOOP Testing, WCAP-15830 Wrap-up

- Questions and Comments
- Summary and Schedule