

January 7, 2008

LICENSEE: Carolina Power & Light Company

FACILITY: Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE CALL HELD ON
AUGUST 13, 2007, BETWEEN THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION AND CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, CONCERNING
DRAFT REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE
SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 1, LICENSE RENEWAL
APPLICATION

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and representatives of Carolina Power & Light Company held a telephone conference call on August 13, 2007, to discuss and clarify the staff's draft requests for additional information (D-RAIs) concerning the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, license renewal application. The telephone conference call was useful in clarifying the intent of the staff's D-RAIs.

Enclosure 1 provides a listing of the participants and Enclosure 2 contains a listing of the D-RAIs discussed with the applicant, including a brief description on the status of the items.

The applicant had an opportunity to comment on this summary.

/RA/

Maurice Heath, Project Manager
License Renewal Branch A
Division of License Renewal
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-400

Enclosures:

1. List of Participants
2. List of Draft Requests for
Additional Information

cc w/encls: See next page

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OFFICE	PM:RLRA:DLR	LA:DLR	BC:RLRA:DLR
NAME	MHeath	IKing	LLund
DATE	09/05/07	09/04/07	01/07/08

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TELEPHONE CONFERENCE CALL
SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 1
LICENSE RENEWAL APPLICATION

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
AUGUST 13, 2007

PARTICIPANTS

Maurice Heath
Stanley Gardocki
Steve Pope
John Woodfield
Roger Stewart
Chris Malliner

AFFILIATIONS

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
NRC
Information Systems Laboratories (ISL)
ISL
Progress Energy
Progress Energy

DRAFT REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 1
LICENSE RENEWAL APPLICATION

AUGUST 13, 2007

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the staff) and representatives of Carolina Power & Light Company held a telephone conference call on August 13, 2007, to discuss and clarify the following draft requests for additional information (D-RAIs) concerning the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant (HNP), Unit 1, license renewal application (LRA).

D-RAI 2.1.1.2-1

LRA Section 2.1 Scoping and Screening Methodology

In LRA Section 2.1.1.2, "Non-Safety Related Criteria Pursuant to 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2)," the applicant describes the methodology in identifying applicable structures, systems, and components (SSCs) in LRA Section 2.1.1.2 contains guidance for "10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) Scoping Based on NRC Scoping Guidance for Spatial Interactions and Seismic-Connected Piping." Additionally, in LRA Section 2.1.1.2, the applicant describes "Spatial Interactions," and on page 2.1-10, the applicant states that the non-connected, non-safety related systems be brought within the scope of license renewal to protect safety related SSCs from the consequences of failures of the non-safety related systems.

On LRA pages 2.1-9 and 11, the applicant states in the guidance that the turbine building contains safety related components and that this information is used to identify non-safety related systems having potential for adverse spatial interactions. On LRA page 2.1-11, the applicant describes that feedwater system flow transmitters, the feedwater regulating valves, associated bypass valves, etc., in the Turbine Building as designated safety related in the Pass Port equipment data base (EDB). However, the applicant makes the conclusion, "Therefore, no systems in the Turbine Building are brought into scope per the current guidance regarding special interactions."

On LRA pages 2.1-9 and 11, the applicant states in the guidance that the Waste Processing Building contains safety-related components and that this information is used to identify non-safety related systems having potential for adverse spatial interactions. On LRA page 2.1-11, the applicant describes that the waste gas decay tanks and associated piping and valves and radiation monitor components as designated safety related in the Pass Port EDB.

Although, there are non-safety related SSCs within the Waste Processing Building and within the Turbine Building that may have the potential for adverse spatial interaction with safety-related components, the applicant has excluded them from 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) for spatial interactions. The applicant's evaluation has determined that the safety-related components do not meet the license renewal definition of "safety related."

Provide the details of the evaluation that allowed the exclusion of the non-safety related SSC's within the Turbine Building and within the Waste Processing Building from the 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) criterion for spatial interactions.

Enclosure 2

Discussion: The applicant indicated that the question is clear. This D-RAI will be sent as a formal RAI.

D-RAI 2.1.1.2-2

In LRA Section 2.1.1.2, page 2.1-13, under the topic of Seismic-Connected Piping, the applicant states, “These air/gas piping systems with seismically-connected piping include the Instrument Air System [Section 2.3.3.27], Service Air System [Section 2.3.3.28], Bulk Nitrogen Storage System [Section 2.3.3.29], Hydrogen Gas System [Section 2.3.3.30], and Penetration Pressurization System [Section 2.3.3.62].” These systems have non-safety related piping connected to safety-related piping that are included in the scope of license renewal up to the first seismic anchor or equivalent anchor past the safety/non-safety interface. It is expected all of these systems should have an intended function of “M-4 structural support” in LRA Tables 2.3.3-23, 2.3.3-24, 2.3.3-25, 2.3.3-26 respectively.

Explain why the intended function M-4 Structural Support (i.e. provide structural support/seismic integrity) is not shown also in LRA tables mentioned above for the components subject to an Aging Management Review (AMR).

Discussion: The applicant indicated that the question is clear. This D-RAI will be sent as a formal RAI.

D-RAI 2.1.2.1-1

In LRA Section 2.1.2.1, “Mechanical Components,” the applicant describes the process used to identify mechanical components subject to Aging Management Review (AMR). In LRA Section 2.1.2.1 paragraph 5, on page 2.1-22, the applicant states, “In-scope mechanical components with no mechanical intended function are assigned a screening result of ‘no mechanical intended function,’ and they are not subjected to Aging Management Review.” However, the applicant states, “In a limited number of cases, there are in-scope mechanical components that do not support a mechanical system intended function but are in the scope because of their potential to damage safety related components through direct impact during a seismic event.”

Please Identify the in-scope mechanical components with “no mechanical intended function” that are not subject to an AMR and describe why they are not subject to an AMR.

Discussion: The applicant indicated that the question is clear. This D-RAI will be sent as a formal RAI.

D-RAI 2.3-1

LRA Section 2.3 Scoping and Screening Results – Mechanical Systems

In several LRA section descriptions and associated licensee renewal scoping drawings, the applicant describes and highlights various components indicating that they are within the scope of the license renewal and subject to an AMR. The staff notes that many component/commodity types are not included in the associated LRA tables. The highlighted

components include: valves, piping, accumulators closure bolting, drain traps, detectors, pumps, etc. In the associated LRA tables, the applicant did not identify the following component/commodity types:

- Section 2.3.3.6 Circulating Water System – expansion joints, temperature elements, thermowells
- Section 2.3.3.21 Emergency Diesel Generator System – expansion joints, flexible connections
- Section 2.3.3.27 Instrument Air System – valves
- Section 2.3.3.28 Service Air System – valves, drain trap(s), closure bolting
- Section 2.3.3.29 Bulk Nitrogen Storage System – valves, accumulator tank
- Section 2.3.3.30 Hydrogen Gas System – valves, excess flow check valve
- Section 2.3.3.18 Emergency Screen Wash System – buried piping
- Section 2.3.4.14 Turbine System – valves
- Section 2.3.3.37 Laundry and Hot Shower System – piping, piping components, and piping elements
- Section 2.3.3.54 Spent Fuel Cask Decontamination and Spray System – filters, pumps, tanks, valves
- Section 2.3.3.81 Mechanical Components in Electrical Systems – detector, sample cooler
- Sections 2.3.3.6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, etc. - valves and/or pumps
- Section 2.3.4.4 Main Steam Dump System - silencers

Specifically explain how each of these components is represented in the LRA. Additionally, explain what components the term “piping, piping components, and piping elements” includes for each system.

Discussion: The applicant indicated that the question is clear. This D-RAI will be sent as a formal RAI.

D-RAI 2.3.3.12-1

2.3.3.12 Normal Service Water System

In final safety analysis report (FSAR) Section 9.2.1.2, page 9.2.1-3, the applicant describes the normal service water pumps as follows:

Normal Service Water (NSW) Pumps - Two 100 percent capacity pumps are provided with one pump normally supplying all service water requirements. One single supply header will normally furnish the two redundant loops serving the essential plant components. Pumps are sized such that the water requirements for Unit start-up and normal operation can be met by one pump. Both pumps may be required after four hours have elapsed from the plant normal shutdown initiation (see Table 9.2.1-1). In this case both loops serving the essential plant components will be in service.

In LRA Section 2.3.3.12, pages 2.3-70 & 71, the applicant describes the NSW pumps as follows:

Two 100-percent capacity NSW pumps are provided. During Unit start-up, shutdown, and normal operation, Service Water (SW) requirements will be met by one of the NSW

pumps. The pump furnishes all normal operating SW requirements for the Unit through a single supply line.

Explain the discrepancy in operating requirements of one or two pumps, between the descriptions in FSAR Section 9.1.2 and LRA Section 2.3.3.12.

Discussion: The applicant indicated that the question is clear. This D-RAI will be sent as a formal RAI.

D-RAI 2.3.3.13-1

2.3.3.13 Emergency Service Water System

In LRA Section 2.3.3.13, the applicant, identifies that under emergency operation, the service water booster pumps start. However, the booster pumps are not identified in either LRA Table 2.3.3-11 or LRA Table 2.3.3-10 (Section 2.3.3.12) as one of the component/commodity types subject to an AMR.

Explain why the service water booster pumps are not identified as a component/commodity type in either LRA Tables 2.3.3-10 or 2.3.3-11.

Discussion: The applicant indicated that the question is clear. This D-RAI will be sent as a formal RAI.

D-RAI 2.3.3.16-1

2.3.3.16 Essential Services Chilled Water System

On license renewal scoping drawing 5-G-0499, location L-16, for the essential services chilled water system, a flag is shown with a "3" in it indicating that the piping and valves beyond it are designed to meet Safety Class 3 and Seismic Category I requirements. The piping beyond the piping class flag (line number 3CX4-71SB-1) is partially highlighted as in the scope of license renewal for 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1) criterion. There is no piping class flag indicating a change in pipe class at the location along the pipe where the highlighting stops.

Since pipe line 3CX4-71SB-1 is designed to meet Safety Class 3 and Seismic Category I requirements, explain why pipe line 3CX4-71SB-1 is not highlighted along its total length; thereby, indicating that it is not within the scope of license renewal for 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1) criterion.

Discussion: The applicant indicated that the question is clear. This D-RAI will be sent as a formal RAI.

D-RAI 2.3.3.21-1

2.3.3.21 Emergency Diesel Generator System

In LRA Table 2.3.3.17, the applicant identifies, for the emergency diesel generator system, the component/commodity type of “piping, piping components, and piping elements.”

It is unclear why the words “piping components” were listed twice. Please clarify whether this is a typographical error and what the intended verbiage should be.

Discussion: The applicant indicated that the question is clear. This D-RAI will be sent as a formal RAI.

D-RAI 2.3.3.22-1

2.3.3.22 Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System

In LRA Section 2.3.3.22, the applicant describes that buried fuel oil piping is coated and cathodically protected. The buried piping is required in order for the system to perform its intended function of supplying fuel oil to the emergency diesel generators for all modes of operation. In LRA Table 2.2-3, License Renewal Scoping Results for Electrical/I&C Systems, the applicant identifies that the cathodic protection system is not within the scope of license renewal.

Explain whether the cathodic protection for the diesel generator fuel oil storage and transfer system buried piping is included within the system identified in LRA Table 2.2-3, or if it should be added or included into LRA Table 2.3.3-18. If it is included in Table 2.2-3, explain why the cathodic protection system is not within the scope of license renewal.

Discussion: The applicant indicated that the question is clear. This D-RAI will be sent as a formal RAI.

D-RAI 2.3.3.22-2

On license renewal scoping drawing 5-G-0133-LR, the applicant depicts the diesel generator fuel oil day tanks 1A-SA and AB-SB for emergency diesel generators 1A-SA and 1B-SB respectively. Each day tank has a supply line from its respective fuel oil transfer pump which is required for the system to perform its intended function. Piping Sections 3FO1-237SA-1 and 3FO1-238SB-1 are not highlighted on the license renewal scoping drawing, even though their failure could prevent the transfer of fuel oil to the day tanks.

Explain whether these piping sections are intended to be excluded from the scope of license renewal. If they are, then explain the effects of their failure on the diesel generator fuel oil storage and transfer system.

Discussion: The applicant indicated that the question is clear. This D-RAI will be sent as a formal RAI.

D-RAI 2.3.3.28-1

2.3.3.28 Service Air System

On license renewal scoping drawing 5-G-0300, location B-2, for the service air system, the applicant depicts valve 7SA-V79-1 as attached to the continuation piping required for containment isolation at penetration M-41. The piping required for the containment isolation at penetration M-41 is highlighted as in the scope of license renewal for 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1) criteria; and the continuation piping has been highlighted as in the scope of license renewal for 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) criteria for functional support (seismic continuity).

Explain why valve 7SA-V79-1 is not highlighted as within the scope of license renewal for 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) criterion since it may be a part of the continuation piping needed for seismic continuity.

Discussion: The applicant indicated that the question is clear. This D-RAI will be sent as a formal RAI.

D-RAI 2.3.3.28-2

In LRA Section 2.3.3.28, page 2.3-109, the applicant states that the service air system includes safety-related system piping associated with the containment penetration as well as supply piping for the essential services chilled water system. On page 2.3-110, the applicant states that the license renewal scoping boundaries for the service air system are shown on the following boundary drawing 5-G-0300-LR. In addition, the staff noted that service air system piping and components are highlighted on license renewal scoping drawings 8-G-0498-S02-LR, HVAC essential services chilled water condenser flow diagram Unit 1-SA and 8-G-0499-S02-LR, HVAC essential services chilled water condenser flow diagram Unit 1-SB, indicating they are within the scope of license renewal.

Explain why the license renewal scoping drawings 8-G-0498-S02-LR and 8-G-0499-S02-LR are not included on LRA page 2.3-110 as license renewal scoping drawings for the service air system.

Discussion: The applicant indicated that the question is clear. This D-RAI will be sent as a formal RAI.

D-RAI 2.3.3.34-1

2.3.3.34 Radioactive Floor Drains System

In Section 2.3.3.34, the applicant has included “system strainers” as a component/commodity type in LRA Tables 2.3.3-30 and 3.3.2-30. This component has intended functions of filtration and pressure boundary. On license renewal scoping drawings 5-G-0816-LR at location F-3, and 5-G-0866-LR at locations F-2, 4 and 6, pump strainers were found, however these strainers are not indicated on the drawings as being within the scope of license renewal. Additionally, if these strainers as indicated in Tables 2.3.3-30 and 3.3.2-30 have a pressure boundary intended function, the surrounding piping would also need to also have a pressure boundary function.

Clarify if these strainers and the surrounding piping are the specified components indicated in LRA Tables 2.3.3-30 and 3.3.2-30 that are subject to AMR or justify their exclusion.

Discussion: The applicant indicated that the question is clear. This D-RAI will be sent as a formal RAI.

D-RAI 2.3.3.43-1

2.3.3.43 Oily Waste Collection and Separation System

On the license renewal scoping drawing titled “Scoping Notes for Miscellaneous Systems,” also known as “System Boundary Drawing Scoping Discussions,” CALC HNP-P/LR-0002, Attachment 4, Revision 2, the applicant states that highlighted flow paths in the “Oily Drains System” are intended to indicate flow paths for draining fire fighting water when needed. However, on license renewal scoping drawing 5-G-0485-LR, the applicant does not highlight portions of the system downstream of the oil water separator.

Explain why the piping downstream of the oil water separator is not needed to support the intended function of draining fire fighting water. If piping is to be included in the scope of license renewal, identify the piping downstream of the oil water separator necessary to support the fire protection intended function.

Discussion: The applicant indicated that the question is clear. This D-RAI will be sent as a formal RAI.

D-RAI-2.3.3.45-1

2.3.3.45 Secondary Waste Treatment System

In LRA Section 2.3.3.45, the applicant states that the Secondary Waste Treatment System only performs the system intended function of containing components that have the potential for spatial interactions with safety-related SSC’s or are relied on for seismic continuity in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). However, on license renewal scoping drawing titled “Scoping Notes for Miscellaneous Systems”, the applicant states that highlighted flow paths in the “Liquid Waste Processing System” are intended to indicate flow paths for draining fire fighting water when needed. In FSAR Section 11.2.2.6, the applicant describes the Secondary Waste Treatment System as a subsystem of the Liquid Waste Processing System.

Explain the exclusion of the system intended function associated with fire protection, 10 CFR 50.48, for the secondary waste treatment system in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3).

Discussion: The applicant indicated that the question is clear. This D-RAI will be sent as a formal RAI.

D-RAI 2.3.4.1-1

2.3.4.1 Steam Generator Blowdown System

In LRA Section 2.3.4.1, the applicant identifies the steam generator blowdown system as in scope of license renewal because, in part, it contains components that are relied on during postulated fires and station blackout events, and components that are part of the environmental qualification program. In FSAR Section 10.4.8, the applicant describes the steam generator blowdown system, but does not identify how the system is credited in fire protection, station blackout, and environmental qualification.

Provide a list of all the components and their intended function(s) within this system that are within the scope of license renewal and are relied on during postulated fires, station blackout events, or part of the environmental qualification program.

Discussion: The applicant indicated that the question is clear. This D-RAI will be sent as a formal RAI.

Letter to Carolina Power & Light Company, from M. Heath dated January 7, 2008

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MHeath

SHernandez

LRegner

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1

cc:

David T. Conley
Associate General Counsel II -
Legal Department
Progress Energy Service Company, LLC
P.O. Box 1551
Raleigh, NC 27602-1551

Resident Inspector / Harris NPS
c/o U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
5421 Shearon Harris Road
New Hill, NC 27562-9998

Ms. Margaret A. Force
Assistant Attorney General
State of North Carolina
P.O. Box 629
Raleigh, NC 27602

Public Service Commission
State of South Carolina
P.O. Drawer 11649
Columbia, SC 29211

Ms. Beverly Hall, Section Chief
Division of Radiation Protection
N.C. Department of Environment
and Natural Resources
3825 Barrett Drive
Raleigh, NC 27609-7721

Mr. J. Paul Fulford, Manager
Performance Evaluation and
Regulatory Affairs PEB 5
Carolina Power & Light Company
P.O. Box 1551
Raleigh, NC 27602-1551

Mr. Eric McCartney
Plant General Manager
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
Carolina Power & Light Company
P.O. Box 165, Mail Zone 3
New Hill, NC 27562-0165

Mr. Chris L. Burton
Director of Site Operations
Carolina Power & Light Company
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
P.O. Box 165, Mail Zone 1
New Hill, NC 27562-0165

Mr. Robert P. Gruber
Executive Director
Public Staff NCUC
4326 Mail Service Center
Raleigh, NC 27699-4326

Chairman of the North Carolina
Utilities Commission
P.O. Box 29510
Raleigh, NC 27626-0510

Mr. Herb Council, Chair
Board of County Commissioners
of Wake County
P.O. Box 550
Raleigh, NC 27602

Mr. Tommy Emerson, Chair
Board of County Commissioners
of Chatham County
P.O. Box 87
Pittsboro, NC 27312

Mr. Thomas J. Natale, Manager
Support Services
Carolina Power & Light Company
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
P.O. Box 165, Mail Zone 1
New Hill, NC 27562-0165

Mr. David H. Corlett, Supervisor
Licensing/Regulatory Programs
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
Carolina Power & Light Company
P.O. Box 165, Mail Zone 1
New Hill, NC 27562-0165

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 -2-

cc:

Mr. John H. O'Neill, Jr.
Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge
2300 N Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037-1128