- (4) FSEG Nuclear LLC, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to receive, possess, and use at any time any byproduct, source and special nuclear material as sealed neutron sources for reactor startup, sealed sources for reactor instrumentation and radiation monitoring equipment calibration, and as fission detectors in amounts as required;
- (5) PSEG Nuclear LLC, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to receive, possess, and use in amounts as required any byproduct, source or special nuclear material without restriction to chemical or physical form, for sample analysis or instrument calibration or associated with radioactive apparatus or components; and
- (6) PSEG Nuclear LLC, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to possess, but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of the facility.
- C. This license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I and is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below:
  - (1) Maximum Power Level

PSEG Nuclear LLC is authorized to operate the facility at reactor core power levels not in excess of 3339 megawatts thermal (100 percent rated power) in accordance with the conditions specified herein.

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No.171 , and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated into the license. PSEG Nuclear LLC shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

(3) Inservice Testing of Pumps and Valves (Section 3.9.6, SSER No. 4)\*

This License Condition was satisfied as documented in the letter from W. R. Butler (NRC) to C. A. McNeill, Jr. (PSE&G) dated December 7, 1987. Accordingly, this condition has been deleted.

<sup>&</sup>quot;The parenthetical notation following the title of many license conditions denotes the section of the Safety Evaluation Report and/or its supplements wherein the license condition is discussed.

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#### DEFINITIONS

OPERABLE - OPERABILITY

1.28 A system, subsystem, train, component or device shall be OPERABLE or have OPERABILITY when it is capable of performing its specified function(s) and when all necessary attendant instrumentation, controls, electrical power, cooling or seal water, lubrication or other auxiliary equipment that are required for the system, subsystem, train, component or device to perform its function(s) are also capable of performing their related support function(s).

#### OPERATIONAL CONDITION - CONDITION

1.29 An OPERATIONAL CONDITION, i.e., CONDITION, shall be any one inclusive combination of mode switch position and average reactor coolant temperature as specified in Table 1.2.

#### PHYSICS TESTS

1.30 PHYSICS TESTS shall be those tests performed to measure the fundamental nuclear characteristics of the reactor core and related instrumentation and 1) described in Chapter 14 of the FSAR, 2) authorized under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59, or 3) otherwise approved by the Commission.

#### PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE

1.31 PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE shall be leakage through a non-isolable fault in a reactor coolant system component body, pipe wall or vessel wall.

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY 1.32 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall exist when:

- a. All primary containment penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:
  - 1. Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE primary containment automatic isolation system, or
  - Closed by at least one manual valve, blind flange, or deactivated automatic valve secured in its closed position, except for valves that are opened under administrative control as permitted by Specification 3.6.3.
- b. All primary containment equipment hatches are closed and sealed.
- c. Each primary containment air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3.
- d. The primary containment leakage rates are within the limits of Specification 3.6.1.2.
- e. The suppression chamber is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.2.1.
- f. The sealing mechanism associated with each primary containment penetration; e.g., welds, bellows or 0-rings, is OPERABLE.

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			TABLE 3.3.2-1			
		ISOLA	ATION ACTUATION INSTRU	MENTATION		
			VALVE ACTUA-	1 T 841 184		
			OPERATED BY OPERABLE	CHANNELS	APPLICABLE OPERATIONAL	
חופת	FUNC	P T ON		CVCTEM <sup>(a)</sup>	CONDITIONAD	ACTION
1.	PRIM	ARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION		515161	CONDITION	ACTION
	a.	Reactor Vessel Water Level				
		1) Low Low, level 2	1, 2, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18	2	1, 2, 3	20
		2) Low low Low, Level 1	10, 11, 15, 16	2	1, 2, 3	20
	b.	Drywell Pressure - High	1, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18	2(;)	1, 2, 3	20
	c.	Reactor Building Exhaust Radiation - High	1, 8, 9, 12 13, 14, 15, 17, 18	3	1, 2, 3	28
	d.	Manual Initiation	1, 8, 9, 10 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18	1	1, 2, 3	24
2.	SECO	NDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION				
	a.	Reactor Vessel Water Level -	(c)			
		Lcw Low, Level 2	19(0)	2	1, 2, 3 and $*$	26
	b.	Drywell Pressure - High	19 <sup>(c)</sup>	2 <sup>(j)</sup>	1, 2, 3	26
	c.	Refueling Floor Exhaust Radiation - High	19 <sup>(c)</sup>	3	1, 2, 3 and *	29
	d.	Reactor Building Exhaust Radiation - High	19 <sup>(c)</sup>	3	1, 2, 3 and *	28
	e.	Manual Initiation	19 <sup>(c)</sup>	1	1, 2, 3 and *	26

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## ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

TR	IP FUNCTION	VALVE ACTUA- TION GROUPS OPERATED BY <u>SIGNAL</u>	MINIMUM OPERABLE CHANNELS PER TRIP SYSTEM <sup>(a)</sup>	APPLICABLE OPERATIONAL CONDITION	ACTION
3.	MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION				
	a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 1	1	2	1, 2, 3	21
	b. Main Steam Line Radiation - High, High	2 <sup>(b)</sup>	2	1, 2, 3##	28
	c. Main Steam Line Pressure - Low	1	2	1	22
	d. Main Steam Line Flow - High	1	2/line	1, 2, 3	20
	e. Condenser Vacuum - Low	1	2	1, 2**, 3**	21
	f. Main Steam Line Tunnel Temperature - High	1	2/line	1, 2, 3	21
	g. Manual Initiation	1, 2, 17	2	1, 2, 3	25
4.	REACTOR WATER CLEANUP SYSTEM ISOLAT	ION			
	a. RWCJ Δ Flow - High	7	1/Valve <sup>(e)</sup>	1, 2, 3	23
	b. RWCU Δ Flow - High, Timer	7	1/Valve <sup>(e)</sup>	1, 2, 3	23
	c. RWCU Area Temperature - High	7	6/Valve <sup>(e)</sup>	1, 2, 3	23
	d. RWCU Area Ventilation $\Delta$ Temperature-High	7	6/Valve <sup>(e)</sup>	1, 2, 3	23
	e. SLCS Initiation	7 <sup>(f)</sup>	1/Valve <sup>(e)</sup>	1, 2	23
	f. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2	7	2/Valve <sup>(e)</sup>	1, 2, 3	23
	g. Manual Initiation	7	1/Valve <sup>(e)</sup>	1, 2, 3	25

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## ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

TRIP FUI	NCTIO	<u>ON</u>	VALVE ACTUA- TION GROUPS OPERATED BY SIGNAL	MINIMUM OPERABLE CHANNELS PER TRIP SYSTEM <sup>(a)</sup>	APPLICABLE OPERATIONAL CONDITION	ACTION
5. REAC	TOR (	CORE ISOLATION CCOLING SYSTEM	ISOLATION			
Ċ	a.	RCIC Steam Line ∆ Pressure (Flow) - High	6	1/Valve <sup>(e)</sup>	1, 2, 3	23
]	b.	RCIC Steam Line Δ Pressure (Flow) - High, Timer	6	1/Valve <sup>(e)</sup>	1, 2, 3	23
	c.	RCIC Steam Supply Pressure - Low	6	2/Valve <sup>(e)</sup>	1, 2, 3	23
	d.	RCIC Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure - High	6	2/Valve <sup>(e)</sup>	1, 2, 3	23
	e.	RCIC Pump Room Temperature - High	6	1/Valve <sup>(e)</sup>	1, 2, 3	23
	f.	RCIC Pump Room Ventilation Du $\Delta$ Temperature - High	cts 6	1/Valve <sup>(e)</sup>	1, 2, 3	23
	g.	RCIC Pipe Routing Area Temperature - High	6	1/Valve <sup>(e)</sup>	1, 2, 3	23
	h.	RCIC Torus Compartment Temperature-High	6	3/Valve <sup>(e)</sup>	1, 2, .3	23
	i.	Drywell Pressure - High <sup>(g)</sup>	6	2/Valve <sup>(e)</sup>	1, 2, 3	23
	j.	Manual Initiation	6 <sup>(h)</sup>	1/RCIC System	1, 2, 3	25
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## ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

<u>TRIP F</u>	UNCTI	<u>NC</u>	VALVE ACTUA- TION GROUPS OPERATED BY SIGNAL	MINIMUM OPERABLE CHANNELS PER TRIP SYSTEM <sup>(a)</sup>	APPLICABLE OPERATIONAL CONDITION	ACTION
6.	HIGH	PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION S	YSTEM ISOLATI	ON		
	a.	HPCI Steam Line Δ Pressure (Flow) - High	5	1/Valve <sup>(e)</sup>	1, 2, 3	23
	b.	HPCI Steam Line Δ Pressure (Flow) - High, Timer	5	1/Valve <sup>(e)</sup>	1, 2, 3	23
	c.	HPCI Steam Supply Pressure-L	ow 5	2/Valve <sup>(e)</sup>	1, 2, 3	23
	d.	HPCI Turbine Exhaust Diaphra Pressure - High	gm 5	2/Valve <sup>(e)</sup>	1, 2, 3	23 ,
	e.	HPCI Pump Room Temperature - High	5	1/Valve <sup>(e)</sup>	1, 2, 3	23
	f.	HPCI Pump Room Ventilation Ducts Δ Temperature - High	5	1/Valve <sup>(e)</sup>	1, 2, 3	23
	g.	HPCI Pipe Routing Area Temperature - High	5	1/Valve <sup>(e)</sup>	1, 2, 3	23
	h.	HPCI Torus Compartment Temperature-High	5	3/Valve <sup>(e)</sup>	1, 2, 3	23
	i.	Drywell Pressure - High <sup>(g)</sup>	5	2/Valve <sup>(e)</sup>	1, 2, 3	23
	j.	Manual Initiation	5 <sup>(i)</sup>	1/HPCI system	1, 2, 3	25

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## **ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION**

TRIP	FUNC	TION	VALVE ACTUA- TION GROUPS OPERATED BY SIGNAL	MINIMUM OPERABLE CHANNELS PER TRIP SYSTEM <sup>(a)</sup>	APPLICABLE OPERATIONAL CONDITION	ACTION
7.	RHR	SYSTEM SHUTDOWN COCLING MODE	ISOLATION			
	d.	Level - Low, Level 3	. 3 <sup>(j)</sup>	2/Valve <sup>(e)</sup>	1, 2, 3	27
	b.	Reactor Vessel (RHR Cut-in Permissive) Pressure - High	3 <sup>(j)</sup>	2/Valve <sup>(e)</sup>	1, 2, 3	27
	c.	Manual Initiation	3	1/Valve <sup>(e)</sup>	1, 2, 3	25

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#### NOTES

- When handling recently irradiated fuel in the secondary containment and during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.
- \*\* When any turbine stop valve is greater than 90% open and/or when the key-locked bypass switch is in the Norm position.
- ## The hydrogen water chemistry (HWC) system shall not be placed in service until reactor power reaches 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER. After reaching 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER, and prior to operating the HWC system, the normal full power background radiation level and associated trip setpoints may be increased to levels previously measured during full power operation with hydrogen injection. Prior to decreasing below 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER and after the HWC system has been shutoff, the background level and associated setpoint shall be returned to the normal full power values. If a power reduction event occurs so that the reactor power is below 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER without the required setpoint change, control rod motion shall be suspended (except for scram or other emergency actions) until the necessary setpoint adjustment is made.
- (a) A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 6 hours for required surveillance without placing the trip system in the tripped condition provided at least one other OPERABLE channel in the same trip system is monitoring that parameter.
- (b) Also trips and isolates the mechanical vacuum pumps.
- (c) Also starts the Filtration, Recirculation and Ventilation System (FRVS).
- (d) DELETED
- (e) Sensors arranged per valve group, not per trip system.
- (f) Closes only RWCU system isolation valve(s) HV-F001 and HV-F004.
- (g) Requires system steam supply pressure-low coincident with drywell pressure-high to close turbine exhaust vacuum breaker valves.
- (h) Manual isolation closes HV-F008 only, and only following manual or automatic initiation of the RCIC system.
- (i) Manual isolation closes HV-FO03 and HV-F042 only, and only following manual or automatic initiation of the HPCI system.
- (j) Trip functions common to RPS instrumentation.

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# Pages 3/4 3-18 through 3/4 3-21 have been intentionally omitted

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#### 3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2\* and 3.

ACTION:

Without PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, restore PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within 1 hour or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated:

- After each closing of each penetration subject to Type B testing, except the primary containment air locks, if opened following Type A or B test, by leak rate testing in accordance with the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.
- b. At least once per 31 days by verifying that all primary containment penetrations\*\* not capable of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in position, except for valves that are opened under administrative control as permitted by Specification 3.6.3.
- c. By verifying each primary containment air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3.
- d. By verifying the suppression chamber is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.2.1.

\*See Special Test Exception 3.10.1

<sup>\*\*</sup>Except valves, blind flanges, and deactivated automatic valves which are located inside the primary containment, and are locked, sealed or otherwise secured in the closed position. These penetrations shall be verified closed during each COLD SHUTDOWN except such verification need not be performed when the primary containment has not been de-inerted since the last verification or more often than once per 92 days.

#### PRIMARY CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.2 Primary containment leakage rates shall be limited to:

- a. An overall integrated leakage rate (Type A test) in accordance with the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.
- b. A combined leakage rate in accordance with the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program for all primary containment penetrations and all primary containment isolation valves that are subject to Type B and C tests, except for: main steam line isolation valves\*, valves which form the boundary for the long-term seal of the feedwater lines, other valves which are hydrostatically tested, and those valves where an exemption to Appendix J of 10 CFR 50 has been granted.
- c. \*Less than or equal to 150 scfh per main steam line and less than or equal to 250 scfh combined through all four main steam lines when tested at 5 psig (leakage rate corrected to 1 Pa, 48.1 psig).
- d. A combined leakage rate of less than or equal to 10 gpm for all containment isolation valves which form the boundary for the long-term seal of the feedwater lines, when tested at 1.10 Pa, 52.9 psig.
- e. A combined leakage rate of less than or equal to 10 gpm for all other penetrations and containment isolation values in hydrostatically tested lines which penetrate the primary containment, when tested at 1.10 Pa, 52.9 psig  $\Delta p$ .

<u>APPLICABILITY</u>: When PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is required per Specification 3.6.1.1.

#### ACTION: With:

- a. The measured overall integrated primary containment leakage rate (Type A test) not in accordance with the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program, or
- b. The measured combined leakage rate exceeding the leakage rate specified in the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program for all primary containment penetrations and all primary containment isolation valves that are subject to Type B and C tests, except for: main steam line isolation valves\*, valves which form the boundary for the long-term seal of the feedwater lines, valves which are hydrostatically tested, and those valves where an exemption to Appendix J of 10 CFR 50 has been granted, or
- c. The measured leakage rate exceeding 150 scfh per main steam line or exceeding 250 scfh combined through all four main steam lines, or

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<sup>\*</sup>Exemption to Appendix "J" of 10 CFR 50:

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

ACTION (Continued)

- d. The measured combined leakage rate for all containment isolation valves which form the boundary for the long-term seal of the feedwater lines exceeding 10 gpm, or
- e. The measured combined leakage rate for all other penetrations and containment isolation valves in hydrostatically tested lines which penetrate the primary containment exceeding 10 gpm,

restore:

- a. The overall integrated leakage rate(s) (Type A test) to be in accordance with the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program, and
- b. The combined leakage rate to be in accordance with the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program for all primary containment penetrations and all primary containment isolation valves that are subject to Type B and C tests, except for: main steam line isolation valves\*, valves which form the boundary for the long-term seal of the feedwater lines, valves which are hydrostatically tested, and those valves where an exemption to Appendix J of 10 CFR 50 has been granted, and
- c. The leakage rate to less than or equal to 150 scfh per main steam line and less than or equal to 250 scfh combined through all four main steam lines, and
- d. The combined leakage rate for all containment isolation valves which form the boundary for the long-term seal of the feedwater lines to less than or equal to 10 gpm, and
- e. The combined leakage rate for all other penetrations and containment isolation valves in hydrostatically tested lines which penetrate the primary containment to less than or equal to 10 gpm,

prior to increasing reactor coolant system temperature above 200°F.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.2.a The primary containment leakage rates shall be demonstrated in accordance with the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program for the following:

- 1. Type A test.
- 2. Type B and C tests (including air locks).
- b. DELETED.
- c. DELETED.

\* Exemption to Appendix "J" of 10 CFR 50.

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## SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

- d. DELETED.
- e. DELETED.
- f. Main steam line isolation valves shall be leak tested at least once per 18 months.
- g. Containment isolation values which form the boundry for the long-term seal of the feedwater lines shall be hydrostatically tested at 1.10  $P_a$ , 52.9 psig, at least once per 18 months.
- h. All containment isolation values in hydrostatically tested lines which penetrate the primary containment shall be leak tested at least once
  per 18 months.
- i. DELETED.
- j. DELETED.

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#### 3/4.6.3 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.3 Each primary containment isolation valve and each reactor instrumentation line excess flow check valve shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 3.

#### ACTION:

- a. With one or more of the primary containment isolation values inoperable, maintain at least one isolation value OPERABLE in each affected penetration that is open and within 4 hours either:
  - 1. Restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status, or
  - Isolate each affected penetration by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolated position,\* or
  - 3. Isolate each affected penetration by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange.\*
  - 4. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable provided that within 4 hours the affected penetration is isolated in accordance with ACTION a.2. or a.3. above, and provided that the associated system, if applicable, is declared inoperable and the appropriate ACTION statements for that system are performed.

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

- b. With one or more of the reactor instrumentation line excess flow check valves inoperable, operation may continue and the provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable provided that within 4 hours either:
  - 1. The inoperable valve is returned to OPERABLE status, or
  - 2. The instrument line is isolated and the associated instrument is declared inoperable.

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

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<sup>\*</sup> Isolation valves closed to satisfy these requirements may be reopened on an intermittent basis under administrative control.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.3.1 Each primary containment isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by cycling the valve through at least one complete cycle of full travel and verifying the specified isolation time.

4.6.3.2 Each primary containment automatic isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by verifying that on a containment isolation test signal each automatic isolation valve actuates to its isolation position.

4.6.3.3 The isolation time of each primary containment power operated or automatic valve shall be determined to be within its limit when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

4.6.3.4 At least once per 18 months, verify that a representative sample of reactor instrumentation line excess flow check valves<sup>#</sup> actuates to the isolation position on a simulated instrument line break signal.

4.6.3.5 Each traversing in-core probe system explosive isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE\*:

- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying the continuity of the explosive charge.
- b. At least once per 18 months by removing the explosive squib from at least one explosive valve such that each explosive squib in each explosive valve will be tested at least once per 90 months, and initiating the explosive squib. The replacement charge for the exploded squib shall be from the same manufactured batch as the one fired or from another batch which has been certified by having at least one of that batch successfully fired. No squib shall remain in use beyond the expiration of its shelf-life or operating life, as applicable.

\* Exemption to Appendix J of 10 CFR Part 50.

# The reactor vessel head seal leak detection line (penetration J5C) is not required to be tested pursuant to this requirement.

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TABLE 3.6.3-1 DELETED

Pages 3/4 6-20 through 3/4 6-42 have been intentionally omitted