



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II
SAM NUNN ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER
61 FORSYTH STREET, SW, SUITE 23T85
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8931

April 25, 2005

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
ATTN: Mr. L. M. Stinson
Vice President - Farley Project
P. O. Box 1295
Birmingham, AL 35201-1295

SUBJECT: JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION
REPORT 05000348/2005002 and 05000364/2005002

Dear Mr. Stinson:

On March 31, 2005, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on March 31, 2005, with Mr. Randy Johnson and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

This report documents one self-revealing finding of very low safety significance which was determined to be a violation of regulations. Because this violation is of very low safety significance and was entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest this NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Farley Nuclear Plant.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the

SNC

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NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Malcolm T. Widmann, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 50-348 and 50-364
License Nos. NPF-2 and NPF-8

Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000348/2005002 and 05000364/2005002
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket Nos.: 50-348, 50-364

License Nos.: NPF-2, NPF-8

Report Nos.: 05000348/2005002 and 05000364/2005002

Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC)

Facility: Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant

Location: 7388 N. State Highway 95
Columbia, AL 36319

Dates: January 1 - March 31, 2005

Inspectors: C. Patterson, Senior (Sr.) Resident Inspector
J. Baptist, Resident Inspector
S. Stewart, Sr. Resident Inspector - Crystal River
S. Rose, Sr. Operations Engineer (Section 1R11)
L. Mellen, Sr. Reactor Inspector (Section 4OA5.1)
K. Maxey, Reactor Inspector (Section 4OA5.1)

Approved by: Malcolm T. Widmann, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000348/2005002, 05000364/2005002; 01/01/2005-03/31/2005; Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2; Event Followup.

The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors. One self-revealing Green non-cited violation was identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3, dated July, 2000.

A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

- Green. A self-revealing (NCV) was identified for failure to comply with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings. Procedures for conducting surveillance testing were not appropriate to the circumstances and resulted in the loss of the operating residual heat removal pump during shutdown operations.

The finding is greater than minor since it is associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone for equipment availability and because it affects the associated Cornerstone objective. Specifically, the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective is to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the opposite train RHR pump was started within one minute and an adequate shutdown cooling (SDC) thermal margin was maintained. The SDC thermal margin was verified as maintained by a calculated reactor coolant system time-to-boil of greater than 20 hours. (Section 4OA3)

B. Licensee-Identified Violations

None

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 operated at or near rated thermal power (RTP) during the inspection period.

Unit 2 operated at or near RTP during this inspection period.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

a. Inspection Scope

Impending Adverse Conditions Review. The inspectors evaluated implementation of the adverse weather preparation procedures and compensatory measures for adverse weather that occurred on March 26. The inspectors reviewed procedures FNP-0-AOP-21.0, Severe Weather, and FNP-0-EIP-8.0, Non-Emergency Notifications, to verify that applicable portions of the procedure were performed for high river level. The inspectors also conducted a site tour to verify that the licensee was taking appropriate actions for high river level.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

Partial System Walk-downs. The inspectors performed partial walk-downs of the following three systems to verify they were properly aligned when redundant systems or trains were out of service. The walk-downs were performed using the criteria in licensee procedures FNP-0-AP-16, Conduct of Operations - Operations Group, and FNP-0-SOP-0, General Instructions to Operations Personnel. The walk-downs included reviewing the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), plant procedures and drawings, checks of control room and plant valves, switches, components, electrical power line-ups, support equipment, and instrumentation.

C Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) 1-2A, 1B, 1C, and 2C during 2B EDG maintenance outage

C Penetration Room Filtration (PRF) System 2A during 2B PRF maintenance outage

C Main Control Room (MCR) Ventilation Train A during MCR Train B maintenance outage

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protectiona. Inspection Scope

Fire Area Tours. The inspectors conducted a walk-down of the ten fire areas listed below to verify the licensee's control of transient combustibles, the operational readiness of the fire suppression system, and the material condition and status of fire dampers, doors, and barriers. The requirements were described in licensee procedures FNP-0-AP-36, Fire Surveillance and Inspection; FNP-0-AP-38, Use of Open Flame; FNP-0-AP-39, Fire Patrols and Watches; and the associated Fire Zone Data sheets. In addition, the inspectors reviewed procedure changes to FNP-0-ACP-35.2, Flammable Material, Combustible Material, and Chemical Product Control, that established interim compensatory measures to limit transient combustible materials in areas having large penetration seals with less than a three-hour rating. To verify implementation, the inspectors also checked that compensatory measures, including fire watches, were in place for degraded fire barriers. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

C Unit 1 Turbine Building 137' Condensate Pump Area, Fire Zone 85C
 C Unit 1 Turbine Building 137' Common Area, Fire Zone 85A
 C Unit 1 Turbine Building 137' Seal Oil Supply Unit, Fire Zone 84C
 C Unit 1 Turbine Building 155' Common Area, Fire Zone 85B
 C Unit 1 Turbine Building 155' Steam Generator Feedwater Pump "B", Fire Zone 87B
 C Unit 1 Turbine Building 155' Steam Generator Feedwater Pump "A", Fire Zone 87A
 C Unit 1 Turbine Building 155' Main Turbine Oil Reservoir, Fire Zone 84B
 C Unit 1 Turbine Building 155' 4160V Switchgear Bus 1E, Fire Zone 88C
 C Unit 1 Turbine Building 155' 4160V Switchgear Bus 1D, Fire Zone 88B
 C Unit 1 Turbine Building 189' Main Turbine Generator Operating Floor, Fire Zone 85I

Fire Drill. On March 23, the inspectors observed a fire drill for a simulated fire in the EDG building switchgear. The inspectors observed that the licensee response in the control room and entrance of the EDG building was in accordance with plant procedures. The inspectors reviewed procedures FNP-0-AOP-29.0, Plant Fire; FNP-0-EIP-13.0, Fire Emergencies; and FNP-0-FVP-11.0, Fire Ventilation-EDG Building, to verify they were properly implemented. The inspectors attended the licensee's critique of the drill to verify deficiencies were identified. The inspectors discussed inspector's observations with plant management.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalificationa. Inspection Scope

Quarterly Resident Review. On February 1, the inspectors observed portions of the licensed operator training and testing program to verify implementation of procedures FNP-0-AP-45, Farley Nuclear Plant Training Program; FNP-0-TCP-17.6, Simulator Training Evaluation Documentation; and FNP-0-TCP-17.3, Licensed Operator

Continuing Training Program Administration. The inspectors observed scenarios conducted in the licensee's simulator for a secondary steam leak and subsequent reactor trip and safety injection. The inspectors observed high risk operator actions, overall performance, self-critiques, training feedback, and management oversight to verify operator performance was evaluated against the performance standards of the licensee's scenario. In addition, the inspectors observed implementation of the applicable emergency operating procedures to verify that licensee expectations in procedures FNP-0-AP-16 and FNP-0-TCP-17.6 were met. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

Requalification Examination Results Review. On December 17, 2004, the licensee completed the comprehensive written examinations and operating tests given to all licensed reactor operators as required by 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2). The inspectors conducted an in-office review of the overall pass/fail results of the written examinations, individual operating tests, and the crew simulator operating tests. These results were compared to the thresholds established in Manual Chapter 609 Appendix I, Operator Requalification Human Performance Significance Determination Process.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following two condition reports (CRs) to verify implementation of licensee procedures FNP-0-87, Maintenance Rule (MR) Scoping Manual; FNP-0-SYP-19, Maintenance Rule Performance Criteria; and FNP-0-89, FNP Maintenance Rule Site Implementation Manual; and compliance with 10 CFR 50.65. The inspectors assessed the licensee's evaluation of appropriate work practices, common cause failures, functional failures, maintenance preventable functional failures, repetitive failures, availability and reliability monitoring, trending and condition monitoring, and system specialist involvement. The inspectors also interviewed maintenance personnel, system specialists, the MR coordinator, and operations personnel to assess their knowledge of the program.

C CR 2005102181, Unit 1 Post Loss-of-Coolant Accident Vent Valve (FV3556)
C CR 2005102025, Unit 2 Radiation Monitor R-11 Functional Failure Evaluation

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed the licensee's planning and control for the following five planned activities to verify the requirements in licensee procedures FNP-0-ACP-52.3, Guidelines for Scheduling of On-Line Maintenance; FNP-0-AP-52, Equipment Status Control and Maintenance Authorization; FNP-0-AP-16; and the MR risk assessment guidance in 10 CFR50.65 (a)(4) were met.

- CR 2005100366, Large Penetration Seal Work not on Plan of the Day
- CR 2004107339, Dried Boron on Reactor Coolant System (FT 434)
- CR 2005101584, 1B EDG Air Start Motor Troubleshooting
- CR 2005100307, Spent Fuel Cask Crane - Part 21 Issue Whiting
- CR 2005102528, Unit 2 - Circulating Water Leak at Amertap Connection

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following five operability evaluations to verify they met the requirements of licensee procedures FNP-0-AP-16 and FNP-0-ACP-9.2, Operability Determination, for technical adequacy, consideration of degraded conditions, and identification of compensatory measures. The inspectors reviewed the evaluations against the design bases, as stated in the UFSAR and Functional System Descriptions to verify system operability was not affected.

- CR 2005100889, 1-2A EDG Air intake louvers (UFSAR 9.4.7.2.1)
- CR 2005101317, 2D Service Water (SW) Pump Failed to Start
- CR 2005101650, 2B AB Battery Charger - Failed
- CR 2005101948, Unable to Isolate SW Cyclone Separator
- CR 2005101870, Unit 2 Train 2 SW with 2B SW Booster Pump Inoperable

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R16 Operator Work-Arounds

a. Inspection Scope

Significant Work-Around Review. The inspectors reviewed the following operator work-around to determine if the functional capability of the related system or human performance in responding to an initiating event was not affected, and the prioritization

of required actions met the requirements of licensee procedure FNP-0-ACP-17, Operator Work-Arounds.

- CR 200510033, Pressurizer level control in manual due to automatic control not controlling

Cumulative Review. The inspectors reviewed the cumulative effects of the operator work-arounds list on both units to verify they did not affect the operator's ability to perform actions in both abnormal and emergency operating procedures, did not increase initiating event frequency, and did not affect multiple mitigating systems.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following two plant modifications to verify the implementation of procedure FNP-0-AP-8, Design Modification Control. This included verification that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability or risk significant systems, structures, and components would not be degraded through the modifications and the modifications would not place the plant in an unsafe condition. The inspectors also discussed the modifications with engineering and operations personnel, and reviewed the related procedures and drawings.

- C DCP 2039997801, Unit 2 Main Control Room Paperless Recorder Installation
- DCP 2049000601, Upgrade of Large Fire Rated Penetration Seals

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the criteria contained in licensee procedures FNP-0-PMT-0.0, Post Maintenance Test Program, to verify post-maintenance test procedures and test activities for the following six systems/components were adequate to verify system operability and functional capability.

- C FNP-1-S0P-22.0, Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW) run after speed control circuit adjustment
- C FNP-1-STP-21.3, TDAFW Steam Supply Valve Inservice Test
- C FNP-2-STP-80.6, 2B EDG 24 Hour Load Run
- FNP-1-STP-73.1, 1A Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Hot Shutdown Panel Operability Verification

- FNP-2-STP-914, Auxiliary Building Battery Charger Load Test
- FNP-0-SOP-0.11, Unit 2 F, G, and H Annunciator Power Supply Repair

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed surveillance test procedures and either witnessed the test or reviewed test records for the following seven surveillance tests to determine if the test adequately demonstrated equipment operability and met the TS requirements. The inspectors reviewed the activities to assess for preconditioning of equipment, procedure adherence, and valve alignment following completion of the surveillance. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedures FNP-0-AP-24, Test Control; FNP-0-M-050, Master List of Surveillance Requirements; and FNP-0-AP-16, and attended selected briefings to determine if procedure requirements were met.

Surveillance Tests

- FNP-2-STP-27.1, AC Source Verification When 2B EDG out of service
- FNP-2-IMP-210.1, Component Cooling Water HX 2C Outlet Temperature and Service Water Flow
- FNP-1-STP-33.0A, Solid State Protection System Train A Operability Test
- FNP-2-STP-80.18, 1000 KW Load Rejection Test

In-Service Tests

- FNP-1-STP-4.2, 1B Charging Pump Quarterly Inservice Test
- FNP-0-STP-81.3, 1C EDG Fuel Oil Transfer System Inservice Test

Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Leak Detection

- FNP-1-STP-9.0, RCS Leakage Test

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

1. Daily Review

- a. As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, "Identification and Resolution of Problems," and to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the

licensee's corrective action program. This review was accomplished by reviewing daily hard copy summaries of CRs and by reviewing the licensee's electronic CR database.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2. Annual Sample Review

a. Inspection Scope

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, "Identification and Resolution of Problems," the inspectors performed a detailed review of the history problems with Unit 1 Containment Air Particulate Sample Radiation Monitor (RE-11) and recent CRs numbered 2005101976, 2005102025, 2005102065, and 2005102457. The CRs were examined to verify safety concerns were properly classified and prioritized for resolution; technical issues were evaluated and dispositioned to address operability and reportability; apparent cause determinations were sufficiently thorough; extent of condition, generic implications, common causes and previous history was adequately considered; and appropriate corrective actions (short and long-term) were implemented or planned in a manner consistent with safety and compliance. The inspectors also evaluated the CRs against the requirements of the licensee's corrective action program as delineated in Procedure NMP-GM-003, "Corrective Action Program," and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings of significance were identified. RE-11 was classified as MR (a)(1) status on August 10, 2004, due to past functional failures. New performance goals were established for RE-11 allowing only one functional failure from September 1, 2004 to September 1, 2005. From February 16 through February 18, 2005, RE-11 had three functional failures. In response to this condition, the licensee's engineering staff performed an evaluation of these functional failures and determined the cause to be a design issue. The licensee requested corporate engineering develop a design change to change the volumetric flow rates through RE-11. Based on a review of the CRs, discussions with engineers and plant management, and information exchanged during licensee meetings, the inspectors concluded that the licensee's assessment of the identified problem and the subsequent corrective actions were thorough and appropriate.

4OA3 Event Follow-up

1. (Closed) LER 05000348/2004002-00, Loss of Operating Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump Due to B Train Loss of Site Power During Shutdown Operations.

- a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the LER and CR 2004105289, documenting the event in the corrective action program, to verify the cause of the November 5, 2004, Unit 1 loss of RHR was identified and the corrective actions were reasonable. The loss of the 1B RHR pump was caused by a B train loss of site power (LOSP) due to an inadvertent actuation of B train undervoltage relays during surveillance testing. The inspectors reviewed plant parameters and verified that licensee staff properly implemented the plant procedures, plant equipment performed as required, and that timely notifications were made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73.

- b. Findings

Introduction. A Green, self-revealing (NCV) was identified for failure to comply with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings. Procedures for conducting surveillance testing were not appropriate to the circumstances and resulted in the loss of the operating RHR pump during shutdown operations.

Description. On November 5, 2004, with the reactor in Mode 6, Unit 1 experienced a B Train LOSP due to inadvertent actuation of B Train bus undervoltage relays during surveillance testing. Two surveillance tests had started. One test established initial conditions for performance of the B Train LOSP, Load Shedding, and Station Black Out Diesel Generator Start (STP 80.15). Jumpers were installed for performance of this test that allowed the 27XG and 2G relays to energize with the sequencer in test mode. Relay 27XG actuates the Load Shed relays and provides the start signal to the 1B DG. Relay 2G removes the Load Shed and DG start signal from relay 27XG after 2 seconds has elapsed.

During these test preparations, the second surveillance test was started involving the monthly Degraded Grid Voltage and Loss of Voltage Protection Relays Operability (STP 80.16). This monthly test was not in the outage schedule and is intended to be performed with the sequencer in test mode, in which the 27XG and 2G relays are de-energized. This monthly test normally does not actuate any Engineered Safety Feature equipment.

Depressing the test pushbuttons in accordance with the monthly undervoltage relay operability test caused an undervoltage condition to be detected by the sequencer relays. Since the jumpers were installed for the performance of the B Train LOSP Test, these relays were energized and therefore initiated the load shed and 1B DG start sequence. By design, the LOSP sequencers do not start the RHR pumps; therefore, the LOSP caused a loss of the running 1B RHR pump. The operating crew immediately restored shutdown cooling by starting the 1A RHR pump, in accordance with Abnormal Operating Procedures, in less than one minute. All actions of the Abnormal Operating Procedure for loss of shutdown cooling were completed and offsite power was restored

to the B Train safeguards busses.

Analysis. The finding is greater than minor since it is associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone for equipment availability and because it affects the associated Cornerstone objective. Specifically, the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective is to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the opposite train RHR pump was started within one minute and an adequate shutdown cooling (SDC) thermal margin was maintained. The SDC thermal margin was verified as maintained by a calculated RCS time-to-boil of greater than 20 hours.

Enforcement. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, requires that activities which affect quality be prescribed by procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these procedures. Contrary to the above, STP- 80.16 and STP- 80.15 were not appropriate to the circumstances, as neither procedure reflected the incompatibilities which existed between these two tests. Because this failure to have adequate procedural guidance is of very low safety significance and has been entered into the licensee's corrective action program (CR 2004105289), this violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy. NCV 05000348/2005-002-001, Loss of Running RHR Pump.

40A5 Other Activities

1. (Closed) Unresolved Item 05000348, 364/2004006-01: Adequacy of Plant Design Basis Documents and Performance of Contactors in Safety-related MOV Starters Under Minimum Design Voltage Conditions

The inspectors reviewed Request for Engineering Review Transmittal 05-6609-01 and licensee actions in response to CRs 2004000589 and 2004000602 which documented the contactor test results and procedure revisions. In addition, DOEJ-SE-05-6609-001, Farley Nuclear Plant MCC Contactor Pickup Voltage Adequacy Unit EMP Tests, which determined the acceptability of contactor performance under minimum design conditions, was reviewed. The analysis adequately demonstrated that the MOVs in question were capable of performing their design basis functions based on the tested contactor pickup voltages. Based on the inspector's review, no findings of significance were identified.

2. Temporary Instruction (TI) Status

The following TIs were previously documented in the associated integrated inspection report (IIR). This section is provided to administratively update the TI status stated in the IIR with the current status. This completes the regional inspection effort for these TIs.

<u>TI Number</u>	<u>IIR Number</u>	<u>IIR Status</u>	<u>Current Status</u>
2515/153	05000348/2004005	Discussed	Closed
2515/153	05000364/2004002	Discussed	Closed
2515/154	05000348, 05000364/2004002	Discussed	Closed
2515/156	05000348, 05000364/2004003	Discussed	Closed
2515/159 (referenced as TI 2515/160 in IIR)	05000348, 05000364/2004005	None	Closed

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On March 31, 2005, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Randy Johnson and the other members of his staff who acknowledged the findings. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

R. V. Badham, Security Manager
W.L. Bargeron, Assistant General Manager - Operations
W. R. Bayne, Performance Analysis Supervisor
S. H. Chestnut, Engineering Support Manager
C. D. Collins, Nuclear Support General Manager, Farley Project
R.S. Fucich, Work Control Superintendent
P. Harlos, Health Physics Manager
J. Horn, Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager
J.R. Johnson, Plant General Manager
T. Livingston, Chemistry Manager
R. R. Martin, Operations Manager
B. L. Moore, Maintenance Manager
W. D. Oldfield, Quality Assurance Supervisor
R. J. Vanderbye, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
T. L. Youngblood, Assistant General Manager - Plant Support

NRC personnel

M. Widmann, Chief, Reactor Projects, Branch 2

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened and Closed

05000348/2005-002-001 NCV Loss of Running RHR Pump (Section 4OA3)

Closed

05000348/2004002-00 LER Loss of Operating RHR Pump Due to B Train Loss
of Site Power During Shutdown Operations
(Section 4OA3)

05000348, 364/2004006-01 URI Adequacy of Plant Design Basis Documents and
Performance of Contactors in Safety-related MOV
Starters Under Minimum Design Voltage
Conditions (Section 4OA5)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment

Drawing D-205022 P&ID, Penetration Room, Filtration System HVAC
FNP-2-SOP-60.0 Penetration Room Filtration System
Technical Specification 3.7.12 Penetration Room Filtration System
FSAR Section 6.2.3.2.2 Penetration Room Filtration System
FNP-0-SOP-56.0 Control Room HVAC System

Drawing D-205012 Control Room & Computer Room HVAC P&ID
FSAR Section 9.4.1 Control Room
FNP-0-SOP-38.0 Diesel Generators

Technical Specification 3.8.1 AC Sources - Operating
FSAR 8.3.1.1.7 On-Site Emergency Power Systems
Functional System Description A-181005 Diesel Generator System

Section 1R05: Fire Protection

Fire Zone data sheet A-508650-2
Fire Zone data sheet A-508650-50
Fire Zone data sheet A-508650-51
Fire Zone data sheet A-508650-52
Fire Zone data sheet A-508650-53
Fire Zone data sheet A-508650-56
Fire Zone data sheet A-508650-57

Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification

FNP-1-ARP-1.9, Annunciator Response Procedure
FNP-1-AOP-14.0, Secondary System Leakage
FNP-1-EEP-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection
FNP-O-EIP-9.0, Emergency Classification and Actions

Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness

NEI 96-07 Guidelines for 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations
FNP-0-ACP-88.1 Applicability Determination
FNP-1-SOP-10.0 Post LOCA Containment Pressurization and Ventilation System
Drawing D-175019 Post Accident Containment Combustible Gas Control System P&ID
FSAR 6.2.5.2.2 Post Accident Venting System
NMP-GM-002 Corrective Action Program
FNP2-SOP-45.0 Radiation Monitoring System
Technical Specification 3.4.15 RCS Leakage Detection System
Functional System Description A-181015 Radiation Monitoring System