



January 13, 2005

10 CFR 50.54(f)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
11555 Rockville Pike
Rockville, Maryland 20852

Palisades Nuclear Plant
Docket 50-255
License No. DPR-20

60-Day Report Per Bulletin 2004-01

- References: 1) *"Inspection of Alloy 82/182/600 Materials Used in the Fabrication of Pressurizer Penetrations and Steam Space Piping Connections at Pressurized-Water Reactors," dated May 28, 2004*
- 2) *Letter from NMC to NRC, "60-Day Response to Bulletin 2004-01," dated July 26, 2004*

By letter dated May 28, 2004, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Bulletin 2004-01 (Reference 1). By letter dated July 26, 2004, Nuclear Management Company, LLC (NMC) sent the 60-day response to the Bulletin (BL) for the Palisades Nuclear Plant (Reference 2).

Section (2)(a), of Reference 1, requires a report be submitted within 60 days after returning the plant to operation from a refueling outage in which a required inspection was completed. Palisades Nuclear Plant was returned to operation on November 17, 2004, after completion of a refueling outage. During this refueling outage, a bare metal visual examination of 100% of the pressurizer heater sleeve locations, including 360° around each sleeve, was conducted. Additionally, bare metal visual examinations of 36 Alloy 82/182/600 primary system pressure boundary locations, normally operated at greater than or equal to 350°F, were performed. Enclosure 1 provides the details of the inspection results.

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Summary of Commitments

This letter contains no new commitments and no revisions to existing commitments.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on
January 13, 2005.



Daniel J. Malone
Site Vice President, Palisades Nuclear Plant
Nuclear Management Company, LLC

Enclosure

CC Administrator, Region III, USNRC
Project Manager, Palisades, USNRC
Resident Inspector, Palisades, USNRC

ENCLOSURE 1
60-DAY REPORT PER BULLETIN 2004-01
PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT PRESSURIZER INSPECTION RESULTS

NRC Requested Information

- (2) *Within 60 days of plant restart following the next inspection of the Alloy 82/182/600 pressurizer penetrations and steam space piping connections, the subject PWR licensees should either:*
- (a) *submit to the NRC a statement indicating that the inspections described in the licensee's response to item (1)(c) of this bulletin were completed and a description of the as-found condition of the pressurizer shell, any findings of relevant indications of through-wall leakage, followup NDE performed to characterize flaws in leaking penetrations or steam space piping connections, a summary of all relevant indications found by NDE, a summary of the disposition of any findings of boric acid, and any corrective actions taken and/or repairs made as a result of the indications found,*
- or*
- (b) *...*

NMC Response

- (2) (a) Palisades Nuclear Plant was returned to operation on November 17, 2004, after completion of a refueling outage. During this refueling outage, a bare metal visual examination of 100% of the pressurizer heater sleeve locations, including 360° around each sleeve, was conducted. Additionally, bare metal visual examinations of 36 Alloy 82/182/600 primary system pressure boundary locations, normally operated at greater than or equal to 350°F, were performed.

In NMC's response to item (1)(c) of the BL, four new commitments were made.

Commitment 1

NMC will perform a bare metal visual inspection of 100 percent of all pressurizer heater sleeve locations, in a manner that visual access to the bare metal 360 degrees around each sleeve can be attained each refueling outage at Palisades Nuclear Plant.

NMC Action

During the 2004 refueling outage, a bare metal visual inspection of all 120 pressurizer heater sleeves (J-groove welds) was performed. This examination included 360° around each sleeve.

There was no accumulation of boric acid in the vicinity of any of the penetrations. All visual examinations of the penetrations had acceptable results.

Commitment 2

NMC will perform non-destructive examination (NDE) capable of characterizing crack orientation of all sleeves for which visual inspection shows evidence of leakage at Palisades Nuclear Plant. The NDE will be performed prior to any repairs.

NMC Action

No action was required since the visual examinations did not show any evidence of leakage.

Commitment 3

NMC will notify the NRC immediately if the NDE defines the flaw as potential circumferential primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC) in either the pressure boundary or non-pressure boundary portions of any locations covered under the scope of Bulletin 2004-01 for the Palisades Nuclear Plant. An appropriate inspection plan will be developed, which will define additional sleeves to be inspected by NDE, sufficient to determine the extent of condition commensurate with the characterization of the flaw.

NMC Action

No action was required since the visual examinations did not show any evidence of leakage.

Commitment 4

NMC will perform bare metal visual inspections of all Alloy 82/182/600 primary system pressure boundary locations normally operated at greater than or equal to 350°F within the next two refueling outages for the Palisades Nuclear Plant.

NMC Action

During the 2004 refueling outage, a bare metal visual examination of the following Alloy 82/182/600 primary system pressure boundary locations, normally operated at greater than or equal to 350°F, was performed:

- Eight pressurizer level taps (butt welds)
- Three pressurizer safety relief valve nozzles (butt welds)
- Two pressurizer temperature element penetrations (pad weld)
- One pressurizer PORV nozzle (butt welds)
- Ten hot leg temperature element penetrations (J-groove weld)
- Twelve cold leg temperature element penetrations (J-groove weld)

Qualified VT-2 examiners, using direct visual techniques, performed the examinations in accordance with a qualified NDE procedure. Results of the bare metal visual examination of the Alloy 600 penetrations listed above, including 360° around each penetration, were acceptable, with no accumulation of boric acid in the vicinity of any of the penetrations.

The remaining Alloy 82/182/600 primary system pressure boundary locations normally operated at greater than or equal to 350°F will be examined during the next refueling outage in 2006.

Examination results indicate that Palisades' pressurizer and hot and cold leg piping are in an acceptable condition with no leakage of boric acid through any of the penetrations inspected.