



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
SAM NUNN ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER
61 FORSYTH STREET SW SUITE 23T85
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8931

April 23, 2003

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
ATTN: Mr. J. B. Beasley, Jr.
Vice President
P. O. Box 1295
Birmingham, AL 35201-1295

SUBJECT: JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION
REPORT 50-348/03-02 AND 50-364/03-02

Dear Mr. Beasley:

On April 5, 2003, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Farley Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on April 7, 2003, with Mr. Don Grissette and other members of your staff.

This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be publicly available in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Brian R. Bonser, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 50-348, 50-364
License Nos. NPF-2, NPF-8

Enclosure: Inspection Report 50-348, 364/03-02
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

cc w/encl: (See page 2)

SNC

2

cc w/encl:

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DATE	4/23/2003	4/23/2003	4/21/2003				
E-MAIL COPY?	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO				
PUBLIC DOCUMENT	YES NO						

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket Nos.: 50-348, 50-364

License Nos.: NPF-2, NPF-8

Report Nos.: 50-348/03-02 and 50-364/03-02

Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC)

Facility: Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2

Location: 7388 N. State Highway 95
Columbia, AL 36319

Dates: January 5, 2003 - April 5, 2003

Inspectors: T. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector (SRI)
C. Rapp, Senior Project Engineer
S. Stewart, SRI Crystal River 3

Approved by: Brian R. Bonser, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000348/2003-02, 05000364/2003-02; Southern Nuclear Operating Company; 01/05/2003 - 04/05/2003; Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2; routine integrated report.

The report covered a three month period of inspection by senior resident inspectors and a regional senior project engineer. No findings of significance were identified. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Operating Reactor Oversight web site <http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html>.

A. Inspector Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

None

B. Licensee Identified Violations

None

Enclosure

Report Details

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 began the period at 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP) and operated at 100 percent RTP until March 22, when it began a coast down for a planned refueling outage. On March 29, the unit was shutdown for refueling.

Unit 2 operated at or near 100 percent RTP for the entire inspection period.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of licensee procedures FNP-0-AP-21.0, Severe Weather, and FNP-0-SOP-0.12, Cold Weather Contingencies, prior to the onset of predicted cold weather to determine if required compensatory measures for equipment affected by cold weather were satisfactorily completed. The inspectors reviewed the implementation of licensee procedure FNP-1(2)-EMP-1383.01, Freeze Protection Inspections, used to check the units' freeze protection circuit thermostats. The inspectors walked down safety-related, risk significant, and fire protection equipment to verify adequate cold weather protection measures were taken for the following:

- Units 1 and 2 Condensate Storage Tanks and associated instrumentation
- Units 1 and 2 Reactor Water Storage Tanks
- Fire Protection Tanks and associated pump house
- Units 1 and 2 Plant Vent Stack Radiation Monitors
- Units 1 and 2 Circulating Water Structure
- Units 1 and 2 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Flow Transmitters
- Units 1 and 2 Steam Generator pressure transmitters.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial system walkdowns to verify the systems listed below were properly aligned when redundant systems or trains were out of service, or after realignment, or when degraded equipment conditions existed. The walkdowns were performed using the criteria in licensee procedures FNP-0-AP-16, Conduct of Operations - Operations Group, and FNP-0-SOP-0, General Instructions to Operations Personnel. The walkdowns included review of applicable sections of the Updated Final

Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), and plant procedures and drawings, and checks of control room indications and plant valves, switches, components, electrical power line-ups, support equipment, and instrumentation. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

- Unit 1 A train Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) during 1B EDG overhaul
- Unit 2 EDGs during and after 2B EDG overhaul
- Unit 1 High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) System after charging pump test realignment
- Unit 2 HHSI System after charging pump test realignment
- Unit 1 Cold Leg Accumulators (CLAs) due to in-leakage and after periodic level draining
- Unit 2 CLAs due to in-leakage and after periodic level draining

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a walkdown of the six fire areas listed below to verify the licensee's control of transient combustibles, the operational readiness of the fire suppression system, and the material condition and status of fire dampers, doors, and barriers. The inspectors also checked that compensatory measures, including fire watches, were in place for degraded fire barriers. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedures FNP-0-AP-36, Fire Surveillance and Inspection, FNP-0-AP-38, Use of Open Flame, FNP-0-AP-39, Fire Patrols and Watches, and the associated Fire Zone Data sheets. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

- Diesel Generator Building Fire Area 56A
- Diesel Generator Building Fire Area 59-61
- Auxiliary Building Fire Area 1-35A
- Auxiliary Building Fire Area 2-6C
- Service Water Structure Fire Area 72A
- Control Room Fire Area 44A

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R07 Heat Sink Performance

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed portions of the cleaning, engineering performance testing, and vendor eddy current testing of the Unit 1 A and B Component Cooling Water (CCW) heat exchangers to verify implementation of licensee procedures FNP-0-ETP-4379, Performance Test for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 CCW Heat Exchangers, FNP-0-MP-94.2, CCW Heat Exchanger Tube Plugging, and vendor procedure ET001, Eddy Current Testing of Heat Exchanger Tubes. The inspectors reviewed the performance test results to verify the licensee had adequately identified and resolved any potential heat exchanger deficiencies which could mask degraded performance, common cause heat sink performance problems that could increase risk, and heat sink performance problems that could result in initiating events or affect multiple heat exchangers in mitigating systems. The inspectors reviewed the eddy current testing results to verify the licensee had properly identified any additional heat exchanger tubes that required plugging. The inspectors also reviewed licensee calculation ES91-2016, CCW Design Basis Heat Load Summary Report, to verify the plugged heat exchanger tubes did not adversely affect heat removal capacity.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed portions of the licensed operator training and testing program to verify implementation of procedures FNP-0-AP-45, Farley Nuclear Plant Training Program, FNP-0-TCP-17.6, Simulator Training Evaluation Documentation, and FNP-0-TCP-17.3, Licensed Operator Continuing Training Program. The inspectors observed scenarios conducted in the licensee's simulator for a loss of vital bus power, loss of coolant accident, loss of emergency recirculation, simultaneous hot leg and cold leg recirculation, and an offsite radioactive release. The inspectors observed operator ability to take timely actions that were risk significant, emergency plan classification and implementation, use of procedures, alarm response, group dynamics and communications, overall performance, self-critiques, training feedback, and management oversight to verify operator performance was evaluated against the performance standards of the licensee's scenario. In addition, the inspectors observed implementation of the applicable emergency operating procedures to verify that licensee expectations in FNP-0-AP-16 and FNP-0-TCP-17.6 were met. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following three condition reports (CRs) to verify implementation of licensee procedures FNP-0-M-87, Maintenance Rule Scoping Manual, FNP-0-SYP-19, Maintenance Rule Performance Criteria, and FNP-0-M-89, FNP Maintenance Rule Site Implementation Manual, and compliance with 10 CFR 50.65. The inspectors assessed the licensee's evaluation of appropriate work practices, common cause failures, functional failures, maintenance preventable functional failures, repetitive failures, availability and reliability monitoring, trending and condition monitoring, and system specialist involvement. The inspectors also interviewed maintenance personnel, system specialists, the maintenance rule (MR) coordinator, and operations personnel to assess their knowledge of the program.

- CR 2002001887, 1C Service Water (SW) Pump Motor Failures
- CR 2002002773, 4 kilo-volt Breaker Failures
- CR 2002002588, EDG Annunciator Failures

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed the licensee's planning and control for the following eight planned risk related licensee activities to verify the requirements in licensee procedures FNP-0-ACP-52.1, Guidelines for Scheduling of On-Line Maintenance, AP-FNP-0-AP-52, Equipment Status Control and Maintenance Authorization, and FNP-0-AP-16, and the Maintenance Rule risk assessment guidance in 10CFR50.65 a(4) were met. The inspectors reviewed the risk assessment and observed actions to minimize overall risk, configuration control, work controls, pre-job briefings, management involvement, job planning and execution, and problem identification and resolution.

- 2B EDG maintenance overhaul
- Service Water Intake Structure Wet Pit Cleaning with 1C/2C SW pumps tagged out
- 1B Auxiliary Building 125 VDC battery cell replacements
- 1B EDG 6 Month Maintenance concurrent with switch yard work
- Unit 2 SW pump cyclone separator outage
- 2A Load Center outage
- Unit 1 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW) testing, concurrent with 1D SW pump outage and switch yard work
- Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling outage

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R14 Personnel Performance During Non-routine Plant Evolutions

a. Inspection Scope

For the two non-routine events described below, the inspectors assessed the licensee's use of operating procedures, surveillance test procedures, annunciator procedures, abnormal and emergency operating procedures, control room actions, command and control, post event recovery, management involvement, training expectations, previous CRs, maintenance work history, and communication. The inspectors reviewed operator logs, plant computer data, control room strip charts, post event/trip report, and discussed actions with operations personnel. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

- Unit 2 Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) block valve MOV 8000B packing failure during quarterly stroke test (CR 2003000496)
- Fire protection system rupture and resultant automatic start of the motor and diesel driven fire pumps (CR 2003000674)

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following six operability evaluations to verify they met the requirements of licensee procedures FNP-0-AP-16 and FNP-0-ACP-9.2, Operability Determination (OD), for technical adequacy, consideration of degraded conditions, and identification of compensatory measures. The inspectors reviewed the evaluations against the design bases, as stated in the UFSAR and Functional System Descriptions (FSD), to verify system operability was not affected.

- OD-03-01, Unit 2 2B EDG inter-cooler water pump casing crack
- Unit 2 Annunciator Panels J, K, L, and M
- OD-03-02, Unit 1 1B auxiliary building battery corrosion buildup
- OD-02-11, Service water leak at valve V560
- OD-03-03, Unit 2 PORV block valve MOV8000B packing failure
- CR 2003000402, EDG 1-2A mechanical overspeed trip set point

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R16 Operator Work-Aroundsa. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following five operator work-arounds to determine if the functional capability of the related system or human performance in responding to an initiating event were not affected and the prioritization of required actions met the requirements of licensee procedure FNP-0-ACP-17, Operator Work-Arounds.

- Unit 2A Steam Generator Feedwater Pump (SGFP) low pressure governor valve Electro-Hydraulic Control (EHC) leak
- Unit 2 Annunciator Panels J, K, L, and M abnormalities
- Unit 1 and 2 Fire Protection alarm panel power supply failure to swap to alternate
- Unit 1 Control Rod H-14 position indication non-urgent failure alarms
- Unit 2 PORV block valve Motor Operated Valve (MOV) 8000B packing failure

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R17 Permanent Plant Modificationsa. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following three plant modifications to verify the implementation of licensee procedure FNP-0-AP-8, Design Modification Control. This included verification that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of risk significant structures, systems, and components (SSC) would not be degraded through the modifications and the modifications would not place the plant in an unsafe condition. The inspectors also observed the Plant Review Board (PRB) approval of these Design Change Packages (DCPs), discussed the modifications with the engineering and operations personnel, and reviewed the related procedures and drawings. The inspectors reviewed the following DCPs:

- 02-1-9788, Unit 1 Cooling Towers Replacement
- 99-1-9506, Provide Safety Injection Bypass for Unit 1 HHSI MOV 8803B
- 99-2-9506, Provide Safety Injection Bypass for Unit 2 HHSI MOV 8803B

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the criteria contained in licensee procedures FNP-0-ACP-52.1 and AP-FNP-0-AP-52 to verify post-maintenance test procedures and test activities for the following six systems/components were adequate to verify system operability and functional capability:

- 1E SW pump post-maintenance outage testing
- FNP-1-EMP-1341.3, Replacement of AB Battery Individual Cell
- 2B EDG 24 month post-overhaul testing
- 1B EDG six-month maintenance outage
- FNP-0-ETP-1007, SW Wet Pit Cleanup
- 2B Vital Inverter Control Board Replacements

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R20 Refueling and Outage Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following activities related to the Unit 1 refueling outage for conformance to licensee procedures FNP-0-UOP-4.0, General Outage Operations Guideline, and FNP-1-UOP-4.1, Refueling Outage Operation. Shut down risk, management oversight, procedural compliance, and operator awareness were evaluated for each of the following activities. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

- New fuel receipt, inspection, and transfer
- Refueling risk plans, contingencies, schedules, and implementation
- Decay heat removal and spent fuel pool cooling (SFP) system operations
- Core refueling off-load operations
- Reactor vessel disassembly and head lift activities
- Core upper internals lift
- Outage-related surveillance tests
- Reactor coolant draindown activities
- Mode changes, cooldown limits, and TS compliance
- Work and test control, task manager conduct, outage control center oversight and communications, clearance activities, inventory and reactivity control, and operations outage conduct
- Refueling outage risk and safety oversight
- Electrical system alignments and availability
- Problem identification and resolution activities

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed surveillance test procedures and either witnessed the test or reviewed test records for the following seven surveillance tests to determine if the test adequately demonstrated equipment operability and met the TS requirements. The inspectors reviewed the activities to assess for preconditioning of equipment, procedure adherence, and valve alignment following completion of the surveillance. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedures FNP-0-AP-24, Test Control, FNP-0-M-050, Master List of Surveillance Requirements, and FNP-0-AP-16, and attended selected briefings to determine if procedure requirements were met.

- FNP-1-STP-11.2, 1B RHR Pump Inservice Test (IST)
- FNP-1-STP-905.4, Auxiliary Building Battery Quarterly Verification
- FNP-2-STP-80.1, 2B EDG Operability Test
- FNP-1-STP-22.1, 1A AFW Pump Quarterly Inservice Test
- FNP-2-STP-23.2, 2B Component Cooling Water Pump Quarterly Inservice Test (IST)
- FNP-2-STP-22.1, 2A AFW Pump Quarterly Inservice Test
- FNP-2-STP-4.1, 2A Charging Pump Quarterly Inservice Test

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following four minor departures (MD), and associated 10 CFR 50.59 screening criteria against the system design bases information and documentation and the licensee's temporary modifications procedure FNP-0-AP-8, Design Modification Control. The inspectors reviewed implementation, configuration control, post-installation test activities, drawing and procedure updates, and operator awareness for these temporary modifications.

- MD-02-2731, Temporary Jumper on the 1B Auxiliary Building Battery
- MD-02-2730, Temporary Substation Power
- MD-02-2729, Installation of Thermal Insulation on Thermocouple Racks of the 1-2A EDG
- MD-02-2728, EDG Building Low Pressure CO2 Pilot Valve Plug

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed an emergency plan table top drill on February 25 to verify the licensee was properly classifying the event, making required notifications, making protective action recommendations, and conducting self-assessments. The table top drill included simulated activation of selected emergency response facilities. The inspectors reviewed procedure FNP-0-EIP-15.0, Emergency Drills, to verify the licensee's response to the drill. The inspectors observed or reviewed the emergency plan drill scenario, classification and notification, team work and communications, identification of weaknesses and deficiencies, corrective action documentation, management involvement, and overall performance.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the PIs listed below for the period from January 2002 through December 2002. To verify the accuracy of the PI data reported during the period, PI definitions and guidance contained in licensee procedure FNP-0-AP-54, Preparation and Review of NRC Performance Indicator Data, and NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 2, were used to verify the basis in reporting for each data element.

Initiating Events Cornerstone

- Unit 1 and Unit 2 unplanned scrams
- Unit 1 and Unit 2 scrams with a loss of normal decay heat removal
- Unit 1 and Unit 2 unplanned power changes

The inspectors reviewed a selection of LERs, portions of Unit 1 and Unit 2 operator log entries, daily morning reports (including the daily CR descriptions), the monthly operating reports, and PI data sheets to determine whether the licensee adequately identified the number of scrams and unplanned power changes greater than 20 percent that occurred during the previous four quarters. This number was compared to the number reported for the PI during the current quarter. The inspectors also reviewed to

verify the accuracy of the number of critical hours reported and the licensee's basis for crediting normal heat removal capability for each of the reported reactor scrams. In addition, the inspectors also interviewed licensee personnel associated with the PI data collection, evaluation, and distribution.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed Operations' Department Safety Tagging Self Assessment, December 2002, and CR2003000020, Broken Bolt on RHR Valve and Root Cause, to verify that equipment, human performance, and program issues were being identified and corrected as required by licensee procedures FNP-0-AP-30, Preparation and Processing of Condition Reports Program, FNP-0-ACP-9.1, Root Cause, and FNP-0-ACP-9.3, Focused Self Assessments. These two samples were selected based on their importance to risk, nuclear safety, and personnel safety. The safety tagging self assessment scope included attending a management meeting which reviewed the issues and corrective actions, review of the assessment report and related CRs, and discussion with the assessment team members. The RHR valve broken bolt issue scope included attendance at a management root cause review meeting, review of the root cause report with emphasis on cause determination and corrective actions, and discussions with root cause team members.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings of significance were identified. The inspectors noted that the root cause evaluation was thorough and timely. Corrective actions appeared to be effective, and addressed the root causes.

4OA3 Event Follow-up

.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-348/2002-004: Manual Reactor Trip on Loss of Both Steam Generator Feedwater Pumps (SGFPs)

On December 10, Unit 1 was manually tripped due to the loss of both SGFPs. The licensee determined that the SGFPs tripped when a worker bumped a switchgear breaker that controlled the pumps. This event was discussed in Section 1R14 of NRC Inspection Report 50-348, 364/2002-05. The LER was reviewed by the inspectors and no findings of significance were identified.

.2 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-348/2002-003: Technical Specification Violation Due to a Section of the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) Missile Barrier Not in Place

On November 6, 2002, during a surveillance test to check barrier integrity and valve positions, the licensee discovered that a portion of the horizontal missile barrier section of the Unit 1 CST to AFW suction piping was not adequately in place and nor secured following previous maintenance activities. The licensee evaluated this condition and determined the AFW suction piping was adequately protected. The LER was reviewed by the inspectors and no additional findings of significance were identified. The failure to restore the barrier is a violation of minor significance that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with Section IV of the NRC's enforcement policy. The licensee documented this condition in CR 2002002713.

40A6 Meetings, Including Exit

.1 Exit Meeting Summary

On April 7, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. D. Grissette and other members of his staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.

.2 Annual Assessment Meeting Summary

On March 27, 2003, the NRC's Chief of Reactor Project's Branch 2 and the Senior Resident Inspector assigned to the Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP) met with Southern Nuclear Operating Company to discuss the NRC's Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) and the NRC's annual assessment of FNP safety performance for the period of January 1, 2002 - December 31, 2002. The major topics addressed were: the NRC's assessment program, the results of the FNP assessment, and NRC security activities. Attendees included FNP site management, members of site staff, corporate management and staff, and members of the local news media.

This meeting was open to the public. The presentation material used for the discussion is available from the NRC's document system (ADAMS) as accession number ML030990060. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Attachment: Supplemental Information

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel:

R. V. Badham, Administration Manager
C. L. Buck, Chemistry/Health Physics Manager
R. M. Coleman, Outage and Modification Manager
C. D. Collins, Assistant General Manager - Plant Support
K. C. Dyar, Security Manager
D. E. Grissette, Plant General Manager
J. R. Johnson, Assistant General Manager - Operations
R. R. Martin, Engineering Support Manager
B. L. Moore, Maintenance Manager
C. D. Nesbitt, Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager
W. D. Oldfield, Quality Assurance Supervisor
L. M. Stinson, Nuclear Support General Manager, Farley Project
R. J. Vanderbye, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
T. Youngblood, Operations Manager
P. Crone, Licensing Supervisor
P. Harlos, Health Physics Superintendent
T. Livingston, Chemistry Manager
R. Wells, Operations Superintendent

NRC personnel:

B. R. Bonser, Chief, Division of Reactor Projects, Branch 2

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Closed

50-348/2002-004	LER	Manual Reactor Trip on Loss of Both Steam Generator Feedwater Pumps (SGFPs)
50-348/2002-003	LER	Technical Specification Violation Due to a Section of the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) Missile Barrier Not in Place

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Section 1R04

FNP-1(2)-SOP-8.1A, HHSI System
FNP-1(2)-AOP-1, RCS Leakage
HHSI System Functional System Description (FSD) - A181009
FNP-0-SOP-38, EDG System
FNP-1(2)-ARP-0001, Main Control Board Annunciator Panel
FNP-1(2)-AOP-5, Loss of A or B Train Electrical Power

FNP-1(2)-AOP-5.1, Contingency Electrical Alignments
 FNP-1(2)-AOP-5.2, Degraded Grid
 FNP-0-SOP-38.1, Emergency Starting of the EDG System
 FNP-0-SOP-42, EDG Fuel Oil Transfer System
 Technical Specifications 3.8.1, 3.8.2, 3.7
 UFSAR Section 8.3
 FNP-0-ARP-19.1, Local EDG Control Panel Annunciator Panel
 FNP-0-ARP-19.2, Local EDG Control Panel Annunciator Panel
 FNP-0-STP-80 and 81 series, EDG Surveillances

Section 1R11

FNP-1-ARP-0001, Main Control Board Annunciator Panel
 FNP-1-ESP-0.1, Reactor Trip Recovery
 FNP-1-ESP-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation
 FNP-1-ESP-1.4, Transfer to Simultaneous Cold and Hot Leg Recirculation
 FNP-1-ECP-1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation
 FNP-1-EEP-0, Reactor Trip or SI
 FNP-1-EEP-1, Loss Reactor or Secondary Coolant
 FNP-1-EEP-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation
 FNP-0-AP-30, Preparation and Processing of Condition Reports and Licensee Event Reports
 FNP-0-TCP-17.5, License Administration
 FNP-0-TCP-17.6, Simulator Training Evaluation/Documentation
 Licensed Operator Continuing Training Simulator Exercise Guide, OPS-56400A
 Scenario 2003-C303

Section 1R14

FNP-2-ARP-0001, Main Control Board Annunciator Panel
 CR 2003000496 and Root Cause Report
 10 CFR50.72 reportability requirements
 CR 2002002119
 CR 2000005141
 Technical Specifications 3.4.11 and bases
 FNP-2-STP-10.3, ECCS Inservice Test
 Control Room Operator Logs for March 10
 FNP-2-SOP-1.2, Reactor Coolant Pressure Relief System

Section 1R20

FNP-0-FHP-3, Receipt and Storage of New Fuel
 FNP-0-FHP-3.1, Shipment of New Fuel
 FNP-0-FHP-4, Transfer of New Fuel to Spent Fuel Pit
 FNP-1-FHP-5.15, New Fuel Monorail Hoist
 FNP-1-FHP-5.16, New Fuel Crane
 FNP-1-FHP-5.15, New Fuel Monorail Hoist
 FNP-1-FHP-5.17, New Fuel Elevator
 FNP-1-FHP-5.15, Spent Fuel Bridge Crane
 FNP-1-SOP-7, Residual Heat Removal
 FNP-1-SOP-54, SFP Cooling and Purification
 Westinghouse Unit 1 Cycle 19 Core Reload Manual
 FNP-1-STP-170, Check Valve Inservice Test

FNP-1-STP-151.5, Turbine Generator Overspeed Test
FNP-1-STP-158, Reactor Coolant Check Valves Leakage Test
FNP-1-STP-608, Main Steam Safety Valve Operational Test
FNP-1-STP-22.10, TDAFW Pump Blackout Start Test
FNP-1-STP-32.1, Accumulator Check Valves Leakage Test
FNP-1-STP-34, Containment Inspection
FNP-1-STP-35, RCS Pressure and Temperature Limits
FNP-1-SOP-1.6, Draining the RCS
FNP-0-ACP-47, Outage Implementation
FNP-0-ACP-47.4, Outage Execution and Critique
FNP-0-AP-94, Outage Nuclear Safety
FNP-0-UOP-4.0, General Outage Operations Guideline
FNP-1-UOP-4.1, Refueling Outage Operation
1R18 Outage Handbook
1R18 Significant Work Activities
Outage Control Center Procedures
1R18 Readiness Reviews
1R18 Critical Path and Safety Assessment Plan
1R18 Task Managers
1R18 Schedule Overview
1R18 RWP Summary and ALARA issues
FNP-1-MP-1.0, Maintenance refueling Procedure