

EUROPEAN PRESSURIZED REACTOR (EPR)

Directorate General for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection (DGSNR) Point of View

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DGSNR's point of view on the EPR project

Historical milestones

- ✓ The set-up of French-German organisations
- Development of the EPR project
- ✓ The successive steps in the safety analysis

The EPR safety approach

- ✓ EPR safety objectives
- Key subjects examined by the Safety Authorities
- ✓ Contents of the Basic Design Report and of the EPR Technical codes
- Contents of the "Technical guidelines"

State of instruction - Prospective aspects



Historical milestones (1) The set-up of French-German joint organisations

Safety organisations:

1989:

- ✓ Common declaration by BMU and the French Ministry of Industry.
- ✓ Agreement between GRS and IPSN.

1990:

✓ Creation of the DFD (Deutsch-Französischer Direktionsausschuss)



Historical milestones (2) The set-up of French-German joint organisations

Nuclear industry and customers:

1989:

- Creation of NPI by Framatome and Siemens/KWU.
- ✓ Three different R&D programs for future PWRs developed separately :
 - NPI common product
 - SEDF-Framatome REP 2000 N4+program
 - Siemens-German utilities "Planungsauftrag"

1992:

- ✓ NPI, EDF and German utilities R&D programs merged into the EPR program. Creation of the EPR Project Directorate
- First mission: developing the nuclear island of EPR.
- ✓ Aim: ensure that the same PWR design be licensable in both countries



Historical milestones (3) Development of the EPR project

- 1992-1995: Conceptual Phase
 - nuclear island only
 - ✓ EPR "Conceptual Safety Features Review File" (Sept 1993).
- 1995-1997: Basic Design Phase
 - ✓ nuclear island only
 - ✓ "Basic Design Report" submitted in 1997.
- 1997-1999: Basic Design Optimisation Phase
 - examination of the possibility of increasing plant power, reduction of investment and generation cost, complying with the safety requirements.
 - ✓ Updated "Basic Design Report" (February 1999).



The successive steps in the safety analysis (1): the safety goals

- 1991: DSIN letter to EDF on the safety of future PWRs
- 1993: DFD "joint declaration by the French and German safety authorities on a Common Safety Approach for Future PWRs"
- Iterative procedure between the industrial design development and the safety approach :
 - ✓ potential inconsistencies identified early
 - extend of necessary refinement within the safety approach easier to estimate



Department

The successive steps in the safety analysis (2): the joint examination process

Up to 1999:

- Examination by the technical supports IPSN GRS=> common reports
- Examination by the expert groups GPR RSK
 => common positions transmitted to DFD
- Adoption of these positions by DFD (co-signed letters)

Since 1999:

- Examination by the technical supports IPSN GRS
 => common reports
- Examination by the expert group GPR, including invited German experts



The successive steps in the safety analysis (3): synopsis

- Sept 1993: Conceptual Safety
 Features Review File (CSFRF)
- From 1995 on:
 - Basic design studies
 - ✓ "EPR Technical codes"
- Oct. 1997: Submission of the Basic Design Report
- 1997-1999: BDR optimisation phase
- 1999: Submission of the Optimised Basic Design Report

- June 1993: Joint declaration on a common safety approach for future PWRs
- 1993-95: Investigation of 5 key subjects from the CSFRF
- Feb 1995: DFD joint recommendations on the CSFRF key subjects
- 1995-2000: Joint examination of the basic design studies
- Oct 2000: adoption by GPR of the "EPR Technical guidelines"



The EPR safety approach: Strategy - Safety objectives

- Safety approach applicable to PWRs to be built at the beginning of the 21st century => evolutionary approach (>1000 r.y of operating experience in both countries)
- These reactors may still be in operation in 2070-2080 => ambitious safety objectives



EPR safety objectives : an evolutionary strategy

- An "evolutionary" strategy, grounded on:
 - ✓ Existing reactor operating know-how, feedback and results of in-depth safety studies (eg., PSAs)
 - ✓ A reinforcement of the defence-in-depth.
 (eg., significant improvement of the containment function)
 - ✓ A deterministic design basis, supplemented by the use of probabilistic methods



EPR safety objectives : severe accidents management (1)

Objectives for severe accidents:

Prevention of accidents:

✓ Significant reduction of the probability of core meltdown.

Mitigation of the consequences of accidents:

- ✓ "Practical elimination" of accidents likely to lead to large early releases of radioactivity.
- ✓ The maximum potential releases for a core meltdown accident should only require very limited protective measures in space and time.
- ✓ No protective measures should be needed for accidents without core meltdown.



EPR safety objectives: severe accidents management (2)

Practical elimination of:

- ✓ high pressure core melt
- early bypass of the containment
- ✓ vapour explosion
- ✓ global hydrogen detonation

• Mitigation of:

- ✓ low pressure core melt
- hydrogen deflagration



EPR safety objectives: normal operation and maintenance

- Objectives for normal operation and maintenance:
 - ✓ simplification of operation, maintenance, inspection.
 - ✓ reduction of incidents, occupational exposure, effluents etc.

...to be duly studied at the design stage.



The 5 key subjects from the CSFRF investigated by the safety Authorities

- Severe accidents: radiological consequences; approach and main orientations for the preventive and mitigating features.
- Probabilistic goals; system design
- Implementation of the break preclusion concept on the main primary coolant lines
- External hazards (earthquake, explosion, aircraft crash)
- Radiological consequences of incidents and accidents, excluding severe accidents; design basis accidents



Scope of the EPR Basic Design Report

- Site dependant aspects and conventional part of the plant not addressed.
- Equivalent to the standard part of the French "Preliminary Safety Analysis Report" used for "Authorisation of creation."
- Relevant to establish the German "Safety Report."



EPR design options

- 1500 MWe PWR
- Safety redundancy: 4
- Corium spreading and cooling system
- Protection against military aircraft crash
- Double wall containment with partial liner
 - designed for LOCA and hydrogen explosion
 - ✓ no direct leak
- Water pool inside containment



Scope of the EPR Technical Codes (ETC) (1)

- Elaboration of a set of industrial rules common to the French and German nuclear industry.
- Contribution to the safety demonstration in the licensing process.
 - ✓ Supports the elaboration of the results of the Basic Design.
- Approach following the French practice (RCC)
 - ✓ ETC will not be binding



Scope of the EPR Technical Codes (ETC) (2)

6 documents scheduled to cover:

- Safety and process
- Mechanical components
- ✔ Electrical equipment
- Instrumentation and control
- Civil works
- Fire protection
- ✓ + Common requirements for handling devices/ventilating



Contents of the "Technical Guidelines"

 The recommendations continuously developed by GPR and RSK have been structured into a complete set of technical guidelines, adopted by GPR and German experts

Contents:

- Principle of the safety concept
- Conceptual safety features
- Accident prevention and plant safety characteristics
- Control of reference transients, incidents and accidents
- ✓ Control of multiple failure conditions and core melt accidents
- Protection against hazards
- ✓ System design requirements and effectiveness of the safety functions



State of the project Prospective aspects

- DGSNR is able to take position on EPR safety options
- EDF's goal: issuing a "Preliminary Safety Report" by end 2002.
- Further investigations will be necessary at the detailed design stage
- Considerable progress in the harmonisation of requirements between France and Germany
 - ✓ well balanced approach rather than adding up all sets of requirements
- Further development is needed along the path to achieve a European approach on future PWRs...