

March 17, 2000

Mr. Mike Reandeau
Director - Licensing
Clinton Power Station
P.O. Box 678
Clinton, IL 61727

Distribution w/encls:

File Center
PUBLIC
PD3-2 r/f
ACRS

GHill (2)
GGrant, RIII
WBeckner
OGC

SUBJECT: CLINTON - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT ALLOWING A ONE-TIME
EXTENSION OF CERTAIN SURVEILLANCE INTERVALS (TAC NO. MA7702)

Dear Mr. Reandeau:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Commission) has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 125 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-62 for the Clinton Power Station, Unit 1. The amendment is in response to your application dated December 16, 1999.

The amendment allows a one-time extension of some Technical Specification surveillance intervals to support elimination of a planned spring 2000 midcycle outage.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Jon B. Hopkins, Senior Project Manager, Section 2
Project Directorate III
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-461

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 125 to NPF-62
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

DOCUMENT NAME: G:\PDIII-2\CLINTON\AMD-7702.WPD

To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without enclosures "E" = Copy with enclosures "N" = No copy

OFC	PM:PD3-2	E	LA:PD3-2	E	BC:EEIB	BC:SPL	BC:SRXB	E	OGC	SC:PD3-2
NAME	JHopkins		THarris		JCalve	JHannon	JWermiel		Cmarco	AMendola
DATE	2/17/00		3/16/00		2/23/00	2/24/00	2/25/00		3/15/00	1/100

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

2/17#2
J

OGC FILE CENTER COPY

DF01

Mike Reandeau

Clinton Power Station, Unit 1
Illinois Power Company

cc:

Michael Coyle
Vice President
Clinton Power Station
P.O. Box 678
Clinton, IL 61727

Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety
Office of Nuclear Facility Safety
ATTN: Mr. Frank Nizidlek
1035 Outer Park Drive
Springfield, IL 62704

Patrick Walsh
Manager Nuclear Station
Engineering Department
Clinton Power Station
P.O. Box 678
Clinton, IL 61727

Kevin P. Gallen
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP
1800 M Street, NW
Washington, DC 20036

Resident Inspector
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
RR#3, Box 229 A
Clinton, IL 61727

R. T. Hill
Licensing Services Manager
General Electric Company
175 Curtner Avenue, M/C 481
San Jose, CA 95125

Regional Administrator, Region III
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
801 Warrenville Road
Lisle, IL 60532-4351

Chairman of DeWitt County
c/o County Clerk's Office
DeWitt County Courthouse
Clinton, IL 61727

J. W. Blattner
Project Manager
Sargent & Lundy Engineers
55 East Monroe Street
Chicago, IL 60603



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

AMERGEN ENERGY COMPANY, LLC

DOCKET NO. 50-461

CLINTON POWER STATION, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 125
License No. NPF-62


1. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by AmerGen Energy Company, LLC (the licensee), dated December 16, 1999, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-62 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No.125 are hereby incorporated into this license. AmerGen Energy Company, LLC shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance, and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Anthony J. Mendiola, Chief, Section 2
Project Directorate III
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: March 17, 2000

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 125

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-62

DOCKET NO. 50-461

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Pages

3.0-4

3.0-5

Insert Pages

3.0-4

3.0-5

3.0-6

3.0-7

3.0-8

3.0-9

3.0-10

3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY

SR 3.0.1 SRs shall be met during the MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability for individual LCOs, unless otherwise stated in the SR. Failure to meet a Surveillance, whether such failure is experienced during the performance of the Surveillance or between performances of the Surveillance, shall be failure to meet the LCO. Failure to perform a Surveillance within the specified Frequency shall be failure to meet the LCO except as provided in SR 3.0.3. Surveillances do not have to be performed on inoperable equipment or variables outside specified limits.

SR 3.0.2 The specified Frequency for each SR is met if the Surveillance is performed within 1.25 times the interval specified in the Frequency, as measured from the previous performance or as measured from the time a specified condition of the Frequency is met. (For each of the SRs listed in Table 3.0.2-1, however, the specified Frequency is met if the SR is performed prior to November 30, 2000. This extension of the test intervals for these SRs is permitted on a one-time basis, effective until November 30, 2000.)

For Frequencies specified as "once," the above interval extension does not apply.

If a Completion Time requires periodic performance on a "once per . . ." basis, the above Frequency extension applies to each performance after the initial performance.

Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications.

SR 3.0.3 If it is discovered that a Surveillance was not performed within its specified Frequency, then compliance with the requirement to declare the LCO not met may be delayed, from the time of discovery, up to 24 hours or up to the limit of the specified Frequency, whichever is less. This delay period is permitted to allow performance of the Surveillance.

If the Surveillance is not performed within the delay period, the LCO must immediately be declared not met, and the applicable Condition(s) must be entered.

(continued)

3.0 SR APPLICABILITY (continued)

SR 3.0.3
(continued) When the Surveillance is performed within the delay period and the Surveillance is not met, the LCO must immediately be declared not met, and the applicable Condition(s) must be entered.

SR 3.0.4 Entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of an LCO shall not be made unless the LCO's Surveillances have been met within their specified Frequency. This provision shall not prevent entry into MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

SR 3.0.4 is only applicable for entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability in MODES 1, 2, and 3.

TABLE 3.0.2-1
Surveillance Intervals Extended to November 30, 2000

TS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT	DESCRIPTION OF SR REQUIREMENT
3.1.7.8	SLCS Injection Operability
3.1.8.3	Scram Discharge Volume vent and drain valve operability
3.3.1.1.12, Table 3.3.1.1-1, Item 11	RPS Reactor Mode Switch - Shutdown Position CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.1.1.15, Table 3.3.1.1-1, Item 1.a	RPS IRM Neutron Flux - High LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.1.1.15, Table 3.3.1.1-1, Item 1.b	RPS IRM Inoperative LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST.
3.3.1.1.15, Table 3.3.1.1-1, Item 2.a	RPS APRM Neutron Flux - High, Setdown LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.1.1.15, Table 3.3.1.1-1, Item 2.b	RPS APRM Flow Biased Simulated Thermal Power - High LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.1.1.15, Table 3.3.1.1-1, Item 2.c	RPS APRM Fixed Neutron Flux - High LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.1.1.15, Table 3.3.1.1-1, Item 2.d	RPS APRM Inoperative LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.1.1.15, Table 3.3.1.1-1, Item 3	RPS Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure - High LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.1.1.15, Table 3.3.1.1-1, Item 4	RPS Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.1.1.15, Table 3.3.1.1-1, Item 5	RPS Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.1.1.15, Table 3.3.1.1-1, Item 6	RPS Main Steam Isolation Valve - Closure LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.1.1.15, Table 3.3.1.1-1, Item 7	RPS Drywell Pressure - High LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.1.1.15, Table 3.3.1.1-1, Item 8.a	RPS Scram Discharge Volume Water Level - High, Transmitter LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.1.1.15, Table 3.3.1.1-1, Item 8.b	RPS Scram Discharge Volume Water Level - High, Float Switch LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.1.1.15, Table 3.3.1.1-1, Item 9	RPS Turbine Stop Valve Closure LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.1.1.15, Table 3.3.1.1-1, Item 10	RPS Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.1.1.15, Table 3.3.1.1-1, Item 11	RPS Reactor Mode Switch - Shutdown Position LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.1.1.15, Table 3.3.1.1-1, Item 12	RPS Manual Scram LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.1.1.17, Table 3.3.1.1-1, Item 2.b	RPS APRM Flow Biased Simulated Thermal Power - High RESPONSE TIME TEST
3.3.1.1.17, Table 3.3.1.1-1, Item 2.c	RPS APRM Fixed Neutron Flux - High RESPONSE TIME TEST
3.3.3.1.3, Table 3.3.3.1-1, Item 6	PAM Drywell Area Radiation CHANNEL CALIBRATION
3.3.3.1.3, Table 3.3.3.1-1, Item 7	PAM Penetration Flow Path, Automatic PCIV Position CHANNEL CALIBRATION
3.3.3.2.2	Remote Shutdown System circuit and control switch demonstration
3.3.5.1.4, Table 3.3.5.1-1, Item 2.c	ECCS LPCI B and LPCI C Subsystems, LPCI Pump B Start - Time Delay Logic Card CHANNEL CALIBRATION
3.3.5.1.4, Table 3.3.5.1-1, Item 5.c	ADS Trip System 2, ADS Initiation Timer CHANNEL CALIBRATION
3.3.5.1.4, Table 3.3.5.1-1, Item 5.f	ADS Trip System 2, ADS Drywell Pressure Bypass Timer CHANNEL CALIBRATION

TABLE 3.0.2-1 (Continued)
Surveillance Intervals Extended to November 30, 2000

TS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT	DESCRIPTION OF SR REQUIREMENT
3.3.5.1.5, Table 3.3.5.1-1, Item 1.a	ECCS LPCI A and LPCS Subsystems, Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.5.1.5, Table 3.3.5.1-1, Item 1.b	ECCS LPCI A and LPCS Subsystems, Drywell Pressure - High LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.5.1.5, Table 3.3.5.1-1, Item 1.c	ECCS LPCI A and LPCS Subsystems, LPCI Pump A Start - Time Delay Logic Card LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.5.1.5, Table 3.3.5.1-1, Item 1.d	ECCS LPCI A and LPCS Subsystems, Reactor Vessel Pressure - Low LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.5.1.5, Table 3.3.5.1-1, Item 1.f	ECCS LPCI A and LPCS Subsystems, LPCI Pump A Discharge Flow - Low LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.5.1.5, Table 3.3.5.1-1, Item 1.g	ECCS LPCI A and LPCS Subsystems, Manual Initiation LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.5.1.5, Table 3.3.5.1-1, Item 2.a	ECCS LPCI B and LPCI C Subsystems, Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.5.1.5, Table 3.3.5.1-1, Item 2.b	ECCS LPCI B and LPCI C Subsystems, Drywell Pressure - High LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.5.1.5, Table 3.3.5.1-1, Item 2.c	ECCS LPCI B and LPCI C Subsystems, LPCI Pump B Start - Time Delay Logic Card LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.5.1.5, Table 3.3.5.1-1, Item 2.d	ECCS LPCI B and LPCI C Subsystems, Reactor Vessel Pressure - Low LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.5.1.5, Table 3.3.5.1-1, Item 2.e	ECCS LPCI B and LPCI C Subsystems, LPCI Pump B and LPCI Pump C Discharge Flow - Low LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.5.1.5, Table 3.3.5.1-1, Item 2.f	ECCS LPCI B and LPCI C Subsystems, Manual Initiation LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.5.1.5, Table 3.3.5.1-1, Item 3.a	ECCS HPCS, Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.5.1.5, Table 3.3.5.1-1, Item 3.b	ECCS HPCS, Drywell Pressure - High LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.5.1.5, Table 3.3.5.1-1, Item 3.c	ECCS HPCS, Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.5.1.5, Table 3.3.5.1-1, Item 3.f	ECCS HPCS, HPCS Pump Discharge Pressure - High LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.5.1.5, Table 3.3.5.1-1, Item 3.g	ECCS HPCS, HPCS System Flow Rate - Low LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.5.1.5, Table 3.3.5.1-1, Item 3.h	ECCS HPCS, Manual Initiation LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.5.1.5, Table 3.3.5.1-1, Item 4.c	ADS Trip System 1, ADS Initiation Timer LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.5.1.5, Table 3.3.5.1-1, Item 4.g	ADS Trip System 1, ADS Drywell Pressure Bypass Timer LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.5.1.5, Table 3.3.5.1-1, Item 5.c	ADS Trip System 2, ADS Initiation Timer LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.5.1.5, Table 3.3.5.1-1, Item 5.f	ADS Trip System 2, ADS Drywell Pressure Bypass Timer LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.6.1.5, Table 3.3.6.1-1, Item 3.b	Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation, RCIC System Isolation, RCIC Steam Line Flow - High, Time Delay CHANNEL CALIBRATION
3.3.6.1.6, Table 3.3.6.1-1, Item 1.b	Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation, Main Steam Line Isolation, Main Steam Line Pressure - Low LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST

TABLE 3.0.2-1 (Continued)
Surveillance Intervals Extended to November 30, 2000

TS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT	DESCRIPTION OF SR REQUIREMENT
3.3.6.1.6. Table 3.3.6.1-1. Item 1.d	Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation. . Main Steam Line Isolation, Condenser Vacuum - Low LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.6.1.6. Table 3.3.6.1-1. Item 2.d	Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation, Drywell Pressure - High (ECCS Divisions 1 and 2) LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.6.1.6. Table 3.3.6.1-1. Item 2.e	Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation, Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 (HPCS NSPS Divisions 3 and 4) LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.6.1.6. Table 3.3.6.1-1. Item 2.f	Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation, Drywell Pressure - High (HPCS NSPS Divisions 3 and 4) LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.6.1.6. Table 3.3.6.1-1. Item 2.g	Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation, Containment Building Fuel Transfer Pool Ventilation Plenum Radiation - High LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.6.1.6. Table 3.3.6.1-1. Item 2.h	Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation, Containment Building Exhaust Radiation - High LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.6.1.6. Table 3.3.6.1-1. Item 2.i	Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation, Containment Building Continuous Containment Purge Exhaust Radiation - High
3.3.6.1.6. Table 3.3.6.1-1. Item 2.j	Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation, Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.6.1.6. Table 3.3.6.1-1. Item 3.b	Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation, RCIC System Isolation, RCIC Steam Line Flow - High Time Delay LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.6.1.6. Table 3.3.6.1-1. Item 5.d	Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation, RHR System Isolation, Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.6.1.6. Table 3.3.6.1-1. Item 5.f	Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation, RHR System Isolation, Drywell Pressure - High LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.6.2.5. Table 3.3.6.2-1. Item 3	Secondary Containment Isolation, Containment Building Fuel Transfer Pool Ventilation Plenum Exhaust Radiation - High LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.6.2.5. Table 3.3.6.2-1. Item 4	Secondary Containment Isolation, Containment Building Exhaust Radiation - High LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.6.2.5. Table 3.3.6.2-1. Item 5	Secondary Containment Isolation, Containment Building Continuous Containment Purge Exhaust Radiation - High LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.6.2.5. Table 3.3.6.2-1. Item 6	Secondary Containment Isolation, Fuel Building Exhaust Radiation - High LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.6.3.4. Table 3.3.6.3-1. Item 4	RHR Containment Spray System, Timers, System A and System B CHANNEL CALIBRATION
3.3.6.3.4. Table 3.3.6.3-1. Item 5	RHR Containment Spray System, Timers, System B Only CHANNEL CALIBRATION
3.3.6.3.5. Table 3.3.6.3-1. Item 1	RHR Containment Spray System, Drywell Pressure - High LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.6.3.5. Table 3.3.6.3-1. Item 2	RHR Containment Spray System, Containment Pressure - High LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.6.3.5. Table 3.3.6.3-1. Item 3	RHR Containment Spray System, Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.6.3.5. Table 3.3.6.3-1. Item 4	RHR Containment Spray System, Timers, System A and System B LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST

TABLE 3.0.2-1 (Continued)
Surveillance Intervals Extended to November 30, 2000

TS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT	DESCRIPTION OF SR REQUIREMENT
3.3.6.3.5. Table 3.3.6.3-1. Item 5	RHR Containment Spray System. Timers. System B Only LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.6.3.5. Table 3.3.6.3-1. Item 6	RHR Containment Spray System. Manual Initiation LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.8.1.3. Table 3.3.8.1-1. Item 1.a	Loss of Power, Divisions 1 and 2 - 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage. Loss of Voltage - 4.16 kV basis CHANNEL CALIBRATION
3.3.8.1.3. Table 3.3.8.1-1. Item 1.b	Loss of Power, Divisions 1 and 2 - 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage. Loss of Voltage - Time Delay CHANNEL CALIBRATION
3.3.8.1.3. Table 3.3.8.1-1. Item 1.c	Loss of Power, Divisions 1 and 2 - 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage. Degraded Voltage Reset - 4.16 kV basis CHANNEL CALIBRATION
3.3.8.1.3. Table 3.3.8.1-1. Item 1.d	Loss of Power, Divisions 1 and 2 - 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage. Degraded Voltage Drop-out - 4.16 kV basis CHANNEL CALIBRATION
3.3.8.1.3. Table 3.3.8.1-1. Item 1.e	Loss of Power, Divisions 1 and 2 - 4.16 kV Emergency Bus. Undervoltage. Degraded Voltage - Time Delay CHANNEL CALIBRATION
3.3.8.1.3. Table 3.3.8.1-1. Item 2.a	Loss of Power, Division 3 - 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage. Loss of Voltage - 4.16 kV basis CHANNEL CALIBRATION
3.3.8.1.3. Table 3.3.8.1-1. Item 2.b	Loss of Power, Division 3 - 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage. Loss of Voltage - Time Delay CHANNEL CALIBRATION
3.3.8.1.4. Table 3.3.8.1-1. Item 1.a	Loss of Power, Divisions 1 and 2 - 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage. Loss of Voltage - 4.16 kV basis LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.8.1.4. Table 3.3.8.1-1. Item 1.b	Loss of Power, Divisions 1 and 2 - 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage. Loss of Voltage - Time Delay LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.8.1.4. Table 3.3.8.1-1. Item 1.c	Loss of Power, Divisions 1 and 2 - 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage. Degraded Voltage Reset - 4.16 kV basis LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.8.1.4. Table 3.3.8.1-1. Item 1.d	Loss of Power, Divisions 1 and 2 - 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage. Degraded Voltage Drop-out - 4.16 kV basis LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.8.1.4. Table 3.3.8.1-1. Item 1.e	Loss of Power, Divisions 1 and 2 - 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage. Degraded Voltage - Time Delay LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.8.1.4. Table 3.3.8.1-1. Item 2.a	Loss of Power, Division 3 - 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage. Loss of Voltage - 4.16 kV basis LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.8.1.4. Table 3.3.8.1-1. Item 2.b	Loss of Power, Division 3 - 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage. Loss of Voltage - Time Delay LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.8.1.4. Table 3.3.8.1-1. Item 2.c	Loss of Power, Division 3 - 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage. Degraded Voltage Reset - 4.16 kV basis LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.8.1.4. Table 3.3.8.1-1. Item 2.d	Loss of Power, Division 3 - 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage. Degraded Voltage Drop-out - 4.16 kV basis LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
3.3.8.1.4. Table 3.3.8.1-1. Item 2.e	Loss of Power, Division 3 - 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage. Degraded Voltage - Time Delay LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST

TABLE 3.0.2-1 (Continued)
Surveillance Intervals Extended to November 30, 2000

TS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT	DESCRIPTION OF SR REQUIREMENT
3.5.1.5	ECCS - Operating injection/spray subsystem actuation
3.5.1.8	ECCS - Operating injection/spray subsystem RESPONSE TIME TEST
3.5.2.6	ECCS - Shutdown injection/spray subsystem actuation
3.6.1.3.7	Automatic PCIV actuation
3.6.1.3.11	Excess flow check valve PCIV actuation
3.6.1.7.3	Automatic RHR Containment Spray valve actuation
3.6.4.2.3	Automatic SCID actuation
3.6.4.3.3	SGT subsystem actuation
3.6.5.3.5	Automatic drywell isolation valve actuation
3.7.2.2	Division 3 Shutdown Service Water subsystem actuation
3.7.3.5	Inleakage verification of the negative pressure portions of the Control Room Ventilation System
3.8.1.8	AC Sources - Alternate Offsite Circuit
3.8.1.9	AC Sources - Load Reject (single largest load)
3.8.1.10	AC Sources - Full Load Reject
3.8.1.11	AC Sources - LOP
3.8.1.12	AC Sources - Auto Start
3.8.1.13	AC Sources - Non-essential Trip Bypass
3.8.1.16	AC Sources - Manual Sync and Load Transfer
3.8.1.17	AC Sources - Test Mode Override on ECCS Initiation Signal
3.8.1.18	AC Sources - Load Sequence Time
3.8.1.19	AC Sources -LOP / ECCS Initiation Signal Auto Start
3.8.4.6	Battery Charger Functional Test
3.8.4.7	Battery Charger Capacity
3.8.11.2	Static VAR Compensator Protection System Functional Test



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 125 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-62

AMERGEN ENERGY COMPANY, LLC

CLINTON POWER STATION, UNIT 1

DOCKET NO. 50-461

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated December 16, 1999, AmerGen Energy Company, LLC, (the licensee) proposed a one-time extension of some Technical Specification (TS) surveillance intervals to support elimination of a planned spring 2000 mid-cycle outage (PO-8) for the Clinton Power Station (CPS). For the applicable surveillances, the licensee proposes to extend their surveillance intervals to November 30, 2000, the scheduled startup date from refueling outage 7 (RF-7). October 15, 2000, is the planned start date for RF-7.

Normally, CPS can operate a full operating cycle without needing a mid-cycle shutdown to perform TS surveillances. However, CPS had a lengthy shutdown (over 2 1/2 years) that ended in May 1999. TS surveillances were performed during that shutdown for an earlier restart date than occurred. As a result, some of the surveillances are now coming due before the end of the current operating cycle.

2.0 EVALUATION

CPS is on a nominal 18 month operating cycle. There are TS surveillances that can only be performed during shutdown conditions. The allowed interval for performance of those TS is 18 months plus a 25 percent allowance that provides some scheduling flexibility. Due to the lengthy shutdown, some of the CPS TS surveillances will come due for performance before the next refueling outage (RF-7) even after utilization of the 25 percent allowance. Due, in part, to the good operational performance since plant startup in May 1999, the licensee proposes a one-time extension to these surveillance intervals to negate the need for a mid-cycle outage prior to RF-7.

The longest requested extension is for 6 1/2 months beyond the 25 percent allowance for a total surveillance interval of 29 months. This is less than the interval allowed for those plants which have been approved for 24 month TS surveillances considering the 25 percent allowance for a total of 30 months.

The licensee evaluated the surveillance extensions, in part, using the guidance provided in NRC Generic Letter 91-04, "Changes in Technical Specification Surveillance Intervals to Accommodate a 24-Month Fuel Cycle," dated April 2, 1991. A review of each surveillance was

performed considering surveillance history, other testing that would continue to be performed on the affected equipment or components, and the availability of redundant equipment during the surveillance interval extension. Additionally, drift evaluations were performed, as appropriate, for calibration surveillances.

In its submittal, the licensee sorted the surveillances into 21 groups. A separate justification was then provided for each group. Every justification discusses recent surveillance history (mostly the last two operating cycles). In each case, the licensee states that acceptance criteria were met during the recent past surveillances. The exception is for Group 21, Static VAR Compensator (SVC) Protection Systems. In that case, the SVC installation is so recent that the surveillances have only been performed for initial SVC operation.

Many of the TS surveillances involve a check of logic system circuitry. The licensee points out in their submittal that logic systems are inherently more reliable than other plant components. The NRC staff acknowledged that in our Safety Evaluation dated August 2, 1993, relating to extension of the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit 2 and 3, surveillance intervals from 18 to 24 months, we stated the following:

Industry reliability studies for boiling water reactors (BWRs), prepared by the BWR Owners' Group (NEDC-30936P) show that the overall safety systems' reliabilities are not dominated by the reliabilities of the logic system, but by that of the mechanical components (e.g., pumps and valves), which are consequently tested on a more frequent basis. Since the probability of a relay or contact failure is small relative to the probability of mechanical component failure, increasing the logic system functional test interval represents no significant change in the overall safety system unavailability.

The above is still the NRC's position regarding the reliability of logic system circuits.

Also, many of the systems that have TS surveillances requested for extension are at least partially checked by other surveillances routinely during operation. For example, Group 12, Primary Containment Isolation Valves, will continue to have some of the instrumentation and circuitry checked throughout the operating cycle by the performance of channel checks, calibrations, and channel functional tests. These surveillance tests performed periodically during operation provide additional assurance that extension of the 18-month shutdown surveillance is acceptable.

The licensee provides the above reasons of good surveillance history, logic system reliability, and other surveillances performed as justification for many of the requested surveillance extensions. Specifically they are provided as the justification for the following surveillance groups:

- Group 2, Scram Discharge Volume
- Group 3, Reactor Protection System Instrumentation
- Group 5, Remote Shutdown System
- Group 7, Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation
- Group 8, Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation

Group 11, ECCS [emergency core cooling systems] - Operating and ECCS - Shutdown
Group 12, Primary Containment Isolation Valves
Group 13, RHR [residual heat removal] Containment Spray System
Group 14, Secondary Containment Isolation Dampers
Group 15, Standby Gas Treatment System
Group 16, Drywell Isolation Valves
Group 17, Division 3 Shutdown Service Water Subsystem
Group 19, AC Sources - Operating.

The NRC staff reviewed the justification provided for the one-time extension of the surveillances contained in the above groups and based on the good surveillance history, logic system reliability, and other surveillances performed, the staff finds the extension acceptable.

For the following three groups, the licensee provided the above justification of good surveillance history, logic system reliability, and other surveillances performed plus an instrument drift review. The licensee found that the instrument drift, if any, was small and acceptable for the proposed one-time extensions.

Group 6, Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation
Group 9, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Containment Spray System Instrumentation
Group 10, Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation

The NRC staff reviewed the justification provided for the above three groups and based on the good surveillance history, logic system reliability, instrument drift review, and other surveillances performed, the staff finds that the one-time surveillance extension is acceptable.

For Group 1, Standby Liquid Control System, the licensee provided justification of good surveillance history, and the performance of other surveillances as the basis for the extension. Valve continuity is one of the other surveillances providing additional assurance of system operability. The continuity check shows that significant valve degradation has not occurred, and thereby, provides assurance that the valve should function when called upon. The NRC staff reviewed the justification provided, and based on the good surveillance history and the other surveillances performed, the staff finds that the one-time surveillance extension is acceptable.

For Group 4, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM), the licensee provided justification of good surveillance history and instrument accuracy as the basis for the extension. PAM instrumentation is used for information post-accident by control room operators. PAM instrumentation does not have to have the same degree of accuracy that accident detection or automatic mitigation trip devices have, rather PAM instrumentation is expected to only have sufficient accuracy to detect trends or the existence of a condition. The licensee states that the PAM instrumentation accuracy at CPS is significantly greater than that required by the industry standard for similar instruments; thereby, providing assurance that the instrumentation will be capable of performing their intended function, if needed, during the surveillance extension. The staff reviewed the justification provided, and based on the good surveillance history and instrument accuracy, the staff finds that the one-time surveillance extension is acceptable.

For Group 18, Control Room Ventilation System, the licensee provided justification of good surveillance history and a trend analysis of surveillance data. The licensee states that trend analysis of past surveillances indicates no degradation of the ductwork sealant. Additionally, only control room ventilation system 'Train A' requires the one-time extension. 'Train B' will remain within its surveillance interval. The staff reviewed the justification provided, and based on the good surveillance history and the trend analysis of surveillance data, the staff finds that the one-time surveillance extension is acceptable.

For Group 20, DC Sources - Operating, the licensee provided justification of good surveillance history and other surveillances performed during operation; specifically, monitoring of battery parameters. Monitoring of battery parameters ensures prompt identification of substantial battery degradation. The staff reviewed the justification provided and based on the good surveillance history, and battery parameter monitoring, the staff finds that the one-time surveillance extension is acceptable.

For Group 21, Static VAR Compensator (SVC) Protection Systems, the licensee provided justification of other surveillances performed during operation. Specifically, the harmonic relays and distribution protection units have indication and trouble indication lights that are checked daily. The licensee states that although the SVCs and their protection systems were installed recently, the protection systems have proven reliable to date. Additionally, the requested extension is only for 31 days to the scheduled end of RF-7. The staff reviewed the justification provided and based on the monitoring of the indication and trouble indication lights, and the short duration of the extension, the staff finds that the one-time surveillance extension is acceptable.

In summary, the NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's request for a one-time extension of various surveillances until the planned end of RF-7 (November 30, 2000) and finds, based on the above, that the request is acceptable. The staff also notes that, even if these surveillances were performed during a mid-cycle outage, the surveillances would have to be performed again during RF-7 to reach the end of the next operating cycle. Therefore, some additional personnel radiation exposure would occur if the surveillance intervals were not extended to eliminate PO-8.

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Illinois State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

This amendment changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding (65 FR 1921). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR

51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: J. Hopkins

Date: March 17, 2000