Mr. Ted C. Feigenbaum
Executive Vice President and
Chief Nuclear Officer
North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation
c/o Mr. James M. Peschel
P.O. Box 300
Seabrook, NH 03874

SUBJECT: GENERIC LETTER 97-01, "DEGRADATION OF CRDM/CEDM NOZZLE AND

OTHER VESSEL CLOSURE HEAD PENETRATIONS" REVIEW OF THE RESPONSES FOR THE SEABROOK STATION, UNIT 1 (TAC NO. M98595)

## Dear Mr. Feigenbaum:

This letter provides the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff's assessment of your letters dated May 1 and July 30, 1997, which provided your 30-day and 120-day responses to Generic Letter (GL) 97-01, "Degradation of CRDM/CEDM Nozzle and Other Vessel Closure Head Penetrations," and your letter of March 9, 1999, which provided your response to the staff's request for additional information (RAI) dated December 9, 1998, relative to the issuance of the GL. Your responses provided your proposed program and efforts to address the potential for primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC) to occur in the control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) nozzles at the Seabrook Station.

On April 1, 1997, the staff issued GL 97-01 to the industry, requesting that addressees provide a description of the plans to inspect the vessel head penetrations (VHPs) at their respective pressurized water reactor (PWR) designed plants. In the discussion section of the GL, the staff indicated that it did not object to individual PWR licensees basing their inspection activities on an integrated, industry-wide inspection program.

The Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG), in coordination with the efforts of the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) the Babcock and Wilcox Owners Group [B&WOG] and the Combustion Engineering Owners Group [CEOG], determined that it was appropriate for its members to develop a cooperative integrated inspection program in response to GL 97-01. Therefore, on July 25, 1997, the WOG submitted two Topical Reports, WCAP-14901, Revision 0, and WCAP-14902, Revision 0, on behalf of the member utilities in the WOG. In these reports, the WOG provided descriptions of the two models, the EPRI/Dominion Engineering CIRSE Model (crack initiation and growth susceptibility model) and the Westinghouse Model, that were being used to rank the VHPs at the participating plants in the owners group. You provided your responses for the Seabrook Station on May 1 and July 30, 1997, respectively. In these responses, you indicated that you were a participant in the WOG's integrated program for evaluating the potential for PWSCC to occur in the VHPs of Westinghouse-designed PWRs,

and that you were endorsing the probabilistic susceptibility model in WCAP-14901 as being applicable to the assessment of VHPs at the Seabrook Station.

The NRC staff performed a review of your 30- and 120-day responses and the applicable WCAP for your facility and determined that some additional information was needed for completion of the review. Therefore, on December 9, 1998, the staff issued an RAI requesting: (1) a description of the probabilistic susceptibility ranking for a plant's VHPs to undergo PWSCC relative to the rankings for the rest of the industry; (2) a description of how the respective susceptibility models were benchmarked; (3) a description of how the variability in the product forms, material specifications, and heat treatments used to fabricate a plant's VHPs were addressed in the susceptibility models; and (4) a description of how the models would be refined in the future to include plant-specific inspection results. As was the case for the earlier responses to the GL, the staff encouraged a coordinated, generic response to the requests in the RAI.

On December 11, 1998, NEI submitted a generic, integrated response to the RAIs on behalf of the PWR industry and the utility members in the owners groups. In the generic submittal, NEI informed the staff that it normalized the susceptibility rankings for the industry. The generic response to the RAIs also provided sufficient information to answer the requests in the RAIs, and emphasized that the integrated program is an ongoing program that will be implemented in conjunction with EPRI, the PWR Owners Groups, the participating utilities, and the Material Reliability Projects' Subcommittee on Alloy 600. By letter dated March 21, 1999, the staff informed NEI that the integrated program was an acceptable approach for addressing the potential for PWSCC to occur in the VHPs of PWR-designed nuclear plants, and that licensees responding to the GL could refer to the integrated program as a basis for assessing the postulated occurrence of PWSCC in PWR-design VHPs.

To date, all utilities have implemented VT-2 type visual examinations of their VHPs in compliance with the ASME requirements specified in Table IWB-2500 for Category B-P components. Most utilities, if not all, have also performed visual examinations as part of plant-specific boric acid wastage surveillance programs. In addition, the following plants have completed voluntary, comprehensive augmented volumetric inspections (eddy current examinations or ultrasonic testing examinations) of their CRDM nozzles:

- 1994 Point Beach Unit 1 (Westinghouse design)
- 1994 Oconee Unit 2 (B&W design)
- 1994 D.C. Cook Unit 2 (Westinghouse design)
- 1996 North Anna Unit 1 (Westinghouse design)
- 1998 Millstone Unit 2 (a CE design)
- 1999 Ginna (a Westinghouse design)

In addition, the following plants have completed voluntary, limited augmented volumetric inspections of their VHPs as well:

- 1995 Palisades eight instrument nozzles (CE design)
- 1996 Oconee Unit 2 reinspection of two CRDM nozzles (B&W design)
- 1997 Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 vessel head vent pipe (CE design)
- 1999 Oconee Unit 2 reinspection of eight CRDM nozzles (B&W design)

The majority of these plants have been ranked as having the more susceptible VHPs in the industry. Of these inspections, only the inspections at D.C. Cook Unit 2 has resulted in the identification of any domestic PWSCC type flaw indications. The current program includes additional commitments to perform further volumetric inspections of the CRDM nozzles at Oconee Unit 2 (a reinspection of 2-12 nozzles in 1999), Crystal River 3 (in 2001, a B&W design), Diablo Canyon Unit 2 (in 1999, a Westinghouse design), Farley Unit 2 (in 2001, a Westinghouse design), and San Onofre Unit 3 (in 2002-2008, a CE design). These plants are currently ranked in either the high or moderate susceptibility categories.

On March 9, 1999, you provided your response to the staff's RAI. In your letter you endorsed the NEI submittal of December 11, 1998, and indicated that you were a participant in the NEI/WOG integrated program. Since the additional voluntary volumetric inspections performed to date have confirmed that PWSCC is not an immediate safety concern with respect to the structural integrity of VHPs in domestic PWRs, and since we have approved the integrated program for implementation, we conclude that the integrated program provides an acceptable basis for evaluating your VHPs. You may refer to the integrated program when submitting VHP-related licensing action submittals for the remainder of the current 40-year licensing period. However, if you are considering applying for license renewal of your facility, your application will need to address the following items: (1) an assessment of the susceptibility of your VHPs to develop PWSCC during the extended license terms for the facility; (2) a confirmation that the VHPs at your facility are included under the scope of your boric acid corrosion inspection program, and (3) a summary of the results of any inspections that have been completed on your VHPs prior to the license renewal application, as appropriate.

This completes the staff's efforts relative to your responses to GL 97-01. Thank you for your consideration and efforts in addressing this issue.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Robert M. Pulsifer, Project Manager, Section 2 Project Directorate I Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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Sincerely, /RA/

Robert M. Pulsifer, Project Manager, Section 2 Project Directorate I Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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