

March 14, 2000

Mr. Robert P. Powers, Senior Vice President
Indiana Michigan Power Company
Nuclear Generation Group
500 Circle Drive
Buchanan, MI 49107

SUBJECT: DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - ISSUANCE OF
AMENDMENTS (TAC NOS. MA4929 AND MA4930)

Dear Mr. Powers:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No.242 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-58 and Amendment No. 223 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-74 for the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated December 3, 1998. The amendments incorporate the Distribution Ignition System requirements into the Unit 1 and Unit 2 TSs.

A copy of our related safety evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly *Federal Register* notice.

Sincerely,

/RA/

John F. Stang, Senior Project Manager, Section 1
Project Directorate III
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-315 and 50-316

- Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 242 to DPR-58
- 2. Amendment No. 223 to DPR-74
- 3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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DATE	3/1/00		2/29/00		03/14/00	3/13/00	3/15/00	

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

March 15, 2000

Mr. Robert P. Powers, Senior Vice President
Indiana Michigan Power Company
Nuclear Generation Group
500 Circle Drive
Buchanan, MI 49107

SUBJECT: DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - ISSUANCE OF
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Sincerely,

John F. Stang, Senior Project Manager, Section 1
Project Directorate III
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-315 and 50-316

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 242 to DPR-58
2. Amendment No. 223 to DPR-74
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2

cc:

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-315

DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE


Amendment No. 242
License No. DPR-58

1. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Indiana Michigan Power Company (the licensee) dated December 3, 1998, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-58 is hereby amended to read as follows:
 - (2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 242 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Claudia M. Craig, Chief, Section 1
Project Directorate III
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: March 15, 2000

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 242

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-58

DOCKET NO. 50-315

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

<u>REMOVE</u>	<u>INSERT</u>
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3/4 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

ELECTRIC HYDROGEN RECOMBINERS - W

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.4.2 Two independent containment hydrogen recombiner systems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTION:

With one hydrogen recombiner system inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.4.2 Each hydrogen recombiner system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 18 months by verifying during a recombiner system functional test that the minimum heater sheath temperature increases to $\geq 700^{\circ}\text{F}$ within 90 minutes and is maintained for at least 2 hours.
- b. At least once per 18 months by:
 1. Performing a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of all recombiner instrumentation and control circuits.
 2. Verifying through a visual examination that there is no evidence of abnormal conditions within the recombiners (i.e., loose wiring or structural connections, deposits of foreign materials, etc.)
 3. Verifying during a recombiner system functional test that the heater sheath temperature increases to $\geq 1200^{\circ}\text{F}$ within 5 hours and is maintained for at least 4 hours.
 4. Verifying the integrity of all heater electrical circuits by performing a continuity and resistance to ground test following the above required functional test. The resistance to ground for any heater phase shall be $\geq 10,000$ ohms.

3/4 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

DISTRIBUTED IGNITION SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.4.3 Both trains of the Distributed Ignition System shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTION:

With one train of the Distributed Ignition System inoperable:

- a. Restore the inoperable train to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or
- b. Perform surveillance requirement 4.6.4.3a once per 7 days on the OPERABLE train until the inoperable train is restored to OPERABLE status.

With no OPERABLE hydrogen igniter in one containment region, restore one hydrogen igniter in the affected containment region to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.4.3 Each train of the Distributed Ignition System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. Once per 92 days by energizing the supply breakers and verifying that at least 34 of 35 igniters are energized.
- b. Once per 92 days, by verifying at least one hydrogen igniter is OPERABLE in each containment region.
- c. Once per 18 months by verifying the temperature of each igniter is a minimum 1700°F.

3/4 BASES

3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS

3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the containment spray system ensures that containment depressurization and cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA. The pressure reduction and resultant lower containment leakage rate are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

3/4.6.2.2 SPRAY ADDITIVE SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the spray additive system ensures that sufficient NaOH is added to the containment spray in the event of a LOCA. The limits on NaOH minimum volume and concentration, ensure that 1) the iodine removal efficiency of the spray water is maintained because of the increase in pH value, and 2) corrosion effects on components within containment are minimized. These assumptions are consistent with the iodine removal efficiency assumed in the accident analyses.

Surveillance Requirement 4.6.2.2.d is performed by verifying a water flow rate ≥ 20 gpm and ≤ 50 gpm from the spray additive tank test line to each containment spray system with the spray pump operating on recirculation with a pump discharge pressure ≥ 255 psig.

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment. Containment isolation within the time limits specified ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA.

The opening of containment purge and exhaust valves and locked or sealed closed containment isolation valves on an intermittent basis under administrative control includes the following considerations: (1) stationing a qualified individual, who is in constant communication with control room, at the valve controls, (2) instructing this individual to close these valves in an accident situation, and (3) assuring that environmental conditions will not preclude access to close the valves and that this action will prevent the release of radioactivity outside the containment.

3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL

Hydrogen Analyzers and Recombiners

The OPERABILITY of the equipment and systems required for the detection and control of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipment will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions. Either recombiner unit is capable of controlling the expected hydrogen generation associated with: 1) zirconium-water reactions; 2) radiolytic decomposition of water; and 3) corrosion of metals within containment.

The acceptance criterion of 10,000 ohms is based on the test being performed with the heater element at an ambient temperature, but can be conservatively applied when the heater element is at a temperature above ambient.

3/4 BASES
3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL (continued)

Distributed Ignition System (DIS)

The DIS permits controlled burning of the excessive hydrogen generated during degraded core LOCAs postulated by 10 CFR 50.44, "Standards for combustible gas control system in light-water-cooled power reactors." The postulated amount of hydrogen is equivalent to that generated from the reaction of 75% of the fuel cladding with water. Controlled burning at low hydrogen concentrations precludes containment damage that could result from random ignition at high concentrations. An extensive program of testing and analysis has demonstrated that a system of strategically placed hydrogen igniters (the DIS) can be relied upon for controlled burns of the hydrogen gas postulated for degraded cores. Furthermore, it has been shown that this can be accomplished at combustion temperatures and pressures that will not challenge the integrity of the containment structure or the OPERABILITY of containment equipment necessary to shutdown (and maintain shutdown) the reactor.

The hydrogen igniters are not included for mitigation of a Design Basis Accident (DBA) because an amount of hydrogen equivalent to that generated from the reaction of 75% of the fuel cladding with water is far in excess of the hydrogen calculated for the limiting DBA loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The hydrogen concentration resulting from a DBA can be maintained less than the flammability limit using the hydrogen recombiners.

The DIS consists of two independent trains of 35 igniters located throughout containment. The igniters in each train are further divided into six groups per train powered from different phases of two separate three phase transformers. It is the transformer phase that uniquely defines a group.

Operation in MODES 1 and 2 with both trains available ensures the capability for controlled burning of hydrogen gas inside containment during degraded core LOCA events.

In MODES 3 and 4 both the hydrogen production rate and the total hydrogen production after a LOCA would be significantly less than that calculated for the DBA LOCA. Also, because of the limited time in these MODES, the probability of an accident requiring the DIS is low. Therefore the DIS is not required in MODES 3 and 4.

In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of a LOCA are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, the DIS is not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6.

The 7 day Completion Time for restoration of an inoperable DIS train in MODES 1 or 2 is based on the low probability of occurrence of a degraded core event that would generate hydrogen in amounts equivalent to a metal water reaction of 75% of the core cladding and the low probability of failure of the OPERABLE DIS train. This justification also applies to the 7 day Completion Time allowed for redundant igniters being inoperable in the same containment region. For this case there would also be ignition capability from adjacent containment regions by flame propagation to the region with no OPERABLE igniters.

Confidence in system OPERABILITY is demonstrated by surveillance testing. Since many igniters are inaccessible at power, surveillance testing in MODE 1 is limited to measurement of igniter current when the DIS is energized by groups. Measured currents are compared with baseline data for the group.

Igniter temperature measurement for all igniters can only be performed during shutdown and is performed every 18 months. This testing energizes all igniters and confirms the ability of each igniter to obtain a surface temperature of at least 1700°F. This temperature is conservatively above the temperature necessary to ignite hydrogen mixtures at concentrations near the lower flammability limit. Test experience indicates that individual igniter failures are generally total failures and do not involve the inability to reach the required temperature when an igniter is drawing normal amperage. This observed failure mode provides reasonable confidence that an igniter failing to reach the required temperature would also be detected by reduced group current measurements during the MODE 1 surveillances. Therefore the 18 month frequency for actual temperature measurements is acceptable.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-316

DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 223
License No. DPR-74

1. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Indiana Michigan Power Company (the licensee) dated December 3, 1998, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.


2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-74 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 223 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Claudia M. Craig, Chief, Section 1
Project Directorate III
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: March 15, 2000

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 223

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-74

DOCKET NO. 50-316

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

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DISTRIBUTED IGNITION SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.4.3 Both trains of the Distributed Ignition System shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTION:

With one train of the Distributed Ignition System inoperable:

- a. Restore the inoperable train to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or
- b. Perform surveillance requirement 4.6.4.3a once per 7 days on the OPERABLE train until the inoperable train is restored to OPERABLE status.

With no OPERABLE hydrogen igniter in one containment region, restore one hydrogen igniter in the affected containment region to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.4.3 Each train of the Distributed Ignition System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. Once per 92 days by energizing the supply breakers and verifying that at least 34 of 35 igniters are energized.
- b. Once per 92 days, by verifying at least one hydrogen igniter is OPERABLE in each containment region.
- c. Once per 18 months by verifying the temperature of each igniter is a minimum 1700°F.

3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL

Hydrogen Analyzers and Recombiners

The OPERABILITY of the equipment and systems required for the detection and control of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipment will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions. Either recombining unit is capable of controlling the expected hydrogen generation associated with: 1) zirconium-water reactions; 2) radiolytic decomposition of water; and 3) corrosion of metals within containment. These hydrogen control systems are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.7, "Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a LOCA," March 1971.

The acceptance criterion of 10,000 ohms is based on the test being performed with the heater element at an ambient temperature, but can be conservatively applied when the heater element is at a temperature above ambient.

Distributed Ignition System (DIS)

The DIS permits controlled burning of the excessive hydrogen generated during degraded core LOCAs postulated by 10 CFR 50.44, "Standards for combustible gas control system in light-water-cooled power reactors." The postulated amount of hydrogen is equivalent to that generated from the reaction of 75% of the fuel cladding with water. Controlled burning at low hydrogen concentrations precludes containment damage that could result from random ignition at high concentrations. An extensive program of testing and analysis has demonstrated that a system of strategically placed hydrogen igniters (the DIS) can be relied upon for controlled burns of the hydrogen gas postulated for degraded cores. Furthermore, it has been shown that this can be accomplished at combustion temperatures and pressures that will not challenge the integrity of the containment structure or the OPERABILITY of containment equipment necessary to shutdown (and maintain shutdown) the reactor.

The hydrogen igniters are not included for mitigation of a Design Basis Accident (DBA) because an amount of hydrogen equivalent to that generated from the reaction of 75% of the fuel cladding with water is far in excess of the hydrogen calculated for the limiting DBA loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The hydrogen concentration resulting from a DBA can be maintained less than the flammability limit using the hydrogen recombiners.

The DIS consists of two independent trains of 35 igniters located throughout containment. The igniters in each train are further divided into six groups per train powered from different phases of two separate three phase transformers. It is the transformer phase that uniquely defines a group.

Operation in MODES 1 and 2 with both trains available ensures the capability for controlled burning of hydrogen gas inside containment during degraded core LOCA events.

In MODES 3 and 4 both the hydrogen production rate and the total hydrogen production after a LOCA would be significantly less than that calculated for the DBA LOCA. Also, because of the limited time in these MODES, the probability of an accident requiring the DIS is low. Therefore the DIS is not required in MODES 3 and 4.

In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of a LOCA are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, the DIS is not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6.

The 7 day Completion Time for restoration of an inoperable DIS train in MODES 1 or 2 is based on the low probability of occurrence of a degraded core event that would generate hydrogen in amounts equivalent to a metal water reaction of 75% of the core cladding and the low probability of failure of the OPERABLE DIS train. This justification also applies to the 7 day Completion Time allowed for redundant igniters being inoperable in the same containment region. For this case there would also be ignition capability from adjacent containment regions by flame propagation to the region with no OPERABLE igniters.

3/4 BASES
3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL (continued)

Confidence in system OPERABILITY is demonstrated by surveillance testing. Since many igniters are inaccessible at power, surveillance testing in MODE 1 is limited to measurement of igniter current when the DIS is energized by groups. Measured currents are compared with baseline data for the group.

Igniter temperature measurement for all igniters can only be performed during shutdown and is performed every 18 months. This testing energizes all igniters and confirms the ability of each igniter to obtain a surface temperature of at least 1700°F. This temperature is conservatively above the temperature necessary to ignite hydrogen mixtures at concentrations near the lower flammability limit. Test experience indicates that individual igniter failures are generally total failures and do not involve the inability to reach the required temperature when an igniter is drawing normal amperage. This observed failure mode provides reasonable confidence that an igniter failing to reach the required temperature would also be detected by reduced group current measurements during the MODE 1 surveillances. Therefore the 18 month frequency for actual temperature measurements is acceptable.

3/4.6.5 ICE CONDENSER

The requirements associated with each of the components of the ice condenser ensure that the overall system will be available to provide sufficient pressure suppression capability to limit the containment peak pressure transient to less than 12 psig during LOCA conditions.

3/4.6.5.1 ICE BED

The OPERABILITY of the ice bed ensures that the required ice inventory will 1) be distributed evenly through the containment bays, 2) contain sufficient boron to preclude dilution of the containment sump following the LOCA, 3) contain sufficient heat removal capability to condense the reactor system volume released during a LOCA, 4) contain sufficient water to maintain adequate sump inventory, and 5) result in a post-LOCA sump pH within the allowed range. These conditions are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

The ice, together with the containment spray, is adequate to absorb the initial blowdown of steam and water from a design basis accident and the additional heat loads that would enter containment during several hours following the initial blowdown. The additional heat loads would come from the residual heat in the reactor core, the hot piping and components, and the secondary system, including the steam generators.

Over the course of a fuel cycle, sublimation reduces the weight of ice in the ice condenser. For the ice condenser to be considered OPERABLE, the minimum as-found ice weight of 1144 pounds per ice basket, for those ice baskets selected for weighing per the surveillance requirements, must be present at the end of a fuel cycle. An instrument measurement error allowance is included in the required minimum ice basket weight. To account for loss due to sublimation, a conservative average ice bed sublimation of 10% over an eighteen-month period is used. The beginning-of-cycle, or as-left ice basket weight, is adjusted accordingly to assure the LCO limit will be met at the end of each fuel cycle.

3/4.6.5.2 ICE BED TEMPERATURE MONITORING SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the ice bed temperature monitoring system ensures that the capability is available for monitoring the ice temperature. In the event the monitoring system is inoperable, the ACTION requirements provide assurance that the ice bed heat removal capacity will be retained within the specified time limits.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 242 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-58

AND AMENDMENT NO. 223 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-74

INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER COMPANY

DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-315 AND 50-316

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated December 3, 1998, the Indiana Michigan Power Company (the licensee) requested amendments to the Technical Specifications (TSs) for the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The proposed amendments would incorporate limiting conditions of operation, modes of applicability and surveillance requirements for the Distribution Ignition System (DIS) into Units 1 and 2 TSs.

2.0 EVALUATION

10 CFR 50.44, "Standard for Combustible Gas Control System in Light-Water-Cooled Power Reactors," requires the design and installation of systems to mitigate and control the concentration of combustible gas inside containment following a design basis loss of coolant accident (LOCA). To comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.44, the licensee has installed a distributed ignition system (DIS). An extensive program of testing and analysis has demonstrated that a system of strategically placed igniters can be relied upon for controlled burns of hydrogen postulated following a design basis accident. The DIS at D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant consists of two independent trains of resistance heating elements (igniters). Each DIS train has 35 igniters. The DIS has been selected by the licensee to comply with 10 CFR 50.44 to mitigate the consequences of the hydrogen generation following a design basis accident. The licensee made several previous submittals to the NRC concerning the design, analysis, and testing of the DIS. The NRC's review and approval of the DIS was documented in a safety evaluation dated December 17, 1981. As such, the system is considered significant to the protection of the public health and safety and meets Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii)(D), for inclusion into the plant TSs.

The proposed amendment adds limiting conditions for operation, applicable modes, surveillance requirements and associated bases for the DIS. The TS requirements proposed by the licensee incorporate the requirements of the improved TSs (NUREG-1431, Revision 1, "Standard Technical Specifications, Westinghouse Plants"). The addition of the DIS system to the TSs will provide additional assurance of the system availability and maintain a greater margin of safety for containment integrity following design basis accidents.

3.0 SUMMARY

Based on the above evaluation, the staff finds that the DIS installed to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.44 meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.36 for inclusion into the TSs. The proposed TSs have incorporated the requirements of NUREG-1431 for operability and surveillance of the DIS. Therefore, the staff finds the proposed changes to the TSs acceptable.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Michigan State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

These amendments change the requirements with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and change the surveillance requirements. The staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding (65 FR 4279). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

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Date: March 15, 2000