Westinghouse Owners Group Large Break (LB) LOCA Redefinition Program

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Westinghouse Owners Group LBLOCA Redefinition

- · Desired Outcomes from this Meeting
 - Describe the WOG Proposed Program for the Redefinition
 - · Identify Issues Associated with the Redefinition
 - Establish a Process for WOG and Industry to Interact with the NRC to Move Ahead with the Redefinition

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- Presentation Overview
 - Introduction
 - Background
 - Program Approach
 - Safety Benefits
 - · Examples of Potential Benefits
 - · Program Plan
 - · Potentially Affected Regulatory Requirements/Issues
 - · Status
 - · Rule-Making
 - · Identification of Break Size Limit

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- · Presentation Overview (cont.)
 - Safety Margin
 - Containment
 - · Analytical Codes
 - February 2000 Option 3 Workshop
 - Industry Comments
 - Conclusions
 - · Process for Moving Forward

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Background

- · November 20, 1998 WOG Letter to Commissioner Diaz
 - · Identified LBLOCA as Highest Priority Regulatory Issue
- · January 12, 2000 NEI Letter to Chairman Meserve
 - Identified 10CFR50.46 and Appendix K to Part 50 as Prime Candidates for Assessment and Change
- NRC Options Presented as February 2000 Option 3 Workshop

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- Program Approach
 - Licensing Consistent with Risk-Informing Part 50
 - SECY-99-264 (Proposed Staff Plan for Risk-Informing Technical Requirements in 10 CFR Part 50)
 - Risk-Informing the Technical Requirements Complements Risk-Informing the Special Treatment Requirements and Adds Clarity/Consistency to the Regulations
 - · Changes to 10 CFR Part 50
 - 50.46 Acceptance Criteria for ECCS
 - Appendix A GDC (LOCA definition)
 - Appendix K (I.C.1)

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· Program Approach (continued)

- · Redefine the Design Basis LOCA
 - Size
 - Attendant Consequences
- · Maintain an Acceptable Margin of Safety
- Technical Justification
 - Use Risk-Informed Technology to Show Low Risk of LBLOCA
 - · Utilize the Framework Contained in Regulatory Guide 1.174
 - Use Leak Before Break Analysis to Justify Break Size
 - Define New Limiting Break Size & Reanalyze, as Necessary, to Obtain Benefits
 - · Intent is to Reduce Break Size Down to SBLOCA Range

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- Safety Benefits
 - · Focus Resources on Activities of Greater Risk Significance
 - Reduce Burden of Revising and Maintaining LBLOCA Design/Licensing Basis
 - · Consistency within the Regulations
 - · Consistency in Various Individual Analytical Applications
 - · Provides a More Realistic Basis for Design Evaluations
 - · Promotes Realistic Equipment Testing Requirements

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- · Examples of Potential Benefits
 - Avoided LBLOCA-Related Regulatory Issues
 - Reduced Scope of Generic Issues
 - Tech Spec Relaxations
 - Diesel Generator Start Time
 - Accumulators
 - · Reduced Analytical Cost/Maintenance
 - Post LOCA Issues
 - · Control Rod Insertion
 - · Hot Leg Switchover
 - · Peaking Factor Increases
 - · Power Uprates
 - · Reactor Vessel Internals
 - Barrel Baffle Bolts

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- · Program Plan
 - · Program Objective
 - Pursue Rule-Making under SECY-98-300, Option 3 to Allow Redefinition of the Limiting LOCA Break Size Required for Plant Licensing Basis
 - Program Tasks
 - Phase 1 Scope and Feasibility
 - · Determine Benefits and Costs of Program
 - Phase 2 (Target June 2000) Prepare Technical Justification for Rule-Making
 - · Industry Coordination
 - · Prepare Generic Topical Report(s)
 - · Identify Implementation Methodology
 - Phase 3- Rule-Making (Target 2002)
 - · Support Rule-Making Activities
 - · Implementation Guidance
 - Plant-Specific Implementation(s)

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- · Rule-making
 - · Utilize Rule-Making Based on SECY-98-300 Option 3
 - · Rule-Making with Option of Retaining Current Licensing Basis
 - Regulatory Impact
 - 10 CFR 50.46
 - 10 CFR 50 Appendix K
 - 10 CFR 50 Appendix A General Design Criteria
 - Ideally, the Regulations Should Define what the Implementing Methodology must Achieve, Rather than how the Requirements must be Satisfied
 - Provides Broadest Range of Benefits
 - · Minimizes Staff Resources versus Exemption Requests

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- · Potentially Affected Regulatory Requirements/Issues
 - SRP/FSAR (15)
 - Reg Guides (10)
 - USIs (21)
 - GSIs (12)

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· Identification of Break-Size Limit

- Utilize Risk Insights and LBB Analyses to Support Rule-Making
 - Exclude Breaks Demonstrated to be "Not Credible" by LBB from Licensing Basis
 - Ensure break size from LBB is supported from PRA perspective
 - Generic Aspects of the Program
 - · Demonstration of the Principle
 - · LBB Methodology
 - NUREG-1061, Volume 3 and Draft SRP 3.6.3
 - WOG Target Value for the Maximum Break Size is in the SBLOCA range
 - Achievable for Most or all Plants
 - Eliminates all Break Sizes Down to the Range of Break Sizes
 Currently Evaluated in a Typical FSAR for SBLOCA, Simplifying the Change in the DBA to "Remove LB and Retain SB".

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· Safety Margin

- Risk-Informed Approach Maintains the Defense-In-Depth Philosophy that Underlies the Safety Regulations (SECY-98-300)
- · CDF and LERF Ensure Margins for Health and Safety of the Public
 - LBLOCA Initiating Event Frequency May Be Requantified in Support of Quantitative Health Objectives (QHOs)
- · Redefinition of LBLOCA, Retains LOCA as a DBE
- · Other DBAs Continue to Maintain Adequate Margin
- · Focus Resources on Activities of Greater Risk Significance
 - Optimize Surveillance Requirements
 - Operator Training
 - Post-Accident Operator Actions

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- Containment
 - · Provides Safety Margin and Defense-in-Depth
 - Remains the Intact Fission Product Barrier in Event of Design Basis LOCA
 - · Maintain Structural Integrity

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- Analytical Codes
 - Large Break LOCA Evaluation Models can be Eliminated for Plants who Pursue the Revised Licensing Basis
 - No Changes to Remaining Codes/Analyses Required to Support the Rule Change

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- February 2000 Option 3 Workshop
 - · Relax Simultaneous Failure Assumptions
 - · Relax Appendix K Conservatism
 - · Make Best-Estimate Analysis Less Burdensome
 - · Treat Break Size and Location Probabilistically
 - · Large Break LOCA Redefinition

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Westinghouse Owners Group LBLOCA Redefinition

- Conclusions
 - Maintains Acceptable Margin of Safety
 - Key Part of Risk-Informing Part 50
 - Consistent with Intent of Reactor Oversight Process
 - Single Approach to Reduce Burdens Imposed by an Unrealistic Event
 - Complementary to the 1987 GDC-4 Rule Change
 - Integrates Pursuit of Individual Applications in a Cohesive One Time Rule Change
 - Eliminates the Need for More Complex Levels of Analysis
 - Consistent with Technological Advances/Knowledge
 - Reduces both Staff and Industry Resources Associated with LBLOCA
 - Increases Efficiency and Effectiveness

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- · Process For Moving Forward
 - Use 50.59 Rule Change Process as a Model
 - · Establish Regular NRC WOG/Industry Interaction
 - · Desired Product is an Amended Rule

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Westinghouse Owners Group LBLOCA Redefinition

- Potentially Affected SRP/FSAR Sections
 - 2.3.4 Short-Term Diffusion Estimates for Accidental Atmospheric Releases
 - 3.6.2 Determination of Rupture Locations and Dynamic Effects Associated with the Postulated Rupture of Piping (BTP MEB-3-1)
 - 3.9.3 ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 Components, Component Supports, and Core Support Structures
 - 4.2 Fuel Design
 - · 6.2.1 Containment Functional Design
 - 6.2.2 Containment Heat Removal Systems
 - 6.2.3 Secondary Containment Functional Design
 - 6.3 Emergency Core Cooling System

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Potentially Affected SRP/FSAR Sections

- · 6.4 Control Room Habitability Systems
- 6.5.1 ESF Atmosphere Cleanup Systems
- · 6.5.2 Containment Spray as a Fission Product Cleanup System
- 6.5.3 Fission Product Control Systems and Structures
- · 9.2.1 Station Service Water System
- · 9.2.5 Ultimate Heat Sink
- 15.6.5 Loss-of-Coolant Accidents Resulting from Spectrum of Postulated Piping Breaks Within the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary

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· Potentially Affected Reg Guides

- Regulatory Guide 1.1 (Safety Guide 1), Revision 0 (12/70) Net Positive Suction Head for Emergency Core Cooling and Containment Heat Removal Systems
- Regulatory Guide 1.4, Revision 2 (6/74) Assumptions Used for Evaluating the Potential Radiological Consequences of a Loss of Coolant Accident for Pressurized Water Reactors
- Regulatory Guide 1.7, Revision 2 (11/78) Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a Loss of Coolant Accident
- Regulatory Guide 1.14, (Safety Guide 14) Revision 0 (10/71) Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel Integrity
- · Regulatory Guide 1.27, Ultimate Heat Sink for Nuclear Power Plants

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· Potentially Affected Reg Guides

- Regulatory Guide 1.46 (5/73) Protection Against Pipe Break Inside Containment
- Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2 (3/78) Design, Testing, and Maintenance Criteria for Post Accident ESF Atmosphere Cleanup Systems Air Filtration and Adsorption Units of Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants
- Regulatory Guide 1.82, Revision 2 (5/96) Water Sources for Long-Term Recirculation Cooling Following a Loss-of-Coolant Accident
- Regulatory Guide 1.89, Revision I (6/84) Environmental Qualification of Certain Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Plants
- Regulatory Guide 1.124, Revision 1, (1/78) Service Limits and Loading Combinations for Class 1 Linerar-Type Component Supports

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- Potentially Affected Unresolved Safety Issues (USIs)
 - Water Hammer (A-1)
 - Asymmetric Blowdown Loads on the Reactor Primary Coolant Systems (A-2)
 - Westinghouse Steam Generator Tube Integrity (A-3)
 - · Combustion Engineering Steam Generator Tube Integrity (A-4)
 - · Babcock and Wilcox Steam Generator Tube Integrity (A-5)
 - Anticipated Transients Without Scram (A-9)
 - · Reactor Vessel Materials Toughness (A-11)
 - Fracture Toughness of Steam Generator and Reactor Coolant Pump Supports (A-12)

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- Potentially Affected Unresolved Safety Issues (USIs)
 - Systems Interactions in Nuclear Power Plants (A-17)
 - Qualification of Class 1E Safety-Related Equipment (A-24)
 - Reactor Vessel Pressure Transient Protection (A-26)
 - Residual Heat Removal Requirements (A-31)
 - · Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel (A-36)

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- Potentially Affected Unresolved Safety Issues (USIs)
 - Seismic Design Criteria Short Term Program (A-40)
 - Containment Emergency Sump Performance (A-43)
 - Station Blackout (A-44)
 - Shutdown Decay Heat Removal Requirements (A-45)
 - Seismic Qualification of Equipment in Operating Plants (A-46)
 - · Safety Implications of Control Systems (A-47)
 - Hydrogen Control Measures and Effects of Hydrogen Burns on Safety Equipment (A-48)
 - Pressurized Thermal Shock (A-49)

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- Potentially Affected Generic Safety Issues (GSIs)
 - A-13: Snubber Operability Assurance
 - B-14: Study of Hydrogen Mixing Capability in Containment Post-LOCA
 - C-1: Assurance of Continuous Long-Term Capability of Hermetic Seals on Instrumentation and Electrical Equipment
 - · C-10: Effective Operation of Containment Sprays in a LOCA
 - · C-11: Assessment of Failure and Reliability of Pumps and Valves
 - 121: Hydrogen Control for Large, Dry PWR Containment
 - 24: Automatic Emergency Core Cooling System Switch to Recirculation
 - 156.6.1: Pipe Break Effects on Systems and Components
 - · 171: ESF Failure From LOOP Subsequent to a LOCA
 - · B-17: Criteria for Safety-Related Operator Actions
 - · B-61: Allowable ECCS Equipment Outage Periods
 - · 191: Assessment of Debris Accumulation on PWR Sump Performance

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