

March 15, 2000

ARR
Template-058

Mr. H. L. Sumner, Jr.
Vice President - Nuclear
Hatch Project
Southern Nuclear Operating
Company, Inc.
Post Office Box 1295
Birmingham, Alabama 35201-1295

SUBJECT: EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - ISSUANCE OF
AMENDMENTS RE: (TAC NOS. MA7306 AND MA 7307)

Dear Mr. Sumner:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 218 to Facility Operating License DPR-57 and Amendment No. 159 to Facility Operating License NPF-5 for the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications and associated Bases in response to your application dated November 30, 1999.

The amendments revise Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.12 to remove the restriction which prevents performance of the diesel generator 24-hour run while operating in either Mode 1 or Mode 2.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly *Federal Register* notice.

Sincerely,
/RA/

Leonard N. Olshan, Senior Project Manager, Section 1
Project Directorate II
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-321 and 50-366

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 218 to DPR-57
2. Amendment No. 159 to NPF-5
3. Safety Evaluation

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

March 15, 2000

Mr. H. L. Sumner, Jr.
Vice President - Nuclear
Hatch Project
Southern Nuclear Operating
Company, Inc.
Post Office Box 1295
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AMENDMENTS (TAC NOS. MA7306 AND MA7307)

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Sincerely,

Leonard N. Olshan, Senior Project Manager, Section 1
Project Directorate II
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Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-321 and 50-366

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 218 to DPR-57
2. Amendment No. 159 to NPF-5
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC.

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY

OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION

MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA

CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA

DOCKET NO. 50-321

EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 218
License No. DPR-57

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment to the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 (the facility) Facility Operating License No. DPR-57 filed by Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (Southern Nuclear), acting for itself, Georgia Power Company, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, and City of Dalton, Georgia (the licensees), dated November 30, 1999, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.


2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-57 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 218 are hereby incorporated in the license. Southern Nuclear shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Richard L. Emch, Jr., Chief, Section 1
Project Directorate II
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Technical Specification
Changes

Date of Issuance: March 15, 2000

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 218

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-57

DOCKET NO. 50-321

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications and associated Bases with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

<u>Remove</u>	<u>Insert</u>
3.8-15	3.8-15
B3.8-34	B3.8-34
B3.8-35	B3.8-35
B3.8-36	B3.8-36
B3.8-37	B3.8-37

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>SR 3.8.1.12 -----NOTES-----</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Momentary transients outside the load and power factor ranges do not invalidate this test. 2. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2, unless the other two DGs are OPERABLE. If either of the other two DGs becomes inoperable, this surveillance shall be suspended. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. 3. If grid conditions do not permit, the power factor limit is not required to be met. Under this condition, the power factor shall be maintained as close to the limit as practicable. 4. For the swing DG, a single test at the specified Frequency will satisfy this Surveillance for both units. <p>-----</p> <p>Verify each DG operating at a power factor ≤ 0.88 operates for ≥ 24 hours:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. For ≥ 2 hours loaded ≥ 3000 kW; and b. For the remaining hours of the test loaded ≥ 2775 kW and ≤ 2825 kW. 	<p>18 months</p>

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.12 (continued)

possible, testing must be performed using a power factor ≤ 0.88 . This power factor is chosen to be representative of the actual design basis inductive loading that the DG could experience. A load band is provided to avoid routine overloading of the DG. Routine overloading may result in more frequent teardown inspections in accordance with vendor recommendations in order to maintain DG OPERABILITY.

The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 10), paragraph 2.a.(3); takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance; and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

This Surveillance has been modified by four Notes. Note 1 states that momentary transients due to changing bus loads do not invalidate this test. Similarly, momentary power factor transients above the limit do not invalidate the test. The reason for Note 2 is that during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this Surveillance could cause perturbations to the electrical distribution systems that would challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, plant safety systems. However, it is acceptable to perform this SR in MODES 1 and 2 provided the other two DGs are OPERABLE, since a perturbation can only affect one divisional DG. If during the performance of this Surveillance, one of the other DGs becomes inoperable, this Surveillance is to be suspended. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. Note 3 is provided in recognition that if the offsite electrical power distribution system is lightly loaded (i.e., system voltage is high), it may not be possible to raise voltage without creating an overvoltage condition on the ESF bus. Therefore, to ensure the bus voltage, supplied ESF loads, and DG are not placed in an unsafe condition during this test, the power factor limit does not have to be met if grid voltage or ESF bus loading does not permit the power factor limit to be met when the DG is tied to the grid. When this occurs, the power factor should be maintained as close to the limit as practicable. To minimize testing of the swing DG, Note 4 allows a single test (instead of two tests, one for each unit) to satisfy the requirements for both units. This is allowed since the main purpose of the Surveillance can be met by performing the test on either unit (no unit

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.12 (continued)

specific DG components are being tested). If the swing DG fails one of these Surveillances, the DG should be considered inoperable on both units, unless the cause of the failure can be directly related to only one unit.

SR 3.8.1.13

This Surveillance demonstrates that the diesel engine can restart from a hot condition, such as subsequent to shutdown from normal Surveillances, and achieve the required voltage and frequency within 12 seconds. The 12 second time is derived from the requirements of the accident analysis to respond to a design basis large break LOCA. The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 10), paragraph 2.a.(5).

This SR is modified by three Notes. Note 1 ensures that the test is performed with the diesel sufficiently hot. The requirement that the diesel has operated for at least 2 hours at near full load conditions prior to performance of this Surveillance is based on manufacturer recommendations for achieving hot conditions. Momentary transients due to changing bus loads do not invalidate this test. Note 2 allows all DG starts to be preceded by an engine prelube period to minimize wear and tear on the diesel during testing. To minimize testing of the swing DG, Note 3 allows a single test (instead of two tests, one for each unit) to satisfy the requirements for both units. This is allowed since the main purpose of the Surveillance can be met by performing the test on either unit (no unit specific DG components are being tested). If the swing DG fails one of these Surveillances, the DG should be considered inoperable on both units, unless the cause of the failure can be directly related to only one unit.

SR 3.8.1.14

This Surveillance is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 10), paragraph 2.a.(6), and ensures that the manual synchronization and automatic load transfer from the DG to the offsite source can be made and that the DG can be returned to ready-to-load status when offsite power is restored. It also ensures that the

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.14 (continued)

auto-start logic is reset to allow the DG to reload if a subsequent loss of offsite power occurs. The DG is considered to be in ready-to-load status when the DG is at rated speed and voltage, the output breaker is open and can receive an auto-close signal on bus undervoltage, and the load sequence timers are reset.

The Frequency of 18 months is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 10), paragraph 2.a.(6), and takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. This Surveillance tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 1 swing bus. The comparable test specified in the Unit 2 Technical Specifications tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 2 swing bus. Consequently, a test must be performed within the specified Frequency for each unit. The Note specifying the restriction for not performing the test while the unit is in MODE 1, 2, or 3 does not have applicability to Unit 2. As the Surveillance represents separate tests, the Unit 1 Surveillance should not be performed with Unit 1 in MODE 1, 2, or 3 and the Unit 2 test should not be performed with Unit 2 in MODE 1, 2, or 3.

SR 3.8.1.15

Demonstration of the test mode override ensures that the DG availability under accident conditions is not compromised as the result of testing. Interlocks to the LOCA sensing circuits cause the DG to automatically reset to ready-to-load operation if an ECCS initiation signal is received during operation in the test mode. Ready-to-load operation is defined as the DG running at rated speed and voltage with the DG output breaker open. Although Plant Hatch Unit 1 is not committed to this standard, this SR is consistent with the provisions for automatic switchover required by IEEE-308 (Ref. 13), paragraph 6.2.6(2).

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.15 (continued)

The intent in the requirements associated with SR 3.8.1.15.b is to show that the emergency loading is not affected by the DG operation in test mode. In lieu of actual demonstration of connection and loading of loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the emergency loads to perform these functions is acceptable. This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified.

The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 10), paragraph 2.a.(8); takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance; and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. This Surveillance tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 1 swing bus. The comparable test specified in the Unit 2 Technical Specifications tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 2 swing bus. Consequently, a test must be performed within the specified Frequency for each unit. The Note specifying the restriction for not performing the test while the unit is in MODE 1, 2, or 3 does not have applicability to Unit 2. As the Surveillance represents separate tests, the Unit 1 Surveillance should not be performed with Unit 1 in MODE 1, 2, or 3 and the Unit 2 test should not be performed with Unit 2 in MODE 1, 2, or 3.

SR 3.8.1.16

Under accident conditions, loads are sequentially connected to the bus by the automatic load sequence timing devices. The sequencing logic controls the permissive and starting signals to motor breakers to prevent overloading of the DGs due to high motor starting currents. The 10% load sequence time interval tolerance ensures that sufficient time exists for the DG to restore frequency and voltage prior to applying the next load and that safety analysis assumptions regarding ESF equipment time delays are not violated. Reference 2 provides a summary of the automatic loading of ESF buses.

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UNITED STATES
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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC.

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY

OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION

MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA

CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA

DOCKET NO. 50-366

EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 159
License No. NPF-5

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment to the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 (the facility) Facility Operating License No. NPF-5 filed by Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (Southern Nuclear), acting for itself, Georgia Power Company, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, and City of Dalton, Georgia (the licensees), dated November 30, 1999, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-5 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 159 , are hereby incorporated in the license. Southern Nuclear shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Richard L. Emch, Jr., Chief, Section 1
Project Directorate II
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Technical Specification
Changes

Date of Issuance: March 15, 2000

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 159

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-5

DOCKET NO. 50-366

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications and associated Bases with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove

Insert

3.8-15
B3.8-34

3.8-15
B3.8-34

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.12 (continued)

overloading of the DG. Routine overloading may result in more frequent teardown inspections in accordance with vendor recommendations in order to maintain DG OPERABILITY.

The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9), paragraph 2.a.(3); takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance; and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

This Surveillance has been modified by four Notes. Note 1 states that momentary transients due to changing bus loads do not invalidate this test. Similarly, momentary power factor transients above the limit do not invalidate the test. The reason for Note 2 is that during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this Surveillance could cause perturbations to the electrical distribution systems that would challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, plant safety systems. However, it is acceptable to perform this SR in MODES 1 and 2 provided the other two DGs are OPERABLE, since a perturbation can only affect one divisional DG. If during the performance of this Surveillance, one of the other DGs becomes inoperable, this Surveillance is to be suspended. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. Note 3 is provided in recognition that if the offsite electrical power distribution system is lightly loaded (i.e., system voltage is high), it may not be possible to raise voltage without creating an overvoltage condition on the ESF bus. Therefore, to ensure the bus voltage, supplied ESF loads, and DG are not placed in an unsafe condition during this test, the power factor limit does not have to be met if grid voltage or ESF bus loading does not permit the power factor limit to be met when the DG is tied to the grid. When this occurs, the power factor should be maintained as close to the limit as practicable. To minimize testing of the swing DG, Note 4 allows a single test (instead of two tests, one for each unit) to satisfy the requirements for both units. This is allowed since the main purpose of the Surveillance can be met by performing the test on either unit (no unit specific DG components are being tested). If the swing DG fails one of these Surveillances, the DG should be considered inoperable on both units, unless the cause of the failure can be directly related to only one unit.

(continued)



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 218 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-57
AND AMENDMENT NO. 159 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-5
SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC., ET AL.
EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2
DOCKET NOS. 50-321 AND 50-366

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated November 30, 1999, Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (Southern Nuclear, the licensee), et al., proposed license amendments to change the Technical Specifications (TS) and associated Bases for the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The proposed changes would change TS Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.8.1.12 to remove the restriction which prevents performance of the diesel generator 24-hour run while operating in either Mode 1 or Mode 2.

2.0 BACKGROUND

The onsite standby power source for the three 4.16 kV Engineered Safety Features (ESF) buses per unit at the Hatch plant is served by four unit specific diesel generators (DGs) for buses 1/2E and 1/2G and a swing DG, which can provide power to either unit's emergency bus F. Two DGs, one of which can be the swing DG, are sufficient to ensure that the unit can be placed in a safe shutdown condition. In the event of the loss of the normal offsite power source, the safety loads are automatically connected to the DGs in sufficient time to ensure safe shutdown and to mitigate the consequences of a design basis accident.

3.0 EVALUATION

SR 3.8.1.12 for the Hatch plant currently requires verification that each DG, loaded at a specific power factor ≤ 0.88 , operates for ≥ 24 hours. The tested DG is loaded ≥ 3000 kW for ≥ 2 hours and for the remaining hours of the test it is loaded ≥ 2775 kW and ≤ 2825 kW. This value of power factor is indicative of the actual design basis inductive loading that the DG would experience in an accident situation. This SR also includes a note that states this surveillance shall not be performed in Modes 1 or 2. The basis for this SR note is to prevent unnecessary perturbation to the electrical distribution systems which could challenge steady state operation if the reactor is in Mode 1 or 2. The licensee has proposed to perform this SR in any operational mode. The licensee states that performing this surveillance during power operation will result in greater flexibility to schedule other critical outage-related work.

The staff considered the effect of performing a 24-hour emergency diesel generator endurance test with the unit at power. When a DG is operated connected to offsite power, the emergency power system (i.e., DG) is not independent of disturbances on the offsite power systems, which can adversely affect emergency power availability. In this condition, a disturbance in the non-emergency power system (offsite power system) could result in loss of offsite power and disabling of the emergency power source. Further, if a fault develops while the DG is connected to non-emergency buses, DG availability for subsequent emergency demands may be affected. In some design configurations, the DG would trip as a result of overcurrent or reverse power, actuate a lockout device, and require local operator actions to reset the lockout. In such cases, the DG is recoverable but the timeliness of its availability is not comparable to that of having the DG in its normal standby.

In order to perform this SR, the DG has to be synchronized and paralleled to offsite power via the respective 4.16 kV ESF bus. The licensee states that at the Hatch plant, the design of the DG incorporates features that enable the DG to automatically switch from the test mode to the standby mode. As such, if a DG is running in the test mode and a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) signal were to occur, the LOCA signal would override the test mode of the DG and the DG would be returned to standby operation. Thus, the performance of this surveillance while at power has minimal effect on the availability of the DG.

The proposed change to the SR to revise Note 2 of the SR reads, "This surveillance shall not be performed in mode 1 or 2, unless the other two DGs are operable. If either of the other two DGs become inoperable, this surveillance shall be suspended." This would ensure that the other DGs will be fully operable during the conduct of this test. Since the DG is in test and its support systems remain available during the 24-hour test, even if this surveillance is conducted with the reactor critical, capability exists to mitigate the consequences of any design basis accident assuming a single failure.

In the application, the licensee stated that (1) there were administrative controls in place to preclude performing this surveillance during unstable grid conditions or during severe weather conditions, and (2) the other two DGs for that unit must be operable prior to performing the subject surveillance for the DG under test. Further, normal risk management practices required under the Maintenance Rule would ensure that this surveillance would not be scheduled during maintenance and test conditions that could have adverse effects on the offsite power system. These risk management practices would also restrict maintenance and testing of required safety systems that depend on the remaining diesel generators as a source of emergency power. In addition, the change to the Bases for the subject SR states that "it is acceptable to perform this SR in modes 1 and 2 provided the other two DGs are operable, since a perturbation can only affect one divisional DG." This implies that strict administrative controls will ensure that other systems or piece of equipment necessary to prevent or mitigate the consequences of previously evaluated events are available and operable. Therefore, the staff is assured that controls are in place to avoid high-risk combinations of equipment being taken out of service at the same time.

Based on the above, the staff concludes that the licensee has adequately addressed concerns regarding risk management during power operation and has provided assurance that performing the 24-hour test while at power will not adversely impact the availability of DG when it is most needed. Therefore, the proposed change to modify the associated note and perform this SR at power is acceptable.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Georgia State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change a surveillance requirement. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts and no significant change in the types of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (64 FR 73098). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: R. Jenkins

Date: March 15, 2000