

## 6.4 Habitability Systems

The habitability systems are a set of individual systems that collectively provide the habitability functions for the plant. The systems that make up the habitability systems are the:

- Nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system (VBS)
- Main control room emergency habitability system (VES)
- Radiation monitoring system (RMS)
- Plant lighting system (ELS)
- Fire Protection System (FPS)

When a source of ac power is available, the nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system (VBS) provides normal and abnormal HVAC service to the main control room (MCR), technical support center (TSC), instrumentation and control rooms, dc equipment rooms, battery rooms, and the nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system equipment room as described in subsection 9.4.1.

When a source of ac power is not available to operate the nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system or radioactivity is detected in the MCR air supply, which could lead to exceeding General Design Criterion 19 operator dose limits, the main control room emergency habitability system (VES) is capable of providing emergency ventilation and pressurization for the main control room. The main control room emergency habitability system also provides emergency passive heat sinks for the main control room, instrumentation and control rooms, and dc equipment rooms.

Radiation monitoring of the main control room environment is provided by the radiation monitoring system. Smoke detection is provided in the VBS system. Emergency lighting is provided by the plant lighting system. Storage capacity is provided in the main control room for personnel support equipment. Manual hose stations outside the MCR and portable fire extinguishers are provided to fight MCR fires.

### 6.4.1 Safety Design Basis

The safety design bases discussed here apply only to the portion of the individual system providing the specified function. The range of applicability is discussed in subsection 6.4.4.

#### 6.4.1.1 Main Control Room Design Basis

The habitability systems provide coverage for the main control room pressure boundary as defined in subsection 6.4.2.1. The following discussion summarizes the safety design bases with respect to the main control room:

- The habitability systems are capable of maintaining the main control room environment suitable for prolonged occupancy throughout the duration of the postulated accidents discussed in Chapter 15 that require protection from the release of radioactivity. Refer to Section 3.1 and subsections 6.4.4 and 15.6.5.3 for a discussion on conformance with

General Design Criterion 19 and to Section 1.9 for a discussion on conformance with Generic Issue B-66.

- The main control room is designed to withstand the effects of an SSE and a design-basis tornado.
- A maximum main control room occupancy of up to 11 persons can be accommodated.
- The radiation exposure of main control room personnel throughout the duration of the postulated limiting faults discussed in Chapter 15 does not exceed the limits set by General Design Criterion 19.
- The emergency habitability system maintains CO<sub>2</sub> concentration to less than 0.5 percent for up to 11 main control room occupants.
- The habitability systems provide the capability to detect and protect main control room personnel from external fire, smoke, and airborne radioactivity.
- Automatic actuation of the individual systems that perform a habitability systems function is provided. Smoke detectors, radiation detectors, and associated control equipment are installed at various plant locations as necessary to provide the appropriate operation of the systems.

#### **6.4.1.2 Instrumentation and Control Room/DC Equipment Rooms Design Basis**

The habitability systems are also designed to service the instrumentation and control rooms and dc equipment rooms. The habitability systems are capable of maintaining the temperature in the instrumentation and control rooms and dc equipment rooms below the equipment qualification temperature limit throughout the duration of the postulated accidents discussed in Chapter 15, an SSE, or design-basis tornado.

#### **6.4.2 System Description**

Only the main control room emergency habitability system is discussed in this subsection. The remaining systems are described only as necessary to define their functions in meeting the safety-related design bases of the habitability systems. Descriptions of the nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system, fire protection system, plant lighting system, and radiation monitoring system are found in subsections 9.4.1, 9.5.1, 9.5.3, and Section 11.5, respectively.

##### **6.4.2.1 Definition of the Main Control Room Pressure Boundary**

The main control room pressure boundary is located on elevation 117'-6" in the auxiliary building, on the nuclear island. As shown in Figure 6.4-1, the pressure boundary encompasses the main control area, tagging room, operator area, shift supervisor's office, clerk's office, kitchen, and toilet facilities. The pressure boundary is represented by the line around the

periphery of the boundary in the figure. The stairwell leading down to elevation 100' is specifically excluded from the boundary.

The areas, equipment, and materials to which the main control room operator requires access during a postulated accident are shown in Figure 6.4-1. This figure is a subset of Figure 1.2-8. Areas adjacent to the main control room are shown in Figures 1.2-25 and 1.2-31. The layout, size, and ergonomics of the operator workstations and wall panel information system depicted in Figure 6.4-1 do not reflect the results of the design process described in Chapter 18. The actual size, shape, ergonomics, and layout of the operator workstations and wall panel information system is an output of the design process in Chapter 18.

#### 6.4.2.2 General Description

The main control room emergency habitability system air storage tanks are sized to deliver the required air flow to the main control room to meet the ventilation and pressurization requirements for 72 hours based on the performance requirements of subsection 6.4.1.1. Normal system makeup is provided by a connection to the breathable quality air compressor in the compressed and instrument air system (CAS). See subsection 9.3.1 for a description of the CAS. A connection for refilling operation is provided in the CAS.

The function of providing passive heat sinks for the main control room, instrumentation and control rooms, and dc equipment rooms is part of the main control room emergency habitability system. The heat sinks for each room are designed to limit the temperature rise inside each room during the 72-hour period following a loss of nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system operation. The heat sinks consist primarily of the thermal mass of the concrete that makes up the ceilings and walls of these rooms.

To enhance the heat-absorbing capability of the ceilings, a metal form is attached to the interior surface of the concrete at selected locations. Metallic plates are attached perpendicular to the form. These plates extend into the room and act as thermal fins to enhance the heat transfer from the room air to the concrete. The specifics of the fin construction for the main control room and I&C room ceilings are described in subsection 3.8.4.1.2.

The normal operating temperatures in the main control room, instrumentation and control rooms, dc equipment rooms, and adjacent rooms are kept within a specified range by the nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system in order to maintain a design basis initial heat sink capacity of each room. See subsection 9.4.1 for a description of the nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system.

In the unlikely event that power to the nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system is unavailable for more than 72 hours, MCR habitability is maintained by operating one of the two MCR ancillary fans to supply outside air to the MCR. See subsection 9.4.1 for a description of this cooling mode of operation. Doors and ducts may be opened to provide a supply pathway and an exhaust pathway. Likewise, outside air is supplied to division B

and C instrumentation and control rooms in order to maintain the ambient temperature below the qualification temperature of the equipment.

The main control room emergency habitability system piping and instrumentation diagram is shown in Figure 6.4-2.

### 6.4.2.3 Component Description

The main control room emergency habitability system compressed air supply contains a set of storage tanks connected to a main and an alternate air delivery line. Components common to both lines include a manual isolation valve, a pressure regulating valve, and a flow metering orifice. Single active failure protection is provided by the use of redundant, remotely operated isolation valves, which are located within the MCR pressure boundary. In the event of insufficient or excessive flow in the main delivery line, the main delivery line is isolated and the alternate delivery line is manually actuated. The alternate delivery line contains the same components as the main delivery line with the exception of the remotely operated isolation valves, and thus is capable of supplying compressed air to the MCR pressure boundary at the required air flowrate. The VES piping and penetrations for the MCR envelope are designated as equipment Class C. Additional details on Class C designation are provided in subsection 3.2.2.5. The classification of VES components is provided in Table 3.2-3, as appropriate.

- Emergency Air Storage Tanks

There are a total of 32 air storage tanks. The air storage tanks are constructed of forged, seamless pipe, with no welds, and conform to Section VIII and Appendix 22 of the ASME Code. The design pressure of the air storage tanks is 4000 psi. The storage tanks collectively contain a minimum storage capacity of 314,132 scf of air at a minimum pressure of 3400 psig.

- Pressure Regulating Valve

Each compressed air supply line contains a pressure regulating valve located downstream of the common header. The pressure at the outlet of the valve is controlled via a self contained pressure control operator. The downstream pressure is set to approximately 100 psig so that the flow rate can be controlled by an orifice downstream of the valve.

- Flow Metering Orifice

The flow rate of air delivered to the main control room pressure boundary is limited by an orifice located downstream of the pressure regulating valve. The orifice is sized to provide the required air flowrate to the main control room pressure boundary, with an upstream pressure of approximately 100 psig.

- Air Delivery Main Isolation Valve

The pressure boundary of the compressed air storage tanks is maintained by normally closed remotely operated isolation valves in the main supply line. These valves are located within MCR pressure boundary downstream of the pressure regulating valve and automatically initiate air flow upon receipt of a signal to open (see subsection 6.4.3.2).

- Pressure Relief Isolation Valve

To limit the pressure increase within the main control room, isolation valves are provided, one in each of redundant flowpaths, which open on a time delay after receipt of an emergency habitability system actuation signal. The valves provide a leak tight seal to protect the integrity of the main control room pressure boundary during normal operation, and are normally closed to prevent interference with the operation of the nonradioactive ventilation system.

- Main Air Flowpath Isolation Valve

The main air flowpath contains a normally open, manually operated valve located within the MCR pressure boundary, upstream of the remotely operated air delivery main isolation valves. The valve is provided as a means of isolating and preserving the air storage tank's contents in the event of a pressure regulating valve malfunction.

- Air Delivery Alternate Isolation Valve

The alternate air delivery flowpath contains a normally closed, manually operated valve, located within the MCR pressure boundary. The valve is provided as a means of manually activating the alternate air delivery flowpath in the event the main air delivery flowpath is inoperable.

- Pressure Relief Damper

Pressure relief dampers are located downstream of the butterfly isolation valves, and are set to open on a differential pressure of at least 1/8-inch water gauge with respect to the surrounding areas. The differential pressure between the control room and the relief damper exhaust location is monitored to ensure that a positive pressure is maintained in the control room with respect to its surroundings.

- Control Room Access Doors

Two sets of doors, with a vestibule between that acts as an airlock, are provided at the access to the main control room.

- Breathing Apparatus

Self-contained portable breathing equipment with air bottles is stored inside the main control room pressure boundary. The amount of stored air is sufficient to provide a 6-hour supply of breathable air for up to 11 main control room occupants. This is backup protection to the permanently installed habitability systems.

#### 6.4.2.4 Leaktightness

The main control room pressure boundary is designed for low leakage. It consists of cast-in-place reinforced concrete walls and slabs, and is constructed to minimize leakage through construction joints and penetrations. The following features are applied as needed in order to achieve this objective:

- The outside surface of penetrations sleeves in contact with concrete are sealed with epoxy crack sealer. The piping and electrical cable penetrations are sealed with qualified pressure-resistant material compatible with penetration materials and/or cable jacketing.
- The interior or exterior surfaces of the main control room envelope (walls, floor, and ceiling) are coated with low permeability paint/epoxy sealant.
- Inside surfaces of penetrations and sleeves in contact with commodities (i.e., pipes and conduits, etc.) are sealed. Main control room pressure boundary HVAC isolation valves are qualified to shut tight against control room pressure.
- Penetration sealing materials are designed to withstand at least 1/4-inch water gauge pressure differential in an air pressure barrier. Penetration sealing material is gypsum cement or equivalent.

The piping, conduits, and electrical cable trays penetrating through any combination of main control room pressure boundary are sealed with seal assembly compatible with the materials of penetration commodities. Penetration sealing materials are selected to meet barrier design requirements and are designed to withstand specific area environmental design requirements and remain functional and undamaged during and following an SSE. No silicone sealant or other patching material is used on VES piping, valves, dampers, or penetrations forming the MCR pressure boundary. There are no adverse environmental effects on the MCR sealant materials resulting from postulated spent fuel pool boiling events.

The main control room pressure boundary main entrance is designed with an airlock-type double-door vestibule. The emergency exit door (stairs to elevation 100') is normally closed, and remains closed under design basis source term conditions.

When the main control room pressure boundary is isolated in an accident situation, there is no direct communication with the outside atmosphere, nor is there communication with the normal ventilation system. Leakage from the main control room pressure boundary is the

result of an internal pressure of at least 1/8-inch water gauge provided by emergency habitability system operation.

The exfiltration and infiltration analysis for nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system operation is discussed in subsection 9.4.1.

#### **6.4.2.5 Interaction with Other Zones and Pressurized Equipment**

The main control room emergency habitability system is a self-contained system. There is no interaction between other zones and pressurized equipment.

For a discussion of the nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system, refer to subsection 9.4.1.

#### **6.4.2.6 Shielding Design**

The design basis loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) dictates the shielding requirements for the main control room. Main control room shielding design bases are discussed in Section 12.3. Descriptions of the design basis LOCA source terms, main control room shielding parameters, and evaluation of doses to main control room personnel are presented in Section 15.6.

The main control room and its location in the plant are shown in Figure 12.3-1.

### **6.4.3 System Operation**

This subsection discusses the operation of the main control room emergency habitability system.

#### **6.4.3.1 Normal Mode**

The main control room emergency habitability system is not required to operate during normal conditions. The nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system maintains the air temperature of a number of rooms within a predetermined temperature range. The rooms with this requirement include the rooms with a main control room emergency habitability system passive heat sink design and their adjacent rooms.

#### **6.4.3.2 Emergency Mode**

Operation of the main control room emergency habitability system is automatically initiated by the following safety-related signals:

- High-high particulate or iodine radioactivity in the main control room supply air duct
- Loss of ac power

Operation can also be initiated by manual actuation.

If radiation levels in the main control room supply air duct exceed the "high-high" setpoint, the nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system is isolated from the main control room pressure boundary by automatic closure of the isolation devices located in the nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system ductwork. At the same time, the main control room emergency habitability system begins to deliver air from the emergency air storage tanks to the main control room by automatically opening the isolation valves located in the supply line. The relief damper isolation valves also open allowing the pressure relief dampers to function.

After the main control room emergency habitability system isolation valves are opened, the air supply pressure is regulated by a self-contained regulating valve. This valve maintains a constant downstream pressure regardless of the upstream pressure. A constant air flow rate is maintained by the flow metering orifice downstream of the pressure regulating valve. This flow rate is sufficient to maintain the main control room pressure boundary at least 1/8-inch water gauge positive differential pressure with respect to the surroundings. The main control room emergency habitability system air flow rate is also sufficient to maintain the carbon dioxide levels below 0.5 percent concentration for 11 occupants and to maintain air quality within the guidelines of Table 1 and Appendix C, Table C-1, of Reference 1.

The emergency air storage tanks are sized to provide the required air flow to the main control room pressure boundary for 72 hours. After 72 hours, the main control room is cooled by drawing in outside air and circulating it through the room, as discussed in subsection 6.4.2.2.

The temperature and humidity in the main control room pressure boundary following a loss of the nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system remain within limits for reliable human performance (References 2 and 3) over a 72-hour period. The initial values of temperature/relative humidity in the MCR are 75°F/60 percent. At 3 hours, when the non-1E battery heat loads are exhausted, the conditions are 87.2°F/41 percent. At 24 hours, when the 24 hour battery heat loads are terminated, the conditions are 84.4°F/45 percent. At 72 hours, the conditions are 85.8°F/39 percent.

Sufficient thermal mass is provided in the walls and ceiling of the main control room to absorb the heat generated by the equipment, lights, and occupants. The temperature in the instrumentation and control rooms and dc equipment rooms following a loss of the nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system remains below acceptable limits as discussed in subsection 6.4.4. As in the main control room, sufficient thermal mass is provided surrounding these rooms to absorb the heat generated by the equipment. After 72 hours, the instrumentation and control rooms will be cooled by drawing in outside air and circulating it through the room, as discussed in subsection 6.4.2.2.

In the event of a loss of ac power, the nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system isolation valves automatically close and the main control room emergency habitability system isolation valves automatically open. These actions protect the main control room occupants from a potential radiation release. In instances in which there is no radiological source term present, the compressed air storage tanks are refilled via a connection to the breathable quality air compressor in the compressed and instrument air system (CAS). The compressed air



storage tanks can also be refilled from portable supplies by an installed connection in the CAS.

#### 6.4.4 System Safety Evaluation

Doses to main control room personnel resulting from a postulated LOCA are presented in subsection 15.6.5.3. The doses associated with the LOCA are bounding for all other design basis accidents. No radioactive materials are stored or transported near the main control room pressure boundary.

As discussed and evaluated in subsection 9.5.1, the use of noncombustible construction and heat and flame resistant materials throughout the plant reduces the likelihood of fire and consequential impact on the main control room atmosphere. Operation of the nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system in the event of a fire is discussed in subsection 9.4.1.

The exhaust stacks of the onsite standby power diesel generators are located in excess of 150 feet away from the fresh air intakes of the main control room. The onsite standby power system fuel oil storage tanks are located in excess of 300 feet from the main control room fresh air intakes. These separation distances reduce the possibility that combustion fumes or smoke from an oil fire would be drawn into the main control room.

The protection of the operators in the main control room from offsite toxic gas releases is discussed in Section 2.2. The sources of onsite chemicals are described in Table 6.4-1 and their locations are shown on Figure 1.2-2. Analysis of these sources are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.78 and shows that these sources do not represent a toxic hazard to control room personnel.

A supply of protective clothing, respirators, and self-contained breathing apparatus adequate for 11 persons is stored within the main control room pressure boundary.

The main control room emergency habitability system components discussed in subsection 6.4.2.3 are arranged as shown in Figure 6.4-2. The location of components and piping within the main control room pressure boundary provides the required supply of compressed air to the main control room pressure boundary, as shown in Figure 6.4-1.

During emergency operation, the main control room emergency habitability system passive heat sinks are designed to limit the temperature inside the main control room to remain within limits for reliable human performance (References 2 and 3) over 72 hours. The passive heat sinks limit the air temperature inside the instrumentation and control rooms to 125°F and dc equipment rooms to 120°F. The walls and ceilings that act as the passive heat sinks contain sufficient thermal mass to accommodate the heat sources from equipment, personnel, and lighting for 72 hours.

The main control room emergency habitability system nominally provides 65 scfm of ventilation air to the main control room from the compressed air storage tanks. Sixty scfm of ventilation flow is sufficient to pressurize the control room to at least positive 1/8-inch

water gauge differential pressure with respect to the surrounding areas in addition to limiting the carbon dioxide concentration below one-half percent by volume for a maximum occupancy of 11 persons and maintaining air quality within the guidelines of Table 1 and Appendix C, Table C-1, of Reference 1.

Automatic transfer of habitability system functions from the nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system to the main control room emergency habitability system is accomplished by the receipt of one of two signals:

- "High-high" particulate or iodine radioactivity in MCR air supply
- Loss of ac power sources

The airborne fission product source term in the reactor containment following the postulated LOCA is assumed to leak from the containment and airborne fission products are assumed to result from spent fuel pool steaming. The concentration of radioactivity, which is assumed to surround the main control room, after the postulated accident, is evaluated as a function of the fission product decay constants, the containment leak rate, and the meteorological conditions assumed. The assessment of the amount of radioactivity within the main control room takes into consideration the radiological decay of fission products and the infiltration/exfiltration rates to and from the main control room pressure boundary.

A single active failure of a component of the main control room emergency habitability system or nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system does not impair the capability of the systems to accomplish their intended functions. The Class 1E components of the main control room emergency habitability system are connected to independent Class 1E power supplies. Both the main control room emergency habitability system and the portions of the nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system which isolates the main control room are designed to remain functional during an SSE or design-basis tornado.

#### **6.4.5 Inservice Inspection/Inservice Testing**

A program of preoperational and postoperational testing requirements is implemented to confirm initial and continued system capability. The VES system is tested and inspected at appropriate intervals, as defined by the technical specifications. Emphasis is placed on tests and inspections of the safety-related portions of the habitability systems.

##### **6.4.5.1 Preoperational Inspection and Testing**

Preoperational testing of the main control room emergency habitability system is performed to verify that the air flow rate of  $65 \pm 5$  scfm is sufficient to maintain pressurization of the main control room envelope of at least 1/8-inch water gauge with respect to the adjacent areas. The positive pressure within the main control room is confirmed via the differential pressure transmitters within the control room. The installed flow meters are utilized to verify the system flow rates. The pressurization of the control room limits the ingress of radioactivity to maintain operator dose limits below regulatory limits. Air quality within the

MCR environment is confirmed to be within the guidelines of Table 1 and Appendix C, Table C-1, of Reference 1 by analyzing air samples taken during the pressurization test.

The storage capacity of the compressed air storage tanks is verified to be in excess of 314,132 scf of compressed air at a minimum pressure of 3400 psig. This amount of compressed air will assure 72 hours of air supply to the main control room.

An inspection will verify that the heat loads within the rooms identified in Table 6.4-3 are less than the specified values.

Preoperational testing of the main control room isolation valves in the nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system is performed to verify the leaktightness of the valves.

Preoperational testing for main control room inleakage during VES operation will be conducted in accordance with ASTM E741, "Standard Test Method for Determining Air Leakage Rate by Tracer Dilution."

Testing and inspection of the radiation monitors is discussed in Section 11.5. The other tests noted above are discussed in Chapter 14.

#### **6.4.5.2 Inservice Testing**

Inservice testing of the main control room emergency habitability system and nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system is conducted in accordance with the surveillance requirements specified in the technical specifications in Chapter 16.

Leaktightness testing of the main control room pressure boundary is conducted in accordance with the frequency specified in the technical specifications.

#### **6.4.5.3 Air Quality Testing**

Connections are provided for sampling the air supplied from the compressed and instrument air system and for periodic sampling of the air stored in the storage tanks. Air samples of the compressed air storage tanks are taken quarterly and analyzed for acceptable air quality within the guidelines of Table 1 and Appendix C, Table C-1, of Reference 1.

#### **6.4.5.4 Air Inleakage Testing**

Testing for main control room inleakage during VES operation will be conducted once every ten years. This testing will be conducted in accordance with ASTM E741, "Standard Test Method for Determining Leakage Rate by Tracer Dilution."

#### 6.4.6 Instrumentation Requirements

The indications in the main control room used to monitor the main control room emergency habitability system and nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system are listed in Table 6.4-2.

Instrumentation required for actuation of the main control room emergency habitability system and nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system are discussed in subsection 7.3.1.

Details of the radiation monitors used to provide the main control room indication of actuation of the nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system supplemental filtration mode of operation and actuation of main control room emergency habitability system operation are given in Section 11.5.

A description of initiating circuits, logic, periodic testing requirements, and redundancy of instrumentation relating to the habitability systems is provided in Section 7.3.

#### 6.4.7 Combined License Information

Combined License applicants referencing the AP600 certified design are responsible for the amount and location of possible sources of toxic chemicals in or near the plant and for seismic Category I Class 1E toxic gas monitoring, as required. Regulatory Guides 1.78 and 1.95 address control room protection for toxic chemicals, and for evaluating offsite toxic releases (including the potential for toxic releases beyond 72 hours) in accordance with the guidelines of Regulatory Guides 1.78 and 1.95 in order to meet the requirements of TMI Action Plan Item III.D.3.4 and GDC 19.

Combined License applicants referencing the AP600 certified design are responsible for verifying that procedures and training for control room habitability are consistent with the intent of Generic Issue 83 (see Section 1.9).

#### 6.4.8 References

1. "Ventilation for Acceptable Indoor Air Quality," ASHRAE Standard 62 - 1989.
2. "Human Engineering Design Guidelines," MIL-HDBK-759C, 31 July 1995.
3. "Human Engineering," MIL-STD-1472E, 31 October 1996.

Table 6.4-1

**ONSITE CHEMICALS**

<b>Material</b>	<b>State</b>	<b>Location</b>
Hydrogen	Gas	Gas storage
Nitrogen	Liquid	Turbine bldg.
CO <sub>2</sub>	Liquid	Turbine bldg.
Oxygen Scavenger	Liquid	Turbine bldg.
pH Addition	Liquid	Turbine bldg.
Sulfuric Acid	Liquid	Turbine bldg.
Sodium Hydroxide	Liquid	Turbine bldg.
Dispersant <sup>(a)</sup>	Liquid	Turbine bldg.
Fuel Oil	Liquid	DG fuel oil storage tank/DG bldg./Turbine bldg./Annex bldg.
Corrosion Inhibitor	Liquid	Turbine bldg.
Scale Inhibitor	Liquid	Turbine bldg.
Biocide/Disinfectant	Liquid	Turbine bldg.
Algicide	Liquid	Turbine bldg.

**Note:**

(a) Site-specific, by Combined License applicant

Table 6.4-2

**MAIN CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY INDICATIONS AND ALARMS**

VES emergency air storage tank pressure (indication and low and low-low alarms)

VES MCR pressure boundary differential pressure (indication and high and low alarms)

VES air delivery line flowrate (indication and high and low alarms)

VBS main control room supply air radiation level (high-high alarms)

VBS outside air intake smoke level (high alarm)

VBS isolation valve position

VBS MCR pressure boundary differential pressure

**Note:**

KEY: VES = Main control room emergency habitability system  
VBS = Nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system  
MCR = Main control room

Table 6.4-3

## LOSS OF AC POWER HEAT LOAD LIMITS

Room Name	Room Numbers	Heat Load 0 to 24 hours (Btu/sec)	Heat Load 24 to 72 Hours (Btu/sec)
MCR Envelope	12401	12.823 (Hour 0 through 3) 5.133 (Hour 4 through 24)	3.928
I&C Rooms	12301, 12305	8.854	0
I&C Rooms	12302, 12304	13.07	4.22
dc Equipment Rooms	12201, 12205	3.792 (Hour 0 through 1) 2.465 (Hour 2 through 24)	0
dc Equipment Rooms	12203, 12207	5.84 (Hour 0 through 1) 4.51 (Hour 2 through 24)	2.05




Figure 6.4-1

**Main Control Room Envelope**







Figure 6.4-2 (Sheet 1 of 2)

Main Control Room Habitability System Piping and Instrumentation Diagram



NOTES

1. THE SYSTEM LOCATOR CODE "YES" HAS BEEN OMITTED FROM ALL COMPONENT NUMBERS. THE COMPONENT CODE HAS BEEN OMITTED FROM ALL COMPONENTS EXCEPT EQUIPMENT. REFER TO THE PAID LEGEND DRAWING ON PMS 001, 002 AND 003 FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING COMPONENT NUMBERING.
2. REFER TO SYSTEM DESCRIPTIONS FOR A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF ALL INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS.
3. SYSTEM IS FILLED AND REFILLED USING BREATHABLE QUALITY AIR SOURCE.
4. REFER TO DRAWING VBS-M6-002 FOR NORMAL HVAC SYSTEM.
5. SYSTEM ACTUATION ON HIGH - HIGH PARTICULATE OR IODINE RADIOACTIVITY IN THE MCR SUPPLY AIR DUCT OR LOSS OF ALL AC POWER.
6. TEMPORARY PRESSURE INSTRUMENT CONNECTION TO PERMIT ADJUSTMENT OF PRESSURE REGULATING VALVES.
7. DELETED
8. SCREWED CAP CONNECTION IS FITTED WITH AN INTEGRAL BLEED MECHANISM TO RELIEVE LINE PRESSURE.
9. LOW FLOW ALARM TO BE ACTIVATED ON TIME DELAY AFTER VES ACTUATION.

10. PRESSURE RELIEF DAMPERS QUALIFIED TO ASME/ANSI NS09 AND NS10 AND ARE USED FOR LOW PRESSURE RELIEF OF THE MCR PRESSURE BOUNDARY DURING YES OPERATION.
11. DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE SIGNAL USED FOR INDICATION AND ALARM FUNCTION FOR YES OPERATION. DAMPER CONTROL FUNCTION PROVIDED FOR VBS OPERATION.
12. MAXIMUM AIR TANK PRESSURE IS 3800 PSIG TO PRECLUDE PROBLEMS WITH RELIEF VALVE RESEATING.
13. PRESSURE RELIEF ISOLATION VALVE TO BE ACTUATED ON TIME DELAY AFTER VES ACTUATION SIGNAL.
14. TEMPORARY PRESSURE INSTRUMENT CONNECTION.
15. VBS DAMPER CONTROL PROVIDED VIA PLS.

Figure 6.4-2 (Sheet 2 of 2)

Main Control Room Habitability System Piping and Instrumentation Diagram