

**2.1.1 Fuel Handling and Refueling System****Design Description**

The fuel handling and refueling system (FHS) transfers fuel assemblies and core components during fueling operations and stores new and spent fuel assemblies in the new and spent fuel storage racks. The refueling machine (RM) and the fuel transfer tube are operated during refueling mode. The fuel handling machine (FHM) is operated during normal modes of plant operation, including startup, power operation, cooldown, shutdown and refueling.

The component locations of the FHS are as shown in Table 2.1.1-2.

1. The functional arrangement of the FHS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.1.1.
2. The FHS has the RM, the FHM, and the new and spent fuel storage racks.
3. The FHS preserves containment integrity by isolation of the fuel transfer tube penetrating containment.
4. The RM and FHM gripper assemblies are designed to prevent opening while the weight of the fuel assembly is suspended from the gripper.
5. The lift height of the RM and FHM masts is limited such that the minimum required depth of water shielding is maintained.
6. The RM and FHM are designed to maintain their load carrying and structural integrity functions during a safe shutdown earthquake.
7. The new and spent fuel storage racks maintain the effective neutron multiplication factor less than the required limits during normal operation, design basis seismic events, and design basis dropped fuel assembly accidents.

**Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria**

Table 2.1.1-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the FHS.

Table 2.1.1-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria		
Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
1. The functional arrangement of the FHS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.1.1.	Inspection of the as-built system will be performed.	The as-built FHS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.1.1.
2. The FHS has the refueling machine (RM), the fuel handling machine (FHM), and the new and spent fuel storage racks.	Inspection of the system will be performed.	The FHS has the RM, the FHM, and the new and spent fuel storage racks.
3. The FHS preserves containment integrity by isolation of the fuel transfer tube penetrating containment.	See Tier 1 Material, subsection 2.2.1, Containment System.	See Tier 1 Material, subsection 2.2.1, Containment System.
4. The RM and FHM gripper assemblies are designed to prevent opening while the weight of the fuel assembly is suspended from the gripper.	The RM and FHM will be tested by operating the open controls of the gripper while suspending a dummy fuel assembly.	The gripper will not open while suspending a dummy test assembly.
5. The lift height of the RM and FHM masts is limited such that the minimum required depth of water shielding is maintained.	The RM and FHM will be tested by attempting to raise a dummy fuel assembly.	The bottom of the dummy fuel assembly cannot be raised to within 24 ft, 6 in of the operating deck floor.
6. The RM and FHM are designed to maintain their load carrying and structural integrity functions during a <u>safe shutdown</u> earthquake.	<p>i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the RM and FHM are located on the nuclear island.</p> <p>ii) Type test, analysis, or a combination of type tests and analyses of the RM and FHM will be performed.</p>	<p>i) The RM and FHM are located on the nuclear island.</p> <p>ii) A report exists and concludes that the RM and FHM can withstand seismic design basis dynamic loads without loss of load carrying or structural integrity functions.</p>

<p align="center"><b>Table 2.1.1-1 (cont.) Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria</b></p>		
<b>Design Commitment</b>	<b>Inspections, Tests, Analyses</b>	<b>Acceptance Criteria</b>
<p>7. The new and spent fuel storage racks maintain the effective neutron multiplication factor less than the required limits during normal operation, design basis seismic events, and design basis dropped fuel assembly accidents.</p>	<p>i) Analyses will be performed to calculate the effective neutron multiplication factor in the new and spent fuel storage racks during normal conditions.</p> <p>ii) Inspection will be performed to verify that the new and spent fuel storage racks are located on the nuclear island.</p> <p>iii) Seismic analysis of the new and spent fuel storage racks will be performed.</p> <p>iv) Analysis of the new and spent fuel storage racks under design basis dropped fuel assembly loads will be performed.</p>	<p>i) The calculated effective neutron multiplication factor for the new and spent fuel storage racks is less than 0.95 under normal conditions.</p> <p>ii) The new and spent fuel storage racks are located on the nuclear island.</p> <p>iii) A report exists and concludes that the new and spent fuel racks can withstand seismic design basis dynamic loads and maintain the calculated effective neutron multiplication factor less than 0.95.</p> <p>iv) A report exists and concludes that the new and spent fuel racks can withstand design basis dropped fuel assembly loads and maintain the calculated effective neutron multiplication factor less than 0.95.</p>

<b>Table 2.1.1-2</b>		
<b>Component Name</b>	<b>Tag No.</b>	<b>Component Location</b>
Refueling Machine	FHS-FH-01	Containment
Fuel Handling Machine	FHS-FH-02	Auxiliary Building
Spent Fuel Storage Racks	FHS-FS-20	Auxiliary Building
New Fuel Storage Racks	FHS-FS-01	Auxiliary Building
Fuel Transfer Tube	FHS-FT-01	Auxiliary Building/Containment

## 2.1.2 Reactor Coolant System

### Design Description

The reactor coolant system (RCS) removes heat from the reactor core and transfers it to the secondary side of the steam generators for power generation. The RCS contains two vertical U-tube steam generators, four canned motor reactor coolant pumps (RCPs), and one pressurizer.

The RCS is as shown in Figure 2.1.2-1 and the component locations of the RCS are as shown in Table 2.1.2-5.

1. The functional arrangement of the RCS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.1.2.
2.
  - a) The components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.
  - b) The piping identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.
3.
  - a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.
  - b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.
4.
  - a) The components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.
  - b) The piping identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.
5.
  - a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.
  - b) Each of the lines identified in Table 2.1.2-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.
6. Each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as designed for leak before break (LBB) meets the LBB criteria, or an evaluation is performed of the protection from the dynamic effects of a rupture of the line.

7.
  - a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.
  - b) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E division.
  - c) Separation is provided between RCS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.
8. The RCS provides the following safety-related functions:
  - a) The pressurizer safety valves provide overpressure protection in accordance with Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.
  - b) The pressurizer safety valves operate with low flow at pressures near the valve set pressure.
  - c) The reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) have a rotating inertia to provide RCS flow coastdown on loss of power to the pumps.
  - d) Each RCP flywheel assembly can withstand a design overspeed condition.
  - e) The RCS provides automatic depressurization during design basis events.
  - f) The RCS provides emergency letdown during design basis events.
9. The RCS provides the following nonsafety-related functions:
  - a) The RCS provides circulation of coolant to remove heat from the core.
  - b) The RCS provides the means to control system pressure.
  - c) The pressurizer heaters trip after a signal is generated by the PMS.
10. Safety-related displays identified in Table 2.1.2-1 can be retrieved in the main control room (MCR).
11.
  - a) Controls exist in the MCR to cause the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 to perform active functions.
  - b) The valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as having protection and safety monitoring system (PMS) control perform an active safety function after receiving a signal from the PMS.
  - c) The valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as having diverse actuation system (DAS) control perform an active safety function after receiving a signal from DAS.

12. a) The automatic depressurization valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.
  - b) After loss of motive power, the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 assume the indicated loss of motive power position.
13. a) Controls exist in the MCR to trip the RCPs.
  - b) The RCPs trip after receiving a signal from the PMS.
  - c) The RCPs trip after receiving a signal from the DAS.
14. Controls exist in the MCR to cause the components identified in Table 2.1.2-3 to perform the listed function.
15. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.1.2-3 can be retrieved in the MCR.

**Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria**

Table 2.1.2-4 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the RCS.

**Table 2.1.2-1**

Equipment Name	Tag No.	ASME Code Section III	Seismic Cat. I	Remotely Operated Valve	Class 1E/Qual. for Harsh Envir.	Safety-Related Display	Control PMS/DAS	Active Function	Loss of Motive Power Position
Steam Generator 1	RCS-MB-01	Yes	Yes	-	-/-	-	-	-	-
Steam Generator 2	RCS-MB-02	Yes	Yes	-	-/-	-	-	-	-
RCP 1A	RCS-MP-01A	Yes	Yes	-	No/No	No	Yes/Yes (pump trip)	No	-
RCP 1B	RCS-MP-01B	Yes	Yes	-	No/No	No	Yes/Yes (pump trip)	No	-
RCP 2A	RCS-MP-02A	Yes	Yes	-	No/No	No	Yes/Yes (pump trip)	No	-
RCP 2B	RCS-MP-02B	Yes	Yes	-	No/No	No	Yes/Yes (pump trip)	No	-
Pressurizer	RCS-MV-02	Yes	Yes	-	No/No (heaters) -/-	-	Yes/No (heater trip) -/-	-	-
Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) Sparger A	PXS-MW-01A	Yes	Yes	-	-/-	-	-/-	-	-
ADS Sparger B	PXS-MW-01B	Yes	Yes	-	-/-	-	-/-	-	-

Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.



**Table 2.1.2-1 (cont.)**

Equipment Name	Tag No.	ASME Code Section III	Seismic Cat. I	Remotely Operated Valve	Class 1E/Qual. for Harsh Envir.	Safety-Related Display	Control PMS/DAS	Active Function	Loss of Motive Power Position
Pressurizer Safety Valve	RCS-PL-V005A	Yes	Yes	No	-/-	No	-/-	Transfer Open/Transfer Closed	-
Pressurizer Safety Valve	RCS-PL-V005B	Yes	Yes	No	-/-	No	-/-	Transfer Open/Transfer Closed	-
First-stage ADS Motor-operated Valve (MOV)	RCS-PL-V001A	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/Yes	Yes (Valve Position)	Yes/Yes	Transfer Open	As Is
First-stage ADS MOV	RCS-PL-V001B	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/Yes	Yes (Valve Position)	Yes/Yes	Transfer Open	As Is
Second-stage ADS MOV	RCS-PL-V002A	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/Yes	Yes (Valve Position)	Yes/Yes	Transfer Open	As Is
Second-stage ADS MOV	RCS-PL-V002B	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/Yes	Yes (Valve Position)	Yes/Yes	Transfer Open	As Is
Third-stage ADS MOV	RCS-PL-V003A	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/Yes	Yes (Valve Position)	Yes/Yes	Transfer Open	As Is

Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

Table 2.1.2-1 (cont.)

Equipment Name	Tag No.	ASME Code Section III	Seismic Cat. I	Remotely Operated Valve	Class IE/Qual. for Harsh Envir.	Safety-Related Display	Control PMS/DAS	Active Function	Loss of Motive Power Position
Third-stage ADS MOV	RCS-PL-V003B	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/Yes	Yes (Valve Position)	Yes/Yes	Transfer Open	As Is
Fourth-stage ADS Squib Valve	RCS-PL-V004A	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/Yes	No	Yes/Yes	Transfer Open	As Is
Fourth-stage ADS Squib Valve	RCS-PL-V004B	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/Yes	No	Yes/Yes	Transfer Open	As Is
Fourth-stage ADS Squib Valve	RCS-PL-V004C	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/Yes	No	Yes/Yes	Transfer Open	As Is
Fourth-stage ADS Squib Valve	RCS-PL-V004D	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/Yes	No	Yes/Yes	Transfer Open	As Is
First-stage ADS Isolation MOV	RCS-PL-V011A	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/Yes	Yes (Valve Position)	Yes/Yes	Transfer Open	As Is
First-stage ADS Isolation MOV	RCS-PL-V011B	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/Yes	Yes (Valve Position)	Yes/Yes	Transfer Open	As Is
Second-stage ADS Isolation MOV	RCS-PL-V012A	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/Yes	Yes (Valve Position)	Yes/Yes	Transfer Open	As Is
Second-stage ADS Isolation MOV	RCS-PL-V012B	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/Yes	Yes (Valve Position)	Yes/Yes	Transfer Open	As Is

Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

**Table 2.1.2-1 (cont.)**

Equipment Name	Tag No.	ASME Code Section III	Seismic Cat. I	Remotely Operated Valve	Class 1E/Qual. for Harsh Envir.	Safety-Related Display	Control PMS/DAS	Active Function	Loss of Motive Power Position
Third-stage ADS Isolation MOV	RCS-PL-V013A	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/Yes	Yes (Valve Position)	Yes/Yes	Transfer Open	As Is
Third-stage ADS Isolation MOV	RCS-PL-V013B	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/Yes	Yes (Valve Position)	Yes/Yes	Transfer Open	As Is
Fourth-stage ADS MOV	RCS-PL-V014A	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/Yes	Yes (Valve Position)	Yes/No	None	As Is
Fourth-stage ADS MOV	RCS-PL-V014B	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/Yes	Yes (Valve Position)	Yes/No	None	As Is
Fourth-stage ADS MOV	RCS-PL-V014C	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/Yes	Yes (Valve Position)	Yes/No	None	As Is
Fourth-stage ADS MOV	RCS-PL-V014D	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/Yes	Yes (Valve Position)	Yes/No	None	As Is
Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valve	RCS-PL-V150A	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/Yes	No	Yes/No	Transfer Open	Closed
Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valve	RCS-PL-V150B	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/Yes	No	Yes/No	Transfer Open	Closed
Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valve	RCS-PL-V150C	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/Yes	No	Yes/No	Transfer Open	Closed
Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valve	RCS-PL-V150D	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/Yes	No	Yes/No	Transfer Open	Closed

Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

**Table 2.1.2-1 (cont.)**

Equipment Name	Tag No.	ASME Code Section III	Seismic Cat. I	Remotely Operated Valve	Class 1E/Qual. for Harsh Envir.	Safety-Related Display	Control PMS/DAS	Active Function	Loss of Motive Power Position
RCS Cold Leg 1A Flow Sensor	RCS-101A	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-
RCS Cold Leg 1A Flow Sensor	RCS-101B	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-
RCS Cold Leg 1A Flow Sensor	RCS-101C	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-
RCS Cold Leg 1A Flow Sensor	RCS-101D	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-
RCS Cold Leg 1B Flow Sensor	RCS-102A	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-
RCS Cold Leg 1B Flow Sensor	RCS-102B	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-
RCS Cold Leg 1B Flow Sensor	RCS-102C	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-
RCS Cold Leg 1B Flow Sensor	RCS-102D	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-
RCS Cold Leg 2A Flow Sensor	RCS-103A	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-
RCS Cold Leg 2A Flow Sensor	RCS-103B	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-
RCS Cold Leg 2A Flow Sensor	RCS-103C	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-
RCS Cold Leg 2A Flow Sensor	RCS-103D	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-

Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

**Table 2.1.2-1 (cont.)**

Equipment Name	Tag No.	ASME Code Section III	Seismic Cat. I	Remotely Operated Valve	Class 1E/Qual. for Harsh Envir.	Safety-Related Display	Control PMS/DAS	Active Function	Loss of Motive Power Position
RCS Cold Leg 2B Flow Sensor	RCS-104A	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-
RCS Cold Leg 2B Flow Sensor	RCS-104B	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-
RCS Cold Leg 2B Flow Sensor	RCS-104C	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-
RCS Cold Leg 2B Flow Sensor	RCS-104D	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-
RCS Cold Leg 1A Narrow Range Temperature Sensor	RCS-121A	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-
RCS Cold Leg 1B Narrow Range Temperature Sensor	RCS-121B	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-
RCS Cold Leg 1B Narrow Range Temperature Sensor	RCS-121C	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-
RCS Cold Leg 1A Narrow Range Temperature Sensor	RCS-121D	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-
RCS Cold Leg 2B Narrow Range Temperature Sensor	RCS-122A	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-
RCS Cold Leg 2A Narrow Range Temperature Sensor	RCS-122B	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-

Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

**Table 2.1.2-1 (cont.)**

Equipment Name	Tag No.	ASME Code Section III	Seismic Cat. I	Remotely Operated Valve	Class 1E/Qual. for Harsh Envir.	Safety-Related Display	Control PMS/DAS	Active Function	Loss of Motive Power Position
RCS Cold Leg 2A Narrow Range Temperature Sensor	RCS-122C	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-
RCS Cold Leg 2B Narrow Range Temperature Sensor	RCS-122D	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-
RCS Cold Leg 1A Dual Range Temperature Sensor	RCS-125A	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	Yes (Wide Range)	-/-	-	-
RCS Cold Leg 2A Dual Range Temperature Sensor	RCS-125B	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	Yes (Wide Range)	-/-	-	-
RCS Cold Leg 1B Dual Range Temperature Sensor	RCS-125C	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	Yes (Wide Range)	-/-	-	-
RCS Cold Leg 2B Dual Range Temperature Sensor	RCS-125D	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	Yes (Wide Range)	-/-	-	-
RCS Hot Leg 1 Narrow Range Temperature Sensor	RCS-131A	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-
RCS Hot Leg 2 Narrow Range Temperature Sensor	RCS-131B	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-
RCS Hot Leg 1 Narrow Range Temperature Sensor	RCS-131C	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-

Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

**Table 2.1.2-1 (cont.)**

Equipment Name	Tag No.	ASME Code Section III	Seismic Cat. I	Remotely Operated Valve	Class 1E/Qual. for Harsh Envir.	Safety-Related Display	Control PMS/DAS	Active Function	Loss of Motive Power Position
RCS Hot Leg 2 Narrow Range Temperature Sensor	RCS-131D	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-
RCS Hot Leg 1 Narrow Range Temperature Sensor	RCS-132A	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-
RCS Hot Leg 2 Narrow Range Temperature Sensor	RCS-132B	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-
RCS Hot Leg 1 Narrow Range Temperature Sensor	RCS-132C	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-
RCS Hot Leg 2 Narrow Range Temperature Sensor	RCS-132D	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-
RCS Hot Leg 1 Narrow Range Temperature Sensor	RCS-133A	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-
RCS Hot Leg 2 Narrow Range Temperature Sensor	RCS-133B	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-
RCS Hot Leg 1 Narrow Range Temperature Sensor	RCS-133C	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-
RCS Hot Leg 2 Narrow Range Temperature Sensor	RCS-133D	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-

Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

Table 2.1.2-1 (cont.)

Equipment Name	Tag No.	ASME Code Section III	Seismic Cat. I	Remotely Operated Valve	Class IE/Qual. for Harsh Envir.	Safety-Related Display	Control PMS/DAS	Active Function	Loss of Motive Power Position
RCS Hot Leg 1 Wide Range Temperature Sensor	RCS-135A	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	Yes	-/-	-	-
RCS Hot Leg 2 Wide Range Temperature Sensor	RCS-135B	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	Yes	-/-	-	-
RCS Wide Range Pressure Sensor	RCS-140A	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	Yes	-/-	-	-
RCS Wide Range Pressure Sensor	RCS-140B	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	Yes	-/-	-	-
RCS Wide Range Pressure Sensor	RCS-140C	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	Yes	-/-	-	-
RCS Wide Range Pressure Sensor	RCS-140D	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	Yes	-/-	-	-
RCS Hot Leg 1 Level Sensor	RCS-160A	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	Yes	-/-	-	-
RCS Hot Leg 2 Level Sensor	RCS-160B	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	Yes	-/-	-	-
Passive Residual Heat Removal (PRHR) Return Line Temperature Sensor	RCS-161	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	Yes	-/-	-	-
Pressurizer Pressure Sensor	RCS-191A	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	Yes	-/-	-	-
Pressurizer Pressure Sensor	RCS-191B	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	Yes	-/-	-	-

Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.



**Table 2.1.2-1 (cont.)**

Equipment Name	Tag No.	ASME Code Section III	Seismic Cat. I	Remotely Operated Valve	Class 1E/Qual. for Harsh Envir.	Safety-Related Display	Control PMS/DAS	Active Function	Loss of Motive Power Position
Pressurizer Pressure Sensor	RCS-191C	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	Yes	-/-	-	-
Pressurizer Pressure Sensor	RCS-191D	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	Yes	-/-	-	-
Pressurizer Level Reference Leg Temperature Sensor	RCS-193A	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	Yes	-/-	-	-
Pressurizer Level Reference Leg Temperature Sensor	RCS-193B	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	Yes	-/-	-	-
Pressurizer Level Reference Leg Temperature Sensor	RCS-193C	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	Yes	-/-	-	-
Pressurizer Level Reference Leg Temperature Sensor	RCS-193D	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	Yes	-/-	-	-
Pressurizer Level Sensor	RCS-195A	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	Yes	-/-	-	-
Pressurizer Level Sensor	RCS-195B	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	Yes	-/-	-	-
Pressurizer Level Sensor	RCS-195C	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	Yes	-/-	-	-
Pressurizer Level Sensor	RCS-195D	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	Yes	-/-	-	-

Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

Table 2.1.2-1 (cont.)

Equipment Name	Tag No.	ASME Code Section III	Seismic Cat. I	Remotely Operated Valve	Class 1E/Qual. for Harsh Envir.	Safety-Related Display	Control PMS/DAS	Active Function	Loss of Motive Power Position
RCP 1A Bearing Water Temperature Sensor	RCS-211A	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	Yes	-/-	-	-
RCP 1A Bearing Water Temperature Sensor	RCS-211B	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	Yes	-/-	-	-
RCP 1A Bearing Water Temperature Sensor	RCS-211C	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	Yes	-/-	-	-
RCP 1A Bearing Water Temperature Sensor	RCS-211D	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	Yes	-/-	-	-
RCP 1B Bearing Water Temperature Sensor	RCS-212A	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	Yes	-/-	-	-
RCP 1B Bearing Water Temperature Sensor	RCS-212B	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	Yes	-/-	-	-
RCP 1B Bearing Water Temperature Sensor	RCS-212C	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	Yes	-/-	-	-
RCP 1B Bearing Water Temperature Sensor	RCS-212D	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	Yes	-/-	-	-
RCP 2A Bearing Water Temperature Sensor	RCS-213A	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	Yes	-/-	-	-

Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

**Table 2.1.2-1 (cont.)**

Equipment Name	Tag No.	ASME Code Section III	Seismic Cat. I	Remotely Operated Valve	Class IE/ Harsh Envir.	Safety-Related Display	Control PMS/DAS	Active Function	Loss of Motive Power Position
RCP 2A Bearing Water Temperature Sensor	RCS-213B	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	Yes	-/-	-	-
RCP 2A Bearing Water Temperature Sensor	RCS-213C	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	Yes	-/-	-	-
RCP 2A Bearing Water Temperature Sensor	RCS-213D	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	Yes	-/-	-	-
RCP 2B Bearing Water Temperature Sensor	RCS-214A	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	Yes	-/-	-	-
RCP 2B Bearing Water Temperature Sensor	RCS-214B	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	Yes	-/-	-	-
RCP 2B Bearing Water Temperature Sensor	RCS-214C	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	Yes	-/-	-	-
RCP 2B Bearing Water Temperature Sensor	RCS-214D	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	Yes	-/-	-	-
RCP 1A Pump Speed Sensor	RCS-281	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-
RCP 1B Pump Speed Sensor	RCS-282	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-

Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

**Table 2.1.2-1 (cont.)**

Equipment Name	Tag No.	ASME Code Section III	Seismic Cat. I	Remotely Operated Valve	Class 1E/Qual. for Harsh Envir.	Safety-Related Display	Control PMS/DAS	Active Function	Loss of Motive Power Position
RCP 2A Pump Speed Sensor	RCS-283	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-
RCP 2B Pump Speed Sensor	RCS-284	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-

Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

Table 2.1.2-2				
Line Name	Line Number	ASME Code Section III	Leak Before Break	Functional Capability Required
Hot Legs	RCS-L001A RCS-L001B	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cold Legs	RCS-L002A RCS-L002B RCS-L002C RCS-L002D	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pressurizer Surge Line	RCS-L003	Yes	Yes	Yes
ADS Inlet Headers	RCS-L004A/B RCS-L006A/B RCS-L030A/B RCS-L020A/B	Yes	Yes	Yes
Safety Valve Inlet Piping	RCS-L005A RCS-L005B	Yes	Yes	Yes
Safety Valve Discharge Piping	RCS-L050A/B RCS-L051A/B	Yes	No	Yes
ADS First-stage Valve Inlet Piping	RCS-L010A/B RCS-L011A/B	Yes	No	Yes
ADS Second-stage Valve Inlet Piping	RCS-L021A/B RCS-L022A/B	Yes	Yes	Yes
ADS Third-stage Valve Inlet Piping	RCS-L031A/B RCS-L032A/B	Yes	Yes	Yes
ADS Outlet Piping	RCS-L012A/B RCS-L023A/B RCS-L033A/B RCS-L034A/B RCS-L061A/B RCS-L063A/B RCS-L064A/B RCS-L200A/B PXS-L130A/B	Yes	No	Yes
ADS Fourth-stage Inlet Piping	RCS-L133A/B RCS-L135A/B RCS-L136A/B RCS-L137A/B	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pressurizer Spray Piping	RCS-L110A/B RCS-L212A/B RCS-L213 RCS-L215	Yes	No	No

Table 2.1.2-3			
Equipment	Tag No.	Display	Control Function
RCP 1A Breaker (Status)	ECS-ES-51	Yes	-
RCP 1A Breaker (Status)	ECS-ES-52	Yes	-
RCP 1B Breaker (Status)	ECS-ES-61	Yes	-
RCP 1B Breaker (Status)	ECS-ES-62	Yes	-
RCP 2A Breaker (Status)	ECS-ES-53	Yes	-
RCP 2A Breaker (Status)	ECS-ES-54	Yes	-
RCP 2B Breaker (Status)	ECS-ES-63	Yes	-
RCP 2B Breaker (Status)	ECS-ES-64	Yes	-
Pressurizer Heaters	RCS-EH-03	Yes	On/Off
Pressurizer Heaters	RCS-EH-04A	Yes	On/Off
Pressurizer Heaters	RCS-EH-04B	Yes	On/Off
Pressurizer Heaters	RCS-BH-04C	Yes	On/Off
Pressurizer Heaters	RCS-EH-04D	Yes	On/Off
Fourth-stage ADS Squib Valve (Position Indication)	RCS-PL-V004A	Yes	-
Fourth-stage ADS Squib Valve (Position Indication)	RCS-PL-V004B	Yes	-
Fourth-stage ADS Squib Valve (Position Indication)	RCS-PL-V004C	Yes	-
Fourth-stage ADS Squib Valve (Position Indication)	RCS-PL-V004D	Yes	-
Pressurizer Safety Valve (Position Indication)	RCS-PL-V005A	Yes	-
Pressurizer Safety Valve (Position Indication)	RCS-PL-V005B	Yes	-
Pressurizer Spray Valve (Position Indication)	RCS-PL-V110A	Yes	-

Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

Table 2.1.2-3 (cont.)			
Equipment	Tag No.	Display	Control Function
Pressurizer Spray Valve (Position Indication)	RCS-PL-V110B	Yes	-
Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valve (Position Indication)	RCS-PL-150A	Yes	-
Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valve (Position Indication)	RCS-PL-150B	Yes	-
Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valve (Position Indication)	RCS-PL-150C	Yes	-
Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valve (Position Indication)	RCS-PL-150D	Yes	-

Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

<b>Table 2.1.2-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria</b>		
<b>Design Commitment</b>	<b>Inspections, Tests, Analyses</b>	<b>Acceptance Criteria</b>
1. The functional arrangement of the RCS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.1.2.	Inspection of the as-built system will be performed.	The as-built RCS conforms with the functional arrangement described in the Design Description of this Section 2.1.2.
2.a) The components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection will be conducted of the as-built components as documented in the ASME design reports.	The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III.
2.b) The piping identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection will be conducted of the as-built components as documented in the ASME design reports.	The ASME code Section III design reports exist for the as-built piping identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III.
3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.	3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.	A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.
3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.	A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.



<b>Table 2.1.2-4 (cont.) Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria</b>		
<b>Design Commitment</b>	<b>Inspections, Tests, Analyses</b>	<b>Acceptance Criteria</b>
4.a) The components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.	A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.	A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.
4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.	A hydrostatic test will be performed on the piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.	A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the piping identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.
5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.	<p>i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment and valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 are located on the Nuclear Island.</p> <p>ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.</p> <p>iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-installed equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.</p>	<p>i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.</p> <p>ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.</p> <p>iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-installed equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.</p>
5.b) Each of the lines identified in Table 2.1.2-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.	Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built piping meets the requirements for functional capability.	A report exists and concludes that each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.1.2-2 for which functional capability is required meets the requirements for functional capability.

<b>Table 2.1.2-4 (cont.)</b> <b>Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria</b>		
<b>Design Commitment</b>	<b>Inspections, Tests, Analyses</b>	<b>Acceptance Criteria</b>
6. Each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as designed for LBB meets the LBB criteria, or an evaluation is performed of the protection from the dynamic effects of a rupture of the line.	Inspection will be performed for the existence of an LBB evaluation report or an evaluation report on the protection from dynamic effects of a pipe break. Tier 1 Material, Section 3.3, Nuclear Island Buildings, contains the design descriptions and inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria for protection from the dynamic effects of pipe rupture.	An LBB evaluation report exists and concludes that the LBB acceptance criteria are met by the as-built RCS piping and piping materials, or a pipe break evaluation report exists and concludes that protection from the dynamic effects of a line break is provided.
7.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.	A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.
7.b) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E division.	Testing will be performed on the RCS by providing a simulated test signal in each Class 1E division.	A simulated test signal exists at the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 when the assigned Class 1E division is provided the test signal.
7.c) Separation is provided between RCS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.	See Tier 1 Material, Section 3.3, Nuclear Island Buildings.	See Tier 1 Material, Section 3.3, Nuclear Island Buildings.
8.a) The pressurizer safety valves provide overpressure protection in accordance with Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.	i) Inspections will be conducted to confirm that the value of the vendor code plate rating is greater than or equal to system relief requirements.  ii) Testing and analysis in accordance with ASME Code Section III will be performed to determine set pressure.	i) The sum of the rated capacities recorded on the valve ASME Code plates of the safety valves exceeds 800,000 lb/hr.  ii) A report exists and concludes that the safety valves set pressure is 2485 psig $\pm$ 25 psi.

<p align="center"><b>Table 2.1.2-4 (cont.)</b>  <b>Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria</b></p>		
<b>Design Commitment</b>	<b>Inspections, Tests, Analyses</b>	<b>Acceptance Criteria</b>
<p>8.b) The pressurizer safety valves operate with low flow at pressures near the valve set pressure.</p>	<p>Tests or type tests are performed to correlate flow through the safety valves as a function of inlet pressure.</p>	<p>A report exists and concludes that the safety valves operate in a stable manner with a leakage rate greater or equal to 0.35 lbm/sec at a pressure below the valve full-open pressure.</p>
<p>8.c) The RCPs have a rotating inertia to provide RCS flow coastdown on loss of power to the pumps.</p>	<p>Inspection of as-built RCP vendor data will be performed.</p>	<p>The calculated rotating inertia of each RCP is no less than 5000 lb-ft<sup>2</sup>.</p>
<p>8.d) Each RCP flywheel assembly can withstand a design overspeed condition.</p>	<p>Shop testing of each RCP flywheel assembly will be performed at the vendor facility at overspeed conditions.</p>	<p>Each RCP flywheel assembly has passed an overspeed condition of no less than 125% of operating speed.</p>
<p>8.e) The RCS provides automatic depressurization during design basis events.</p>	<p>i) A low pressure flow test and associated analysis will be conducted to determine the total piping flow resistance of each ADS valve group connected to the pressurizer (i.e., ADS Stages 1-3) from the pressurizer through the outlet of the downstream ADS control valves. The reactor coolant system will be at cold conditions with the pressurizer full of water. The normal residual heat removal pumps will be used to provide injection flow into the RCS discharging through the ADS valves.</p> <p>Inspections and associated analysis of the piping flow paths from the discharge of the ADS valve groups connected to the pressurizer (i.e., ADS Stages 1-3) to the spargers will be conducted to verify the line routings are consistent with the line routings used for design flow resistance calculations.</p>	<p>i) The calculated ADS piping flow resistance from the pressurizer through the sparger with all valves of each ADS group open is <math>\leq 2.46E-6</math> ft/gpm<sup>2</sup>.</p>

<b>Table 2.1.2-4 (cont.) Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria</b>		
<b>Design Commitment</b>	<b>Inspections, Tests, Analyses</b>	<b>Acceptance Criteria</b>
	<p>ii) Inspections and associated analysis of each fourth-stage ADS valve group (four valves and associated piping connected to each hot leg) will be conducted to verify the line routing is consistent with the line routing used for design flow resistance calculations.</p> <p>iii) Inspections of each fourth-stage ADS valve will be conducted to determine the flow area through each valve.</p> <p>iv) Type tests and analysis will be performed to determine the effective flow area through each stage 1,2,3 ADS valve.</p> <p>v) Inspections of the elevation of the ADS stage 4 valve discharge will be conducted.</p> <p>vi) Inspections of the ADS stage 4 valve discharge will be conducted.</p> <p>vii) Inspection of each ADS sparger will be conducted to determine the flow area through the sparger holes.</p> <p>viii) Inspection of the elevation of each ADS sparger will be conducted.</p>	<p>ii) The calculated flow resistance for each group of fourth-stage ADS valves and piping with all valves open is <math>\leq 3.30E-7</math> ft/gpm<sup>2</sup>.</p> <p>iii) The flow area through each fourth-stage ADS valve is <math>\geq 38</math> in<sup>2</sup>.</p> <p>iv) A report exists and concludes that the effective flow area through each stage 1 ADS valve <math>\geq 4.6</math> in<sup>2</sup> and each stage 2,3 ADS valve is <math>\geq 21</math> in<sup>2</sup>.</p> <p>v) The minimum elevation of the bottom inside surface of the outlet of these valves is greater than plant elevation 110 feet.</p> <p>vi) The discharge of the ADS stage 4 valves is directed into the steam generator compartments.</p> <p>vii) The flow area through the holes in each ADS sparger is <math>\geq 274</math> in<sup>2</sup>.</p> <p>viii) The centerline of the connection of the sparger arms to the sparger hub is <math>\leq 11.5</math> feet below the IRWST overflow level.</p>
8.f) The RCS provides emergency letdown during design basis events.	Inspections of the reactor vessel head vent valves and inlet and outlet piping will be conducted.	A report exists and concludes that the capacity of the reactor vessel head vent is sufficient to pass not less than 8.2 lbm/sec at 1250 psia in the RCS.

<b>Table 2.1.2-4 (cont.) Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria</b>		
<b>Design Commitment</b>	<b>Inspections, Tests, Analyses</b>	<b>Acceptance Criteria</b>
9.a) The RCS provides circulation of coolant to remove heat from the core.	Testing and analysis to measure RCS flow with four reactor coolant pumps operating at no-load RCS pressure and temperature conditions will be performed. Analyses to convert the measured pre-fuel load flow will be performed. This analysis accounts for flow measurement uncertainties.	The calculated post-fuel load RCS flow rate is $\geq 193,200$ gpm.
9.b) The RCS provides the means to control system pressure.	<p>i) Inspections will be performed to verify the rated capacity of pressurizer heater backup groups A and B.</p> <p>ii) Tests will be performed to verify that the pressurizer spray valves can open and close when operated from the MCR.</p>	<p>i) Pressurizer heater backup groups A and B each has a rated capacity of at least 166 kW.</p> <p>ii) Controls in the MCR operate to cause the pressurizer spray valves to open and close.</p>
9.c) The pressurizer heaters trip after a signal is generated by the PMS.	Testing will be performed to confirm trip of the pressurizer heaters identified in Table 2.1.2-3.	The pressurizer heaters identified in Table 2.1.2-3 trip after a signal is generated by the PMS.
10. Safety-related displays identified in Table 2.1.2-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.	Inspection will be performed for retrievability of the safety-related displays in the MCR.	Safety-related displays identified in Table 2.1.2-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.
11.a) Controls exist in the MCR to cause the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 to perform active functions.	<p>i) Testing will be performed on the squib valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 using controls in the MCR without stroking the valve.</p> <p>ii) Stroke testing will be performed on the other remotely operated valves listed in Table 2.1.2-1 using controls in the MCR.</p>	<p>i) Controls in the MCR operate to cause a signal at the squib valve electrical leads which is capable of actuating the squib valve.</p> <p>ii) Controls in the MCR operate to cause the remotely operated valves (other than squib valves) to perform active functions.</p>

<p align="center"><b>Table 2.1.2-4 (cont.) Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria</b></p>		
<b>Design Commitment</b>	<b>Inspections, Tests, Analyses</b>	<b>Acceptance Criteria</b>
<p>11.b) The valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as having PMS control perform an active safety function after receiving a signal from the PMS.</p>	<p>i) Testing will be performed on the squib valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 using real or simulated signals into the PMS without stroking the valve.</p> <p>ii) Testing will be performed on the other remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 using real or simulated signals into the PMS.</p> <p>iii) Testing will be performed to demonstrate that remotely operated RCS isolation valves RCS-V001A/B, V002A/B, V003A/B open within the required response times.</p>	<p>i) The squib valves receive a signal at the valve electrical leads that is capable of actuating the squib valve.</p> <p>ii) The other remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as having PMS control perform the active function identified in the table after receiving a signal from PMS.</p> <p>iii) These valves open within the following times after receipt of an actuation signal:</p> <p>V001A/B                    ≤ 30 sec  V002A/B, V003A/B        ≤ 80 sec  V011A/B                    ≤ 20 sec  V012A/B, V013A/B        ≤ 30 sec</p>
<p>11.c) The valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as having DAS control perform an active safety function after receiving a signal from DAS.</p>	<p>i) Testing will be performed on the squib valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 using real or simulated signals into the DAS without stroking the valve.</p> <p>ii) Testing will be performed on the other remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 using real or simulated signals into the DAS.</p>	<p>i) The squib valves receive a signal at the valve electrical leads that is capable of actuating the squib valve.</p> <p>ii) The other remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as having DAS control perform the active function identified in the table after receiving a signal from DAS.</p>

Table 2.1.2-4 (cont.) Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria		
Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
<p>12.a) The automatic depressurization valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.</p>	<p>i) Tests or type tests of motor-operated valves will be performed that demonstrate the capability of the valve to operate under its design conditions.</p> <p>ii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-installed motor-operated valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.</p> <p>iii) Tests of the as-installed motor-operated valves will be performed under pre-operational flow, differential pressure and temperature conditions.</p> <p>iv) Tests or type tests of squib valves will be performed that demonstrate the capability of the valve to operate under its design conditions.</p> <p>v) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-installed squib valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.</p> <p>vi) See item 8.e.i in this table.</p> <p>vii) See item 8.e.ii in this table.</p>	<p>I) A test report exists and concludes that each motor-operated valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.1.2-1 under design conditions.</p> <p>ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-installed motor-operated valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.</p> <p>iii) Each motor-operated valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.1.2-1 under pre-operational test conditions.</p> <p>iv) A test report exists and concludes that each squib valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.1.2-1 under design conditions.</p> <p>v) A report exists and concludes that the as-installed squib valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.</p> <p>vi) See item 8.e.i in this table. The ADS stage 1-3 valve flow resistances are verified to be consistent with the ADS stage 1-3 path flow resistances.</p> <p>vii) See item 8.e.ii in this table. The ADS stage 4 valve flow resistances are verified to be consistent with the ADS stage 4 path flow resistances.</p>

<b>Table 2.1.2-4 (cont.) Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria</b>		
<b>Design Commitment</b>	<b>Inspections, Tests, Analyses</b>	<b>Acceptance Criteria</b>
	viii) See item 8.e.iii in this table.  ix) See item 8.e.iv in this table.	viii) See item 8.e.iii in this table.  ix) See item 8.e.iv in this table.
12.b) After loss of motive power, the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 assume the indicated loss of motive power position.	Testing of the installed valves will be performed under the conditions of loss of motive power.	Upon loss of motive power, each remotely operated valve identified in Table 2.1.2-1 assumes the indicated loss of motive power position.
13.a) Controls exist in the MCR to trip the RCPs.	Testing will be performed on the RCPs using controls in the MCR.	Controls in the MCR operate to trip the RCPs.
13.b) The RCPs trip after receiving a signal from the PMS.	Testing will be performed using real or simulated signals into the PMS.	The RCPs trip after receiving a signal from the PMS.
13.c) The RCPs trip after receiving a signal from the DAS.	Testing will be performed using real or simulated signals into the DAS.	The RCPs trip after receiving a signal from the DAS.
14. Controls exist in the MCR to cause the components identified in Table 2.1.2-3 to perform the listed function.	Testing will be performed on the components in Table 2.1.2-3 using controls in the MCR.	Controls in the MCR operate to cause the components listed in Table 2.1.2-3 to perform the listed functions.
15. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.1.2-3 can be retrieved in the MCR.	Inspection will be performed for retrievability of the RCS parameters in the MCR.	The displays identified in Table 2.1.2-3 can be retrieved in the MCR.



Table 2.1.2-5		
Component Name	Tag No.	Component Location
Steam Generator 1	RCS-MB-01	Containment
Steam Generator 2	RCS-MB-02	Containment
Reactor Coolant Pump 1A	RCS-MP-01A	Containment
Reactor Coolant Pump 1B	RCS-MP-01B	Containment
Reactor Coolant Pump 2A	RCS-MP-02A	Containment
Reactor Coolant Pump 2B	RCS-MP-02B	Containment
Pressurizer	RCS-MV-02	Containment
ADS Sparger A	PXS-MW-01A	Containment
ADS Sparger B	PXS-MW-01B	Containment




Figure 2.1.2-1 (Sheet 1 of 2)  
 Reactor Coolant System




Figure 2.1.2-1 (Sheet 2 of 2)  
Reactor Coolant System

### 2.1.3 Reactor System

#### Design Description

The reactor system (RXS) generates heat by a controlled nuclear reaction and transfers the heat generated to the reactor coolant, provides a barrier that prevents the release of fission products to the atmosphere and a means to insert negative reactivity into the reactor core and to shutdown the reactor core.

The reactor core contains a matrix of fuel rods assembled into fuel assemblies using structural elements. Rod cluster control assemblies (RCCAs) are positioned and held within the fuel assemblies by control rod drive mechanisms (CRDMs). The CRDMs unlatch upon termination of electrical power to the CRDM thereby releasing the RCCAs. The fuel assemblies and RCCAs are designed in accordance with the principal design requirements.

The RXS is operated during normal modes of plant operation, including startup, power operation, cooldown, shutdown and refueling.

The component locations of the RXS are as shown in Table 2.1.3-3.

1. The functional arrangement of the RXS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.1.3.
2.
  - a) The reactor upper internals rod guide arrangement is as shown in Figure 2.1.3-1.
  - b) The rod cluster control and drive rod arrangement is as shown in Figure 2.1.3-2.
  - c) The reactor vessel arrangement is as shown in Figure 2.1.3-3.
3. The components identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.
4. Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.
5. The pressure boundary components (reactor vessel [RV], control rod drive mechanisms [CRDMs], incore instrument guide tubes) identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.
6. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.3-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.
7. The reactor internals will withstand the effects of flow induced vibration.
8. The reactor vessel direct injection nozzle limits the blowdown of the reactor coolant system (RCS) following the break of a direct vessel injection line.

9. a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.
  - b) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.1.3-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E division.
  - c) Separation is provided between RXS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.
10. The reactor lower internals assembly is equipped with holders for at least eight capsules for storing material surveillance specimens.
  11. The reactor pressure vessel (RPV) beltline material has a Charpy upper-shelf energy of no less than 75 ft-lb.
  12. Safety-related displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.1.3-1 can be retrieved in the main control room (MCR).
  13. The fuel assemblies and rod control cluster assemblies intended for initial core load and listed in Table 2.1.3-1 have been designed and constructed in accordance with the principal design requirements.

**Inspections, Tests, Analysis, and Acceptance Criteria**

Table 2.1.3-2 specifies the inspections, tests, analysis, and associated acceptance criteria for the RXS.

Table 2.1.3-1

Equipment Name	Tag No.	ASME Code Section III Classification	Seismic Cat. I	Class 1E/Qual. for Harsh Envir.	Safety-Related Display
RV	RXS-MV-01	Yes	Yes	-	-
Reactor Upper Internals Assembly	RX-MI-01	Yes	Yes	-	-
Reactor Lower Internals Assembly	RXS-MI-02	Yes	Yes	-	-
Fuel Assemblies (145 locations)	RXS-FA-A04/A05/A06/A07/A08/A09/A10/B03/B04/B05/B06/B07/B08/B09/B10/B11/C02/C03/C04/C05/C06/C07/C08/C09/C10/C11/C12/D01/D02/D03/D04/D05/D06/D07/D08/D09/D10/D11/D12/D13/E01/E02/E03/E04/E05/E06/E07/E08/E09/E10/E11/E12/E13/F01/F02/F03/F04/F05/F06/F07/F08/F09/F10/F11/F12/F13/G01/G02/G03/G04/G05/G06/G07/G08/G09/G10/G11/G12/G13/H01/H02/H03/H04/H05/H06/H07/H08/H09/H10/H11/H12/H13/J01/J02/J03/J04/J05/J06/J07/J08/J09/J10/J11/J12/J13/K01/K02/K03/K04/K05/K06/K07/K08/K09/K10/K11/K12/K13/L02/L03/L04/L05/L06/L07/L08/L09/L10/L11/L12/M03/M04/M05/M06/M07/M08/M09/M10/M11/N04/N05/N06/N07/N08/N09/N10	No <sup>(1)</sup>	Yes	-	-

Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.  
 1. Manufacturer standard, but uses ASME Section III guidelines

Table 2.1.3-1 (cont.)

Equipment Name	Tag No.	ASME Code Section III Classification	Seismic Cat. I	Class IE/Qual. for Harsh Envir.	Safety-Related Display
Rod Cluster Control Assemblies (RCCAs) (minimum 45 locations)	RXS-FR- B04/B06/B08/B10/C05/C07/ C09/D02/D04/D06/D08/D10/ D12/E03/E11/F02/F04/F06/ F08/F12/G03/G07/G11/H02/ H04/H06/H08/H10/H12/J03/ J11/K02/K04/K06/K08/K10/ K12/L05/L07/M04/M06/M08/ M10	No <sup>(1)</sup>	Yes	-	-
Control Rod Drive Mechanisms (CRDMs) (61 Locations)	RXS-MV- 11A07/11B04/11B06/ 11B08/11B10/11C03/ 11C05/11C07/11C09/ 11C11/11D02/11D04/ 11D06/11D08/11D10/ 11D12/11E03/11E05/ 11E07/11E09/11E11/ 11F02/11F04/11F06/ 11F08/11F10/11F12/ 11G01/11G03/11G05/ 11G07/11G09/11G11/ 11G13/11H02/11H04/ 11H06/11H08/11H10/ 11H12/11J03/11J05/ 11J07/11J09/11J11/ 11K02/11K04/11K06/ 11K08/11K10/11K12/ 11L03/11L05/11L07/ 11L09/11L11/11M04/ 11M06/11M08/11M10/ 11N07	Yes	Yes	No/No	No

Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.  
 1. Manufacture standard, but uses ASME Section III guidelines

**Table 2.1.3-1 (cont.)**

Equipment Name	Tag No.	ASME Code Section III Classification	Seismic Cat. I	Class IE/Qual. for Harsh Envir.	Safety-Related Display
Incore Instrument Guide Tubes (38 Core Locations)	IIS-JT-G01 through G38	Yes	-	-	-
Source Range Detectors (4)	RXS-JE-NE001A/NE001B/NE001C/NE001D	-	Yes	Yes/Yes	No
Intermediate Range Detectors (4)	RXS-JE-NE002A/NE002B/NE002C/NE002D	-	Yes	Yes/Yes	Yes
Power Range Detectors - Lower (4)	RXS-JE-NE003A/NE003B/NE003C/NE003D	-	Yes	Yes/Yes	No
Power Range Detectors - Upper (4)	RXS-JE-NE004A/NE004B/NE004C/NE004D	-	Yes	Yes/Yes	No

Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.



<b>Table 2.1.3-2 Inspections, Tests, Analysis, and Acceptance Criteria</b>		
<b>Design Commitment</b>	<b>Inspections, Tests, Analysis</b>	<b>Acceptance Criteria</b>
1. The functional arrangement of the RXS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.1.3.	Inspection of the as-built system will be performed.	The as-built RXS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.1.3.
2.a) The reactor upper internals rod guide arrangement is as shown in Figure 2.3.1-1.	Inspection of the as-built system will be performed.	The as-built RXS will accommodate the fuel assembly and control rod drive mechanism pattern shown in Figure 2.3.1-1.
2.b) The rod cluster control and drive rod arrangement is as shown in Figure 2.1.3-2.	Inspection of the as-built system will be performed.	The as-built RXS will accommodate the rod cluster control and drive rod arrangement shown in Figure 2.1.3-2.
2.c) The reactor vessel arrangement is as shown in Figure 2.1.3-3.	Inspection of the as-built system will be performed.	The as-built RXS will accommodate the reactor vessel arrangement shown in Figure 2.1.3-3.
3. The components identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection will be conducted of the as-built components as documented in the ASME design reports.	The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built components identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as ASME Code Section III.
4. Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.	A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.
5. The pressure boundary components (RV, CRDMs, incore instrument guide tubes) retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.	A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components of the RXS required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.	A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the pressure boundary components (RV, CRDM's, incore instrument guide tubes) conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

<b>Table 2.1.3-2 (cont.) Inspections, Tests, Analysis, and Acceptance Criteria</b>		
<b>Design Commitment</b>	<b>Inspections, Tests, Analysis</b>	<b>Acceptance Criteria</b>
6. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.3-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.	<p>i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.3-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.</p> <p>ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.</p> <p>iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-installed equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.</p>	<p>i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.3-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.</p> <p>ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.</p> <p>iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-installed equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.</p>
7. The reactor internals will withstand the effects of flow induced vibration.	<p>i) A vibration type test will be conducted on the AP600 prototype reactor internals.</p> <p>ii) A pre-test inspection, a flow test and a post-test inspection will be conducted on the as-built reactor internals.</p>	<p>i) A report exists and concludes that the prototype reactor internals have no observable damage or loose parts as a result of the vibration type test.</p> <p>ii) The as-built reactor internals have no observable damage or loose parts.</p>
8. The reactor vessel direct vessel injection nozzle limits the blowdown of the RCS following the break of a direct vessel injection line.	An inspection will be conducted to verify the flow area of the flow limiting venturi within each direct vessel injection nozzle.	The throat area of the direct vessel injection line nozzle flow limiting venturi is less than or equal to 12.57 in <sup>2</sup> .


<b>Table 2.1.3-2 (cont.) Inspections, Tests, Analysis, and Acceptance Criteria</b>		
<b>Design Commitment</b>	<b>Inspections, Tests, Analysis</b>	<b>Acceptance Criteria</b>
9.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	Type tests, analysis, or a combination of type tests and analysis will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.	A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.
9.b) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.1.3-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E division.	Testing will be performed by providing simulated test signals in each Class 1E division.	A simulated test signal exists for Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.3-1 when the assigned Class 1E division is provided the test signal.
9.c) Separation is provided between RXS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.	See Tier 1 Material, Section 3.3, Nuclear Island Buildings.	See Tier 1 Material, Section 3.3, Nuclear Island Buildings.
10. The reactor lower internals assembly is equipped with holders for at least eight capsules for storing material surveillance specimens.	Inspection of the reactor lower internals assembly for the presence of capsules will be performed.	At least eight capsules are in the reactor lower internals assembly.
11. The RPV beltline material has a Charpy upper-shelf energy of no less than 75 ft-lb.	Testing of the Charpy V-Notch specimen of the RPV beltline material will be performed.	A report exists and concludes that the initial RPV beltline Charpy upper-shelf energy is no less than 75 ft-lb.
12. Safety-related displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.1.3-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.	Inspection will be performed for retrievability of the safety-related displays in the MCR.	Safety-related displays identified in Table 2.1.3-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

<b>Table 2.1.3-2 (cont.) Inspections, Tests, Analysis, and Acceptance Criteria</b>		
<b>Design Commitment</b>	<b>Inspections, Tests, Analysis</b>	<b>Acceptance Criteria</b>
13. The fuel assemblies and rod control cluster assemblies intended for initial core load and listed in Table 2.1.3-1 have been designed and constructed in accordance with the principal design requirements.	An analysis is performed of the reactor core design.	A report exists and concludes that the fuel assemblies and rod cluster control rod assemblies intended for the initial core load and listed in Table 2.1.3-1 have been designed and constructed in accordance with the principal design requirements.

Table 2.1.3-3		
Component Name	Tag No.	Component Location
RV	RXS-MV-01	Containment
Reactor Upper Internals Assembly	RX-MI-01	Containment
Reactor Lower Internals Assembly	RXS-MI-02	Containment
Fuel Assemblies (145 locations)	RXS-FA- A04/A05/A06/A07/A08/A09/ A10/B03/B04/B05/B06/B07/ B08/B09/B10/B11/C02/C03/ C04/C05/C06/C07/C08/C09/ C10/C11/C12/D01/D02/D03/ D04/D05/D06/D07/D08/D09/ D10/D11/D12/D13/E01/E02/ E03/E04/E05/E06/E07/E08/ E09/E10/E11/E12/E13/F01/ F02/F03/F04/F05/F06/F07/F08/ F09/F10/F11/F12/F13/G01/ G02/G03/G04/G05/G06/G07/ G08/G09/G10/G11/G12/G13/ H01/H02/H03/H04/H05/H06/ H07/H08/H09/H10/H11/H12/ H13/J01/J02/J03/J04/J05/J06/ J07/J08/J09/J10/J11/J12/J13/ K01/K02/K03/K04/K05/K06/ K07/K08/K09/K10/K11/K12/ K13/L02/L03/L04/L05/L06/ L07/L08/L09/L10/L11/L12/ M03/M04/M05/M06/M07/ M08/M09/M10/M11/N04/N05/ N06/N07/N08/N09/N10	Containment
Rod Cluster Control Assemblies (RCCAs) (minimum 45 locations)	RXS-FR- B04/B06/B08/B10/C05/ C07/C09/D02/D04/D06/D08/ D10/D12/E03/E11/F02/F04/ F06/F08/F12/G03/G07/G11/ H02/H04/H06/H08/H10/H12/ J03/J11/K02/K04/K06/K08/ K10/K12/L05/L07/M04/M06/ M08/M10	Containment

Table 2.1.3-3		
Component Name	Tag No.	Component Location
Control Rod Drive Mechanisms (CRDMs) (61 Locations)	RXS-MV- 11A07/11B04/11B06/11B08/ 11B10/11C03/11C05/11C07/ 11C09/11C11/11D02/11D04/ 11D06/11D08/11D10/11D12/ 11E03/11E05/11E07/11E09/ 11E11/11F02/11F04/11F06/ 11F08/11F10/11F12/11G01/ 11G03/11G05/11G07/11G09/ 11G11/11G13/11H02/11H04/ 11H06/11H08/11H10/11H12/ 11J03/11J05/11J07/11J09/ 11J11/11K02/11K04/11K06/ 11K08/11K10/11K12/11L03/ 11L05/11L07/11L09/11L11/ 11M04/11M06/11M08/11M10/ 11N07	Containment
Incore Instrument Guide Tubes (38 Core Locations)	IIS-JT- G01 through G38	Containment
Source Range Detectors (4)	RXS-JE-NE001A/NE001B/ NE001C/NE001D	Containment
Intermediate Range Detectors (4)	RXS-JE-NE002A/NE002B/ NE002C/NE002D	Containment
Power Range Detectors Lower (4)	RXS-JE-NE003A/NE003B/ NE003C/NE003D	Containment
Power Range Detectors - Upper (4)	RXS-JE-NE004A/NE004B/ NE004C/NE004D	Containment

<p align="center"><b>Table 2.1.3-4</b>  <b>Key Dimensions and Acceptable Variations of the Reactor Vessel and Internals</b>  <b>(Figure 2.1.3.2 and Figure 2.1.3-3)</b></p>			
Description	Dimension or Elevation (inches)	Nominal Value (inches)	Acceptable Variation (inches)
RV inside diameter at beltline (inside cladding)	A	157.0	+1.0/-1.0
RV wall thickness at beltline (without cladding)	B	8.0	+1.0/-0.12
RV wall thickness at bottom head (without cladding)	C	6.0	+1.0/-0.12
RV inlet nozzle inside diameter at safe end	D	22.0	+0.35/-0.10
RV outlet nozzle inside diameter at safe end	E	31.0	+0.35/-0.10
Elevation from RV mating surface to centerline of inlet nozzle	F	62.5	+0.25/-0.25
Elevation from RV mating surface to centerline of outlet nozzle	G	80.0	+0.25/-0.25
Elevation from RV mating surface to centerline of direct vessel injection nozzle	H	100.0	+0.25/-0.25
Elevation from RV mating surface to inside of RV bottom head (inside cladding)	I	378.1	+1.0/-0.50
Elevation from RV mating surface to top of lower core support plate	J	308.8	+0.50/-0.50
Separation distance between bottom of upper core plate and top of lower core support with RV head in place	K	171.3	+0.20/0.20



**Figure 2.1.3-1**  
**Reactor Upper Internals Rod Guide Arrangement**






Figure 2.1.3-2  
Rod Cluster Control and Drive Rod Arrangement




Figure 2.1.3-3  
Reactor Vessel Arrangement