Mr. J. A. Scalice
Chief Nuclear Officer and
Executive Vice President
Tennessee Valley Authority
6A Lookout Place
1101 Market Street
Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801

February 22, 2000

Template # NRR-058

SUBJECT: SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS REGARDING RELOCATION OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES (TAC NOS. MA5166 AND MA5167) (TS 99-01)

Dear Mr. Scalice:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 250 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-77 and Amendment No. 241 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-79 for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, respectively. These amendments, which are in response to your application dated March 19, 1999, relocate Technical Specification Section 3/4.8.3, "Electrical Equipment Protective Devices," and the associated bases to the Technical Requirements Manual.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,
/RA/
Ronald W. Hernan, Senior Project Manager, Section 2
Project Directorate II
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 250 to License No. DPR-77
2. Amendment No. 241 to License No. DPR-79
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures: See next page

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

February 22, 2000

Mr. J. A. Scalice
Chief Nuclear Officer and
Executive Vice President
Tennessee Valley Authority
6A Lookout Place
1101 Market Street
Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801

SUBJECT: SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS REGARDING RELOCATION OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES (TAC NOS. MA5166 AND MA5167) (TS 99-01)

Dear Mr. Scalice:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 250 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-77 and Amendment No. 241 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-79 for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, respectively. These amendments, which are in response to your application dated March 19, 1999, relocate Technical Specification Section 3/4.8.3, "Electrical Equipment Protective Devices," and the associated bases to the Technical Requirements Manual.

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Sincerely,

Ronald W. Hernan

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Project Directorate II
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Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328

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1. Amendment No. 250 to License No. DPR-77
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cc w/enclosures: See next page

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

DOCKET NO. 50-327

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 250
License No. DPR-77

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated March 19, 1999, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended to approve the relocation of certain Technical Specification requirements to licensee-controlled documents, as described in the licensee's application dated March 19, 1999, and reviewed in the staff's safety evaluation report dated February 22, 2000. The license is also amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-77 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   (2) Technical Specifications

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 250 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance, and is to be implemented within 90 days. Implementation shall include the relocation of the Technical Specification requirements and the associated bases to the appropriate licensee-controlled document as identified in the Licensee's application dated March 19, 1999, and reviewed in the staff's safety evaluation report dated February 22, 2000.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Richard P. Correia, Chief, Section 2
Project Directorate II
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: February 22, 2000

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 250

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-77

DOCKET NO. 50-327

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

REMOVE	INSERT
Index IX	Index IX
Index X	Index X
3/4 8-15	3/4 8-15
3/4 8-16	- - -
3/4 8-17	3/4 8-17
3/4 8-20	3/4 8-20
B 3/4 8-2	B 3/4 8-2
B 3/4 8-3	B 3/4 8-3

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

3/4.8.3 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

This specification is deleted.

(Pages 3/4 8-15 through 3/4 8-16 are deleted)

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

MOTOR OPERATED VALVES THERMAL OVERLOAD PROTECTION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

This specification is deleted.

(Page 3/4 8-17 is deleted)

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

ISOLATION DEVICES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

This specification is deleted.

(Page 3/4 8-20 is deleted)

A.C. SOURCES AND ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS (Continued)

Verifying average electrolyte temperature above the minimum for which the battery was sized, total battery terminal voltage onfloat charge, connection resistance values and the performance of battery service and discharge tests ensures the effectiveness of the charging system, the ability to handle high discharge rates and compares the battery capacity at that time with the rated capacity.

Table 4.8-2 specifies the normal limits for each designated pilot cell and each connected cell for electrolyte level, float voltage and specific gravity. The limits for the designated pilot cells float voltage and specific gravity, greater than 2.13 volts and .015 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity or a battery charger current that had stabilized at a low value, is characteristic of a charged cell with adequate capacity. The normal limits for each connected cell for float voltage and specific gravity, greater than 2.13 volts and not more than .020 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity with an average specific gravity of all the connected cells not more than .010 below the manufacture's full charge specific gravity, ensures the OPERABILITY and capability of the battery. R16

Operation with a battery cell's parameter outside the normal limit but within the allowable value specified in Table 4.8-2 is permitted for up to 7 days. During this 7 day period: (1) the allowable values for electrolyte level ensures no physical damage to the plates with an adequate electron transfer capability; (2) the allowable value for the average specific gravity of all the cells, not more than .020 below the manufacturer's recommended full charge specific gravity, ensures that the decrease in rating will be less than the safety margin provided in sizing; (3) the allowable value for an individual cell's specific gravity, ensures that an individual cell's specific gravity will not be more than .040 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity and that the overall capability of the battery will be maintained within an acceptable limit; and (4) the allowable value for an individual cell's float voltage, greater than 2.07 volts, ensures the battery's capability to perform its design function.

3/4.8.3 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

This specification is deleted.

(Page B 3/4 8-3 is deleted)

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

DOCKET NO. 50-328

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 241
License No. DPR-79

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated March 19, 1999, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended to approve the relocation of certain Technical Specification requirements to licensee-controlled documents, as described in the licensee's application dated March 19, 1999, and reviewed in the staff's safety evaluation report dated February 22 , 2000. The license is also amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-79 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   (2) Technical Specifications

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 241 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance, and is to be implemented within 90 days. Implementation shall include the relocation of the Technical Specification requirements and the associated bases to the appropriate licensee-controlled document as identified in the Licensee's application dated March 19, 1999, and reviewed in the staff's safety evaluation report dated February 22, 2000.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Richard P. Correia, Chief, Section 2
Project Directorate II
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: February 22, 2000

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 241

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-79

DOCKET NO. 50-328

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

REMOVE	INSERT
Index X	Index X
3/4 8-16	3/4 8-16
3/4 8-17	- - -
3/4 8-18	3/4 8-18
3/4 8-21	3/4 8-21
B 3/4 8-2	B 3/4 8-2
B 3/4 8-3	B 3/4 8-3

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

3/4.8.3 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

This specification is deleted.

(Pages 3/4 8-16 through 3/4 8-17 are deleted)

MOTOR OPERATED VALVES THERMAL OVERLOAD PROTECTION

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

This specification is deleted.

(Page 3/4 8-18 is deleted)

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

ISOLATION DEVICES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

This specification is deleted.

(Page 3/4 8-21 is deleted)

A.C. SOURCES AND ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS (Continued)

Verifying average electrolyte temperature above the minimum for which the battery was sized, total battery terminal voltage onfloat charge, connection resistance values and the performance of battery service and discharge tests ensures the effectiveness of the charging system, the ability to handle high discharge rates and compares the battery capacity at that time with the rated capacity.

Table 4.8-2 specifies the normal limits for each designated pilot cell and each connected cell for electrolyte level, float voltage and specific gravity. The limits for the designated pilot cells float voltage and specific gravity, greater than 2.13 volts and .015 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity or a battery charger current that had stabilized at a low value, is characteristic of a charged cell with adequate capacity. The normal limits for each connected cell for float voltage and specific gravity, greater than 2.13 volts and not more tha .020 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity with an average specific gravity of all the connected cells not more than .010 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity, ensures the OPERABILITY and capability of the battery.

Operation with a battery cell's parameter outside the normal limit but within the allowable value specified in Table 4.8-2 is permitted for up to 7 days. During this 7 day period: (1) the allowable values for electrolyte level ensures no physical damage to the plates with an adequate electron transfer capability; (2) the allowable value for the average specific gravity of all the cells, not more than .020 below the manufacturer's recommended full charge specific gravity, ensures that the decrease in rating will be less than the safety margin provided in sizing; (3) the allowable value for an individual cell's specific gravity, ensures that an individual cell's specific gravity will not be more than .040 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity and that the overall capability of the battery will be maintained within an acceptable limit; and (4) the allowable value for an individual cell's float voltage, greater than 2.07 volts, ensures the battery's capability to perform its design function.

3/4.8.3 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

This specification is deleted.

(Page B 3/4 8-3 is deleted)

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 250 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-77

AND AMENDMENT NO. 241 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-79

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated March 19, 1999, the Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) proposed an amendment to the Technical Specifications (TS) for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) Units 1 and 2. The requested changes would relocate all three sections of TS Section 3/4.8.3, "Electrical Equipment Protective Devices," and the associated bases to the Technical Requirements Manual.

2.0 BACKGROUND

Section 182a of the Atomic Energy Act (the Act) requires applicants for nuclear power plant operating licenses to include TS as part of the license. In Section 50.36 of Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR 50.36), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established the regulatory requirements related to the content of the TS. That regulation requires that the TS include items in five specific categories, including (1) safety limits, limiting safety system settings, and limiting control settings; (2) limiting conditions for operation; (3) surveillance requirements; (4) design features; and (5) administrative controls. However, the regulation does not specify the particular requirements to be included in the TS.

The NRC developed criteria, as described in the "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors" (58 FR 39132), to determine which of the design conditions and associated surveillances should be located in the TS as limiting conditions for operation. Four criteria were subsequently incorporated into the regulations by an amendment to 10 CFR 50.36 (60 FR 36953):

1. installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary;

2. a process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a design basis accident or transient analysis that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier;

3. a structure, system, or component that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a design basis accident or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier;

4. a structure, system, or component which operating experience or probabilistic safety assessment has shown to be significant to public health and safety.

The Commission's Final Policy Statement and documentation related to the revision of 10 CFR 50.36 acknowledged that implementation of these criteria may cause some requirements presently in TS to be moved to documents and programs controlled by licensees. The staff has determined that license amendment requests to relocate TS should state which licensee-controlled document, such as the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR), will receive the relocated specifications. In the amendment request, the licensee should describe the program it will use to control changes to relocated provisions (for example, 10 CFR 50.59). Control of the relocated provisions in accordance with the applicable regulation will ensure that NRC review and approval will be requested for changes exceeding the stated regulatory threshold (for example, an unreviewed safety question).

3.0 EVALUATION

The licensee has proposed the relocation of three TS sections to the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM), a licensee-controlled document incorporated by reference into the USAR, changes to which are governed by the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59. The applicability of the four TS criteria in 10 CFR 50.36 is evaluated for each of the three TS sections.

3.1 TS 3/4.8.3.1, "Electrical Equipment Protective Devices - Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices"

10 CFR 50.36, Criterion 1 — installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.

Criterion 1 does not apply to this TS because containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices are not instrumentation.

10 CFR 50.36, Criterion 2 — a process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a design basis accident or transient analysis that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.

The protective devices are not initial conditions of a design basis accident or transient analysis. Therefore, Criterion 2 does not apply.

10 CFR 50.36, Criterion 3 — a structure, system, or component that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a design basis accident or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.

The protective devices are not part of a primary success path. They only serve a protective function. Therefore, Criterion 3 does not apply.

10 CFR 50.36, Criterion 4 — a structure, system, or component which operating experience or probabilistic safety assessment has shown to be significant to public health and safety.

Operating experience and risk analysis have demonstrated that the protective devices are not significant to public health and safety. They only serve a protective function for other plant systems. Therefore, Criterion 4 does not apply.

Since none of the 10 CFR 50.36 criteria are applicable, and since these TS requirements will be relocated to a licensee-controlled document (the TRM) where changes are governed by the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59, this proposed relocation is consistent with NRC regulations and the current staff position on TS relocations. Therefore, this proposed change is acceptable.

3.2 TS 3/4.8.3.2, "Electrical Equipment Protective Devices - Motor Operated Valves [MOVs] Thermal Overload Protection"

10 CFR 50.36, Criterion 1 — installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.

Criterion 1 does not apply to this TS because MOV thermal overload protection devices are not instrumentation. They only provide protection.

10 CFR 50.36, Criterion 2 — a process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a design basis accident or transient analysis that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.

The MOV thermal overload protection devices only provide protection. They are not an initial condition of a design basis accident or transient analysis. Therefore, Criterion 2 does not apply.

10 CFR 50.36, Criterion 3 — a structure, system, or component that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a design basis accident or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.

Criterion 3 does not apply because the MOV thermal overload protection devices are not part of the primary success path regarding mitigation of a design basis accident or transient. These devices only provide protection.

10 CFR 50.36, Criterion 4 — a structure, system, or component which operating experience or probabilistic safety assessment has shown to be significant to public health and safety.

Operating experience and risk analysis have demonstrated that the MOV thermal overload protective devices are not significant to public health and safety. They only serve a protective function for other plant systems. Therefore, Criterion 4 does not apply.

Since none of the 10 CFR 50.36 criteria are applicable, and since these TS requirements will be relocated to a licensee-controlled document (the TRM) where changes are governed by the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59, this proposed relocation is consistent with NRC regulations and the current staff position on TS relocations. Therefore, this proposed change is acceptable.

3.3 TS 3/4.8.3.3, "Electrical Equipment Protective Devices - Isolation Devices"

10 CFR 50.36, Criterion 1 — installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.

Criterion 1 does not apply to this TS because isolation devices are not instrumentation. They only provide protection.

10 CFR 50.36, Criterion 2 — a process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a design basis accident or transient analysis that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.

The isolation devices only provide protection. They are not an initial condition of a design basis accident or transient analysis. Therefore, Criterion 2 does not apply.

10 CFR 50.36, Criterion 3 — a structure, system, or component that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a design basis accident or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.

The isolation devices are not part of a primary success path. They only serve a protective function. Therefore, Criterion 3 does not apply.

10 CFR 50.36, Criterion 4 — a structure, system, or component which operating experience or probabilistic safety assessment has shown to be significant to public health and safety.

Operating experience and risk analysis have demonstrated that the isolation devices are not significant to public health and safety. They only serve a protective function for other plant systems. Therefore, Criterion 4 does not apply.

Since none of the 10 CFR 50.36 criteria are applicable, and since these TS requirements will be relocated to a licensee-controlled document (the TRM) where changes are governed by the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59, this proposed relocation is consistent with NRC regulations and the current staff position on TS relocations. Therefore, this proposed change is acceptable.

3.4 Other Changes

The licensee proposed changes to the Table of Contents and to pages affected by the proposed relocations discussed in Sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 above. The staff has determined that these proposed changes are administrative in nature and consistent with the relocations. Therefore, they are acceptable.

The licensee also proposed to relocate the bases for these TS to the TRM. The staff has determined that these relocations are consistent with the changes and relocations addressed above. Therefore, they are acceptable.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Tennessee State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (64 FR 19566). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: A. Hansen, NRR

Dated: February 22, 2000

Mr. J. A. Scalice
Tennessee Valley Authority

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT

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