

February 24, 2000

Mr. James Scarola, Vice President
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
Carolina Power & Light Company
Post Office Box 165, Mail Code: Zone 1
New Hill, North Carolina 27562-0165

SUBJECT: SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 1 - ISSUANCE OF
AMENDMENT TO RELOCATE SEVERAL INSTRUMENTATION TECHNICAL
SPECIFICATIONS TO LICENSEE-CONTROLLED DOCUMENTS
(TAC NO. MA6098)

Dear Mr. Scarola:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued Amendment No. 96 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-63 for the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant (HNP), Unit No. 1, in response to your request dated July 9, 1999. This amendment revises the HNP Technical Specifications (TS) by relocating TS 3/4.3.3.3, "Seismic Instrumentation," TS 3/4.3.3.4, "Meteorological Instrumentation," TS 3/4.3.3.9, "Metal Impact Monitoring System," and TS 3/4.3.3.11, "Explosive Gas Monitoring Instrumentation," to plant procedure PLP-114, "Relocated Technical Specifications and Design Basis Requirements."

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's regular bi-weekly *Federal Register* notice.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Richard J. Laufer, Project Manager, Section 2
Project Directorate II
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-400

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 96 to NPF-63
2. Safety Evaluation

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

February 24, 2000

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Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
Carolina Power & Light Company
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A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's regular bi-weekly *Federal Register* notice.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Richard J. Laufer".

Richard J. Laufer, Project Manager, Section 2
Project Directorate II
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-400

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1. Amendment No. 96 to NPF-63
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, et al.

DOCKET NO. 50-400

SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 96
License No. NPF-63

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Carolina Power & Light Company, (the licensee), dated July 9, 1999, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended to approve the relocation of certain Technical Specification requirements to licensee-controlled documents, as described in the licensee's application dated July 9, 1999, and reviewed in the staff's safety evaluation report dated _____, 2000. This license is also hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-63 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, as revised through Amendment No. 96 , are hereby incorporated into this license. Carolina Power & Light Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and shall be implemented within 150 days of issuance. Implementation shall include the relocation of Technical Specification requirements to the appropriate licensee-controlled document as identified in the Licensee's application dated July 9, 1999, and reviewed in the staff's safety evaluation report dated February 24 , 2000. In addition, implementation shall include the incorporation by reference of Plant Procedure PLP-114, "Relocated Technical Specifications and Design Basis Requirements," into the plant Final Safety Analysis Report.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Richard P. Correia, Chief, Section 2
Project Directorate II
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: February 24, 2000

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 96

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-63

DOCKET NO. 50-400

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Pages

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3/4 3-57
3/4 3-58
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3/4 3-60
3/4 3-61
3/4 3-62
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3/4 3-85
3/4 3-86
3/4 3-88
3/4 11-15
B3/4 3-4
B3/4 3-5
B3/4 3-6

Insert Pages

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3/4 3-58
3/4 3-59
3/4 3-60
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3/4 3-62
3/4 3-74
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(Deleted)	3/4 3-57
TABLE 3.3-7 (DELETED)	3/4 3-58
TABLE 4.3-4 (DELETED)	3/4 3-59
(Deleted)	3/4 3-60
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INSTRUMENTATION

SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.3.3 Deleted

TABLE 3.3-7 Deleted

TABLE 4.3-4 Deleted

INSTRUMENTATION

METEOROLOGICAL INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.3.4 Deleted

TABLE 3.3-8 Deleted

TABLE 4.3-5 Deleted

INSTRUMENTATION

METAL IMPACT MONITORING SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.3.9 Deleted

INSTRUMENTATION

EXPLOSIVE GAS MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.3.11 Deleted

TABLE 3.3-13 Deleted

Pages 3/4 3-84 and 3/4 3-85 have been deleted.

TABLE 4.3-9 Deleted

Pages 3/4 3-87 and 3/4 3-88 have been deleted.

RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS

EXPLOSIVE GAS MIXTURE

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.11.2.5 The concentration of oxygen in the GASEOUS RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM downstream of the hydrogen recombiners shall be limited to less than or equal to 2% by volume whenever the hydrogen concentration exceeds 4% by volume.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

- a. With the concentration of oxygen in the GASEOUS RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM downstream of the hydrogen recombiners greater than 2% by volume but less than or equal to 4% by volume, reduce the oxygen concentration to the above limits within 48 hours.
- b. With the concentration of oxygen in the GASEOUS RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM downstream of the hydrogen recombiners greater than 4% by volume and the hydrogen concentration greater than 4% by volume, immediately suspend all additions of waste gases to the system and reduce the concentration of oxygen to less than or equal to 4% by volume, then take ACTION a., above.
- c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.11.2.5 The concentrations of hydrogen and oxygen in the GASEOUS RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM shall be determined to be within the above limits by monitoring, at least once per 12 hours, the waste gases in the GASEOUS RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM.

INSTRUMENTATION

BASES

3/4.3.3.2 MOVABLE INCORE DETECTORS - DELETED

3/4.3.3.3 DELETED

3/4.3.3.4 DELETED

3/4.3.3.5 REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Remote Shutdown System ensures that sufficient capability is available to permit safe shutdown of the facility from locations outside of the control room. This capability is required in the event control room habitability is lost and is consistent with General Design Criterion 19 of 10 CFR Part 50.

The OPERABILITY of the Remote Shutdown System ensures that a fire will not preclude achieving safe shutdown. The Remote Shutdown System instrumentation, control, and power circuits and transfer switches necessary to eliminate effects of the fire and allow operation of instrumentation, control and power circuits required to achieve and maintain a safe shutdown condition are independent of areas where a fire could damage systems normally used to shut down the reactor.

INSTRUMENTATION

BASES

REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM (Continued)

This capability is consistent with General Design Criterion 3 and Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50.

3/4.3.3.6 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables following an accident. This capability is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 3, "Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident," May 1983 and NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements," November 1980.

3/4.3.3.7 DELETED

3/4.3.3.8 DELETED

3/4.3.3.9 DELETED

3/4.3.3.10 DELETED

INSTRUMENTATION

BASES

3/4.3.3.11 DELETED

3/4.3.4 DELETED



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 1

DOCKET NO. 50-400

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated July 9, 1999, Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L, the licensee) requested a revision to the Technical Specifications (TS) for the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant (HNP). The proposed amendment would relocate selected instrumentation TS to plant procedures in accordance with guidance provided in NRC Generic Letter (GL) 95-10, "Relocation of Selected Technical Specifications Requirements Related to Instrumentation." Specifically, TS 3/4.3.3.3, "Seismic Instrumentation," TS 3/4.3.3.4, "Meteorological Instrumentation," TS 3/4.3.3.9, "Metal Impact Monitoring System," and TS 3/4.3.3.11, "Explosive Gas Monitoring Instrumentation," would be relocated to plant procedure PLP-114, "Relocated Technical Specifications and Design Basis Requirements." In a telephone conference on February 14, 2000, the licensee committed to incorporate by reference PLP-114 into the plant Final Safety Analysis Report as part of implementation of this requested change.

2.0 BACKGROUND

Section 182a of the Atomic Energy Act (the Act) requires applicants for nuclear power plant operating licenses to include TS as part of the license. In Section 50.36 of Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR 50.36), the Commission established the regulatory requirements related to the content of the TS. That regulation requires that the TS include items in five specific categories, including (1) safety limits, limiting safety system settings, and limiting control settings; (2) limiting conditions for operation; (3) surveillance requirements; (4) design features; and (5) administrative controls. However, the regulation does not specify the particular requirements to be included in the TS.

The NRC developed criteria, as described in the "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors" (58 FR 39132), to determine which of the design conditions and associated surveillances should be located in the TS as limiting conditions for operation. Four criteria were subsequently incorporated into the regulations by an amendment to 10 CFR 50.36 (60 FR 36953):

1. installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary;
2. a process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a design basis accident or transient analysis that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier;

3. a structure, system, or component that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a design basis accident or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier;
4. a structure, system, or component which operating experience or probabilistic safety assessment has shown to be significant to public health and safety.

The Commission's Final Policy Statement and documentation related to the revision of 10 CFR 50.36 acknowledged that implementation of these criteria may cause some requirements presently in TS to be moved to documents and programs controlled by licensees. On reviewing typical TS for nuclear power reactors, the staff has determined that, in accordance with the 10 CFR 50.36 criteria, several specifications do not warrant inclusion in the TS. The staff has also concluded that the instrumentation addressed by these specifications are not related to dominant contributors to plant risk. The following TS are among the candidates for relocation to licensee-controlled documents:

- incore detectors (movable incore detectors, traversing incore probe)
- seismic monitoring instrumentation
- meteorological monitoring instrumentation
- chlorine detection system
- loose-part detection system
- explosive gas monitoring instrumentation
- turbine overspeed protection

The staff has determined that license amendment requests should contain a commitment to relocate each selected requirement to a particular licensee-controlled document or program, such as the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) or the emergency plan. The commitment should address the submittal of the revised documents to the NRC in accordance with the applicable regulation. In the amendment request, the licensee should clearly describe the program it will use to control changes to relocated provisions (for example, 10 CFR 50.59 or 50.54(q)). Control of the relocated provisions in accordance with the applicable regulation will ensure that NRC review and approval will be requested for changes exceeding the stated regulatory threshold (for example, an unreviewed safety question or a decrease in effectiveness).

3.0 EVALUATION

The licensee has requested to relocate the following TS:

- seismic instrumentation
- meteorological instrumentation
- metal impact monitoring (loose-part detection) system and
- explosive gas monitoring instrumentation.

All four of these systems were addressed in GL 95-10, and their relocation is evaluated below.

3.1 TS 3/4.3.3.3, "Seismic Instrumentation"

Section VI(a)(3) of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100 requires that seismic monitoring instrumentation be provided to promptly determine the response of those nuclear power plant features important to safety in the event of an earthquake. This capability is required to allow for a comparison of the measured response to that used in the design basis for the unit. Comparison of such data is needed to determine whether the plant can continue to be operated safely and to permit such timely action as may be appropriate. However, seismic instrumentation does not actuate any protective equipment or serve any direct role in the mitigation of an accident.

The capability of the plant to withstand a seismic event or other design basis accident is determined by the initial design and construction of systems, structures, and components. The instrumentation is used to alert operators to the seismic event and evaluate the plant response. The Final Policy Statement explained that instrumentation to detect precursors to reactor coolant pressure boundary leakage, such as seismic instrumentation, is not included in the first criterion. The seismic instrumentation does not serve as a protective design feature or part of a primary success path for events which challenge fission product barriers. The staff has concluded that the seismic monitoring instrumentation does not satisfy the 10 CFR 50.36 criteria and need not be included in the TS.

The licensee stated in the submittal that the seismic instrumentation TS would be relocated to plant procedure PLP-114, "Relocated Technical Specifications and Design Basis Requirements." The licensee further stated that PLP-114 changes are subject to a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation.

Since the proposed relocation is consistent with the criteria in 10 CFR 50.36 and the recommendations in GL 95-10, the staff finds the proposed relocation acceptable.

3.2 TS 3/4.3.3.4, "Meteorological Instrumentation"

In 10 CFR 50.47, "Emergency Plans," and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, "Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities," the Commission requires power plant licensees to provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. Timely access to accurate local meteorological data is important for estimating potential radiation doses to the public and for determining appropriate protective measures. In 10 CFR 50.36a(a)(2), the Commission requires nuclear power plant licensees to submit annual reports specifying the quantity of each of the principal radionuclides released to unrestricted areas in liquid and airborne effluents and such other information as may be required by the NRC to estimate maximum potential annual radiation doses to the public. A knowledge of meteorological conditions in the vicinity of the reactor is important in providing a basis for estimating annual radiation doses resulting from radioactive materials released in airborne effluents. Accordingly, the meteorological monitoring instrumentation serves a useful function in estimating radiation doses to the public from either routine or accidental releases of radioactive materials to the atmosphere.

The meteorological monitoring instrumentation does not serve such a primary protective function as to warrant inclusion in the TS in accordance with the 10 CFR 50.36 criteria. The instrumentation does not serve to ensure that the plant is operated within the bounds of initial conditions assumed in design basis accident and transient analyses or that the plant will be operated to preclude transients or accidents. Likewise, the meteorological instrumentation does not serve as part of the primary success path of a safety sequence analysis used to demonstrate that the consequences of these events are within the appropriate acceptance criteria. Accordingly, the staff has concluded that the meteorological instrumentation does not meet the 10 CFR 50.36 criteria and need not be included in the TS.

The licensee stated in the submittal that the meteorological monitoring instrumentation TS would be relocated to plant procedure PLP-114, "Relocated Technical Specifications and Design Basis Requirements." The licensee further stated that PLP-114 changes are subject to a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation.

Since the proposed relocation is consistent with the criteria in 10 CFR 50.36 and the recommendations in GL 95-10, the staff finds the proposed relocation acceptable.

3.3 TS 3/4.3.3.9, "Metal Impact Monitoring System"

The metal impact monitoring (loose-part detection) system identifies the existence of possible loose parts in the reactor coolant system. Early detection can give operators time to take corrective actions and avoid or mitigate damage to or malfunctions of primary system components. However, as discussed in the Final Policy Statement, the loose-part detection system does not function to detect significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. The loose-part detection system does not serve as an active design feature for establishing initial conditions or mitigation of design basis accidents or transients. The staff has concluded that requirements for this system do not satisfy the 10 CFR 50.36 criteria and need not be included in the TS.

The licensee stated in the submittal that the metal impact monitoring system TS would be relocated to plant procedure PLP-114, "Relocated Technical Specifications and Design Basis Requirements." The licensee further stated that PLP-114 changes are subject to a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation.

Since the proposed relocation is consistent with the criteria in 10 CFR 50.36 and the recommendations in GL 95-10, the staff finds the proposed relocation acceptable.

3.4 TS 3/4.3.3.11, "Explosive Gas Monitoring Instrumentation"

The relocation of most of the instrumentation related to radioactive gaseous effluent monitoring was addressed in Generic Letter 89-01, "Implementation of Programmatic Controls for Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications [RETS] in the Administrative Controls Section of the Technical Specifications and the Relocation of Procedural Details of RETS to the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual or the Process Control Program." Relocation of the requirements for explosive gas monitoring instrumentation was not addressed in the guidance provided by Generic Letter 89-01. Staff positions regarding the monitoring of explosive gases within the radioactive waste management systems are outlined in the NRC Standard Review Plan (see

Section 11.3 and Branch Technical Position ETSB-11-5, "Postulated Radioactive Releases Due to a Waste Gas System Leak or Failure").

The actions required by existing TS typically require alternate sampling, limited operation of the gaseous waste system, and submittal of a special report if the explosive gas monitoring instrumentation does not conform to the limiting condition for operation. The explosive gas monitoring instrumentation requirements address detection of possible precursors to the failure of a waste gas system but do not prevent or mitigate design basis accidents or transients which assume a failure of or present a challenge to a fission product barrier. Acceptable concentrations of explosive gases are actually controlled by other limiting conditions for operation (for example, gaseous effluents, explosive gas mixture) or by programs described in the "Administrative Controls" section of TS. The staff has concluded that the requirements related to explosive gas monitoring instrumentation do not conform to the 10 CFR 50.36 criteria and need not be included in the TS.

The licensee stated in the submittal that the explosive gas monitoring instrumentation TS would be relocated to plant procedure PLP-114, "Relocated Technical Specifications and Design Basis Requirements." The licensee further stated that PLP-114 changes are subject to a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation.

Since the proposed relocation is consistent with the criteria in 10 CFR 50.36 and the recommendations in GL 95-10, the staff finds the proposed relocation acceptable.

3.5 Additional Changes

Additional changes were also proposed to the index and to the applicable bases. These changes are all administrative in nature and are consistent with the changes evaluated in Sections 3.1 through 3.4. Therefore, they are acceptable.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the State of North Carolina official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment relocates limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements to a licensee-controlled document. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (64 FR 43766). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: A. Hansen

Date: February 24, 2000

Mr. James Scarola
Carolina Power & Light Company

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
Unit 1

cc:

Mr. William D. Johnson
Vice President and Corporate Secretary
Carolina Power & Light Company
Post Office Box 1551
Raleigh, North Carolina 27602

Mr. Chris L. Burton
Director of Site Operations
Carolina Power & Light Company
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
Post Office Box 165, MC: Zone 1
New Hill, North Carolina 27562-0165

Resident Inspector/Harris NPS
c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
5421 Shearon Harris Road
New Hill, North Carolina 27562-9998

Mr. Robert P. Gruber
Executive Director
Public Staff NCUC
Post Office Box 29520
Raleigh, North Carolina 27626

Ms. Karen E. Long
Assistant Attorney General
State of North Carolina
Post Office Box 629
Raleigh, North Carolina 27602

Chairman of the North Carolina
Utilities Commission
Post Office Box 29510
Raleigh, North Carolina 27626-0510

Public Service Commission
State of South Carolina
Post Office Drawer
Columbia, South Carolina 29211

Mr. Mel Fry, Director
Division of Radiation Protection
N.C. Department of Environment
and Natural Resources
3825 Barrett Dr.
Raleigh, North Carolina 27609-7721

Mr. Vernon Malone, Chairman
Board of County Commissioners
of Wake County
P. O. Box 550
Raleigh, North Carolina 27602

Mr. Terry C. Morton
Manager
Performance Evaluation and
Regulatory Affairs CPB 7
Carolina Power & Light Company
Post Office Box 1551
Raleigh, North Carolina 27602-1551

Mr. Richard H. Givens, Chairman
Board of County Commissioners
of Chatham County
P. O. Box 87
Pittsboro, North Carolina 27312

Mr. Robert J. Duncan II
Plant General Manager
Carolina Power & Light Company
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
P.O. Box 165, Mail Zone 3
New Hill, North Carolina 27562-0165

Ms. Donna B. Alexander, Manager
Regulatory Affairs
Carolina Power & Light Company
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
P.O. Box 165, Mail Zone 1
New Hill, NC 27562-0165

Mr. John H. O'Neill, Jr.
Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge
2300 N Street, NW.
Washington, DC 20037-1128

Mr. Johnny H. Eads, Supervisor
Licensing/Regulatory Programs
Carolina Power & Light Company
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
P. O. Box 165, Mail Zone 1
New Hill, NC 27562-0165

Complete NRR-058

AMENDMENT NO. 96 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-63 - HARRIS, UNIT 1

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