



MUPOL

RESPONSE TO FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) / PRIVACY ACT (PA) REQUEST

2000-0069

1

RESPONSE TYPE FINAL PARTIAL

REQUESTER

Wayne A. Hall

DATE

FEB 07 2000

PART I. -- INFORMATION RELEASED

- No additional agency records subject to the request have been located.
- Requested records are available through another public distribution program. See Comments section.
- APPENDICES _____ Agency records subject to the request that are identified in the listed appendices are already available for public inspection and copying at the NRC Public Document Room.
- APPENDICES **A** Agency records subject to the request that are identified in the listed appendices are being made available for public inspection and copying at the NRC Public Document Room.
- Enclosed is information on how you may obtain access to and the charges for copying records located at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW, Washington, DC.
- APPENDICES **A** Agency records subject to the request are enclosed.
- Records subject to the request that contain information originated by or of interest to another Federal agency have been referred to that agency (see comments section) for a disclosure determination and direct response to you.
- We are continuing to process your request.
- See Comments.

PART I.A -- FEES

- AMOUNT * _____ You will be billed by NRC for the amount listed. None. Minimum fee threshold not met.
- \$ _____ You will receive a refund for the amount listed. Fees waived.

* See comments for details

PART I.B -- INFORMATION NOT LOCATED OR WITHHELD FROM DISCLOSURE

- No agency records subject to the request have been located.
- Certain information in the requested records is being withheld from disclosure pursuant to the exemptions described in and for the reasons stated in Part II.
- This determination may be appealed within 30 days by writing to the FOIA/PA Officer, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. Clearly state on the envelope and in the letter that it is a "FOIA/PA Appeal."

PART I.C COMMENTS (Use attached Comments continuation page if required)

SIGNATURE -- FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND PRIVACY ACT OFFICER

Carol Ann Reed

RESPONSE TO FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) / PRIVACY ACT (PA) REQUEST

2000-0069

FEB 07 2000

PART II.A -- APPLICABLE EXEMPTIONS

APPENDICES
A

Records subject to the request that are described in the enclosed Appendices are being withheld in their entirety or in part under the Exemption No.(s) of the PA and/or the FOIA as indicated below (5 U.S.C. 552a and/or 5 U.S.C. 552(b)).

- Exemption 1: The withheld information is properly classified pursuant to Executive Order 12958.
- Exemption 2: The withheld information relates solely to the internal personnel rules and procedures of NRC.
- Exemption 3: The withheld information is specifically exempted from public disclosure by statute indicated.
 - Sections 141-145 of the Atomic Energy Act, which prohibits the disclosure of Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data (42 U.S.C. 2161-2165).
 - Section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act, which prohibits the disclosure of Unclassified Safeguards Information (42 U.S.C. 2167).
 - 41 U.S.C., Section 253(b), subsection (m)(1), prohibits the disclosure of contractor proposals in the possession and control of an executive agency to any person under section 552 of Title 5, U.S.C. (the FOIA), except when incorporated into the contract between the agency and the submitter of the proposal.
- Exemption 4: The withheld information is a trade secret or commercial or financial information that is being withheld for the reason(s) indicated.
 - The information is considered to be confidential business (proprietary) information.
 - The information is considered to be proprietary because it concerns a licensee's or applicant's physical protection or material control and accounting program for special nuclear material pursuant to 10 CFR 2.790(d)(1).
 - The information was submitted by a foreign source and received in confidence pursuant to 10 CFR 2.790(d)(2).
- Exemption 5: The withheld information consists of interagency or intraagency records that are not available through discovery during litigation. Applicable privileges:
 - Deliberative process: Disclosure of predecisional information would tend to inhibit the open and frank exchange of ideas essential to the deliberative process. Where records are withheld in their entirety, the facts are inextricably intertwined with the predecisional information. There also are no reasonably segregable factual portions because the release of the facts would permit an indirect inquiry into the predecisional process of the agency.
 - Attorney work-product privilege. (Documents prepared by an attorney in contemplation of litigation)
 - Attorney-client privilege. (Confidential communications between an attorney and his/her client)
- Exemption 6: The withheld information is exempted from public disclosure because its disclosure would result in a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
- Exemption 7: The withheld information consists of records compiled for law enforcement purposes and is being withheld for the reason(s) indicated.
 - (A) Disclosure could reasonably be expected to interfere with an enforcement proceeding (e.g., it would reveal the scope, direction, and focus of enforcement efforts, and thus could possibly allow recipients to take action to shield potential wrongdoing or a violation of NRC requirements from investigators).
 - (C) Disclosure would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
 - (D) The information consists of names of individuals and other information the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to reveal identities of confidential sources.
 - (E) Disclosure would reveal techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or guidelines that could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.
 - (F) Disclosure could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of an individual.
- OTHER (Specify)

PART II.B -- DENYING OFFICIALS

Pursuant to 10 CFR 9.25(g), 9.25(h), and/or 9.65(b) of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations, it has been determined that the information withheld is exempt from production or disclosure, and that its production or disclosure is contrary to the public interest. The person responsible for the denial are those officials identified below as denying officials and the FOIA/PA Officer for any denials that may be appealed to the Executive Director for Operations (EDO).

DENYING OFFICIAL	TITLE/OFFICE	RECORDS DENIED	APPELLATE OFFICIAL		
			EDO	SECY	IG
Hubert J. Miller	Regional Administrator, RI	Appendix A		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	

Appeal must be made in writing within 30 days of receipt of this response. Appeals should be mailed to the FOIA/Privacy Act Officer, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, for action by the appropriate appellate official(s). You should clearly state on the envelope and letter that it is a "FOIA/PA Appeal."

**APPENDIX A
RECORDS BEING WITHHELD IN PART**

<u>NO.</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION/(PAGE COUNT)/EXEMPTIONS</u>
1.	Undated	Indian Point Open Allegations Received Since 1/1/93 (6 pages) EX. 7A
2.	Undated	Indian Point Closed Allegations Received Since 1/1/93 (65 pages) EX. 7C

Indian Point Open Allegations Received Since 1/1/93

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>	<u>Basis for Closure</u>			

RI-1998-A-0106	INDIAN POINT 3	[REDACTED]	5/5/1998	
----------------	----------------	------------	----------	--

[REDACTED]

EX7A

RI-1998-A-0210	INDIAN POINT 3	[REDACTED]	12/22/1998	
----------------	----------------	------------	------------	--

[REDACTED]

EX7A

Information in this record was deleted
in accordance with the Freedom of Information
Act, exemptions 7A
FOIA- 2000-0069

ITEM # 1

A/1

6

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>	<u>Concern Description</u>		<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1999-A-0030	INDIAN POINT 2	[REDACTED]		3/22/1999

[REDACTED]

EX
7A

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	

--	--	--	--	--

EX7A

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	

RI-1999-A-0030

INDIAN POINT 2

[REDACTED]

3/22/1999

[REDACTED]

EX
7A

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>	<u>Basis for Closure</u>			

RI-1999-A-0066 INDIAN POINT 3 [REDACTED] 6/15/1999

[REDACTED]

RI-1999-A-0074 INDIAN POINT 3 [REDACTED] 7/14/1999

[REDACTED]

EX7A

EX7A

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1999-A-0103	INDIAN POINT 2	[REDACTED]		9/13/1999
RI-1999-A-0115	INDIAN POINT 3	[REDACTED]		10/17/1999
RI-1999-A-0121	INDIAN POINT 2	[REDACTED]		10/18/1999
RI-1999-A-0123	INDIAN POINT 3	[REDACTED]		11/1/1999

EX7A

EX
7A

EX7A

EX7A

Indian Point Closed Allegations Received Since 1/1/93

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1993-A-0038	INDIAN POINT 2	Former Contractor Employee	2/22/1993	11/16/1993
1			N	11/16/1993
<p>1) MOTOR OPERATORS WERE INSTALLED ON VALVES WITHOUT THE USE OF RIGGING (OSHA ISSUE) 2) ALLEGER CLAIMS TO HAVE BEEN FIRED FOR REFUSING TO PLACE OPERATOR ON VALVE WITHOUT RIGGING 3) SUPERVISOR DIRECTED THE WORK CREW TO NOT LUBRICATE THE VALVE STEM WHILE INSTALLING THE MOTOR OPERATOR ### CALLED IN TO IPE RESIDENT OFFICE. ATTEMPTS TO RECONTACT 23,24FEB93 FAILED DUE TO WRONG PHONE NUMBER GIVEN. ALLEGER CALLED REGION 26FEB93. PANEL MET 3MAR93. REPANELED 6OCT93 DUE TO APPARENT LACK OF ACTION. INSPECTION DONE 4/93 (IR 50-247/93-06). TECHNICAL ISSUES NOTSUBSTANTIATED. CLOSEOUT LETTER SENT TO ALLEGER 11/15/93. ALLEGER CALLED ON 11/20/93 TO REITERATE THAT HE'D BEEN FIRED BECAUSE OF THE INCIDENT. ALLEGER NOTED THAT HE HAD NOT FOLLOWED THROUGH W/DOL BUT HAD A CURRENT LAWSUIT AGAINST B&W SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1A ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: 11/22/93 REFERENCE: KEYWORD: MOV, H&ID SS:U</p>		NONE		
RI-1993-A-0047	INDIAN POINT 3	Anonymous	3/20/1993	7/26/1993
1			Y	7/26/1993
<p>BUS DRIVER FOR THE PARKING LOT SHUTTLE WAS DRIVING AROUND THE LOT RAMMING INTO CARS. NYPA DECIDED TO HANDLE THE ISSUE INTERNALLY RATHER THAN GOING TO THE POLICE. ### CALLED IN TO HEADQUARTERS DUTY OFFICER. PANELED 24MAR93. REFERRED TO NYPA BY LETTER DATED 19APR93. NYPA RESPONSE DATED 19MAY93, ACKNOWLEDGED 14JUN93. REPANELED 2JUN93. CLOSEOUT MEMO ISSUED 15JUL93. SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1B ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: 20MAR93 REFERENCE: __RTL KEYWORD: FFD SS:N</p>				

Information in this record was deleted
in accordance with the Freedom of Information
Act, exemptions 7C
FOIA- 2000-0069

ITEM # 2

1
12
65

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1993-A-0048	INDIAN POINT 2	Contractor Employee	3/22/1993	7/28/1993
1			Y	7/28/1993
<p>CONTAINMENT COORDINATOR WAS IGNORING HP POSTINGS AND DIRECT-ING WORKERS TO ENTER APOSTED AIRBORNE CONTAMINATION AREA WITHOUT THE REQUIRED RESPIRATORY PROTECTION. ### CALLED IN TO RESIDENT OFFICE. PANELED 24MAR93. ADDITIONAL INFORMATIO PROVIDED BY ALLEGER 24MAR93. REPANELED 26MAR93. CORROBORATION FROM ANOTHER HP TECH PROVIDED 26MAR93. ADDITIONAL LIST OF ISSUES PROVIDED BY DIFFERENT TECHNICIAN. INSPECTED 22-26FEB AND 30MAR-1APR93, REPORT ISSUED 22APR93 WITH LEVEL V NCV. OI CLOSED CASE BY MEMORANDUM DATED 18MAY93INSPECTED 26-29APR93, REPORT ISSUED 17JUN93 WITH NOV(2 LEVEL4S). CLOSEOUT LETTER SENT 28JUL93. SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1A ACTION PENDING: CLOSEOUT (SAC) (31MAY93) DOCUMENTATION: __50-247/93-04, 93-05 ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: 28JUL93 REFERENCE: NOV KEYWORD: HP, POSTING SS:N</p>		NONE		
RI-1993-A-0072	INDIAN POINT 3	See Description Field	3/10/1993	7/20/1995
1			Y	7/20/1995
<p>AN INDIVIDUAL ATTEMPTED TO SUBSTITUTE A BOGUS SAMPLE DURING RANDOM FFD TEST. ### EVENT REPORTED TO NEC BY NYPA AS A COURTESY. PANEL MET 14APR93, 15APR93. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON FALSIFICATION BY SAME INDIVIDUAL OF SURVEILLANCE RESULTS DEVELOPED 23APR93CASE INITIATED BY OI:RI ON 5/93 BUT TRANSFERRED TO RV DUE TORESOURCS CONSTRAINTS AT OI:RI. OI:RV CASED CLOSED ON 6/16/95; FOUND WRONGDOING ON THE PART OF IP3 TECNICIAN. OI:RI REFERRED TO DOJ WHO DECLINED TO PURSUE PROSECUTION. INDIVIDUAL WAS TERMINATED BY LICENSEE IN 5/93. 7/11/95 JOINT ALLEG/ENF PANEL CONCLUDED THAT ALLEGATION SHOULD BE CLOSED AND REMAINDER PURSUED VIA ENF PROCESS. SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1B, OI:RI ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: N/A REFERENCE: KEYWORD: FFD, FALSIFICATION SS:U</p>				

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1993-A-0078	INDIAN POINT 2	Licensee Employee	3/25/1993	10/19/1993
1			Y	10/19/1993
SOME HP ACTIVITIES APPEAR TO BE NOT WELL CONTROLLED. HP SUPERVISION TRIES TO SUPPRESS PROBLEMS. ### ISSUES SPLIT OUT OF RI-93-A-0048. PANEL MET 7APR93. PANEL MET 21APR93. INSPECTED WEEK OF 26APR93. ALLEGATIONS PARTIALLY SUBSTANTIATED DURING INSPECTION 50-274/93-05 NCV IDENTIFIED IN CONNECTION W/ALLEGER CONCERN. CLOSEOUT LETTER TO ALLEGER SENT 10/19/93. SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1A, FRPS FRSSB ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: IR 50-247/93-05 ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: 10/19/93 REFERENCE: KEYWORD: HP SS:N		NONE		
RI-1993-A-0098	INDIAN POINT 3	Contractor Employee	5/13/1993	9/22/1993
1			Y	9/22/1993
PRESSURE SWITCH ASSOCIATED WITH WELD CHANNEL SYSTEM BACKUP AIR VALVE PCV-1140 HAS NOT BEEN CALIBRATED SINCE 1976. ### PROVIDED TO TEAM CONDUCTING ONSITE REVIEW. PANEL MET 19MAY93INSPECTED 1-19JUL93, REPORT ISSUED 23AUG93. REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFO SENT TO ALLEGER 22JUL93. CLOSEOUT LETTER SENT TO ALLEGER 15SEP93. SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1B, SAC ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: 50-286/93-13 (NCV) ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: 15SEP93 REFERENCE: KEYWORD: INSTRUMENT CALIBRATION SS:N				
RI-1993-A-0105	INDIAN POINT 3	Anonymous	5/25/1993	7/26/1993
1			N	7/26/1993
ALLEGER DOESN'T THINK NRC HAS EVER EVALUATED USE OF SECURITYFORCE PERSONNEL FOR FIRE WATCH DUTIES. IF AN INTRUSION WERETO USE A FIRE AS A DIVERSIONARY TACTIC, SECURITY FORCE PERSONNEL COULD NOT RESPOND TO BOTH THE FIRE AND THE INTRU- SION. ### RECEIVED AT SITE FROM MEMBER OF THE SECURITY FORCE. PANEL 2JUN93. ISSUE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED BY NRC AND FOUND ACCEPTABLE, AS DOCUMENTED IN 11JUL85 MEMO FROM NRR ANDNMSS TO REGION II. CLOSEOUT MEMO ISSUED 15JUL93. SUPPORT OFFICE: PRS-1B, SGDS ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: 25MAY93 REFERENCE: KEYWORD: SECURITY, FIRE BRIGADE SS:N				

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1993-A-0122	INDIAN POINT 3	Licensee Employee	6/16/1993	7/28/1994
1			Y	7/28/1994
<p>INTEGRITY OF OPERATIONS MANAGER IS QUESTIONABLE, AS EVIDENCED BY: 1) RECURRING DENIAL OF INFORMATION PRESENTED TO HIM 2) STATEMENT IF LER COMES UP AT OCTOBER 15, 1992 CONFERENCE HE'LL TALK AROUND IT. ### LETTER RECEIVED IN RESIDENT OFFICE. PANEL MET 25JUN93. OI IS ALREADY LOOKING INTO THE ISSUE OF VERACITY OF INFORMATION PROVIDED AT CONFERENCE AND IN LER. _ACK. LTR SENT TO ALLEGER 2/2/94. ALLEGATION SUBSTANTIATED. ALLEGER INFORMED OF ACTION TAKEN AGAINST NYPA AND FORMER GM VIA CLOSEOUT LETTER DATED 7/27/94. SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1B, OI:RI ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: 7/27/94 REFERENCE: KEYWORD: 50.9, LER SS:U</p>				
RI-1993-A-0129	INDIAN POINT 3	Anonymous	6/24/1993	7/26/1993
1			N	7/26/1993
<p>TECH SPEC 6.2.2.I MAY HAVE BEEN VIOLATED SINCE THE NEWLY AP-POINTED OPERATIONS MANAGER DOES NOT HOLD AN SRO LICENSE. ### CONCERN RECEIVED AT RESIDENT OFFICE. PANEL MET 30JUN93. ACTING OPS MANAGER DOES HOLD SRO LICENSE. NEW OPS MANAGER IS IN SRO CLASS. SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1A, PWR ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: 24JUN93 REFERENCE: KEYWORD: TECH SPEC, QUALIFICATION SS:N</p>				
RI-1993-A-0139	INDIAN POINT 3	See Description Field	4/23/1993	4/20/1994
1			N	4/20/1994
<p>DURING INSPECTION OF AN ABNORMAL DOSIMETRY REPORT, AN HP TECH PROVIDED INFORMATION WHICH CONFLICTED WITH INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE RADWASTE OPERATORS INVOLVED, AN HP SUPERVISOR AND HIS OWN WRITTEN REPORT OF THE INCIDENT. ### TURNED UP DURING INSPECTION ON-SITE. PANEL MET 28JUL93. REVIEW DOCUMENTED IN IR 50-286/93-10 AND OI:RI REPORT 1-93-032R. INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE DEVELOPED TO CONCLUDE DELIBERATE MISCONDUCT. JOINT ALLEGATION/ENFORCEMENT PANEL ON 3/25/94 CONCLUDED THAT NO FURTHER ACTION WOULD BE TAKEN. SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1B, FRPS, OI:RI FRSSB ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: IR 50-286/93-10 OI:RI 1-93-032R ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: N/A REFERENCE: KEYWORD: EXPOSURE, WRONGDOING SS:U</p>				

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1993-A-0141	INDIAN POINT 2	Private Citizen	7/14/1993	8/3/1993
1			N	8/3/1993
<p>A NEW STATION FOR THE COMMUTER RAIL LINE INTO NEW YORK IS BEING CONSTRUCTED. THIS WILL ADVERSELY AFFECT EVACUATION TIMES DUE TO THE ADDITIONAL TRAFFIC FROM THE STATION. ### LETTER RECEIVED IN REGIONAL OFFICE. PANEL MET 14JUL93. REPANELED 28JUL93. BEING RESPONDED TO BY NRR UNDER GREEN TICKET. RESPONSE TO GREEN TICKET SIGNED OUT 29JUL93, CLOSE-OUT MEMO ISSUED 2AUG93. SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1A, RPS-1B, EPS FRSSB ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: N/A REFERENCE: KEYWORD: EP, EVACUATION SS:N</p>				
	INDIAN POINT 3	Private Citizen	7/14/1993	8/3/1993
1			N	8/3/1993
RI-1993-A-0143	INDIAN POINT 3	Anonymous	7/21/1993	10/19/1993
1			N	10/19/1993
<p>CONTRACTOR CRAFT WERE SENT HOME ON 21JUL93 AFTER ONLY 2 HOURDAY IN ORDER TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL WHO WERE ON THE SITE AT THE TIME OF THE ACCOUNTABILITY DRILL. THIS WAS TO PERMIT THE LICENSEE TO MEET THE TIME GOAL FOR THE DRILL. ### RECEIVED IN REGIONAL OFFICE, SUBSEQUENTLY CALLED IN TO THE RESIDENT OFFICE. PANEL MET 28JUL93. CONCERN ADDRESSED IN INSPECTION REPORT 50-286/93-07. CLOSEOUT MEMO TO FILE ISSUED 10/14/93. SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1B, EPS FRSSB ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: 22JUL93 REFERENCE: INSPECTION REPORT 50-286/93-07 KEYWORD: EP, ACCOUNTABILITY SS:N</p>				
			NONE	

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1993-A-0147	INDIAN POINT 1	Former Contractor Employee	7/17/1993	8/24/1993
1			N	8/24/1993
74	<p>1) WHILE WORKING AT INDIAN POINT FOR [REDACTED] ALLEGER COMPLAINED TO MANAGEMENT ABOUT THE AMOUNT OF PVC INSULATED WIRE USED IN CONTAINMENT AND WAS TOLD TO SHUT UP ABOUT IT. 2) DUE TO MANY OF THE ENGINEERS BEING FROM FOREIGN COUNTRIES THERE WAS CONFUSION OVER TEMPERATURES (F OR C) AND SOME WIRING MAY NOT BE ADEQUATE FOR THE THERMAL CONDITIONS ### RECEIVED AT HOME FROM NEIGHBOR. PANEL MET 28JUL93. WHEN ALLEGER WAS RECONTACTED FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON 23JUL93, HE STATED THERE WAS NO SAFETY ISSUE, THE PROBLEMS HAD BEEN RESOLVED YEARS AGO. COULD NOT REMEMBER WHICH UNIT IT WAS. ALLEGER RECONTACTED 23JUL93, STATED DID NOT WANT ISSUE PURSUED, WAS JUST HAVING CONVERSATION WITH A NEIGHBOR. CLOSED WITH NO FURTHER ACTION. SUPPORT OFFICE: SAC, RPS-1A, RPS-1B ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: NONE ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: 23JUL93 REFERENCE: KEYWORD: WIRING, INSULATION SS:N</p>		NONE	
	INDIAN POINT 2	Former Contractor Employee	7/17/1993	8/24/1993
1			N	8/24/1993
	INDIAN POINT 3	Former Contractor Employee	7/17/1993	8/24/1993
1			N	8/24/1993

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1993-A-0148	INDIAN POINT 3	Former Contractor Employee	7/26/1993	1/23/1995
1			N	1/23/1995
<p>7C [REDACTED]</p> <p>2) HP AND QC STAFF WERE USING DRUGS (WIDESPREAD PROBLEM), THEY SLEPT ON THE JOB AND DID NOT STAY ON STATION, AND HID THEIR INATTENTIVENESS FROM THE RESIDENT INSPECTORS IN 1983) THERE WERE SIGNIFICANT CRACKS IN THE NOZZLES TO THE 31 AND 32 S/GS WHICH WELDERS COULD NOT FIX. ### SRI CALLED ALLEGER RE: CONGRESSIONAL CONCERN; ALLEGER SUING NYPA; COUNSEL TOLD HIM NOT TO GO TO NRC IN 1983. ACK.LTR. SENT 9/20/93. LTR. TO H. FISH OFFICE 10/27/93. ALLEGER HAS SINCE PROVIDED NO FURTHER INFO. REPANELED 6/29/94; LTRS. SENT TO ALLEGER & H.FISH OFFICE 8/22/94 INDICATING NAP REVIEW; ALLEGER GIVEN ANOTHER CHANCE TO PROVIDE INFO. ALGR. CALLED SAC ON 9/15/94 RE: PROVIDING ADDNL. INFO.; HOWEVER, INITIAL ATTEMPTS TO SET UP INTERVIEW FAILED. REPANELED 10/19/94; WILL ATTEMPT TO RECONTACT ALLEGER; IF NEGATIVE RESPONSE WILL CLOSE FILE. _CLOSED 1/20/95 DUE TO NEGATIVE RESPONSE. SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1B, NDE ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: _50-286/94-15 ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: 9/13/94 TELECON REFERENCE: KEYWORD: RADIOGRAPHY, NDE, FFD, ATTENTIVENESS SS:N</p>		NONE		
RI-1993-A-0154	INDIAN POINT 2	See Description Field	8/2/1993	5/16/1994
1			N	5/16/1994
<p>TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES OF LEVEL III NDE EXAMINER MAY NOT BE UP TO INDUSTRY STANDARDS ### LETTER SENT TO UTILITY BY PUC CC'D TO REGION I. PANEL MET 11AUG93. REFERRED TO CONED BY LETTER DATED 17AUG93. RESPONSE DID NOT ADDRESS THE APPROPRIATE ISSUE. _PANELED 10/6/93; ADDITIONAL REFERRAL TO LICENSEE RECOMMENDED. REPANELED 5/4/94; RECONSIDERED AND DECIDED NOT TO MAKE FURTHER REFERRRAL TO LICENSEE. WILL CLOSEOUT WLTR. TO NY STATE INDICATING THAT NO FURTHER ACTION IS PLANNED. _CLOSEOUTLETTER SENT TO ALLEGER ON 5/12/94. SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1A, NDE ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: N/A REFERENCE: RTL KEYWORD: RADIOGRAPHY, NON-ASME SS:N</p>				

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1993-A-0171	INDIAN POINT 3	See Description Field	8/18/1993	11/10/1993
1			N	11/10/1993
<p>NYP A EMPLOYEES HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN TO STATE ASSEMBLYMAN THAT THEY FEAR RAISING ISSUES TO NRC MAY JEAPORDIZE THEIR JOBS ### ISSUE RAISED AT PUBLIC MEETING, WHEN QUESTIONED LATER, DE - CLINED TO PROVIDE SPECIFICS. PANEL MET 26AUG93. LETTER TO ALLEGER SENT 16SEP93. REFERRED TO LICENSEE BY LETTER DATED 16SEP93. LICENSEE RESPONSE TO REFERRAL SUBMITTED 10/15/93. LICENSEE CONCLUSION WAS THAT ALLEGATION COULD NOT BE SUBSTANTIATED. CLOSEOUT LETTER TO ALLEGER (11/5/93) ATTACHED LICENSEE'S REFERRAL RESPONSE BUT NOTED THAT RESIDENTS WOULD CONTINUE TO MONITOR THIS AREA. ACTION OFFICE: RPS-1B ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: 11/5/93 REFERENCE: KEYWORD: H&ID SS:N</p>				
RI-1993-A-0223	INDIAN POINT 3	See Description Field	1/29/1993	10/19/1994
1			N	10/19/1994
<p>FOXBORO REPRESENTATIVE INFORMED SENIOR RESIDENT AND OTHER NRC PERSONNEL THAT IP3 AMSAC MITIGATION SYSTEM HAD NOT BEEN INSTALLED AT OTHER SITES, DESPITE PROBLEMS BEING FOUND WITH SIMILAR SYSTEMS AT GINNA AND BEAVER VALLEY ### PANELED 10/20/93. OI:RI TO OPEN AN EVALUATION OF FOXBORO. DRP/DRS TO CONTINUE PURSUING TECHNICAL/SAFETY ISSUES. OI:RI COMPLETED CASE 1-93-059R ON 9/21/94; COULD NOT SUBSTANTIATED WRONGDOING ISSUE. CLOSEOUT MEMO TO FILE DATED 10/18/94. SUPPORT OFFICE: DRS, RPS-1B ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: _N/A REFERENCE: KEYWORD: SSW, ATWS SS:Y</p>				

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1993-A-0264	INDIAN POINT 3	Licensee Employee	12/2/1993	4/20/1994
1			Y	4/20/1994
LICENSED SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR SUBMITTED A SUSPECT URINE SAMPLE FOR A RANDOM FITNESS FOR DUTY TEST. LICENSEE MADE A 10 CFR 26.73 NOTIFICATION ON 11/24/93. STAFF SUSPECTED WRONGDOING ### PANELED 12/10/94. SAFETY ISSUE ADDRESSED BY DRS. OI:RI CLOSED CASE ON 12/20/94 DUE TO HIGHER PRIORITIES. ENFORCEMENT ACTION BEING PURSUED AGAINST INDIVIDUAL; WILL BE TRACKED BY THE ENFORCEMENT PROCESS. SUPPORT OFFICE: _RPS-1B BWR ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: _CORRESPONDENCE W/1P3 ON FFD ISSUE ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: __N/A REFERENCE: KEYWORD: FFD, SAMPLE, SSW SS:U		NONE		
RI-1993-A-0266	INDIAN POINT 3	Licensee Employee	12/6/1993	3/10/1994
1			N	3/10/1994
1) INADEQUATE SECURITY STAFF 2) LONG WORK HOURS/ LOW MORALE 3) FFD ISSUE IN SECURITY ### PANELED 12/10/93. INSPECTED BY DRSS VIA IR 50-286/94-03 DATED 1/28/94. ACK/CLOSEOUT LETTER SENT TO ALLEGER ON 3/2/94; ALLEGATIONS NOT SUBSTANTIATED. SUPPORT OFFICE: _RPS-1B SGDS ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: __IR 50-286/94-03 ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: __3/2/94 REFERENCE: KEYWORD: FFD, STAFFING SS:U				
RI-1993-A-0268	INDIAN POINT 3	News Media	12/7/1993	2/23/1994
1			Y	2/23/1994
ANONYMOUS CALL TO REPORTER 1) 3 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS OFFLINE DURING WEEK OF 11/28/93 2) SERVICE WATER SPILL IN PLANT 3) CONTRACTOR WAS TOLD THAT CR HVAC WAS TURNED OFF AND DEPRESSURIZED BUT GOT SPRAYED WHILE DOING JOB ### PANELED 12/29/93. NEED ACK LETTER TO REPORTER. REVIEW DOCUMENTED IN IR 50-286/93-29. ACK./CLOSEOUT LETTER SENT TO ALLEGER 2/22/94. SUPPORT OFFICE: _RPS-1B PSS ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: _IR 50-286/93-29 ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: __2/22/94 REFERENCE: KEYWORD: SERVICE WATER, DIESEL SS:U				

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1993-A-0269	INDIAN POINT 3	Licensee Employee	12/7/1993	3/3/1994
1			N	3/3/1994
SYSTEM ENGINEERS AND OUTAGE COORDINATORS WORKING EXCESSIVE OVERTIME ### PANELED 12/29/93. ACK. LTR. TO ALLEGER 1/26/94. INSPECTED VIA IR 50-286/93-29 DATED 2/2/94; ALLEGATION WAS NOT SUBSTANTIATED. CLOSEOUT LETTER TO ALLEGER 3/2/94. SUPPORT OFFICE: _RPS-1B PSS ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: _IR 50-286/93-29 ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: _3/2/94 REFERENCE: KEYWORD: OVERTIME SS:U				
RI-1993-A-0270	INDIAN POINT 3	Licensee Employee	12/7/1993	7/28/1994
1			Y	7/28/1994
MANAGEMENT NOT RECEPTIVE TO EMPLOYEE SAFETY CONCERNS ### PANELED 12/10/93. ACK. LTR. TO ALLEGER 1/11/94. OI:RI TO INTERVIEW ALLEGER. INSPECTED VIA IR 50-286/93-29. ALLEGATIONPARTIALLY SUBSTANTIATED. OI:RI CLOSED CASE DUE TO HIGHER PRIORITIES ON 4/6/94. OCL TO ALLEGER 7/27/94. SUPPORT OFFICE: _RPS-1B (OI:RI) ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: _50-286/93-29 ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: _7/27/94 REFERENCE: KEYWORD: EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SS:U				
RI-1993-A-0272	INDIAN POINT 3	Licensee Employee	12/8/1993	1/27/1994
1			N	1/27/1994
1) MANAGERS WORK AROUND OR IGNORE PROCEDURES 2) RECENT ERRORS DUE TO PROCEDURAL ADHERENCE PROBLEMS CAUSED BY RUSH TO MEET UNREALISTIC COMMITMENTS ### PANELED 12/10/93. PANELED 12/29/93. _ALLEGER RETRACTED ALLEGATION A FEW DAYS AFTER MAKING IT. NEED ACK./CLOSEOUT LETTER INDICATING THAT WE ARE LOOKING AT ISSUES (DUE TO OTHER ALLEGATIONS) BUT DO NOT INTEND TO CORRESPOND FURTHER WITH ALLEGER. _ACK./CLOSEOUT LETTER SENT 1/25/94. SUPPORT OFFICE: _RPS-1B ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: _1/25/94 REFERENCE: KEYWORD: PROCEDURE SS:U				

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1993-A-0273	INDIAN POINT 3	Licensee Employee	12/9/1993	12/30/1993
1			N	12/30/1993
<p>1) MANAGERS NOT RESPONSIVE TO ALLEGER'S CONCERNS ABOUT VOILATING AN ADMIN PROCEDURE 2) IMPROPER TAGS WERE HUNG IN PLANT BY OPERATIONS UNDER DIRECTION OF INFORMED MANAGER ### PANELED 12/29/93. THIS ISSUE ALONG WITH RI-93-A-0279 FEED INTO ALLEGER'S H&I ISSUE OF RI-93-A-0278. PANEL DECIDED TO INCORPORATE THESE ISSUES INTO THE INE ALLEGATION, RI-93-A- 0278 UNTIL FURTHER ACTION DEEMS IT NECESSARY TO DO OTHERWISEADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSE ON AMS. ALLEGATION RI-93-A-0273 ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSED ON 12/30/93. SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1B ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: 12/9/93 REFERENCE: KEYWORD: PROCEDURE SS:U</p>				
RI-1993-A-0274	INDIAN POINT 3	Licensee Employee	12/9/1993	6/28/1994
1			Y	6/28/1994
<p>NUMEROUS CONCERNS IN MANAGEMENT OF ENGINEERING WORK 1) MANAGEMENT THREATENING ENGR. STAFF TO MEET SCHEDULES; MANAGER STATED SAME IN RECENT TALK TO ENGINEER 2) ALLEGER'S SAFETY ISSUE (SOVS) ACCEPTED, BUT BEING IMPROPERLY QUESTIONED BY MANAGEMENT 3) ALLEGER QUESTIONS TECHNICAL CAPABILITY OF HIS MANAGER 4) ENGINEERING STAFF WORKING EXCESSIVE OVERTIME ### PANELED 12/10/93. ACK LTR TO ALLEGER 1/11/94. DRP TO INSPECTENGINEERING OT (1/15/94). DRP TO REQUEST CLARIFICATION ON ITEMS 2. AND 3. FROM ALLEGER. INSPECTED VIA 50-286/93-29. COL TO ALLEGER DATED 6/28/94 SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1B ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: 50-286/93-29 ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: 6/29/94 REFERENCE: KEYWORD: PROCEDURE SS:U</p>				
RI-1993-A-0278	INDIAN POINT 3	Licensee Employee	12/17/1993	9/29/1994
1			N	9/29/1994
<p>NYPA MANAGEMENT HARASSING AND INTIMIDATING INDIVIDUAL DUE TO RAISING SAFETY CONCERNS ### PANELED 12/29/93. ACK. LTR. TO ALLEGER W/DOL INFO. 1/26/94. OI:RI CLOSED CASE 1-94-002 ON 6/13/94. ACK/ CLOSEOUT LETTER TO ALLEGER ON 9/29/94. SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1B ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: 9/29/94 REFERENCE: KEYWORD: H&I SS:U</p>				

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1993-A-0279	INDIAN POINT 3	Licensee Employee	12/17/1993	12/30/1993
1			N	12/30/1993
<p>IP3 OPERATIONS GM UNRECEPTIVE TO INFORMATION FROM MECHANICS REGARDING SOV(EDG) MAINTENANCE AND SCHEDULE PRESSURE DURING ROOT CAUSE INVESTIGATION ### PANELED 12/29/93. THIS ALLEGATION ALONG WITH RI-93-A-0273 ARE ISSUES FROM SAME ALLEGER THAT FEED INTO HIS H&I ISSUE OF RI-93-A-0278. PANEL DECIDED TO GROUP THESE ISSUES INTO ONE ALLEGATION UNTIL FURTHER ACTION DEEMS IT NECESSARY TO DOOTHERWISE. ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSE ON AMS. RI-93-A-0279 ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSED ON 12/30/93. SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1B ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: 12/17/93 REFERENCE: RI-93-A-0278 KEYWORD: ROOT CAUSE, SCHEDULE SS:U</p>		NONE		
RI-1993-A-0281	INDIAN POINT 3	See Description Field	12/13/1993	7/28/1994
1			Y	7/28/1994
<p>ORIGINAL DRAWINGS ARE MISSING FROM INDIAN POINT 3 ### PANELED 12/29/93. ACK. LTR. TO ALLEGER 2/1/94. ALLEGATION SUBSTANTIATED BUT OF NO SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE. COL TO ALLEGER DATED 7/27/94. SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1B ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: 50-286/94-05 & 94-09 ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: 7/27/94 REFERENCE: KEYWORD: DRAWINGS SS:N</p>				
RI-1993-A-0283	INDIAN POINT 3	News Media	12/29/1993	3/30/1994
1			Y	3/30/1994
<p>REPORTER REFERRED AN ALLEGATION FROM UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS THAT THE IP-3 PORVS ARE LEAKING AND THAT NYPA ARRANGED TO BYPASS THE PORVS VICE FIXING THEM ### P.ESELGROTH RETURNED CALL TO REPORTER ON 12/29/93. INFORMED REPORTER THAT NRC KNEW OF LEAKING PORVS AND THAT THEY CONTROL LEAKAGE USING THE PORV BLOCK VALVE, NOT A BYPASS. DRP TO DEVELOP CLOSEOUT LETTER BASED ON PRIOR INSPECTION ACTIVITIES. CLOSEOUT LETTER SENT TO ALLEGER ON 3/28/94. ISSUES WERE SUBSTANTIATED BUT NRC KNEW OF PROBLEMS IN THE PAST. ALLEGER WAS INFORMED VIA THE CLOSEOUT LETTER THAT THE LICENSEE USED THE PORV BLOCK VALVES, WHICH IS ALLOWED BY THE TECH. SPECS., TO CONTAIN THE VALVE LEAKAGE. SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1B ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: IRS 50-286/93-22; 91-14; 91-08 ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: 3/28/93 REFERENCE: KEYWORD: PORV SS:U</p>				

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1994-A-0019	INDIAN POINT 2	Anonymous	2/1/1994	1/25/1995
1			N	1/25/1995
<p>UNQUALIFIED INSPECTOR PERFORMING SAFETY INSPECTIONS. QC MANAGER KNEW OF PROBLEM AND CONSPIRED WITH QC CONTRACTOR (EBASCO) TO COVERUP ### PANELED 2/9/94. _DRP TO REQUEST, THEN REVIEW LICENSEE'S ONGOING INVESTIGATION RESULTS & DISCUSS W/OI:RI. _REFERRAL LTR. TO LICENSEE DATED 3/3/94. _LICENSEE REAPONDED ON 4/1/94. OI:RI INVESTIGATION COMPLETED ON 10/27/94; ISSUES WERE NOT SUBSTANTIATED. CLOSEOUT MEMO TO FILE ISSUED 1/24/95. SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1A _____ (OI:RI) ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: 2/1/94 REFERENCE: KEYWORD: QUALIFICATION, COVERUP SS:U</p>				
RI-1994-A-0028	INDIAN POINT 3	Anonymous	2/7/1994	11/16/1994
1			N	11/16/1994
<p>1) INCORRECT/UNSAFE SHOULDER STRAPS ON SHOTGUNS 2) SECURITY RESPONSE PERSONNEL SHARING FIRE BRIGADE RESPONSIBILITIES ### ALLEGER INITIALLY PROVIDED NAME BUT LATER REFUSED TO PROVIDE ADDRESS AND PHONE. STATED ON 3/3/94 THAT HE DID NOT WANT A FORMAL RESPONSE FROM NRC. ISSUES WILL BE EVALUATED BY FORTHCOMING OSRE. _DRSS PROVIDED MEMO SUMMARIZING OSRE REVIEW AND FACT THAT ISSUE WAS UNSUBSTANTIATED ON 11/7/94. OSRE REPORT NOT INCLUDED IN FILE DUE TO ITS PREPONDERANCE OF SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1B SGDS (DRSS) ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: _OSRE @ IP-3 (3/21-24/94) ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: 3/3/94 (DISCUSSION W/SRI) REFERENCE: KEYWORD: FIRE BRIGADE SS:N</p>				

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1994-A-0029	INDIAN POINT 3	See Description Field	2/9/1994	4/20/1994
1			Y	4/20/1994
<p>MANAGEMENT NOT RESPONSIVE TO EMPLOYEE CONCERNS. MANAGEMENT UNHEALTHY, ABUSIVE. PLANT MANAGER INCOMPETENT AS EMERGENCY DIRECTOR. NRC REGIONAL ADMINIATRATOR RECOMMENDED PLANT MANAGER FOR JOB AT IP-3. ### SR. RESIDENT PRESENTED ALLEGATION AS A COMPILATION OF MANY RECENT COMPLAINTS BY LICENSEE PERSONNEL RE: NYPA UPPER MANAGEMENT STYLE/RESPONSIVENESS. PANEL (3/2/94) CONCLUDED THAT NO SPECIFIC CORRESPONDENCE WAS REQUIRED. DRP TO ASSESS MGMT VIA NYPA ASESSMENT PANEL. DRS TO ASSESS PLANT MANAGER'S COMPETENCE AS ED. OI:RI WILL COMPARE RESULTS OF THEIR INTERVIEWS (FOR OTHER RELATED ALLEGATIONS) TO CONTENT OF RI-94-A-0029. CLOSED VIA 4/20/94 MEMO TO FILE FURTHER ASSMT OF IP3 MGMT TO BE COVERED BY IP3 NAP/RAP SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1B DRSS (EP) (OI:RI) ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: IP3 RESTART PLAN ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: N/A REFERENCE: KEYWORD: MANAGEMENT RESPONSIVENESS SS:N</p>				
RI-1994-A-0032	INDIAN POINT 3	Licensee Employee	2/15/1994	9/30/1994
1			N	9/30/1994
<p>PLANT MANAGER QUESTIONED STAFF'S ABILITY AND HOW TO HANDLE NY SENATOR'S QUESTIONING. THERE IS PRESSURE REGARDING ONGOING MODIFICATIONS AND MONEY. SAME ALLEGER LATER STATED THAT OTHER PLANT EMPLOYEES HAD HEARD PLANT MANAGER SAY THAT HE HAD LIED TO A NY STATE SENATOR. ### PANELED 3/2/94. W. KANE TO DEAL WITH NY STATE SENATOR ISSUE ACK LETTER TO BE SENT AFTER THAT ACTION COMPLETE. ACK/ CLOSEOUT LETTER SENT TO ALLEGER ON 9/29/94 BASED ON RESULTS OF CONVERSATIONS WITH NY STATE OFFICIALS. SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1B ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: 9/29/94 REFERENCE: KEYWORD: SS:N</p>				

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1994-A-0033	INDIAN POINT 3	Licensee Employee	2/15/1994	9/22/1994
1			N	9/22/1994
<p>ALLEGER FEELS HE HAS BEEN DEMOTED FOR RAISING CONCERNS REGARDING PLANT MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES SINCE 1991 ### PANELED 3/2/94. ACK. LTR. TO ALLEGER 3/16/94. ALLEGER INFORMED OI:RI INVESTIGATOR THAT HIS CONCERNS HAD DIMINISHED BECAUSE OF MANAGEMENT CHANGES AT IP3 AND BECAUSE THE SUPERVISOR WHO AD CAUSED HIS DEMOTION HAD RESIGNED. ALLEGER INFORMED OI:RI INVESTIGATOR THAT HE NO LONGER FELT AN INVESTIGATION WAS NECESSARY AND DID NOT CONTACT DOL. OI:RI CLOSED CASE 1-94-010 ON 6/13/94. CLOSEOUT LETTER WAS SENT TO ALLEGER ON 9/14/94. SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1B (OI:RI) ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: 9/14/94 REFERENCE: OI 1-94-010 KEYWORD: H&I SS:N</p>				
RI-1994-A-0055	INDIAN POINT 3	Licensee Employee	3/8/1994	7/15/1994
1			Y	7/15/1994
<p>INVESTIGATION INTO ROOT CAUSE OF LER 94-01 NOT CONDUCTED FAIRLY AND HONESTLY ### FORM ACK. LTRS. TO (4) ALLEGERS 3/15/94. PANELED 3/23/94. INSPECTED VIA IR 50-286/94-09. FOUND THAT WHILE THERE WERE SOME INACCURACIES IN THE LER, IT WAS THE BEST AVAILABLE INFORMATION AT THE TIME. A LATER REVISION TO THE LER CORRECTED THE DEFICIENCIES. COLS TO ALLEGERS 7/12/94. SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1B ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: 50-286/94-09 ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: 7/12/94 REFERENCE: KEYWORD: LER SS:U</p>				
RI-1994-A-0064	INDIAN POINT 3	Contractor Employee	3/17/1994	5/6/1994
1			N	5/6/1994
<p>ALLEGER SUSPENDED [REDACTED] [REDACTED] EVEN THOUGH DRUG TEST RESULTS WERE NEGATIVE. ### NOT PANELED (PILOT PROGRAM). COMBINED ACK./CLOSEOUT LETTER SENT TO ALLEGER ON 5/3/94. ALLEGATION NOT SUBSTANTIATED; LICENSEE IS PERMITTED BY REGULATIONS TO APPLY MORE STRINGENT CUTOFF LEVELS FOR TESTED SUBSTANCES. ALLEGER PROVIDED DOL INFO AS A COURTESY TO PURSUE HIS "WAGE & HOUR" ISSUE, IF HE STILL DESIRED SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1B ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: 5/3/94 REFERENCE: KEYWORD: FFD SS:N</p>				

EX
LC

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1994-A-0107	INDIAN POINT 3	See Description Field	5/20/1994	8/22/1994
1			N	8/22/1994
<p>LICENSEE PROVIDED TWO CONFLICTING DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE OPERABILITY OF THE SERVICE WATER SYSTEM FOR ITS SAFETY FUNCTION ### PANELED 5/20/94. OI:RI TO CONSIDER INTERVIEWING INDIVIDUAL WHO PROVIDED INFORMATION TO NRC STAFF MEMBER. REPANELED 7/14/94. AFTER REVIEW, STAFF SATISFIED THAT ISSUE WAS APPROPRIATELY ADDRESSED BY LICENSEE AND THAT THERE WAS NO WRONGDOING INVOLVED. OI:RI CLOSED CASE ON 7/25/94. SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1B (OI:RI) ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: _1-94-023 ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: N/A REFERENCE: KEYWORD: SSW, SERVICE WATER SS:U</p>		NONE		
RI-1994-A-0144	INDIAN POINT 3	Licensee Employee	7/27/1994	9/30/1994
1			N	9/30/1994
<p>1) MANAGEMENT DEFICIENCIES 2) MAY RAISE PREVIOUS H&I CASE AGAIN ### PANELED 8/10/94. ACK./CLOSEOUT LETTER SENT TO ALLEGER DATED 9/29/94 STATING THAT IT WAS NOT APPROPRIATE FOR NRC TO INTERVENE IN THE TYPES OF PERSONNEL DECISIONS DISCUSSED AND THAT OI:RI DID NOT INTEND TO REOPEN THE ALLEGER'S CASE UNLESS MORE SUBSTANTIVE INFORMATION COULD BE PROVIDED. SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1B ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: 9/29/94 REFERENCE: __RI-93-A-0278 KEYWORD: H&I SS:U</p>				
RI-1994-A-0158	INDIAN POINT 3	Licensee Employee	8/2/1994	8/26/1994
1			N	8/26/1994
<p>1) CONCERN ABOUT AMSAC SYSTEM RELIABILITY 2) INADEQUATE KNOWLEDGE AND TRAINING OF NYPA STAFF ON AMSAC 3) NRC REVIEW FOUND AMSAC TRAINING ADEQUATE, ALLEGER DISAGREES. ### PANELED 8/10/94. ACK./CLOSEOUT LETTER TO ALLEGER DATED 8/24/94. ALLEGER HAD LATER STATED THAT HE WAS SATISFIED WITH HOW NYPA WAS ADDRESSING ISSUE. SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1B ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: _8/24/94 REFERENCE: KEYWORD: AMSAC, TRAINING SS:U</p>				

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1994-A-0166	INDIAN POINT 3	Licensee Employee	8/15/1994	9/30/1994
1			N	9/30/1994
<p>SR. LEVEL MANAGER LACKS INTEGRITY; DIRECTED OERG INDIVIDUALS TO BE DISHONEST. HAD KNOWLEDGE OF A PLANT TRIP AND DID NOT CONVEY IT TO AN OERG INVESTIGATOR. ANOTEHR SR. LEVEL MANAGER DIRECTED IMPROPER ACTION TO A CONTRATOR FOR A SURVEY OF FIRE PROTECTION (SEPARATION) BOARDS (SEE RI-94-A- 0167) LERS DID NOT REFLECT ACTUAL EVENTS PROCEDURE. PUMP WAS DESTROYRD. ### PANELED 8/24/94. PANEL RECOMMEDMED_ACK/CLOSEOUT INFORAMTION TO BE INCLUDED IN RESPONSE TO RI-94-A-0144. ACK/CLOSEOUT LETTER TO ALLEGER DATED 9/29/94. SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1B ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: 9/29/94 REFERENCE:RI-94-A-0144, 0167, 0166, 0168, 0032, RI-93-A-0278KEYWORD: FIRE PROTECTION, MANAGEMENT INTEGRITY SS:U</p>				
RI-1994-A-0167	INDIAN POINT 3	Contractor Employee	8/16/1994	7/31/1996
1			Y	7/31/1996
<p>1) IN 1987. MAINT. MGR. DIRECTED THAT ONLY THE TRANSITE (FIRE PROTECTION) BOARDS VISIBLE FROM FLOOR BE REPAIRED 2) IN 1989-1990, NYPA INSTALLED INADEQIATE WORM GEARS (INTEGRAL TRAVEL STOPS) IN SERVICE WATER VALVES 3) IN 1989, NYPA MAINT. MGMT. DIRECTED CONSTRUCTION NOT TO __UNCOUPLE RECIRC MOTOR FROM PUMP FOR ROTATION CHECK DESPITE PROCEDURE. PUMP WAS DESTROYRD. ### PANELED 8/24/94. ACK. LTR. 8/31/94. PANEL RECOMMEDMED TRANSFER TO LICENCEE, BUT OI STILL CONCERNED ABOUT POTENTIALWRONGDOING ISSUE. _REPANELED 9/7/94; OI:RI WILL ATTEMPT TO INTERVIEW INDIVIDUAL DURING WEEK OF 9/12/94; DRP TO WAIT UNTIL OI:RI INITIAL INTERVIEW IS COMPLETED BEFORE CONSIDERING REFERRAL TO THE LICENSEE. _REPANELED 10/19/94; ISSUES TO BEREFERRED TO LICENSEE. OI:RI RPT.ISSUES 11/2/94; CLOSED ON HIGHER PRIORITIES. RTL 12/16/94; LIC RESP. 2/16/95. REPANEL 2/22/95; ISSUES TO BE DISCUSSED VIA NAP (MAY AFFECT CLOSURE)FINAL CLOSEOUT LETTER 7/31/96. SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1B _____ (OI:RI) ACTION PENDING: _NONE DOCUMENTATION: ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: 7/31/94 REFERENCE: KEYWORD: FIRE PROTECTION, VALVE, PUMP SS:U</p>				

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>	<u>Basis for Closure</u>			
RI-1994-A-0168	INDIAN POINT 3	Licensee Employee	8/18/1994	9/30/1994
1			N	9/30/1994
<p>EX 7C</p> <p>ALLEGER-FEELS HE WAS REMOVED FROM HIS OLD POSITION AS [REDACTED] BECAUSE OF ISSUES HE DISCUSSED W/NRC FEELS NRC SHOULD REVIEW PAST ISSUES THAT MAY HAVE IMPACTED NUCLEAR SAFETY DUE TO BAD MANAGEMENT (PROVIDED ISSUE OF RI-94-A-0167 AS AN EXAMPLE) ### PANELED 8/24/94. PANEL RECOMMENDED ACK/CLOSEOUT INFORMATION TO BE INCLUDED IN RESPONSE TO RI-94-A-0144. ACK/CLOSEOUT LETTER TO ALLEGER ON 9/29/94. SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1B ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: 9/29/94 REFERENCE: RI-94-A-0144, RI-94-A-0167 KEYWORD: FIRE PROTECTION, MANAGEMENT INTEGRITY, H&I SS:U</p>				
RI-1994-A-0204	INDIAN POINT 3	Former Contractor Employee	9/28/1994	4/26/1995
1			N	4/26/1995
<p>A WELDING INSPECTOR HAS QUESTIONABLE INTEGRITY AND MAY BIAS RESULTS BASED ON OUTSIDE PRESSURES. ### ACK. LETTER SENT 10/4/94. DRS TO ASSESS WHETHER TEST WELD RECORDS ARE STORED/AVAILABLE FOR REVIEW. IF SO, CAN BE REVIEWED AS PARE OF RAP REVIEW ITEM ON RADIOGRAPHY. IF NOT, CLOSE ISSUE W/ALLEGER AND INDICATE GENERAL NRC REVIEW EFFORTS TO LOOK AT WELD INSPECTION AT IP-3. CLOSEOUT LETTER TO ALLEGER DATED 4/18/95. SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1B ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: 4/18/95 REFERENCE: KEYWORD: WELD SS: U</p>				

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1994-A-0267	INDIAN POINT 3	Licensee Employee	12/19/1994	8/9/1995
1			Y	8/9/1995
<p>1) ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEW CONTROL ROOM SUPERVISOR (CRS) POSIITONA AND THE REACTOR OPERATORS ARE NOT WELL ESTABLISHED. 2) NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATORS (NPO) WILL BECOME FIRE BRIGADE LEADERS AND THEY DO NOT HAVE THE REQUIRED KNOWLEDGE. ### PANELED 12/27/94; NEEDS ACK. LTR. NPO FBL CONCERN TO BE RTL'D; DRP TO INSPECT CONTROL ROOM SUPERVISOR ISSUE. ACK. LTR. 12/29/94. _FBL CONCERN REFERRED TO LICENSEE VIA LETTER DATED 1/25/95. _LICENSEE RESPONSE 2/24/95. CONTROL ROOOM SUPERVISOR ISSUE REVIEWED VIA RATI INSPECTION (REPORT ISSUED 5/25/95). CLOEOEUT LETTER TO ALLEGER 8/9/95. SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1B ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: _50-286/95-80 ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: 8/9/95 REFERENCE: KEYWORD: OPERATOR, FIRE BRIGADE SS:U</p>				
RI-1995-A-0016	INDIAN POINT 3	Licensee Employee	1/22/1995	9/22/1995
1			Y	9/22/1995
<p>NYP A HAS NOT REPORTED MANY REPORTABLE CONDITIONS PER 10 CFR 50.72, APPARENTLY ASSOCIATED WITH FIRE PROTECTION. ### PANELED 1/25/95; DRP INITIALLY CONSIDERED SENDING UCS A REQUEST FOR THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE ALLEGER, BUT IS RECONSIDERING. _ACK. LTR. TO ALLEGER 3/3/95. _REP NLED 3/22/95 DRS TO REVIEW 3 ISSUES NOTED IN ALLEGER'S 2/15/95 LETTER; NAP WILL ASSESS RESULTS OF INSPECTION AND OVERALL ISSUE. REPANELED 4/5/95;ADDL. INFO ALLEGED POTENTIAL HARASSMENT; OI:RI WILL OPEN CASE (ON OTHER ALLEGERS). REPANELED 9/6/95; NEED CLOSEOUT LETTER TO 95-0016 ALLEGER INFORMING HIM THAT BOTH TECHNICAL & H&I ISSUES BEING FOLLOWED UP W/SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALS. CLOSEOUT LTR. TO ALLGER 9/19/95 SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1B_(DRS) ESS _____(OI:RI) ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: _50-286/95-10, 95-81 ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: 9/19/95 REFERENCE: _RI-95-A-0074,75,82,83. KEYWORD: FIRE PROTECTION, REPORTABILITY</p>				

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1995-A-0048	INDIAN POINT 2	Anonymous	3/16/1995	7/18/1995
1			Y	7/18/1995
<p>1) IP-2 LEVEL III NDE EXAMINERS DO NOT HAVE COMPLETE QUALIFICATION RECORDS 2) IP-2 WRITTEN PRACTICE FOR QUAL. CERTS. OF NDE PERSONNEL IS INADEQUATE 3) ISI PROGRAM ADMINISTRATOR NOT QUALIFIED FOR THE JOB 4) IP-2 NDE/ISI PROCEDURES ARE OUT OF DATE ### PANELED 3/16/95; DRS (MODES/BLOUGH) TO ASSESS ALLEGATION INFORMATION FOR INCORPORATION INTO FORTHCOMING INSPECTION @ IP-2 (WEEK OF 3/20/95) - DRS TO INSPECT. INSPECTED BY DRS VIA 50-247/95-07. FOUND A PROBLEM WITH ONE NDE EXAMINER'S QUAL RECORDS (LVL IV NOV); PROBLEMS WITH WRITTEN PRACTICE FOR QUAL CERTS (NCV); FOUND SOME PROCEDURE PROBLEMS, PROGRAM ADMINISTRATOR WAS QUALIFIED. CLOSEOUT MEMO TO FILE 7/18/95. SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1A (DRS) MPS ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: _____ ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: 3/16/95 (RECEIPT - ANONYMOUS) REFERENCE: KEYWORD: NDE, ISI, QUALIFICATION SS: _U</p>			NONE	
RI-1995-A-0055	INDIAN POINT 3	Anonymous	4/3/1995	4/24/1995
1			N	4/24/1995
<p>DURING A PUBLIC MEETING AFTER THE IP3 RADIATION ENTRANCE, A MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC ALLEGED THAT IP3 EMPLOYEES BELIEVE THAT THE NRC WOULD NOT BE RESPONSIVE TO CONCERNS BROUGHT TO THEM. ALLEGER STATED THIS IS WHY THE FIRE PROTECTION ISSUES WERE BROUGHT TO MR. ROBERT POLLARD RATHER THAN THE NRC. ### PANELED 4/5/95; SAC TO CALL ALLEGER AND PROVIDE HER WITH IG 800 NUMBER; WILL ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN MORE SPECIFIC INFO, IF POSSIBLE. SAC INFORMED DRA ON 4/12/95; DRA WILL INFORM IG AND TELL THEM OF INTENT TO CALL ALLEGER. SAC CONTACTED ALLEGER BY PHONE ON 4/21/95; ALLEGER OFFERED NO ADDL. INFO AND WAS NOT EXPECTING ANY RESPONSE FROM NRC; INDICATED THAT NRC NEEDS TO TALK TO (ALLEGER FROM RI-95-A-0016) TO RESOLVE ISSUE. ISSUE TO BE CLOSED BASED ON ALLEGER'S COMMENTS; ISSUE BEING REVIEWED UNDER RI-95-A-0016. CLOSEOUT MEMO TO FILE ISSUED 4/21/95. SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1B ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: 4/21/95 (TELECON) REFERENCE: KEYWORD: SS: _U</p>				

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1995-A-0065	INDIAN POINT 3	Anonymous	4/11/1995	7/18/1995
1			N	7/18/1995
<p>NYPA (IP3 & FITZ) DOES NOT DO 10 CFR 50.59 REVIEWS FOR PROCEDURE/FSAR/DESIGN DRAWING CHANGES THAT ARE DERIVED FROM "AS-BUILT" WALKDOWNS -- NYPA POLICY IS THAT ONLY PROCEDURES SPECIFICALLY DESCRIBED IN FSAR WARRANT 50.59 REVIEW, ALL OTHER PROCEDURES NOT ADDRESSED. ALLEGER STATES, INFO. PRESENTED TO NRC REGARDING DEGREE OF COMPLETION OF LONGER- TERM RESTART ACTIONS WERE GROSSLY INFLATED. ### PANELED 4/19/95; RATI AND RESIDENTS TO INSPECT ISSUE AND ADDRESS IN IRS. ALLEGATIONS WERE FOUND NOT TO BE SUBSTANTIATED BY INSPECTOR FOLLOWUP AND REVIEW OF PAST INSPECTION RESULTS. CLOSEOUT MEMO TO FILE DATED 7/18/95. SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1B ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: 50-333/94-17,23,25,95-08; 50-247/93-22,95-80 ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: 4/11/95 (RECEIPT) REFERENCE: KEYWORD: SAFETY REVIEW SS:_U</p>			NONE	
RI-1995-A-0074	INDIAN POINT 3	Contractor Employee	4/13/1995	2/23/1996
1			N	2/23/1996
<p>HARRASSMENT AND DISCRIMINATION BY NYPA EMPLOYEES FOR RAISING FIRE PROTECTION ISSUES. ### PANELED 5/22/95; OI:RI TO INVESTIGATE H&I. PANELED 2/21/96; CLOSEOUT LTRS TO ALLEGERS/CLOSEOUT LTR TO LICENSEE FORWARD SYNOPSIS (DRP 3/1/96). CLOSEOUT MEMO DOCUMENTING REVIEW OF OI TRANSCRIPTS TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE WERE ADDITIONAL TECHNICAL ISSUES (DONE). CLOSEOUT LTR TO ALLEGER W/SYNOPSIS SENT 2/23/96. H&I NOT SUBSTANTIATED. SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1B OI:RI ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: 2/23/96 REFERENCE: RI-95-A-0016, 0075, 0082, 0083 KEYWORD: H&I SS:</p>				

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1995-A-0075	INDIAN POINT 3	Contractor Employee	4/19/1995	2/23/1996
1			N	2/23/1996
<p>HARRASSMENT BY NYPA EMPLOYEE FOR WRITING OPERATIONS PROCEDURES IN TOO MUCH DETAIL. ### PANELED 5/22/95; OI:RI TO INVESTIGATE H&I ISSUE; DRS STAFF WILL ATTEMPT TO RESPOND TO TECHNICAL ISSUE WHICH IS OUTSIDE PLANT DESIGN BASIS. PANELED 2/21/96; NEED CLOSEOUT LTRS TO ALLEGER; CLOSEOUT LTR TO LICENSEE FORWARD COPY OF SYNOPSIS;&CLOSOUT MEMO TO FILE DOCUMENTING REVIEW OF OI TRANSCRIPTS TO DETERMINE WHETHER ANY ADDITIONAL TECH ISSUES (DONE). CLOSEOUT LTR TO ALLEGER W/SYNOPSIS AND REPORT 95-10 SENT 2/23/96. OI:RI DID NOT SUBSTANTIATE H&. OI SYNOPSIS TO LICENSEE 2/23/96. SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1B _____ OI:RI</p> <p>ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: 59-286/95-10 ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: 2/23/96 REFERENCE: RI-95-A-0016, 0074, 0082, 0083 KEYWORD: H&I, FIRE PROTECTION SS:</p>		NONE		
RI-1995-A-0080	INDIAN POINT 2	Contractor Employee	5/2/1995	7/25/1995
1			N	7/25/1995
<p>(1) ASBESTOS ALL OVER THE PLANT (APPARENT UNCONTROLLED). (2) HARRASSMENT FOR RAISING ISSUE TO NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. ### PANELED 5/22/95; NEEDS ACK./CLOSEOUT LETTER TO ALLEGER; ISSUE IS OUTSIDE OF NRC PURVIEW. DRP WILL CHECK WITH BRANCH CHIEF TO SEE IF H&I ISSUE SHOULD BE REFERRED TO OSHA. ACK./CLOSE-OUT LETTER DATED 7/18/95; ALLEGER AGAIN PROVIDED PROPER OSHA CONTACT AND INFORMED THAT WHILE HE MAY HAVE WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION RIGHTS UNDER OTHER FEDERAL STATUTES, NRC'S DOES NOT APPLY. SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1A ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: 7/18/95 REFERENCE: KEYWORD: OSHA SS:</p>				

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1995-A-0082	INDIAN POINT 3	Licensee Employee	5/3/1995	2/23/1996
1			N	2/23/1996
<p>ALLEGER STATED THAT HE WAS HARASSED AND DISCRIMINATED AGAINST BY NYPA MANAGERS FOR RAISING AND PURSUING NUCLEAR SAFETY ISSUES ON FIRE PROTECTION. THE DISCRIMINATION IS IN THE FORM OF A POOR JOB PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL THAT HAS SINCE BEEN ORDERED RESCINDED BY NYPA EXECUTIVE VP. ### PANELED 5/22/95. NO UNRESOLVED TECHNICAL CONCERNS; OI:RI TO INVESTIGATE H&I ISSUE. ACK.LTR. 5/25/95. SUPP. INFO FM NYPA 10/20/95 RE:NYPA INTERVIEW W/ALLEGER (FOR OTHER REASONS). SINCE TECH. ISSUES RELATE TO PRIOR EMERGENCY LIGHTING ISSUESRAISED BY ALGR WHICH HE FELT HAD BEEN TECHNICALLY RESOLVED, & ALSO SINCE EMERG. LIGHT. BATT. MAINT. HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY REVIEWED BY DRS PRIOR TO IP-3 RESTART, INFORMATION TO BE PLACED IN EXISTING ALLEGER FILE (RI-95-A-0082).RESIDENTS WILL ASK LICENSEE TO PROVIDE THEIR FOLLOWUP ON SUPP. INFO. PANELED 2/21/96; COLTA TO ALGR/LIC 2/23/96;H&I NOT SUBST. SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1B _____ OI:RI ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: 2/23/96 REFERENCE: RI-95-A-0016, 0074, 0075, 0083 KEYWORD:H&I</p>				
RI-1995-A-0083	INDIAN POINT 3	Licensee Employee	5/4/1995	2/23/1996
1			N	2/23/1996
<p>ALLEGER STATED THAT HE RECEIVED A POOR PERFORMANCE APPRAISALAND WAS DEMOTED BECAUSE HE HAD RAISED AND PURSUED NUCLEAR SAFETY ISSUES. ### PANELED 5/22/95; OI:RI TO INVESTIGATE H&I ISSUE; DRS TO INSPECT TECH. ISSUES NOT LOOKED AT BY RATI IN 5/95. REPANELED 6/21/95; TECHNICAL ISSUES HAVE BEEN REVIEWED AND RESOLVED BY DRP; NEED LETTER TO ALLEGER CLOSING OUT TECHNIC.ISSUES. ACK. LTR. 6/26/95. PANELED 2/21/96; NEED COLTA TO ALGR AND LIC W/COPY OF SYNOPSIS; CLOSEOUT MEMO_TO FILE DOCUMENTING REVIEW OF OI TRANSCRIPTS FOR ANY ADDL TECH. (DONE). OI:RI DID NOT SUBSTANTIATE H&I. COLTA TO ALGR. W/OI SYNOPSIS & COPY OF IR 95-10 SENT 2/23/96. OI SYNOPSIS SENT TO LICENSEE 2/23/96. SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1B _ESS (DRS) _____ OI:RI ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: 50-286/95-10 ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: 2/23/96 REFERENCE: RI-95-A-0016, 0074, 0075, 0082 KEYWORD:H&I</p>				

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1995-A-0085	INDIAN POINT 2	Former Contractor Employee	5/11/1995	6/20/1995
1			Y	6/20/1995
<p>ALLEGER STATED RADWASTE WAS "DUMPED" INTO INDIAN POINT UNIT 1 STORM/FLOOR DRAIN (DIRECT PATH TO HUDSON RIVER) FROM 1965 UNTIL DECOMMISSIONING. ### PANELED 5/22/95; NEEDS ACK LTR TO ALGR REQUESTING THAT HE PROVIDE "EVIDENCE" OF IP-1 RADWASTE LEAKAGE OR ISSUE WILL BECLOSED._COMBINED ACK/CLOSEOUT LETER TO ALLEGER DATED 6/15/95NOTES NRC AWARENESS OF POTENTIAL FOR UNMONITORED RELEASES FROM IP-1 AND RESULTS OF REVIEWS OF PAST EVENTS. SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1A ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED:_6/15/95 REFERENCE: KEYWORD:</p>		NONE		
RI-1995-A-0109	INDIAN POINT 2	Anonymous	6/30/1995	10/5/1995
1			N	10/5/1995
<p>AN ANONYMOUS OPEN ITEM REPORT (OIR) WAS RECEIVED BY THE CON-EDISON OMBUDSMAN ON 4/24/95 WHICH STATED THAT MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL WERE BEING INFLUENCED FROM WRITING OIRS THROUGH THREATS TO CAREER PATH AND EMPLOYMENT. OF THE OIRS THAT ARE WRITTEN, SOME ARE NOT SUBMITTED TO QA BY UPPER MANAGE- MENT. ### PANELED 7/12/95; DRP TO INSPECT OIR PROCESS; OI:RI WILL WAITFOR RESULTS OF INSPECTION._INSPECTED DURING OPERATIONAL SAFETY TEAM INSPECTION (OSTI) IN 6-7/95; OVERALL, OSTI FOUNDOIR PROCESS TO BE GOOD. THERE ARE SOME MINOR PROBLEMS, BUT THEY ARE NOT PERVASIVE._DRP DISCUSSED W/OI ON 10/5/95, OI:RIFOUND NO ISSUES FOR THEM TO PURSUE. CLOSEOUT MEMO TO FILE 10/5/95. SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1A ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION:_IR 50-247/95-80 ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED:_N/A REFERENCE: KEYWORD:H&I</p>				

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	

RI-1995-A-0110 INDIAN POINT 2 Contractor Employee

6/28/1996

1

N

In a conversation with the resident inspector at Indian Point Unit 2 (IP2) on June 28, 1995, an allegor raised a concern regarding alleged harassment and intimidation while performing duties as a quality control inspector at IP2. Specifically, the allegor indicated that he/she was subject to harassment and intimidation in February 1995 during work on an emergency diesel generator fuel oil tank modification. The allegor stated that he/she was harassed by a system engineer regarding a sign-off for a weld and again subjected to harassment and intimidation for raising issues about work practices in the vapor containment. The allegor was removed from work with the construction group for identifying a problem with removing an electrical breaker from a control cabinet without authorization.

On September 25, 1995, the allegor filed a discrimination complaint with the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) asserting that he/she was harassed, intimidated, and coerced if he/she did not sign-off a weld hold-point on the demand of two employees. The allegor also indicated in the DOL complaint that he/she was told by management to take the next day off and was subsequently removed from overseeing the construction work group after identifying a non-conforming condition. The allegor's employment ended in June 1995, after informing management that he/she would file a complaint with the NRC. The allegor stated that he/she was asked if he/she would still file a complaint with the NRC if there were work available through 1996.

On July 12, 1995, the NRC I Field Office, initiated an in Consolidated Edison Company discriminated against a former (QA) Inspector at the Indian Point for raising safety concerns. Based during the investigation, OI could former contractor QA Inspector was raised against raising safety concerns at IP2. The report No. 1-95-036 was issued on November 9, 1995. The results of the OI investigation were provided to the allegor in a letter dated January 22, 1996.

On October 26, 1995, the DOL Area Director issued a decision that discrimination was not a factor in the actions comprising the complaint. The DOL Area Director indicated that the allegor's employment was terminated because the termination was part of a planned reduction in force and not due to protected activities. The DOL Area Director also stated that the other personnel actions mentioned in the allegor's complaint were found to be due to personality conflicts and not in engagement in protected activities. The allegor appealed this decision to the DOL Administrative Law Judge (DOL-ALJ). On October 14, 1997, the DOL-ALJ rendered a decision and order dismissing the allegor's complaint because the allegor failed to prove that he/she was discriminated against due to protected activity. The DOL-ALJ noted that any adverse action taken against the allegor from February 21, 1995, through the preparation of his/her performance evaluations on September 25, 1995, were taken for legitimate business reasons and were not retaliatory. The allegor appealed the DOL-ALJ decision to the DOL Administrative Review Board (DOL-ARB).

Subsequently, on May 30, 1997, the allegor filed a second discrimination complaint to DOL asserting that he/she was not hired at Indian Point 3 because of prior knowledge about the concern he/she previously raised at IP2. A new allegation file (RI-97-A-0112) was opened to track the DOL decisions in regards to this second discrimination complaint. On July 7, 1997, the DOL Area Director rendered a decision that discrimination was not a factor in the allegor's second complaint. The allegor appealed. On July 27, 1998, the DOL-ALJ rendered a decision to dismiss because the allegor failed to establish a prima facie case. The allegor appealed. DOL-ARB combined both discrimination complaints under one DOL-ARB case (Case No. 98-007).

Since (1) Allegation File No. RI-97-A-0112 continues to monitor the DOL decisions in regards to the allegor's complaint that is before the DOL-ARB, (2) OI did not substantiate discrimination, and (3) DOL Area Director and ALJ have not substantiated that discrimination occurred, this Allegation File is being administratively closed.

*O I
NOT
SUBSTANTIATED*

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1995-A-0110	INDIAN POINT 2	Contractor Employee	6/28/1995	6/29/1999
2			N	6/29/1999
ALLEGER SUBJECT TO H&I FOR RAISING ISSUES ABOUT MORE RECENT WORK PRACTICES IN VAPOR CONTAINMENT. REMOVED FROM WORK GROUP FOR IDENTIFYING PROBLEMS.			On July 12, 1995, the NRC Office of Investigations (OI), Region I Field Office, initiated an investigation to determine whether the Consolidated Edison Company of New York (ConEd) discriminated against a former contractor Quality Assurance (QA) Inspector at the Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2, for raising safety concerns. Based on the evidence developed during the investigation, OI could not substantiate that the former contractor QA Inspector was discriminated against raising safety concerns at IP2. The OI Report No. 1-95-036 was issued on November 9, 1995. The results of the OI investigation were provided to the allegor in a letter dated January 22, 1996.	
			On October 26, 1995, the DOL Area Director issued a decision that discrimination was not a factor in the actions comprising the complaint. The DOL Area Director indicated that the allegor's employment was terminated because the termination was part of a planned reduction in force and not due to protected activities. The DOL Area Director also stated that the other personnel actions mentioned in the allegor's complaint were found to be due to personality conflicts and not in engagement in protected activities. The allegor appealed this decision to the DOL Administrative Law Judge (DOL-ALJ). On October 14, 1997, the DOL-ALJ rendered a decision and order dismissing the allegor's complaint because the allegor failed to prove that he/she was discriminated against due to protected activity. The DOL-ALJ noted that any adverse action taken against the allegor from February 21, 1995, through the preparation of his/her performance evaluations on September 25, 1995, were taken for legitimate business reasons and were not retaliatory. The allegor appealed the DOL-ALJ decision to the DOL Administrative Review Board (DOL-ARB).	
			Subsequently, on May 30, 1997, the allegor filed a second discrimination complaint to DOL asserting that he/she was not hired at Indian Point 3 because of prior knowledge about the concern he/she previously raised at IP2. A new allegation file (RI-97-A-0112) was opened to track the DOL decisions in regards to this second discrimination complaint. On July 7, 1997, the DOL Area Director rendered a decision that discrimination was not a factor in the allegor's second complaint. The allegor appealed. On July 27, 1998, the DOL-ALJ rendered a decision to dismiss because the allegor failed to establish a prima facie case. The allegor appealed. DOL-ARB combined both discrimination complaints under one DOL-ARB case (Case No. 98-007).	
			Since (1) Allegation File No. RI-97-A-0112 continues to monitor the DOL decisions in regards to the allegor's complaint that is before the DOL-ARB, (2) OI did not substantiate discrimination, and (3) DOL Area Director and ALJ have not substantiated that discrimination occurred, this Allegation File is being administratively closed.	

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1995-A-0117	INDIAN POINT 3	Private Citizen	7/4/1995	8/14/1995
1			N	8/14/1995
<p>IP-3 SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN RESTARTED BECAUSE OF ALL ITS PROBLEMS. PLANT IS TOO CLOSE TO NYC. BUILT ON GEOLOGIC FAULT. SEABROOK EVAC PLAN "IS A JOKE". ### DID NOT GO TO PANEL. BEFORE PANEL, BRANCH 1 INFORMED SAC THAT ALLEGATION LETTER WAS SIMILAR TO MANY OTHER LETTERS THAT HAD RECENTLY BEEN RECEIVED BY NRC REGARDING STARTUP OF IP3. ISSUES ARE GENERAL, OLD, WELL-KNOWN COMMENTS AND RESPONSES ARE BEING COORDINATED BY NRR. CLOSED ALLEGATION ADMINISTRATIVELY ON 8/14/95. SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1B ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: NRR WILL CONTACT REFERENCE: KEYWORD: RESTART</p>			NONE	
RI-1995-A-0145	INDIAN POINT 3	Anonymous	8/21/1995	2/14/1996
1			Y	2/14/1996
<p>NYPA HAS NOT RESOLVED REQUIRED FIRE PROTECTION OPEN ITEMS BEFORE STARTUP, QUESTIONS ASSESSMENT OF OPERABILITY/ REPORTABILITY RE: DEFICIENCIES IN EMERGENCY LIGHTING AND BLACKOUT TESTING, TOO MANY ISSUES RELATED TO IP3 DBDS HAVING NOT BEEN REVIEWED. ### PANELED 9/6/95; FIRE PROTECTION & BLACKOUT TESTING ISSUES TO BE REVIEWED BY RESIDENTS; DBD ISSUES TO BE REVIEWED BY DRS. INSPECTED VIA IRS 50-286/95-14 & 95-15; ALLEGATION PARTIALLY SUBSTANTIATED; NOV ISSUES RE: DELAYS IN RESOLVING EMERGENCY LIGHTING ISSUES SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1B DRS PSS ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: 50-286/95-14; 95-15 ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: N/A REFERENCE: KEYWORD: FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY LIGHTING</p>				

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1995-A-0162	INDIAN POINT 3	Private Citizen	9/22/1995	1/23/1996
1			N	1/23/1996
(1) NYPA IS CONTINUING INAPPROPRIATE CONDUCT DESCRIBED IN NRC INSPECTION REPORT 8/28/95 (2) EMERGENCY LIGHTING IS INADEQUATE (3) NYPA MAY NOT MEETS ITS COMMITMENT TO COMPLETE A FIRE PROTECTION DBD BY 12/29/95 (4) NYPA IS NOT ACTIVELY PURSUING COMMITMENT TO COMPLETE MODIFICATIONS WITHIN 60 DAYS OF STARTUP (5) OPERATING OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS (EVENTS: 2357724618, 24620, 25668). NRC HAS NOT TAKEN ACTION. ### PANELED 10/5/95; DRS TO INSPECT FIRE PROTECTION/EMERG. LIGHTING/DBD/MOD COMPLETION ISSUES; DRP TO REVIEW EVENTS ISSUE. ACK. LTR. 10/12/95. ISSUES FOLLOWED UP VIA SEVERAL INSPECTIONS AND TECHNICAL DOCUMENT REVIEWS (SEE ATTACHMENTS TO CLOSEOUT LETTER). ISSUE RE: EMERGENCY LIGHTING WAS PARTIALLY SUBSTANTIATED IN THAT INSPECTORS FOUND NYPA'S RESOLUTION OF SEVERAL EMERGENCY LIGHTING ISSUES TO BE WEAK; HOWEVER, REPORTING ASPECT OF EMERGENCY LIGHTING ISSUE WAS NOT SUBSTANTIATED. CLOSEOUT LETTER TO ALLEGER 1/22/96. SUPPORT OFFICE: _RPS-1B ACTION PENDING: DOCUMENTATION: ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: _1/22/96 REFERENCE: _RI-95-A-0016, 0074, 0075, 0082, 0083 KEYWORD: _EMERGENCY LIGHTING FIRE PROTECTION		NONE		
RI-1995-A-0178	INDIAN POINT 2	Anonymous	10/20/1995	11/17/1995
1			N	11/17/1995
10/13/95 CON ED HP PERSONNEL ESTABLISHED A TEMPORARY CONTROLLED AREA AROUND SEVERAL ON-SITE BUILDINGS AS A PRECAUTION TO PREVENT ACCIDENTAL EXPOSURES DURING THE TRANS-FER OF HIGH INTEGRITY CONTAINERS FOR OFF-SITE SHIPPING PURPOSES. THEY ENLISTED SECURITY FORCE. A NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR WILLFULLY IGNORED A SECURITY GUARD'S INSTRUCTIONS NOT TO PROCEED. NPO'S SITE ACCESS HAS BEEN SUSPENDED. ### PANELED 11/8/95; SINCE TECHNICAL ISSUE WAS OF VERY MINOR SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE AND SINCE A LOW-LEVEL EMPLOYEE WAS INVOLVED, STAFF AND OI:RI INDICATED NO INTEREST IN PURSUING AS A STAFF SUSPECTED WRONGDOING ISSUE. SINCE NO OI CASE IS TO BE OPENED, ALLEGATION FILE WILL BE CLOSED. SUPPORT OFFICE: _RPS-1A ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: _N/A REFERENCE: KEYWORD: _SSW ISSUE				

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1995-A-0204	INDIAN POINT 3	Licensee Employee	11/22/1995	5/30/1997
1			N	5/30/1997
1/5/95 NYPA QC INSPECTOR INITIATED A DER TO DOCUMENT RESULTS OF ACCEPTANCE TESTING PERFORMED BY VENDOR AFTER REFURBISH OF RHR PUMP MOTOR. VENDOR SAID TEST - SATISFACTORY, QC INSPECTOR CURRENT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PHASES WERE UNACCEPT.			NRC Inspection Report 50-286/96-01 - stated in 11/21/96 letter to allegor.	
		SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1B, ACTION PENDING: REPANEL AFTER DRP REVIEW OF OI INTER 5/15/96, DOCUMENTATION:, ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED:, REFERENCE:, KEYWORD: RHR PUMP		
	INDIAN POINT 3	Licensee Employee	11/22/1995	5/30/1997
2			N	5/30/1997
1994 acceptance by an unqualified inspector of Whittaker H2 monitors which allegor previously determined did not meet the purchase spec requirements			NRC Inspection Report 50-286/96-08.	
	INDIAN POINT 3	Licensee Employee	11/22/1995	5/30/1997
3			N	5/30/1997
Electrical safety problems at IP-3 in February 1995			National Electric Code issues involving support facilities outside the plant protected area and thus, not within NRC regulatory purview. Immediate safety concerns were corrected or temporarily resolved via de-energization and locking out of select electrical power supplies.	
	INDIAN POINT 3	Licensee Employee	11/22/1995	5/30/1997
4			N	5/30/1997
The use of several hundred feet of wiring with PVC insulation in a non-safety related reverse osmosis unit at FitzPatrick.			NRC review of matter found that the use of such wire by NYPA is a rare occurrence and permitted only in limited applications where no practical alternative exists. Reg Guide 1.120 and Branch Tech Position 9.5-1 indicate that the use of the wire is prohibited due to possibility of toxic fumes.	

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1996-A-0010	INDIAN POINT 3	Licensee Employee	1/22/1996	2/20/1996
1			N	2/20/1996
INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF MANAGEMENT EXPECTATIONS REGARD PROCEDURE USE AND ADHERENCE. CONTRACTORS SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO USE DER PROCESS AS REQUIRED IN NYPA ADMIN PROCEDURE AP-8. CONCERN SPECIFICALLY APPLIES TO IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DEVIATION AND EVENT REPORTING (DER) PROCESS. ALLEGER HAS DISCUSSED WITH SITE EXECUTIVE OFFICER (SEO) AND RAISED THIS ISSUE WITH THE SPEAKOUT PROGRAM AT IP-3. ALLEGER NOT SATISFIED W/RESPONSE. ### PANELED 2/7/96; NEEDS ACK/CLOSEOUT LETTER; NOV ALREADY ISSUED ON MATTER; NO EVIDENCE OF OTHER CONTRACTORS NOT WRITING DERS WHEN REQUIRED. ACK. CLOSEOUT LETTER TO ALLEGER 2/8/96. SUPPORT OFFICE: RPS-1B ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: 50-285/95-15 & NOV ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: 2/8/96 REFERENCE: KEYWORD: DER PROCESS			The NRC considers NYPA's response to this issue acceptable and acknowledged NYPA's response in a 1/22/96 letter.	
RI-1996-A-0099	INDIAN POINT 2	Anonymous	4/16/1996	2/3/1997
1			Y	2/3/1997
ANONYMOUS INDIVIDUAL ASSERTS THAT SET OF SECURITY KEYS WERE LOST ON 4/9/96 AND THAT THE FACT THAT THEY WERE LOST FOR SOME TIME PERIOD WAS NOT REPORTED TO OR BY CONTRACTOR AND CON ED SECURITY FORCE MEMBERS NOR WAS IT REPORTED TO NRC.			NRC Inspection Report No. 50-247/96-07 and Notice of Violation	
RI-1996-A-0112	INDIAN POINT 2	Anonymous	4/29/1996	10/2/1996
1			N	10/2/1996
Early in 1995 during the IP-2 refueling outage, a loss of core cooling occurred. A tagout was issued by a Senior Watch Supervisor that isolated service water to component cooling heat exchangers which cool RHR.			Closure memo to file based on review of licensee's inspection report.	
RI-1996-A-0125	INDIAN POINT 3	Former Licensee Employee	5/16/1996	2/4/1997
1			N	11/20/1996
RECEIPT OF DOL COMPLAINT: ALLEGER WAS TERMINATED IN 11/95 BE CAUSE HE NOTIFIED THE LICENSEE OF ALLEGED VIOLATIONS AND TESTIFIED BEFORE NRC (INTERVIEWED BY OI)			DOL ARB issued settlement and dismissed case.	
	INDIAN POINT 3	Former Licensee Employee	5/16/1996	2/4/1997
2			N	2/4/1997
TECHNICAL CONCERNS ARE: FIRE PROTECTION.			NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-286/95-80, 95-81, 95-05	
	INDIAN POINT 3	Former Licensee Employee	5/16/1996	2/4/1997
3			N	2/4/1997
INADEQUATE DESIGN CONTROL AND ENGINEER CHANGE PROGRAM.				

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1996-A-0125	INDIAN POINT 3	Former Licensee Employee	5/16/1996	2/4/1997
4			N	2/4/1997
NONCOMPLIANCE W/ GENERIC LETTER 83-28.		NRC Inspection Report No. 50-286/96-11 dated 1/29/97 and Notice of Violation		
RI-1996-A-0138	INDIAN POINT 2	Licensee Employee	6/6/1996	3/6/1997
1			N	3/6/1997
ALLEGER BELIEVES THEY WERE REMOVED FROM SRO DUTIES FOLLOWING ALLEGER'S COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE MENTAL INSTABILITY AND EXCESSIVE PERSONAL PHONE USE OF SENIOR WATCH SUPERVISOR. (SWS).		OI did not substantiate allegor was discriminated against during investigation. Copy of OI synopsis provided to allegor.		
	INDIAN POINT 2	Licensee Employee	6/6/1996	3/6/1997
2			N	3/6/1997
THE SWS WAS REMOVED FROM LICENSED DUTIES ON MARCH 1995 BUT SHOULD HAVE BEEN EVALUATED AND REMOVED FOLLOWING ALLEGER'S INITIAL COMPLAINTS IN DECEMBER 1993.		During OI interview, allegor raised this concern and indicated that within a few days, operators recognized, logged, evaluated and subsequently determined it to be an administrative procedural violation. Based on the info provided to OI and Westreich, the condition was appropriately recognized, logged and resolved through established corrective action processes. No further NRC action is planned in this matter.		
RI-1996-A-0160	INDIAN POINT 2	Anonymous	7/2/1996	5/12/1997
1			Y	5/12/1997
EDG PUTPUT BREAKER DESIGN CIRCUITRY PROBLEM - THE EDG BREAKER WILL TRIP DURING AN ELECTRICAL FAULT, ABNORMAL VOLTAGE EXCURSION DUE TO A DEFECTIVE AUTOMATIC VOLTAGE REGULATOR OR OTHER TRIP CONDITION WHERE THE CVX RELAY TRIPS AHEAD OF THE NORMAL OR BYPASSED PROTECTION. EDG WILL NOT LOCKOUT THEREBY ALLOWING THE EDG BREAKER TO AUTOMATICALLY RECLOSE ONCE WOLTAGE RE-APPLIED TO EDG TERMINALS.		NRC Inspection Report 50-247/97-03, dated 5/9/97.		
RI-1996-A-0167	INDIAN POINT 2	Licensee Employee	7/9/1996	9/9/1996
1			N	9/9/1996
(1) GUARD FORCE PERSONNEL ARE NOT BEING ALLOWED TIMELY ACCESS TO RESTROOM FACILITIES (2) GUARD FORCE PERSONNEL WERE THREATENED WITH TERMINATION IF THEY CAME TO THE NRC WITH COMPLAINTS ### PANELED 7/24/96; ACK/CLOSEOUT LTR TO GUARD ASK TO CLARIFY "THREAT" (WHO, WHAT, WHEN, HOW) W/DOL; RESIDENTS TO GET ALLEGER NAME AND ADDRESS. ACK/CLOSEOUT LTR TO ALGR SENT 9/5/96; ISSUES NOT SUBSTANTIATED. MOST ARE NOT UNDER NRC PURVIEW. SUPPORT OFFICE:RPS-1A_SAFEGUARDS ACTION PENDING: NONE DOCUMENTATION: ALLEGER LAST CONTACTED: 9/5/96 REFERENCE: KEYWORD:		Send ack/closure ltr to allegor w/ EEOC contact information.		

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1996-A-0232	INDIAN POINT 3	Anonymous	9/24/1996	1/21/1997
1			Y	1/21/1997
FAILURE OF SUPERVISOR TO RECORD TIME WORKED RESULTING IN A VIOLATION OF NYPA ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE CONTROL OF OVERTIME			Licensee's response, dated 1/14/97, in response to our referral letter of 11/15/96. Licensee delineated their corrective actions regarding this concern.	
RI-1996-A-0277	INDIAN POINT 3	Anonymous	11/26/1996	4/14/1997
1			N	4/17/1997
ANONYMOUS LETTER RECEIVED STATING THAT PLANT MANAGER, IS SCARING PEOPLE FROM BRINGING UP THINGS THAT MAY BE PROBLEMS, Plant Manager YELLS AT PEOPLE WHO DISAGREE WITH HIM SO PEOPLE DO NOT. ANONYMOUS ALGR STATES IF THEY GO TO SPEAKOUT THEY (SPEAKOUT) WILL TELL PLANT MANAGER AND PLANT MANAGER WILL KNOW WHO THE ANONYMOUS ALGR IS. ALGR STATED THEY WISHED THEY WERE ABLE TO SIGN THE LETTER BUT THEY ARE SCARED.			Based on inspection results on Speak-Out review and residents' assessment of plant management's interactions with staff and recent review of NYPA by Entergy as a result of Entergy's recent consideration of a merger w/ NYPA; Speak-Out program continues to be a viable option for employees to voice concerns and residents believe that plant manager is not intimidating or preventing people from using this program.	
RI-1996-A-0289	INDIAN POINT 3	Anonymous	12/19/1996	4/14/1997
1			N	4/14/1997
NO LICENSED PEOPLE ON PORC OR PLANT LEADERSHIP TEAM			NRC Inspection Report 50-286/96-11	
	INDIAN POINT 3	Anonymous	12/19/1996	4/14/1997
2			N	4/14/1997
IP-3 OPS MANAGER DOES NOT HAVE SRO LICENSE				
	INDIAN POINT 3	Anonymous	12/19/1996	4/14/1997
3			N	4/14/1997
PLANT MANAGER SPEAKS DISRESPECTFULLY TO STAFF; PEOPLE WON'T SPEAK UP				
	INDIAN POINT 3	Anonymous	12/19/1996	4/14/1997
4			N	4/14/1997
QUESTIONS METHODS FOR REDUCTION OF MAINTENANCE BACKLOG				
RI-1997-A-0021	INDIAN POINT 2	State Agency	1/28/1997	4/23/1997
1			Y	4/10/1997
NYS PSC stated that engineers at IP-2 had expressed to him their concern that the plant should have been shutdown earlier in the week to investigate problems with the feedwater system			Based on results of Mgmt meeting w/ Consolidated Edison Co. on 2/19/97 and results of inspections at IP2, NRC determined that there was not sufficient info available to the utility regarding valve FCV-417 prior to the indications and trouble-shooting measures taken during the week of 1/25/97.	
RI-1997-A-0039	INDIAN POINT 3	Anonymous	2/12/1997	5/6/1997
1			Y	5/6/1997
System engineers (and others) are violating Administrative Procedures AP-36 (overtime guidelines) over the past several weeks during the outage.			Inspection Report 50-286/97-01.	

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1997-A-0062	INDIAN POINT 3	Licensee Employee	3/11/1997	4/22/1997
1			N	4/22/1997
Issue deals with the quality of SRO training provided by contractors to the NYPA Training Department versus the use of in-house, experienced personnel.		NRC does not have specific regulations regarding the use of contractors versus in-house staff for NRC license training; this training is not directly reviewed or evaluated by the NRC. NRC relies on the comprehensive NRC exam administered by the NRC to SRO license candidates.		
RI-1997-A-0080	INDIAN POINT 2	Anonymous	3/26/1997	7/22/1997
1			N	7/21/1997
Hostile management style at Indian Point 2 (most notably the odd behavior of the plant manager) and its effect on worker performance and morale.		No further action due to the lack of specifics regarding a possible hostile work environment as stated in IP-2 response to our referral of the issue (dated 6/27/97). The response substantiates a morale problem; however, there is no indication that safe plant operation was compromised. Conclusion is acceptable because the licensee has corrective action in progress which has included several management changes. IP-2's corrective action results are to be submitted by 10/1/97 and will be reviewed by the resident inspectors as a routine part of the inspection program.		
RI-1997-A-0097	INDIAN POINT 2	Licensee Employee	4/14/1997	6/24/1997
1			N	6/24/1997
During performance of the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) six year preventative maintenance this month, mechanics who had not trained for and do not appear on the training matrix for EDGs made signature in the maintenance work package.		NRC inspectors observed and reviewed documentation related to the performance of the six-year preventive maintenance on the 22 emergency diesel generator (EDG). NRC findings are documented in inspection report 50-247/97-04 dated June 19, 1997.		

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1997-A-0102	INDIAN POINT 2	OI Confidential Source	4/16/1997	9/30/1997
1			N	9/30/1997
<p>The allegor stated that on 2/9/95, during the last refueling outage at approximately 2000 hours, the Senior Watch Supervisor (SWS) issue a tagout that isolated service water to the component cooling heat exchangers. This action removed the cooling water supply for reactor decay heat removal via the RHR heat exchangers. The allegor indicated that at the time the operators were planning to swap the service water headers to allow this tagout to be hung. However, the SWS did not wait or check with the watch operators to ensure that this had been accomplished before directing the completion of the tagout. At the time the reactor coolant system was in a reduced inventory condition and the steam generators were not available for decay heat removal because water in the SG tubes had been blown out. The condition was found and corrected quickly by the control room operators. Because the spent fuel pool (SFP) had been cooled down earlier, it acted as the heat sink for the heating CCW water, and kept the reactor coolant heat up to a minimal value. The spent fuel pool heat exchanger also gets cooling water supply from the CCW system. As a result of the event, the RHR heat exchanger strip recorded showed a slight increase, but the increase was limited by the SFP temperature. The tagout number was number 95-0-0032, 0033 or 0034 or close to these numbers in sequence. The allegor thought the tagout could have been modified after the event to cover it up, but the date/time stamp on it would indicate if this had happened. A number of operations personnel knew about the event, but everyone was afraid to turn SWS in because of his relationship with the Plant Manager and Operations Manager). Allegor indicated that personnel including operators and the Operations Manager knew about SWS's irrational, aberrant behavior and did nothing to report him, or remove him from his post as SWS.</p>		<p>The NRC reviewed the information the allegor provided regarding the CCW valve alignment issue, the licensee's report on the subject, and the tagout question. Licensee prompt actions, in accordance with procedures, allowed to control of the system to ensure technical specification limits were not exceeded. Based on NRC review, there was no evidence that supported wilfull misconduct of part of the SWS.</p>		
RI-1997-A-0111	INDIAN POINT 3	Anonymous	5/7/1997	5/28/1997
1			N	5/28/1997
<p>Received an internal handwritten letter describing verbal harassment to a reactor operator, and other members of the operations department by senior management.</p>		<p>Residents spoke with individual on 5/21/97. Individual stated they did not feel they were harassed.</p>		

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>	<u>Basis for Closure</u>			
RI-1997-A-0112	INDIAN POINT 3	Former Licensee Employee	5/8/1997	8/30/1999
1			N	8/30/1999
<p>Alleger was informed during the week of 5/7/97 that he would not be hired at IP-3. Alleger stated that his new employer had initially indicated to him that he was to be hired at IP-3, but later told him that he would not be hired because of the staffing requirements. The alleger feels that, because the IP-3 QC Manager knows the IP-2 QC Manager, information was passed about the alleger's prior H&I issue at IP-2, and that is the reason why his recent employment offer was retracted.</p>	<p>Panel decided on 5/21/97 that a specific investigation of this matter would not be opened at this time since the stated reasoning for the alleged discrimination was based on alleger's speculation of collusion between IP-3 and IP-2, and that this was the reason why the alleger's recent employment was retracted.</p> <p>On July 12, 1995, the Region I Field Office of the NRC Office of Investigations (OI), initiated an investigation to determine whether the Consolidated Edison (ConEd) discriminated against the alleger for raising safety concerns. Based on the evidence developed during the investigation, OI could not substantiate that the alleger was were discriminated against. OI Report No. 1-95-036 was issued on November 9, 1995. Alleger was informed of the results of the OI investigation in a letter dated January 22, 1996.</p> <p>On October 26, 1995, the Director of the DOL Wage and Hour Division District Office in White Plains, New York issued a decision that discrimination was not a factor in the actions comprising the complaint. The DOL District Director indicated that the alleger's employment was terminated as part of a planned reduction in force and not due to engagement in protected activities. The DOL District Director also stated that the other personnel actions mentioned in the complaint were found to be due to personality conflicts and not in engagement in protected activities. Alleger appealed this decision to the DOL Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). On October 14, 1997, the ALJ issued a Recommended Decision and Order dismissing the complaint because the alleger did not prove that he/she was discriminated against due to protected activity. The ALJ noted that any adverse action taken against the alleger from February 21, 1995, through the preparation of performance evaluations on September 25, 1995, were taken for legitimate business reasons and were not retaliatory. Alleger appealed the ALJ decision to the DOL Administrative Review Board (DOL ARB) in October 1997.</p> <p>On May 30, 1997, the allegerou filed a second discrimination complaint with DOL, asserting that he/she was not hired, after applying for a job at Indian Point 3, because of prior knowledge about the concern alleger had previously raised at Indian Point 2. On July 7, 1997, the Regional Administrator of the DOL Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Regional Office in New York, New York, issued a finding that discrimination was not a factor in the actions comprising the alleger's second complaint. Alleger also appealed this decision to the ALJ. On July 27, 1998, the DOL-ALJ issued a Recommended Decision and Order, recommending dismissal of the second complaint because the alleger did not to establish that he/she was not rehired in 1997 due to engagement in protected activities. Alleger appealed the ALJ decision to the DOL ARB in August 1998.</p> <p>On July 27, 1999, the DOL ARB issued an Order of Consolidation and final Decision and Order. After review of both</p>			

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Descripton</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1997-A-0114	INDIAN POINT 3	Anonymous	5/14/1997	8/22/1997
1			N	8/22/1997
Concern with contractor allegedly under investigation for falsifying resumes of employees used on contracts at nuclear power plants.			Referred to Region III the security/EP section since the allegation involves Point Beach facility. Closeout memo to file based on IP2 and IP3's response to referral letter dated 6/9/97. No NPTS employees were employed at IP2. IP3 indicated that there were NPTSemployees, but they have left the site. The licensee conductedbackground screenings and did not find a problem.	
RI-1997-A-0115	INDIAN POINT 3	Anonymous	5/14/1997	6/3/1997
1			N	6/3/1997
Concern with the fact that a NUAP 5.14 is not being followed, specifically the schedule for approving modifications for the next outage. However, since NUAP's are not NRC required procedures, but are rather NYPA policy documents, the concern does not involve an NRC regulated activity. Moreover, while the individual does allege harassment we have no idea who was harassed since the allegation was provided anonymously.			The referenced procedure is a NYPA policy statement and not an NRC required procedure. Additionally, while the allegation claims harassment, insufficient info was provided on who was harassed because the allegation was provided anonymously.	
	INDIAN POINT 3	Anonymous	5/14/1997	6/3/1997
2			N/A	
Harassment of an anonymous individual.			NRC has no idea of identity of individual and therefore cannot effectively review this concern.	
RI-1997-A-0118	INDIAN POINT 3	Licensee Employee	5/16/1997	7/21/1997
1			N	7/21/1997
Alleger has reviewed DERs from first half of 5/97 (approx 100). Many show continuing procedure violations; weak plant configuration; valves out of position; and scheduling problems.			NRC Inspection Report No. 50-286/97-04.	
	INDIAN POINT 3	Licensee Employee	5/16/1997	7/21/1997
2			N	7/21/1997
The May 1, 1997, Level One schedule shows main offsite power coming into the plant and one EDG out-of-service during core offload. All power sources should be available for this activity. One of the DERs shows that backup feed has a problem.				
	INDIAN POINT 3	Licensee Employee	5/16/1997	7/21/1997
3			N	7/21/1997
Recent announcement that over \$4,000,000 has been removed from the outage budget. Alleger is concerned that a) the sudden change in the schedule may lead to mistakes; b) there will be too many control room deficiency tags, temporary modifications, and operator workarounds remaining after the outage is over; and c) reflects that money is more important to safety.				

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1997-A-0124	INDIAN POINT 3	Contractor Employee	5/27/1997	7/17/1997
1			N	7/17/1997
Alleger has been given the responsibility to perform calibrations on various SAMS used at IP-3. One source was missing on the night of 5/22/97, subsequently recovered, however when the alleger investigated they found that the location for the byproduct material was not controlled with a lock when not in use. Alleger discussed with NYPA HP personnel who told him that the curie level of the material was exempt from controls. No deviation report or radiological event report has been written at this time. The alleger could not recall the isotope or curie content of the byproduct source.			NRC Inspection Report No. 50-286/97-04.	
RI-1997-A-0129	INDIAN POINT 3	Anonymous	5/28/1997	6/16/1997
1			N	6/16/1997
Alleger concerned that SEO message from the 5/13/97 "Inside IP-3" newsletter implies that procedures do to have to be followed.			This allegation is virtually identical to File RI-97-A-0115 which was closed with no further action. As previously noted in RI-97-A-0115, NuAPs are not NRC required procedures, but rather constitute NYPA policy statements. As such, compliance with these particular procedures is a NYPA mgmt prerogative vs an NRC requirement.	
	INDIAN POINT 3	Anonymous	5/28/1997	6/16/1997
2			N	6/16/1997
Alleger concerned that licensee is not in compliance with NUAP 5.18. Specifically, NUAP 5.14, Section 3.2 page 3 of 6, states that engineering work activities shall be evaluated in accordance with NUAP 5.18 prior to being included in a work plan.			See basis for close in Concern #1.	
RI-1997-A-0143	INDIAN POINT 3	Anonymous	6/18/1997	6/25/1997
1			N	6/25/1997
Anonymous allegation received through interoffice mail. The current manager of Electrical Design Engineering has resigned effective June 20, 1997. The alleger states that he is resigning due to not getting support from his boss or other senior station management. The alleger is concerned that this lack of support for engineering can affect nuclear safety.			NRC completed an Engineering Team Inspection on May 1, 1997 (Report 97-80) which thoroughly reviewed the area of engineering and found the licensee performance satisfactory.	
RI-1997-A-0158	INDIAN POINT 3	Former Contractor Employee	7/3/1997	5/19/1998
1			N	5/19/1998
The alleger believes he was suspended in retaliation for the concerns he raised to his supervisor regarding the modification paperwork.			OI initiated an investigation to determine if alleger was retaliated against for raising safety concerns about the documentation of a safety related modification. OI could not substantiate alleger was retaliated against.	

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1997-A-0158	INDIAN POINT 3	Former Contractor Employee	7/3/1997	5/19/1998
2			N	12/30/1997
Alleger questioned quality of work done on control room upgrade due to documentation deficiencies.			NRC Inspection Report No. 50-286/97-07. NRC reviewed control room upgrade documentation, evaluations of the QA Manager's Report dated 8/8/97, the final Speakout Report dated 9/15/97 and NYPA's response to the allegor dated 10/10/97. There were some items of misunderstanding by some supervisors regarding the point at which work could be started, the existing quality controls for work to be performed appeared to be sufficient to ensure that work is performed adequately. Based on the information NRC reviewed and on inspections documented, NRC concluded that the quality of work was acceptable.	
RI-1997-A-0159	INDIAN POINT 3	Anonymous	7/7/1997	7/29/1997
1			N	7/29/1997
VENDOR - General Technical Services (GTS) is supplying HP techs to IP-3 who do not meet ANSI 3.1 requirements, specifically, the 3-year experience requirement.			HP inspection conducted on June 9-13, 1997 (IR-97-04), indicated no obvious problems with HP contractor qualifications.	
RI-1997-A-0178	INDIAN POINT 3	Anonymous	7/23/1997	11/4/1997
1			N	11/4/1997
Nozzles were improperly welded and heaters contain dirt and debris.			NRC review of licensee response found that NYPA performed extensive work to verify the integrity of the welds and cleanliness of the system. Based on this information and interviews with licensee personnel, no further NRC action is required. Concern not substantiated.	
	INDIAN POINT 3	Anonymous	7/23/1997	11/4/1997
2			Y	11/4/1997
Unistrut hanger work done without appropriate paperwork.			Allegation substantiated and a Deviation Event Report was generated by NYPA on 8/12/97.	
	INDIAN POINT 3	Anonymous	7/23/1997	11/4/1997
3			N	11/4/1997
Exposure to lead paint due to not following procedures.			Review of work and interviews with licensee staff indicated that all work was performed in accordance with approved documentation. Lead paint was removed prior to cutting pipes and through the use of "Peel Away" or by contractors specifically trained in the removal of lead.	
	INDIAN POINT 3	Anonymous	7/23/1997	11/4/1997
4			N	11/4/1997
Ineffective Plant Q/C program; failed to identify deficiencies.			Review of documentation shows that several of the "fit ups" required additional engineering analysis to relax the maximum alignment. These were documented and approved through an engineering change notice (ECN). The review and radiograph of 6 of these welds demonstrated that the integrity of the weld was not reduced.	
	INDIAN POINT 3	Anonymous	7/23/1997	11/4/1997
5			N/A	11/4/1997
Administrative problems with contractors (sick leave and pay)			This issue is a business/contractual issue to be resolved by NYPA and the contractor. There are no safety issues associated with this issue.	

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1997-A-0178	INDIAN POINT 3	Anonymous	7/23/1997	11/4/1997
6			N	11/4/1997
NYPA pulled work packages after they were removed from the NRC watch list.			NRC Inspection Report No. 50-286/97-04, Section M6.1, dated 7/15/97.	
	INDIAN POINT 3	Anonymous	7/23/1997	11/4/1997
7			N	11/4/1997
Noncompliance on night shift.			The IP3 work process allows shifts, other than the shift that completed work, to verify and sign off steps as being completed. This is not an unusual or uncommon practice, since complicated work activities can often extend beyond the standard shift period (8-12 hours). Since the plant restart after the refueling outage, the only issue that has arisen denoting a problem with either the extraction steam system, feedwater heaters, or the MSRs has been the blockage of a heater drain pump strainer. The root cause of this event was inappropriate engineering guidance. There was no indication that the verification practice led to a degraded equipment performance.	
	INDIAN POINT 3	Anonymous	7/23/1997	11/4/1997
8			Y	11/4/1997
Failure to wear safety belts in tight areas.			While not an NRC regulated activity, the issue was substantiated. The night general foreman counseled workers on the use of safety belts on three separate occasions. Additionally, it was identified that other workers under the turbine did not wear safety belts. Further review identified that this was an approved condition due to entanglement concerns in this area.	
RI-1997-A-0204	INDIAN POINT 2	Licensee Employee	8/13/1997	12/22/1997
1			N	12/16/1997
On Monday, 9/16/96, during security supervisor shift change, the shift lieutenant failed to turn over his security keys to the oncoming shift supervisor sometime between the hours of 0500 and 0600. It turned out that the keys were in shift supervisor's personal locker on his weapon belt. At no time were compensatory measures enacted and at no time were the CAS/SAS operators notified. Allegor not aware if the SSS was notified. An Incident Report was filed but the entry into the SAS log was not made until 1205 hours. It is unclear as to when the keys were found and when any notifications were made. The Captain had entered and exited the protected area many times in between and stayed out for almost an hour. Allegor mentions 10 CFR and "time to duplicate".			Licensee response to referral.. It was determined that the keys were secured during the event	
	INDIAN POINT 2	Licensee Employee	8/13/1997	12/22/1997
2			N	12/16/1997
<div data-bbox="256 1539 792 1753" style="background-color: black; width: 100%; height: 100%;"></div> <p>Allegor believes individual is a threat to himself and others.</p>			Licensee response to referral. Licensee followed procedures in efforts to determine whether individual was fit for duty before allowing him to come back to work.	

EX7C

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1997-A-0204	INDIAN POINT 2	Licensee Employee	8/13/1997	12/22/1997
3			N	12/16/1997
Alleger states NRC should look into what kind of investigations Wackenhut Project Manager, conducts. Project manager continually harasses any Wackenhut employee that gets along with the client.		License response to referral.		
	INDIAN POINT 2	Licensee Employee	8/13/1997	12/22/1997
4			N	12/16/1997
Alleger's termination in July 1997 was purportedly as a result of alleger raising safety concerns to management in October 1996.		Upon request, alleger provided additional information to support his claim of H&I. However, the issues were not related to nuclear or radiological safety. Provided EEOC address to alleger.		
	INDIAN POINT 2	Licensee Employee	8/13/1997	12/22/1997
5			N	12/16/1997
A Security Shift Supervisor was allowed to qualify with a GLOCK .40 caliber pistol by holstering it in his pants under his belt. The weapon fell to the ground on one occasion. Alleger voiced his concern but got no response.		This is a firing range safety issue and is outside of NRC purview. NRC notified the licensee due to the potential personnel safety issues involved.		
RI-1997-A-0219	INDIAN POINT 3	Anonymous	9/5/1997	10/22/1997
1			N	10/22/1997
Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP) background documents were not updated during the latest revision of the EOP procedure.		NRC Inspection Report No. 50-286/97-80 and NOV, dated 6/19/97. Report cited three potential violations regarding EOPs. A Severity Level III violation was issued to NYPA with a \$55,000 CP. NYPA paid the fine and committed to revise and upgrade EOP background documentation. Licensee was cited prior to this anonymous allegation brought to NRC. Resident inspectors noted that operations personnel are not required to use the EOP background info during the execution of EOPs. The background info is a tool that can be utilized to aid in understanding a particular step of the EOPs. There is also no regulatory requirement or licensee admin procedure that requires the EOPs and EOP background documentation be revised concurrently.		
RI-1997-A-0226	INDIAN POINT 2	Licensee Employee	9/15/1997	10/6/1997
1			N/A	10/6/1997
Con Edison has a policy that during legal hearings if an individual makes a negative comment about Con Edison, Con Edison's lawyers have a policy to discredit the witness (even with unfounded information), and this policy has a chilling effect on truthful testimony. The alleger believes that a policy to aggressively discredit anyone who may introduce testimony about Con Ed, even with unfounded information, would have a chilling effect on a person's testimony.		Region I Counsel (Fewell) provided paragraph for closeout letter to alleger regarding aggressive cross-examination procedures in hearings.		
RI-1997-A-0236	INDIAN POINT 2	NRC Staff	9/25/1997	2/19/1998
1			Y	2/19/1998
Monthly surveillance test for Appendix R battery lights could not have been performed as written in the time frame it was performed in, yet required inspections were signed for as being all satisfactory.		Issue is now in the enforcement arena. Allegation closed and issue to be dispositioned via enforcement process. EA No. 98-056.		

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1997-A-0240	INDIAN POINT 2	Licensee Employee	9/30/1997	3/27/1998
1			N	3/27/1998
<p>During prep to perform maintenance on the 21 accumulator pressure transmitter (containment entry required) on 9/30/97, the IC workers were not provided a procedure or specific job controls. Con Ed management repeatedly questioned the workers if they were refusing to perform the work based upon the concerns. The allegor called a "time out" on this activity. In addition, the allegor(s) were concerned about the lack of two valve position. This issue was provided to safety department by the allegors.</p>			IR 97-15, Level IV violation issued	
	INDIAN POINT 2	Licensee Employee	9/30/1997	3/27/1998
2			Y	3/27/1998
<p>The allegor(s) believes that Con Ed failed to propose and implement timely corrective actions to open item report (OIR) 97-EO1310 (attached) documenting a violation of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.33 and ANSI N18.7/ANS 3.2 on failure to use written procedures to perform maintenance on safety-related equipment.</p>			IR 97-15, Level IV violation	
	INDIAN POINT 2	Licensee Employee	9/30/1997	3/27/1998
3			N	3/27/1998
<p>In July, 1997, the allegor(s) discussed a possible "cover up" of an event whereas a main feedwater flow transmitter root isolation valve was improperly positioned during a surveillance activity, resulting in steaming in the Aux Feedwater Room through a vent on the flow transmitter. No problem identification was prepared on this event. The steam resulted in various fire alarms actuating in the aux feedwater pump room. Further, the root isolation valves were repositioned by IC techs, instead of the normal practice of Operations personnel.</p>			Inspected in 2/98. Failure to appropriately log issue was identified as an NCV in IR 98-01, but no specific evidence of coverup was found.	
	INDIAN POINT 2	Licensee Employee	9/30/1997	3/27/1998
4			Y	3/27/1998
<p>Alleged that Con Edison has no work controls for repair work after troubleshooting has identified a problem.</p>			IR 97-15, Level IV violation issued. Noted that a random review of OIRs involving troubleshooting evnets in 1997 found 12% of 33 OIRs reviewed involved an unexpected or adverse condition to safety occurring during troubleshooting.	
RI-1997-A-0250	INDIAN POINT 3	Anonymous	10/14/1997	11/12/1997
1			N	11/12/1997
<p>The Site Executive Officer called a System Engineer a "black cloud" at IP-3. This creates a "negative" at the plant.</p>			Panel decision of 10/23/97 determined that the concerns regarding the statement the Site Executive Officer in this instance did lack specific detail, and that no impropriety or adverse personnel action was indicated. The residents have also observed that the system engineer in question continues to raise issues freely, and does not appear to be chilled by the SEO. Two other similar allegations were addressed previously and also were not substantiated. NRC Inspection Report 50-286/96-12, Section 07.13 addressed the plant manager's interaction with the staff.	


<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1997-A-0274	INDIAN POINT 2	Anonymous	11/25/1997	2/10/1998
1			N	2/10/1998
A draft culture study identified leadership weakness at Indian Point 2 which has resulted in difficulty of moving information upward in the organization and a dysfunctional organization.			Con Ed noted that since the time this report was generated, management changes as well as enhancements in employee communication programs and other programs were undertaken which have and will continue to improve the work environment. They also stated that the plant human performance engineer and the company's director of employee developmental planning are reviewing this report to determine if the issues discussed in the report are valid and being adequately addressed. If not, Con Ed will notify NRC of any additional actions to be taken.	
RI-1997-A-0283	INDIAN POINT 2	Contractor Employee	12/5/1997	3/31/1998
1			N	3/31/1998
Alleger was denied access and was not provided the reason for denial. Alleger was not afforded an opportunity to supply information for his access authorization to be reconsidered.			Asbestos issue; not NRC related. Alleger filed with DOL, who did not find in the alleger's favor at the District Director level. Alleger did not appeal.	
	INDIAN POINT 2	Contractor Employee	12/5/1997	3/31/1998
2			N	3/31/1998
Alleger mentioned a 7/8/97 incident regarding dropping a ratchet in the service water bay (i.e., foreign material exclusion).			IE 98-01, event was reported as required.	
	INDIAN POINT 2	Contractor Employee	12/5/1997	3/31/1998
3			Y	3/31/1998
Problems with insulation.			ConEd brought in a consultant to review the location, types, and condition of insulation in containment. While problems were note, the licensee committed, prior to startup, to complete their inventory and come up with a plan of action.	
RI-1998-A-0005	INDIAN POINT 2	Contractor Employee	1/7/1998	4/22/1998
1			Y	4/22/1998
IP-2 has problems from a containment sump suction strainer perspective - two primary issues: makeup of piping insulation at IP-2 started at 100% Cal-Sil (w/asbestos) and over the years removed it as needed to perform weld inspections. The insulation that was removed was replaced, with whatever the contract outage insulator had. The plant now has NUKON, TempMat, low density fiberglass by Transco, and even some mineral wool insulation. There have been no records kept of what type of insulation was used and when it was used.			NRC Inspection Reports 50-247/98-01 and 50-247/98-201 and licensee's response substantiated elements of alleger's concerns. Specifically, that selected areas of insulation and coatings inside containment were poor material condition. NRC violation of NRC requirements identified. Conclusion based on RG 1.82, which requires the containment sumps to remain operable with up to 50% blockage. Con Ed calculation, in response to GL 97-04, accounts for a 50% blockage in containment sump area. There is no requirement to perform a more extensive analysis. Con Ed is mapping the type and location of insulation in containment should NRC regulations governing the design of the containment sump and assumptions regarding the amount sump blockage due to debris loading change in the future.	
	INDIAN POINT 2	Contractor Employee	1/7/1998	4/22/1998
2			Y	4/22/1998
The coatings on structures inside containment and the containment liner are blistering and delamination is readily visible and thus represents another potential source of debris loading on the containment sump post-accident.			Con Ed has conducted a substantial amount of work to remove and replace insulation and containment coatings that were found to be in poor material condition. NRC is continuing to track Con Ed's corrective actions in this area and the NRC will perform a final closeout inspection of the vapor containment prior to startup.	

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1998-A-0019	INDIAN POINT 3	Anonymous	1/14/1998	3/23/1998
1			N	3/23/1998
Impending difficulties with computer systems in the Year 2000. Individual was part of a presentation at NYPA in White Plains, NY, where they heard the extent of this issue. NYPA's computer that handles areas such as inventory control and purchasing are apparently not able to process transactions involving the Year 2000. When NYPA was asked how they would handle lot numbers and expiration dates required by the NRC, the answer was an immediate "we're not."			NYPA is developing a new database that will allow dates to be entered past the year 2000. Regarding shelf life issues, storeroom personnel perform this verification when items are issued.	
RI-1998-A-0020	INDIAN POINT 3	Anonymous	1/28/1998	3/16/1998
1			N	3/16/1998
Maintenance worker believes resolution of high vibrations found on the 32 control room HVAC unit to be inappropriate.			Inspection found (1) the as-left vibration levels on the fan blower were acceptable, (2) the licensee's efforts to take vibration levels were a recent initiative on their part due to fan failures versus an NRC required test/PM, and (3) the procedure does not specify where to take vibration readings for any given point but rather that task is left to the skill-of-the-trade. Discussions with DRS confirmed that the vibration readings taken were purely an initiative on NYPA's part and do not constitute an NRC requirement. Allegor's concern does not constitute a regulatory violation or operability concern. NRC Inspection Report No. 50-286/97-11, dated 3/3/98.	
	INDIAN POINT 3	Anonymous	1/28/1998	3/16/1998
2			N	3/16/1998
Individual concerned that schedule pressure may be impacting quality of work.			There was no clear evidence that schedule pressure resulted in work activities of inadequate quality. NRC Inspection Report No. 50-286/97-11, dated 3/3/98.	
RI-1998-A-0034	INDIAN POINT 2	Former Contractor Employee	2/9/1998	6/18/1998
1			N	6/18/1998
Licensee did not follow procedure during exit whole body count. Allegor was terminated 1/13/98. Allegor was not whole body counted but feels licensee will create whole body count record.			The inspector reviewed whole body counting procedures, interviewed cognizant personnel, examined exposure files, reviewed radiation work permits (RWPs) and air sampling records. Based on the review of the RWPs that allegor worked on during employment at IP2, including air sampling data for the work areas that the allegor entered, it was not likely that the allegor received an intake greater than 10 percent of the Annual Limit of Intake (ALI), or a single uptake that exceeded a combined effective dose equivalent to 10 millirem. Accordingly, Con Ed was not required by NRC regulations or their procedural guidance to perform an assessment of allegor's internal dose upon termination of allegor's employment on 1/13/98. The inspector also reviewed allegor's exposure history while employed at IP2 and noted that it did not contain a termination whole-body-count record. NRC Inspection Report 50-247/98-03, dated 6/11/98.	

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1998-A-0034	INDIAN POINT 2	Former Contractor Employee	2/9/1998	6/18/1998
2			N	6/18/1998
Spare parts lying around are used to repair Class A level switches. Licensee reasoning that this is acceptable - the plant is shutdown.		NRC performed an in-office review of Con Edison analysis. Con Ed reviewed approximately 30 work orders and found no indication of a misuse of Non-Class A components for a Class A application. Interviews with I&C personnel indicated that they understood the requirements for handling and storage of Class A parts and equipment; however, not all personnel knew which specific document addressed these requirements. Tours were conducted of the I&C shop area, and a storage cage on the 33' elevation of the Unit 1 Turbine Bldg. This tour identified four Class A parts that were not controlled in the I&C shop. These Class A parts were found in the area of the shop where parts are received from the warehouse and entered into the computer. Finally, a review of past events identified eight occurrences between April 1996 and March 1998 in which control of Class A parts were not in compliance with procedures. However, in all of these examples listed above, there were no instances identified that resulted in spare parts or Non-Class A components installed into Class A level switches.		
	INDIAN POINT 2	Former Contractor Employee	2/9/1998	6/18/1998
3			N/A	3/9/1998
Work Order to calibrate pressure switches - spilled mercury found in 7 of 8 switches. Cabinter 4-1 on 15' level (turbine building). The alleged asked what was done with the mercury.		Not NRC regulated activity..		
	INDIAN POINT 2	Former Contractor Employee	2/9/1998	6/18/1998
4			Y	6/18/1998
New level switches never operated and never calibrated.		NRC performed an in office review of the Con Ed analysis. Con Ed confirmed that concern was valid for one of six level switches. The level switches identified in Con Ed's investigation are associated with the condenser water boxes and circulating water pump permissive start interlock (a non-safety related function). Three of the level switches were replaced between February 1991 and June 1996. The other three had not been replaced. One of the switches, LC-1179S (the one painted blue) had no record of calibration since replacement on March 3, 1994. Work orders show that this level switch failed the calibration attempt on April 24, 1995, was removed, disassembled, cleaned reassembled and reinstalled, but no record of calibration was found. Four of the level switches were recalibrated during the current outage. Over a period of time, these level switches have been found to be inoperable due to clogging of the supply tubing. Periodic maintenance to correct past problems has been performed. During the performance of Con Ed's investigation, it was noted that the I&C Preventive Maintenance procedure for calibration of two level transmitters had not been performed in the last three years as required by I&C Admin Directives. This event has been entered into the station's condition identification system and corrective actions will be determined as part of the resolution of this concern.		

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>	<u>Basis for Closure</u>			
RI-1998-A-0034	INDIAN POINT 2	Former Contractor Employee	2/9/1998	6/18/1998
5			N	6/18/1998
Transmitter (on the gas turbine(s)?) are incorrectly calibrated against ISA Standards. Allegor signed paperwork under duress. Individual used his own personal testing equipment which was not calibrated. Another Caliper employee also knew allegor's testing equipment was not calibrated.	NRC performed an in office review of Con Ed analysis and reviewed past Con Ed licensing documents pertaining to station blackout rule (10 CFR 50.63). Extensive maintenance was performed on the Non-Class A Gas Turbines (GT) located in the Buchanan switchyard during the current outage. All GT instruments were calibrated per vendor recommendations or the Bently Nevada specifications. The instruments were not calibrated utilizing the ISA standards. Based on the review of licensing documents, the GT instruments did not have to be calibrated in accordance with the ISA standards. Further review of the work packages and interviews with plant personnel indicated that all calibrations were performed with Con Ed MT&E equipment. This review could not identify the instrument loop that allegor discussed. The only instrument that was similar is an instrument loop on GT 3 that has a full range of 200 psig; however, this instrument loop has a full range of 4-6.7 mA. There was no evidence that this loop was improperly calibrated. The NRC did substantiate that GT instruments were not calibrated in accordance with ISA standards; however, they are not required to be calibrated to this standard. The NRC did not substantiate that the GT instruments were calibrated with personal test equipment that was not calibrated.			
	INDIAN POINT 2	Former Contractor Employee	2/9/1998	6/18/1998
6			N/A	3/9/1998
H&I - Allegor and partner were sent out to adjust volume on a specific gatronics speaker. They could not reach to speaker, even with a safety harness, so they adjusted the one they could reach and altered paperwork to state they adjusted the one they were supposed to adjust. This incident was basis for allegor being fired. Two other employees from Caliper were involved in an incident in January 1998 when a 125 DC bus tripped-went to UPS. The licensee knew of the situation but no one was blamed or punished for this incident. Allegor heard there was a "plan in motion" to get rid of him by his second level management. Allegor was terminated on 1/13/98 for the gatronics speaker issue, but has never received paperwork in his paycheck stating the reason for his termination.	Not NRC regulated activity. Allegor was provided name, address and phone number for EEOC. Allegor was provided DOL rights and brochure with acknowledgement letter.			

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1998-A-0034	INDIAN POINT 2	Former Contractor Employee	2/9/1998	6/18/1998
7			Y	6/18/1998
Caliper is guilty of poor planning and work habits. Allegor stated when you start a job, you should be able to get a work package, get your tools and do the assigned job. Allegor states they when you get the work package, you have to go to document control to get the drawings, and they NEVER see a procedure. Paperwork gets filled out after the fact.			Con Edison could not confirm Caliper exhibited poor work practices, but did confirm that most work packages did not contain procedures or references to drawings, vendor manuals, or other documentation. Paperwork had been completed during the course of work and immediately after the completion of work. This is an acceptable practice under Con Ed admin procedures. According to Con Ed admin procedures, work orders are not designed to describe the details of work. Planning sheets indicate that if a procedure or work step listed is required. If neither is required, an investigative check list is used which contains provisions for identification of references, conditions found and work performed. The NRC has previously identified violations in NRC Inspection Report 50-247/97-15 and NRC Integrated Inspection Report 50-247/96-08 in which written procedures were not being utilized to perform work. Because of these previous NRC violations substantial effort has been undertaken (since November 1997) to increase the level of detail in I&C work packages/procedures.	
	INDIAN POINT 2	Former Contractor Employee	2/9/1998	6/18/1998
8			N	6/18/1998
Allegor states they NEVER know what the "set points" for alarms are. The instrument will alarm eventually at some set point, but it not not because the set points were knowingly set.			NRC performed in office review and discussed issue with an NRC instrumentation specialist. ICAD-7 states that calibration sheets should contain setpoint information. Twelve interviews were conducted, in which 3 people (a foreman, site supervisor and a system engineer) stated that the setpoint were not always known in which case the individual had to perform research to determine the setpoint. All techs interviewed indicated that the setpoint info was provided to them prior to conducting field work. For work associated with non-Class A gas turbines, no setpoint data existed prior to commencement of the work conducted during this outage. Info was obtained from the gas turbine consultant and the instrument calibration sheet was written at the time of the calibration of the instruments. Con Ed has two types of procedures. One type is utilized to calibrate the instrument while the other type is utilized to verify logic. When verifying logic, the setpoint of the instrument is not required to be known. Con Ed is currently upgrading their instrument setpoint program and has committed to complete certain portions of the work prior to plant startup. NRC was unable to substantiate this concern because the information provided lacked specificity.	
	INDIAN POINT 2	Former Contractor Employee	2/9/1998	6/18/1998
9			N	6/18/1998
General Statement: Procedures do not exist at IP-2.			The NRC did not initiate action into this matter because the information allegor provided lacked specificity. However, NRC believes that this issue is related to the quality of work packages as previously discussed in Concern 5.	

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1998-A-0034 10	INDIAN POINT 2	Former Contractor Employee	2/9/1998	6/18/1998 3/9/1998
<p>Alleger currently fears for his life because Caliper is a southern based company an all people from the south carry guns. Alleger stated he was instructed to change a light bulb using a work order dated 1985. People are are just "riding the clock" until they retire at IP-2.</p>		<p>Not NRC regulated activity.</p>		
				
RI-1998-A-0043 1	INDIAN POINT 2	Former Contractor Employee	2/17/1998	6/10/1998 6/10/1998
<p>Alleger was contacted by a contract worker at IP-2. The worker stated his supervisor performed unauthorized replacement of a rubber bellows on a waste gas disposal system valve.</p>		<p>Con Edison investigation identified that the bellows material was not made of rubber and that the bellows replacement was approved and documented.</p>		
2	INDIAN POINT 2	Former Contractor Employee	2/17/1998	6/10/1998 6/10/1998
<p>The worker told the alleger that he/she was fired five days after pointing out the inappropriate work to supervisor.</p>		<p>NRC made several attempts to contact the alleger telephonically, but was unsuccessful. In NRC letter dated 3/18/98, NRC again requested the alleger contact the region. Alleger never responded and NRC could not initiate a review of your discrimination concern. OI could not open case based on fact that no information was provided.</p>		

EX
7C

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Descripton</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1998-A-0056	INDIAN POINT 2	Anonymous	3/6/1998	8/27/1998
1			Y	8/27/1998
Procedural "shortcuts" (no specifics provided) are becoming commonplace. [Alleger noted that shortcuts are not from specific direction to cut corners, but from management pressure to expedite work]			ConEd's investigation results indicate that this concern had some bearing on procedural technicalities in that some procedural errors were found. Primarily these errors were due to the absence or legibility of signatures or the appropriate qualification of the Engineering Support Personnel (ESP) signatory. ConEd indicated that they did not identify any person who deliberately circumvented a programmatic standard or that programmatic standards were deliberately compromised. ConEd indicated that completeness of reviews are being conducted on all modifications performed since 10/14/97, and all identified deficeiciencies will be corrected. In addition, ConEd indicated that an evaluation will be performed to determine if completeness reviews should be extended for all major modifications. The NRC reviewed ConEd's investigation results and determined that additional inspection was necessary to review the engineeing standards and qualifications aspects of this allegation. The inspectors verified that there were several instances where signatures wer missed, signatures were not legible, or the qualifications of plant engineering personnel were questioned. In addition, the inspectors noted that all of the engineering personnel interviewed by ConEd flet that management had exerted pressure for timely disposition of modifcaiton packages. However, none beleived that they had been given insufficient time to verify modification details. The inspectors confirmed that there was no evidence that there was a deliberate attempt to circumvent the procedures. The inspectors noted that during the current outage, ConEd management placed additional personnel in the Facilities Engineering Group to perform multi-discipline modifications on site in order to provide better control of engineering work. The inspectors noted that even though ConEd modified this process, they did not perform completeness reviews of modifications issued from the Facilities Engineering Group. In fact, the inspectors indicated that ConEd did not require compleeness reviews to be performed on modifications issued by this group. However, the inspectors noted that once ConEd identified that this review was not being performed, the VP of Engineering ordered completeness reviews of all modifcaitons performed after 10/14/97. The inspectors noted that the completeness reviews were performed by multi-disciplined senior plant personnel and wer thorough. In addition, the Region I DRS, with support from DRP, recently inspected several facets of engineering work and the engineering support process. These findings are documented in NRC Inspection Reports 50-247/98-04 and 50-247/98-06. These inspections identified several issues; however, the root cause of the identified issues were not related to quality standards or engineeing qualifications as specified in this allegation. The NRC concluded that the allegation was partially substantiated.	

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1998-A-0056	INDIAN POINT 2	Anonymous	3/6/1998	8/27/1998
2			Y	8/27/1998
"Inexperienced" engineers are developing modifications (no specifics provided). To qualify this statement, the alleger indicated that the modifications are being reviewed and approved by "qualified" personnel, but noted that time constraints are not allowing them enough review time.			ConEd's investigation results indicate that 7 of 72 individuals in the Design and Site Engineering Groups had no nuclear experience. ConEd pointed out that their work is being directly supervised. In addition, ConEd's investigation results confirmed that modification packages were generally reviewed and approved by qualified personnel in accordance with internal procedures. ConEd also concluded that even though all personnel interviewed who were involved in the modifacaiton process felt that management had exerted pressure for the timely disposition of modification packages, no one beleived that they had been given insufficient time to verify modification pacakge details. ConEd committed that engineering management will review all department administrative procedures to ensure definitions are clear for various review, verification, and approval function. The NRC reviewed ConEd's investigation results and decided to conduct additional inspection. The inspectors reviewed the surveillance report completed by ConEd which identified that Design Engineering had 1 of 27 engineers and Site Engineering had 6 of 14 new engineers (of 45 total) that had no nuclear experience. The inspectors noted that not all of the new engineering personnel had completed site specific training. However, they had nuclear experience and were supervised by ConEd personnel. In addition, the inspectors noted that all of the engineering personnel interviewed by ConEd felt that management had exerted pressure for timely disposition of modification packages, but none beleived that they had been given insufficient time to verify modification details. The inspectors noted that as a result of ConEd's management's directive to conduct another completeness review of modifacaitons completed after 10/14/97, this action will provide further assurance of the qality of engineering modifications. In addition, the Region I DRS, with support from DRP, recently inspected several facets of engineering work and the engineering support process. These findings are docuemented in NRC Inspection 50-247/98-04 and 50-247/98-06. These inspections identified several issues; however, the root cause of the identified issues were not related to quality standards or engineering qualifications as specified in this allegation. The NRC concluded that the allegation was partially substantiated.	

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1998-A-0056	INDIAN POINT 2	Anonymous	3/6/1998	8/27/1998
3			Y	8/27/1998
Other areas (not specified) are being supplemented by new personnel, and similar compromising of standard is resulting.			ConEd's investigation results indicate that administrative discrepancies were found regarding failure of some personnel to complete specific training courses. In addition, ConEd also identified that several Nuclear Quality Assurance personnel, including newly transferred personnel, who had signed for the review of maintenance work packages or modification packages were determined to be not fully ESP qualified for the tasks assigned to them. ConEd noted that they have placed this item in their corrective action program and reviews for procedural enhancement are in progress. The NRC reviewed ConEd's investigation results and decided to conduct an inspection. The inspectors noted that there were administrative discrepancies found regarding the failure of some personnel to complete specific training courses. The inspectors noted that the issue of newly hired and contractor personnel qualification has been documented in the station's corrective action system and ConEd is currently reviewing this issue. Findings are documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-24798-04 dated 7/24/98. The allegation was partially substantiated.	
	INDIAN POINT 2	Anonymous	3/6/1998	8/27/1998
4			N	3/11/1998
Anonymous alleged stated that they were reluctant to identify themselves due to the "potential results of speaking out."			Since no specific information was provided with regard to "results of speaking out," and since the alleged is anonymous, it would be difficult to perform an effective review of this concern. During the recent inspections that were performed in the area of engineering support, the technical staff interfaced with numerous engineering and plant personnel. While not specifically documented in the inspection reports, the technical staff informed Region I management that they noted no instances of personnel apprehensive to speak out on issues. The concern was not substantiated.	
RI-1998-A-0061	INDIAN POINT 2	Licensee Employee	3/3/1998	5/28/1998
1			N	5/28/1998
Potential falsification of a test procedure. Allegor noted that signatures had been added to the original that were not on the copy made the previous day.			The resident inspectors contacted the named individual to determine if this matter warranted further review. Based on their discussion with this individual, the inspectors noted that the test in question was never completed and therefore not a record of a valid test used to satisfy the NRC testing requirements. In addition, the inspectors noted that it is not uncommon during a review of completed tests to find that signatures have been missed and to require the individual(s) who were responsible for that item to sign after the fact. In any event, by signing the step, the person is indicating that the action was taken. However, signing after the fact, or even during a test, for a step that was not actually performed would be records falsification. There does not appear to be sufficient information to establish that records were falsified in this instance.	
	INDIAN POINT 2	Licensee Employee	3/3/1998	5/28/1998
2			N	4/2/1998
NPO had written an OIR during the 1995 refueling outage. Received a lot of pressure for writing OIR and has basically not written another OIR in 15 months.			NRC communicated directly with the named NPO regarding the matter. NPO provided no additional information.	

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1998-A-0061	INDIAN POINT 2	Licensee Employee	3/3/1998	5/28/1998
3			N	5/28/1998
Alleger believes he was sent for a general fitness evaluation in retaliation for previously raising safety concerns to certain Con Edison managers regarding the performance of a Shift Watch Supervisor.			NRC reviewed additional information provided by alleger and note that alleger has not articulated a sufficient nexus between the safety concerns raised and alleger being asked to submit to a general fitness evaluation.	
	INDIAN POINT 2	Licensee Employee	3/3/1998	5/28/1998
4			N/A	5/28/1998
Alleger questioned the results of the OI investigation report related to alleger's previous discrimination claim and upon further review alleger believes that pertinent people were not interviewed and some of the people interviewed were not asked the proper questions.			The NRC has reviewed comments that alleger provided in their letter dated 4/20/98. NRC notes no new info that would alter the conclusion in the OI report. Alleger was provided the telephone number for the IG.	
RI-1998-A-0074	INDIAN POINT 3	Anonymous	3/24/1998	6/23/1998
1			N	6/23/1998
Plant manager intimidates plant staff.			NYPA investigation showed that the SEO's communication and management style are not optimal. However, there was no evidence that the SEO caused an environment in which safety issues were not raised. There was insufficient evidence to conclude that intimidation, a chilling effect or retaliation associated with protected activities had occurred. All interviewees indicated that there was a good safety environment at Indian Point 3.	
	INDIAN POINT 3	Anonymous	3/24/1998	6/23/1998
2			N	6/23/1998
Plant manager verbally abuses staff.				
RI-1998-A-0077	INDIAN POINT 2	Private Citizen	3/24/1998	4/9/1998
1			N/A	4/9/1998
Westchester County, NY can't provide volunteer emergency response workers with needed radiation monitoring devices. Available radiation monitoring equipment is old (vintage 1950) and cannot measure lower range exposures.			Federal agency responsible for off-site emergency planning matters is FEMA. Region I will refer issues to NRR, liaison office to FEMA. FEMA will coordinate the response to alleger's concern. Alleger provided NRR contact and phone number.	
	INDIAN POINT 2	Private Citizen	3/24/1998	4/9/1998
2			N/A	4/9/1998
Westchester County Health Department can no longer provide enough personnel to staff radiation (monitoring) centers in the event of an emergency.			Federal agency responsible for off-site emergency planning matters is FEMA. The Region I office will refer issues to NRR, liaison to FEMA. FEMA will coordinate response to alleger's concerns. Alleger provided NRR contact and phone number.	

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1998-A-0080	INDIAN POINT 3	Licensee Employee	3/30/1998	9/28/1998
1			N	9/28/1998
Possible falsification of a TS surveillance test (January 1996) 3PT-M21, "Station Battery Surveillance."			The NRC could not substantiate concern that the two performance technicians did not fill the batteries with water as directed by the surveillance procedure. In arriving at this conclusion, the NRC reviewed, in detail, all of the information provided by the allegor. Also we reviewed pertinent security logs for January 2, 1998, and identified no discrepancies.	
			Although the electrolyte level of some battery cells were below the procedural acceptance criteria on January 5, 1996, this as-found condition did not preclude the levels from being satisfactory on January 2, 1996. Variations in measurement techniques and electrolyte temperatures could account for the apparent difference in levels.	
			Variations in electrolyte temperatures could contribute to some, but not all, of the differences in levels. However, the effect on level differences could not be estimated, because the information taken on January 5, 1998, under work request 96-00014-00, did not contain the electrolyte temperatures.	
			Regarding the measurement techniques, variations could be introduced if the level where the electrolyte level touches the cell walls is read, rather than the level at the meniscus. Other variations in techniques, including weak technician performance, could contribute to differences in the recorded levels. However, we noted that issues were appropriately remediated through re-training.	
			It was reasonable that the above factors could account for the differences, as evidence by a subsequent surveillance performed on February 26, 1996, in which 71% of the electrolyte levels were higher than documented in the January Work Request with no record of any water being added in between. The level increases were ostensibly due to increased electrolyte temperatures and that the surveillance was performed by a different person.	
RI-1998-A-0081	INDIAN POINT 2	Former Contractor Employee	3/30/1998	5/29/1998
1			Y	5/29/1998
Electrical safety during the removal of boric acid soaked insulation on heat traced piping during outage work in May 1997.			NRC performed an in-office review of the IP2 report in response to concern. The report, through personnel interviews, review of work packages and other logs and records found no evidence that the workers received electrical shocks. In addition there was no evidence that the heat trace was damaged such that electrical shocks would have resulted. However, the report did find that the workers expressed a concern about the potential for electrical shocks. This is primarily an industrial safety matter. By referring the issue, the NRC feels that Con Ed has been sufficiently informed of this industrial safety issue.	

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>	<u>Basis for Closure</u>			
RI-1998-A-0081	INDIAN POINT 2	Former Contractor Employee	3/30/1998	5/29/1998
2			Y	5/29/1998
Inadequate design of insulation systems over heat traced piping, some of which involved heat traced safety-related piping essential to providing an operable boric acid flow path to the reactor.			NRC performed in-office review of IP2 response. IP2 report stated that, in some cases the existing design was changed similarly to the method that was described in allegor's 3/29/98 fax. This configuration was reviewed and approved by the IP2 staff for the specific areas where it was installed. This was substantiated because the insulation on some of the piping had been changed. However, the change was reviewed and approved by the plant staff.	
	INDIAN POINT 2	Former Contractor Employee	3/30/1998	5/29/1998
3			N	5/29/1998
Alleger observed a Con Ed supervisor and a contract supervisor working on the GET test together instead of individually.			NRC performed an in-office review of IP2 report. There is no requirement that the review of the course material must be performed individually; however, the GET exam must be taken individually. The review of the IP2 report did not identify any impropriety during this exam.	
RI-1998-A-0110	INDIAN POINT 2	Licensee Employee	5/8/1998	9/23/1998
1			Y	9/21/1998
On May 25, 1997, allegor informed supervisor that insulation debris on a scaffolding platform near the pressurizer that may be due to asbestos or deterioration of the cotton canvas insulation jackets in the area around the top of the pressurizer. On June 10, 1998, allegor further clarified that the body of the pressurizer also may require repairs. Allegor subsequently indicated that this issue could contribute to blockage of the containment sump.			NRC Inspection Report 50-247/98-01 and 50-247/98-201. NRC reviewed Con Ed's responses to questions on vapor containment insulation concerns. NRC review of and inspections of partially substantiated elements of allegor's concern; specifically, that certain areas of containment insulation were in poor material condition. Because of these concerns NRC noted that Con Ed has conducted a substantial amount of work to remove and replace insulation and containment coating that were found to be in poor material condition. The NRC will continue to review Con Ed's corrective actions in response to the specific insulation configurations noted above and inform the allegor of our findings and resolution.	

This concern was validated and documented in OIR 98-E05028 by Con Edison after completion of the NRC VC tour. Con Edison encapsulated the insulation on the top of the pressurizer and identified areas on the body of the pressurizer that may need encapsulation. The NRC continued to track Consolidated Edison's corrective actions in this area following our reviews in June-July 1998 and performed a final closeout inspection of the Vapor Containment prior to plant startup in early September 1998. However, no violation of NRC requirements exists due to the deterioration of this insulation jacket.

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1998-A-0110	INDIAN POINT 2	Licensee Employee	5/8/1998	9/23/1998
2			N	9/21/1998
In May and June 1997, noted degraded mirror insulation while working on RCPs 21 and 23. Noted missing insulation latches, oil soaked insulation, and crushed insulation. Questioned licensee method of repair (applying banding versus replacement of latches and insulation). Later noted missing (fallen) mirror insulation on the RCP 21 cold leg. Again suggested that latches and insulation be replaced, but was told to apply more banding.			Many of the areas that were identified by the alleged were documented in the mechanical project insulation repair schedule. Areas that were not specifically documented were reviewed on an NRC VC tour. While we noted during our review that several insulation latches were missing, the insulation appeared to be secured without the use of excessive banding. We note that Con Edison has conducted a substantial amount of work to remove and replace insulation that was found to be in poor material condition. Furthermore, Con Edison is mapping the type and location of insulation in containment in the event that NRC regulations governing the estimated impact of insulation debris on the containment sump post-accident were to change in the future. However, no violation of NRC regulations exists in this matter. The NRC continued to track Con Edison's corrective actions in this area following our reviews in June-July 1998 and performed a final closeout inspection of the Vapor Containment prior to plant startup in early September 1998.	
	INDIAN POINT 2	Licensee Employee	5/8/1998	9/23/1998
3			N/A	9/21/1998
Allegor stated that prior to any house keeping, repair, modifying, or replacement there should be some laboratory analysis or historical documentation establishing the asbestos content of the marinite or transite board used in containment.			This issue is outside the purview of NRC regulations. The Con Edison Asbestos Management Manual specifies controls and procedures to ensure personnel protection when working with asbestos or areas that may contain asbestos. Since Con Edison has asbestos control procedures and this matter is outside our purview, the NRC plans no further inspections in this area.	
	INDIAN POINT 2	Licensee Employee	5/8/1998	9/23/1998
4			N	9/21/1998
Allegor stated that he/she suggested to supervision that Con Edison should utilize a different type of insulation that would reduce condensation on piping surfaces, specifically the service water piping in the VC. This condensation, over a long period of time, could degrade the piping surface coatings and hanger supports.			The NRC has performed containment tours and verified that Con Edison has placed substantial resources on improving the material condition of containment coatings, including equipment coatings in the VC. The overall material condition of the VC has improved since January 1998. Con Edison has attributed the as-found degraded surface coatings to the lack of a performance monitoring program and is planning corrective actions which include the incorporation of surface coatings in the VC into a performance monitoring program. This program would inspect coatings on a periodic basis and repair where necessary. We did not substantiate that the type of insulation in question would lead to increased condensation on the service water piping; however, the planned corrective action, as well as existing inservice inspection requirements on service water system piping integrity, should be able to identify and correct such conditions prior to significant pipe or hanger support degradation occurring. Therefore, the NRC is not planning any further action on this concern.	

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1998-A-0110	INDIAN POINT 2	Licensee Employee	5/8/1998	9/23/1998
5			N	9/21/1998
<p>Alleger raised concerns with the condition and repair of the containment liner insulation.</p>			<p>Regarding the deficiencies noted, the NRC determined that Con Edison had performed a walkdown of the containment liner insulation under the recently enacted Maintenance Rule and did not find any conditions that were outliers requiring repair. Some of the structural steel on the weld channel system was scraped and painted during the outage which began in October 1997, resulting in the removal and replacement of some of the insulation caulking.</p> <p>To review the condition of the liner insulation, an NRC inspector walked the perimeter of the lower two elevations of the containment where the liner insulation is installed. The inspector noted a number of areas where the metal insulation lamination was repaired, apparently due to past punctures of the lamination during maintenance work. Significant areas of the liner insulation showed signs of recent caulking having been applied and visible evidence of numerous studs securing the insulation panels to the liner were noted. We noted as discussed in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) that the insulation was installed during plant construction (circa 1970-1973) in two phases and thus consists of two different types of material; given its length in service, the number and type of repairs to the liner insulation observed did not appear excessive.</p> <p>Overall, the NRC found no noteworthy problem with metal delamination or, more importantly, gaps between the containment liner and the liner insulation as visible along the top or bottom of the insulation panels or indicated by protruding bulges in the shape of liner panels. Based on our review and the inspections conducted by Con Edison under the Maintenance Rule, no violations of NRC requirements were found regarding this liner insulation.</p>	

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1998-A-0149	INDIAN POINT 2	Anonymous	7/14/1998	8/21/1998
1			N	8/21/1998
On 7/4/98 at 2115 hours, a security officer was found at his post at the containment equipment hatch allegedly asleep. This incident was not reported nor logged.			On July 14, 1998, the NRC was informed by Con Edison (ConEd) of an anonymous allegation regarding security at Indian Point Unit 2 (IP2). ConEd informed the NRC of this matter since the anonymous letter was addressed to the NRC, although the letter was never actually received by the NRC.	
			An allegation panel was convened on July 31, 1998. The panel discussed ConEd's investigation results and subsequent disciplinary/corrective actions. The NRC staff concluded that the results of ConEd's investigation revealed no violation of NRC requirements. Although ConEd could not definitively substantiate that a Security Officer was sleeping on duty, the Security Sergeant in question was terminated due to his failure to implement compensatory measures in a timely manner once he determined that the post was compromised due to the appearance that the Security Officer was sleeping. The panel concluded that a closeout memo to file documenting ConEd's follow up actions and the NRC's review of this matter would resolve the allegation. Enclosure 1 to this letter lists the concern and describes the staff's review and conclusions regarding that concern. Enclosure 2 to this letter documents the results of the licensee's investigation and corrective actions.	
			Based on the anonymous nature of the allegation, the reviews of the event by DRS and DRP staff, and since the alleege has not directly forwarded the allegation to the NRC, no response to the alleege is appropriate.	
RI-1998-A-0166	INDIAN POINT 2	Anonymous	9/2/1998	11/19/1998
1			N	11/19/1998
Alleege concerned about safety culture at IP-2 - disregard for nuclear safety and confrontational culture. IP-2 has buffalloed the NRC staff, and is only concerned with getting the plant back online.			Per IP-2 Assessment Panel review, no further action is necessary on this matter due to its lack of specificity. Where there have been obvious performance problems at IP-2 in the past few years, specific problems with safety culture have not been apparent. Also, we have received no similar allegations in the recent past.	
	INDIAN POINT 2	Anonymous	9/2/1998	11/19/1998
2			N	11/19/1998
50.54(f) group contractors notified plant management of inadequate RPS and ESF testing (test failures in areas covered by NRC Generic Letter 96-01). While management eventually corrected the problems, pressure was applied to suppress the issues, and individuals who raised the issues were treated negatively.			These items are representative of past problems at IP-2. NRC reviews are documented in Inspection Reports 98-02, 98-06, 98-09 and 98-10. IP-2 Assessment Panel feels that sufficient corrective actions were accomplished to support restart.	
	INDIAN POINT 2	Anonymous	9/2/1998	11/19/1998
3			N	11/19/1998
Issues similar to Concern 2 were encountered regarding Maintenance Rule risk significant system testing (rod control, steam dumps).			These items are representative of past problems at IP-2. NRC reviews are documented in Inspection Reports 98-02, 98-06, 98-09 and 98-10. The IP-2 Assessment Panel feels that sufficient corrective actions were accomplished to support restart.	

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1998-A-0166	INDIAN POINT 2	Anonymous	9/2/1998	11/19/1998
4			N	11/19/1998
In the past couple of weeks, significant changes were made in testing described in the FSAR and no 50.59 safety evaluation was written. Safety evaluations were only completed after the testing, after the problem was identified (specific technical issue not identified).			Issue not specific. Past problems have been noted in the 50.59 area. However, the IP-2 Assessment Panel believes that sufficient corrective actions were taken to support restart.	
	INDIAN POINT 2	Anonymous	9/2/1998	11/19/1998
5			N	11/19/1998
A contractor recently identified an issue regarding an operability determination (issue not specified), and the Senior Watch Supervisor informed him that he (the SWS) does not make operability determinations.			These items are representative of past problems at IP-2. NRC reviews are documented in Inspection Reports 98-02, 98-06, 98-09 and 98-10. The IP-2 Assessment Panel feels that sufficient corrective actions were accomplished to support restart.	
	INDIAN POINT 2	Anonymous	9/2/1998	11/19/1998
6			N	11/19/1998
Alleger questioned IP-2's ability to adequately resolve setpoint issues raised by the recent NRC AE inspection.			Scaling/loop accuracy issue was not substantiated by either NRC review (IR 50-247/98-06) or by a review by a licensee contractor (General Physics).	
	INDIAN POINT 2	Anonymous	9/2/1998	11/19/1998
7			N	11/19/1998
Plant design drawings contain so many errors that it is difficult to evaluate whether or not the plant design is adequate. This is known by plant management and has become a "work around."			These items are representative of past problems at IP-2. NRC reviews are documented in Inspection Reports 98-02, 98-06, 98-09 and 98-10. The IP-2 Assessment Panel feels that sufficient corrective actions were accomplished to support restart.	

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	

RI-1998-A-0206	INDIAN POINT 2	Contractor Employee	12/8/1998	3/25/1999
1			N	3/25/1999

Ex7C
 Allegor was put on roof to perform work. There was a planned radioactive release. No one on the roof was notified. The allegor and four other individuals were exposed. Other workers were given back their clothing following decontamination

Based on the event, allegor had the following requests for information and concerns:

- requested that radiation exposure from this incident be evaluated and explained;

- indicated that no one on the roof was warned or notified prior to the gaseous release and no access controls were in place to prevent personnel from becoming contaminated.

Regarding request for an evaluation and explanation of your radiation exposure, Con Edison is responsible for providing reports of radiation exposure and instructing personnel on health protection problems associated with exposure to radiation. Con Edison conducted a follow up surveillance (Surveillance Report No. 99-SR-002) to evaluate the circumstances of this event and to address NRC questions. In that report, Con Edison reported that allegor logged a dose of one millirem (mrem) as measured by electronic dosimetry. This radiation dose is a very small fraction of allowable radiation exposure of 5000 mrem per year from occupational sources as well as a small fraction of the exposure that everyone typically receives from natural sources of radiation (i.e., about 300 mrem per year). Con Edison's calculations independently verified that the potential dose that allegor could have received due to gaseous releases was less than one mrem. Con Edison representatives have indicated that all radiation exposure records, measurements, and calculations of radiation exposure were available for individual review.

Ex7C
 However, in responding to this issue, Con Edison informed the NRC that some articles of clothing and one shoe did cause the personnel contamination monitor (PCM) at IP2 to alarm and these articles were initially retained to allow short lived radionuclides to decay. On the next working day, with the exception of the shoe, all items of personnel clothing were surveyed and found to be acceptable for release

Ex7C
 Since the radionuclides detected on the shoe were known to be byproduct material, plant procedures did not permit the shoe to be released until it was decontaminated. Con Edison representatives informed the NRC that the cause of the clothing and shoe contamination was inconclusive because follow-up surveys did not definitively identify the source of the clothing or shoe contamination. Con Edison representatives indicated that the clothing contamination could have come from short lived noble gases released from the plant, noble gases present within the plant, or due to naturally occurring radon gas and radon daughter products. The shoe contamination could have come from contamination that was known to be "fixed" (i.e., not easily removed) within some locations of the roof surface or from an isolated location along the travel pathway within the plant.

Based on the low contamination levels that were found on the clothing and shoe, Con Edison concluded that there was low radiological significance associated with this event. However, Con Edison acknowledged that their communications with workers regarding this event lacked detail and greater emphasis was needed to ensure more complete radiological briefings to plant workers.

Regarding concern that no one on the roof was warned or

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	

RI-1999-A-0008	INDIAN POINT 3	Anonymous	1/26/1999	3/30/1999
1			N	3/30/1999
Anonymous sources indicates that there is an impression that people should not write DERs.			<p>notified prior to the gaseous release and no access controls were in place to prevent personnel from becoming contaminated, Con Edison reported in Surveillance 99-SR-002 that containment pressure venting and charging pump suction stabilizer venting are routine plant evolutions. These evolutions have not historically required personnel access controls to the administration building roof and there are no plant procedures that require the restriction of personnel access to the roof during such gaseous releases from the plant due to the low level of radioactivity in the effluent. Further, based on interviews with cognizant personnel, Con Edison determined that there has not been a time when access to the roof was restricted for the purposes of protecting personnel during gaseous pressure releases.</p> <p>Surveillance 99-SR-002 reported that on Saturday, December 5, 1998, there was a pressure relief from containment lasting 3 hours and 20 minutes, during the time that individuals were working on the roof. In addition, there was a three minute release from the 21 Charging Pump Suction Stabilizer near the end of the period when individuals were on the roof. At that time, three individuals had left the roof and three individuals were still working on the roof. However, plant effluent data indicated that releases were not large enough to warrant occupancy control on the roof. The administration building roof is within the radiologically controlled area (RCA) boundary and there have been instances in the past when access to the roof was controlled due to the presence of loose radioactive contamination on roof surfaces, but not due to gaseous releases.</p> <p>As directed by the APM on 2/10/99, this anonymous allegation is being closed due to a lack of specifics provided by the allegor(s). Specifically, the allegation involves an individual's perceptions of the lack of emphasis/support for writing DERs versus the actual cancellation of premature closure of a specific DER. Past NRC reviews, as detailed by the resident in her 1/26/99 memo to the allegation file, do not support the anonymous allegor's assertion. The DER system is a high volume, low threshold system that appears to be well supported by management. Furthermore, the lack of specifics provided, would make a thorough review of this concern very difficult. Moreover, the 40500 inspection found the DER system implementation was acceptable; plant deficiencies were being appropriately identified and planned corrective actions tracked to correct the problems.</p>	

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1999-A-0021	INDIAN POINT 2	Anonymous	2/27/1999	7/22/1999
1			Y	7/21/1999
<p>"Anonymous" e-mail to OPA with suggestions for item NRC should locate in GL96-01 review:</p> <p>NRC should look at why IP-2 chooses not to shut down and test the fact that the Reactor Coolant Pumps are not verified to trip on undervoltage or underfrequency. NRC should also find out why IP-2 does not test that when the RCP trips and the reactor trips. There is a CRS written against this that IP-2 has written off.</p> <p>These trips are taken credit for in the Safety Analysis of the FSAR. IP-2 is operating with untested reactor trips.</p>			<p>Portion of RCP UF circuit internal to RCP breakers was not tested. Not an NRC violation, but issues had existed since construction. An acceptable operatilibyt determinatoin was prepared by the licensee. Circuits will be tested during the next shutdown.</p>	
	INDIAN POINT 2	Anonymous	2/27/1999	7/22/1999
2			N	7/21/1999
<p>NRC should also look at how IP-2 deals with lifted leads. Many of their systems require lifting of leads to test. NRC should ascertain what sort of verification is done when leads are re-landed. The same issue applies to the use of knife switches or "stabs".</p>			<p>Not substantiated; no violation of NRC requirements.</p>	
RI-1999-A-0041	INDIAN POINT 3	Licensee Employee	4/20/1999	5/20/1999
1			N	5/20/1999
<p>The alleger is being harassed and intimidated for pulling an individual's badge, as he should have under 10 CFR Part 26. The licensee's actions may have a chilling effect on the station.</p>			<p>The NRC was aware of the incident and has been evaluating other aspects of this matter. Evaluated the information provided along with other available information and we have determined that teh alleger has not articulated a prima facie case of discrimination as described in 10 CFR 50.7. Specifically, 10 CFR 50.7 indicates that an employee cannot be discriminated against for engaging in protected activity, which would include raising safety concerns to management or to the NRC. Discrimination includes discharge and other actions that relate to the compensations , terms, conditions or privileges of employment. As of the time the alleger raised this concern, the alleger had not been removed or otherwise suffered discrimination related to your compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. Also, the comments from individuals that the alleger should not have pulled the individual's badge are not sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.</p> <p>Based on our current assessment of the available facts, no further review of this matter is planned. Provided DOL info as a courtesy.</p>	

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1999-A-0054	INDIAN POINT 3	Anonymous	4/23/1999	8/31/1999
1			Y	8/31/1999
<p>The General Manager of Operations (GMO) performed a causal evaluation of Deviation/Event Report (DER) 99-476 regarding a delay in the return of IP-3 to power operations due to inadequate Con Edison support at the Buchanan Switchyard. However, the GMO subsequently placed on the DER the name of another individual as lead investigator, without the individual's prior knowledge and consent, and presented the package to the DER Review Committee for closure on April 5, 1999.</p>			<p>On August 24, 1999, an allegation panel reviewed the licensee's July 9, 1999 reply letter and recommended closure of Concern 1 based on the licensee's independent investigation and stated corrective actions. The licensee concluded that the GMO did make the mistakes described in the concern but that the actions were not wilful. The problems were caused by ineffective communication and a lack of knowledge of the plant procedure requirements for conducting a DER investigation. This concern was substantiated; however there are no nuclear safety issues associated with DER 99-476.</p>	
	INDIAN POINT 3	Anonymous	4/23/1999	8/31/1999
2			N	8/31/1999
<p>With regard to the above issue, there is a concern that this high level manager deviated from corrective action documentation procedures, but that this deviation was not appropriately handled by NYPA senior management. It has been asserted that a similar incident performed by a lower level employee would have been dealt with more severely. Thus, a perception arises that different standards for procedure adherence exist between the staff and management of IP-3.</p>			<p>On August 24, 1999, an allegation panel reviewed the licensee's July 9, 1999 reply letter and recommended closure of Concern 1 based on the licensee's independent investigation. The description provided of the licensee's disciplinary action policy, along with examples of disciplinary actions taken, demonstrated that the disciplinary action taken against the GMO as a result of this matter was not preferential.</p>	

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1999-A-0067	INDIAN POINT 3	Licensee Employee	6/17/1999	7/30/1999
1			N/A	7/30/1999
<p>Backdating of corrective action documentation. Allegor was aware that ACT-98-37297 was signed by the responsible ORG engineer in February 1999. Allegor placed file in eval box. It was left in the eval box until April when allegor reminded supervisor. A few days later the file was signed with February/March date on it. File is now missing.</p>		<p>On June 17, 1999, the NRC received an allegation that certain corrective action documentation was being backdated at Indian Point 3. On July 14, 1999, the NRC sent the allegor an acknowledgment letter. During the course of a telephone conversation with the allegor on July 21, 1999, the allegor specifically requested not to receive correspondence related to this matter. As such, NRC follow up action is described herein.</p> <p>An Allegation Review Board (ARB) was convened on June 30, 1999, to discuss the allegor's concern. The panel concluded that OI would incorporate this concern into their investigation of essentially the same issue, raised in Allegation File No. RI-99-A-0066. On July 22, 1999, the allegor spoke with the Region I Allegation Coordinator, and stated he/she did not want any further correspondence from the NRC and that she was only corroborating the concern raised by the allegor for Allegation File No. RI-99-A-0066. At a subsequent ARB on July 28, 1999, it was decided that since the allegor did not want any further correspondence from the NRC and had raised the same concern as one raised in Allegation File No. RI-99-A-0066. Allegation File No. RI-99-A-0067 could be closed and the information in Allegation File No. RI-99-A-0067 would be incorporated into Allegation File No. RI-99-A-0066.</p> <p>As noted above, this allegor raised the same concern as one raised in Allegation File No. RI-99-A-0066. Since this allegor has subsequently requested that he/she not receive additional correspondence from the NRC, and since review of his/her concern is enveloped by the follow up for Allegation File No. RI-99-A-0066, this allegation is being administratively closed. The information in Allegation File No. RI-99-A-0067 will be incorporated into Allegation File No. RI-99-A-0066.</p>		
RI-1999-A-0077	INDIAN POINT 3	Anonymous	7/12/1999	10/15/1999
1			N/A	8/18/1999
<p>Not everything in ORG is proper.</p>		<p>Based on a lack of specific information, the NRC did not pursue this statement. However, it should be noted that another more specific concern about the work environment in ORG was raised in a similar time frame, and the NRC is pursuing this issue via another allegation file (RI-99-A-0066).</p>		

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1999-A-0077	INDIAN POINT 3	Anonymous	7/12/1999	10/15/1999
2			Y	10/15/1999
<p>Some speakout concerns are not getting proper attention. Management seems to be stalling or waiting until the problems go away by themselves. Or do they not want to offend anyone mentioned in the speakout concern? Meanwhile, employees must continue to be subjected to the problems specified in the concern.</p>			<p>This concern was referred to NYPA on August 10, 1999. NYPA contracted with an independent consultant to investigate the concern. The independent investigation substantiated that some concerns were not getting the needed attention to bring the issues to closure in a timely manner. However, the investigation concluded that those issues with higher potential safety impact were found to be resolved in a much more timely manner. NRC staff review of the licensee's response found it to be comprehensive, with appropriate conclusions reached and supported by the findings. The licensee's response also presented corrective actions which will be taken to help improve the effectiveness of the Speakout program.</p> <p>The concern was substantiated.</p> <p>Additional note: On September 17, 1999, the IP3 resident office received a similar anonymous note (same typeface, same margins, similar wording). Another comment about ORG was similarly vague. Other statements about DERs and ORG are being addressed in Allegation Files RI-99-A-0054 and RI-99-A-0066. Other statements in the note were non-specific. This additional anonymous note has been placed in Allegation File RI-99-A-0077 for information.</p>	
RI-1999-A-0107	INDIAN POINT 3	Contractor Employee	9/23/1999	10/22/1999
1			Y	10/21/1999
<p>The turbine next to the generator may not have been surveyed prior to work on that turbine (August 1999). The alleger was not notified of any swipe results and was not aware if the procedure was followed or not.</p>			<p>The NRC resident inspectors performed a review and found that historically, radioactivity has not been detected in the turbine area. No procedure currently exists that requires health physics personnel to take swipes in this area to check for radioactivity. This is not abnormal, since Indian Point 3 is a pressurized water reactor (PWR) design, and PWR turbines, under normal operating conditions do not contain radioactive steam. On occasion, there can be some degree of radioactive contamination in the main turbines if there is leakage in the steam generators which would allow primary reactor coolant to leak into the secondary water system which generates the steam to drive the turbines. Since the steam generators have all been recently replaced at Indian Point 3, there are no contamination problems with the main turbines.</p> <p>Although NYPA has assigned a health physics technician to survey certain equipment that is opened on the turbine floor, this assignment is predominantly a job task to allow inexperienced health physicists to gain experience prior to being assigned to a radiologically controlled plant area and not a required activity.</p> <p>In summary, the concern, while true, does not constitute a violation of NRC requirements.</p>	

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1999-A-0107	INDIAN POINT 3	Contractor Employee	9/23/1999	10/22/1999
2			N	10/21/1999
<p>Industrial safety concerns about 15 Westinghouse personnel climbing over a hand rail, the 175 ton crane hit the vital crane and personnel failed to follow procedures for stop work (to evaluate if cranes were damaged or not), and the 175 ton crane was operated improperly (open - crane operator's leg could have gotten caught).</p>			<p>These are industrial safety issues which are outside of the NRC regulatory purview. Notwithstanding, the NRC resident inspectors at Indian Point 3 found that two deviation event reports (DERs) were written about incidents with the reactor building polar crane that occurred during the outage, including the incident on September 16, 1999. In both cases, the issues were identified and evaluated by the New York Power Authority (NYPA) and immediate corrective actions were taken to preclude additional errors. Corrective actions documented by NYPA included the following: (1) no movement of the polar crane is to occur while the manipulator crane is in the "home" position; (2) use of a single point-of-contact for all polar crane movements to ensure proper coordination; and (3) the utilization of tape on the floor outlining the travel path of the polar crane until permanent painted lines are completed in the future. Our review did not reveal that there was a fuel cell in the manipulator crane at the time of either of these incidents, as alluded to in the information provided.</p> <p>We have observed station management endorsing both plant and personnel safety and our inspectors verify on a routine basis that personnel adhere to established plant policy and procedures including personnel safety during their tours within the entire protected area.</p>	
	INDIAN POINT 3	Contractor Employee	9/23/1999	10/22/1999
3			Y	10/21/1999
<p>The use of silver tape to mark a foreign materials exclusion (FME) area is not consistent with procedures. Also poor job planning.</p>			<p>The Indian Point 3 Quality Assurance department has identified some minor problems with foreign material exclusion (FME) controls in the turbine-generator area. Although this is a balance-of-plant, non-safety-related area of the plant, NYPA acknowledges that it is important to pay attention to FME controls in this area to protect the integrity of the turbine and associated equipment. The introduction of foreign material into the main turbines or the main electrical generator could cause damage to that equipment, necessitating repairs and resulting in significant cost to NYPA (in terms of outage time, in addition to the cost of repair). Our inspectors have walked down this area and did not identify any current problems with FME or the use of silver duct tape being for FME controls. The inspectors will continue to assess this area as well as other FME areas during their routine plant tours. No further action is planned to address this concern at this time.</p> <p>Based on the information provided by IP3 QA, we found that the concern was partially substantiated in that some FME problems have been identified in the turbine-generator area. NYPA has acknowledged that this area requires attention.</p>	

<u>Allegation Number</u>	<u>Facility</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
<u>Concern Number</u>			<u>Concern Substantiated?</u>	<u>Concern Closed Date</u>
<u>Concern Description</u>			<u>Basis for Closure</u>	
RI-1999-A-0107	INDIAN POINT 3	Contractor Employee	9/23/1999	10/22/1999
4			N	10/21/1999
SCWE - Safety culture problem with the use of chances as bargaining chips.			We find no evidence that NYPA's practice of holding a raffle to promote safety by using chances to win prizes has caused the work force to go against established procedures or perform their duties in an unsafe manner. While we acknowledge that the supervisor, in this instance, should probably have sought to obtain red tape to identify the FME area, his efforts to control the area in some manner (i.e., through use of the silver duct tape) demonstrate that his intentions were appropriate. While his means of accomplishing this (by offering raffle "chances") may have appeared to be unconventional, we do not believe that it was intended, in any way, to undermine safety or to discourage individuals from raising safety issues. Therefore, we could not conclude that this circumstance was representative of a problem with the safety culture at IP3.	