

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

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Report No: 50-266/2000002(DRS); 50-301/2000002(DRS)

Licensee: Wisconsin Electric Power Company

Facility: Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2

Location: 6610 Nuclear Road
Two Rivers, WI 54241

Dates: January 10-14, 2000

Inspector: James L. Belanger, Senior Physical Security Inspector

Approved by: James R. Creed, Safeguards Program Manager
Division of Reactor Safety

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-266/2000002(DRS); 50-301/2000002D(DRS)

This routine inspection on the physical protection program included alarm stations, testing and maintenance, security event logs, security force knowledge, management support, audits and self-assessment program.

- **The licensee has experienced significant delays in the completion of the access control upgrade program which includes replacement of the security computer system. This has not affected security operations because the old system continued to be adequately maintained (Section S1.1).**
- **Records of security force-on-force drills, condition reports, and interviews with security force members showed operability problems with security radios. The licensee has initiated corrective action to address this problem (Section S1.2).**
- **The licensee was transitioning to a new handgun. Inspector observation of recertification, qualifications and interviews with the range instructor identified a personal safety issue relating to defective ammunition. The licensee resolved this issue prior to the conclusion of the inspection (Section S5).**

Report Details

IV. Plant Support

S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities

S1.1 Security Computer Replacement Program Update

a. Inspection Scope (81700)

The inspector observed operations of the Central and Secondary Alarm Stations and interviewed the licensee's Project Manager responsible for the security replacement program.

b. Observations and Findings

The inspector observed that the licensee continued to maintain the security requirements with the old security computer. The Security Supervisor stated that the old computer has been reliable in operating the security system. During a routine inspection in January 1999, the licensee had estimated that the access control project which included the installation of a new security computer system, multiplexers, new alarm station consoles with new monitors, video switchers, etc. would be completed by the end of the year. The Project Manager for the access control project indicated that significant schedule slippages were experienced due to multiple reasons including delays in completing Factory Acceptance Testing and completing modification packages.

The Project Manager stated manpower issues and the need for more timely review of modification packages by Wisconsin Electric personnel were of concern. He also noted that the issue of long-term support and ownership of the system once it is turned over by the contractor had not been resolved.

The inspector observed that the SAS modification project was completed and that the licensee actively utilized the new security computer training simulator to identify potential problems and for training purposes. Security console operators were trained on the new system using the training simulator. The new badging system was operational and the badging staff have scheduled all plant personnel to have their pictures taken for the new system.

c. Conclusions

The licensee experienced delays in the completion of the access control replacement program. The old security computer system continued to maintain the security system. This project has not affected the licensee's compliance with their approved security plan because the existing security computer has been effectively maintained.

S1.2 Effectiveness of Security Radios

a. Inspection Scope (81700)

The inspector reviewed the licensee programs for maintaining the reliability of physical protection equipment and security related devices.

b. Findings and Observations

A review of testing and maintenance related records showed that the licensee has implemented an effected program to maintain their security system. However, interviews with security force members, a review of condition reports, and records of tactical response drills indicated numerous problems with the effectiveness of the security radios. The condition reports written on this subject date back through 1998 and each documented that the radios performed poorly (CR 99-241, CR 99-152, CR 99-066, CR 99-069, CR 98-0893, CR 98-0196).

The licensee evaluated the plant radio communication system and concluded that it was in need of replacement. Interviews with Security Supervisor indicated that this problem was recognized as a problem plant wide and that they developed a action plan to address this issue.

The inspector reviewed the project plan for the upgrade of the Point Beach and Kewaunee Nuclear Plants' radio systems and interviewed the lead project engineer at Point Beach concerning the plan. The project engineer advised the inspector that a Modification Project Team was formed which included representatives from various plant departments, i.e., operations, emergency preparedness, security, engineering, and maintenance. The team surveyed the use of communications at other utilities. At the time of the inspection, the project was at the point of meeting with leading manufacturers to discuss available options and communication schemes. The project schedule called for an engineering evaluation with a target completion of March 1, 2000, and recommendations for a design system to management with a target completion of April 15, 2000. The effectiveness of security radio communications will be reviewed during future inspections.

c. Conclusions

The security radio communication system has affected the performance of the security force. The licensee recognized radio communications as a problem and has initiated a plan to upgrade the plant communications system. The effectiveness of security radio communications will be reviewed during future inspections.

S5 Security and Safeguards Staff Training and Qualification

S5 Recertification of Firearms Qualification with New Handgun

a. Inspection Scope (81700)

The Security Supervisor advised the inspector at the beginning of the inspection that they were transitioning to a new pistol. The inspector reviewed the lesson plans pertaining to the firearms course and observed a portion of the required training.

b. Observations and Findings

The licensee was in the process of recertifying all of its armed response members in the use of the new pistol and expect to complete recertifications by the end of January 2000. This change in the service handgun will require a change to the security plan. The Security Supervisor indicated that she was aware of the requirement and intended to submit a plan change.

The inspector reviewed the lesson plans for the courses required for qualification and recertification using the new weapon. The lesson plans were well written comprehensive and appropriate.

The inspector observed the "marksmanship" and "look-shoot" portions of the required courses covered during the pistol recertification. The training was conducted at the Manitowoc County Sheriff's Department indoor range on January 12, 2000. The conduct of the range instructor and the officers recertifying was professional.

The inspector observed that a malfunction occurred with one weapon during recertification. Specifically, the powder in the round failed to ignite properly and the round lodged in the barrel. The inspector determined through interviews with the range instructor that this same malfunction occurred four times during the recertification process the previous week. In each instance the round lodged in the barrel, necessitating removal of the barrel and sending it to the vendor for analysis and recertification. The training supervisor indicated that in each instance the shooter recognized the malfunction and did not attempt to fire a second shot which had the potential for personal injury.

The licensee initiated a follow-up with their ammunition supplier and subsequently concluded that the less costly ammunition in use was part of a lot that was contaminated with graphite during the manufacturing process. The licensee discontinued the use of this ammunition. The training supervisor indicated that they would use new ammunition until they were able to obtain a new supply of re-loads that were not contaminated. The inspector determined through an interview with the Security Supervisor that the ammunition on the range (re-loads) was different from the ammunition onsite which was factory fresh.

c. Conclusions

The licensee upgraded the security force's pistol. The conduct of operations at the range was professional. The licensee identified and resolved a defective ammunition problem at the range during the recertification process.

S6 Security Organization and Administration

S6.1 Changes in Security Organizational Reporting Structure

a. Inspection Scope (81700)

The inspector reviewed the changes to the security organization reporting matrix that were impacted by the formation of the "Nuclear Management Company" (NMC) in February 1999. (NMC expects to assume day-to-day operating responsibility for the five nuclear sites, including the Point Beach Plant by mid-2000 upon regulatory approval.) Interviews were conducted with the Security Supervisor, the recently appointed Security Manager of NMC, and the Manager, Regulatory Services.

b. Observations and Findings

NMC is a newly formed corporate oversight organization for Point Beach and four other nuclear generating facilities. The approved security plan shows the Manager-Emergency Response as having program responsibility for the security function to include assuring that security procedures are developed, revised and implemented, assuring implementation of the training program, and providing management oversight of the security Supervisor and his/her subordinates. The inspector determined through interviews that the Manager-Emergency Response was selected as the Security Manager of the newly formed NMC and the Manager-Emergency Response is no longer an established position in the security organizational structure. The Security Supervisor currently reports directly to the Manager, Regulatory Services & Licensing. The Security Manager of NMC indicated that upon the transfer of operating licenses from the member utilities to NMC by mid 2000, the PBNP Security Supervisor will report directly to him, but that the Manager, Regulatory Services & Licensing will continue to be the onsite contact. The Manager, Regulatory Services & Licensing reaffirmed management support of the security program. The licensee was aware that the security plan security organizational description required revision.

c. Conclusions

The Manager-Emergency Response was no longer responsible for the oversight of the security program. A security plan change to reflect the current organizational structure and security responsibilities is required.

V. Management Meetings

X1 Exit Meeting Summary

The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on January 14, 2000. The licensee did not identify any information discussed as being proprietary.

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

C. L. Andrews, Security Specialist
A. J. Cayia, Manager, Regulatory Services & Licensing
M. A. Fencil, Security Specialist
M. P. Findlay, Manager, Security (Nuclear Management Company)
F. A. Flentje, Senior Regulation and Compliance Specialist
R. A. Johnson, General Supervisor-Maintenance
J. E. Knorr, Manager, Regulation and Compliance
B. K. Kopetsky, Security Specialist/FFD Administrator
J. E. McCullum, Security Supervisor
R. G. Mende, Plant Manager
C. R. Peterson, Director, Engineering
D. C. Popp, Security Specialist

INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

IP 81700: Physical Security Program For Power Reactors

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

None

Closed

None

Discussed

None

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

CAS	Central Alarm Station
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
FFD	Fitness For Duty
DRS	Division of Reactor Safety
NMC	Nuclear Management Company
PBNP	Point Beach Nuclear Plant
SAS	Secondary Alarm Station

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Radio Communications Upgrade Project Plan, Revision 2

Lesson Plan #SEC.TAC001R1 (10/19/99) Marksmanship Course

Lesson Plan #SEC.TAC002R1 (10/19/99) Multiple Adversary Engagement (Look-Shoot)

Lesson Plan #SEC.TAC003R1 (10/19/99) Tactical Barricades

Lesson Plan #SEC.TAC004R1 (10/20/99) Tactical Close Combat

Project Status Report/Security Upgrade Project (08/12/99 - 09/17/99)

Project Status Report/Security Upgrade Project (09/17/99 - 10/22/99)

Project Status Report/Security Upgrade Project (10/22/99 - 11/15/99)

Security Upgrade Project/Monthly Project Status Report (Report period ending 01/07/2000)

Weekly & Quarterly Vehicle Barrier System Checks (July 99 - January 2000)

Northgate and Southgate Weekly Security Equipment Tests 1999

Weekly PA Intrusion Alarm Test 1999

Weekly Door Intrusion Alarm Test 1999