

PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE PNO-II-00-004

This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance. The information is as initially received without verification or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by Region II staff in Atlanta, Georgia on this date.

| <u>Facility</u> | <u>Licensee Emergency Classification</u> |
|------------------------|---|
| Georgia Power Co. | Notification of Unusual Event |
| Hatch 1 | Alert |
| Baxley, Georgia | Site Area Emergency |
| Dockets: 50-321 | General Emergency |
| | X Not Applicable |

Subject: AUGMENTED INSPECTION TEAM DISPATCHED TO REVIEW HATCH UNIT 1 REACTOR TRIP AND SUBSEQUENT TRANSIENT

On January 28, 2000, Region II dispatched an Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) to review the Hatch Unit 1 reactor trip that occurred on January 26, 2000 (PNO-II-00-003). The AIT will assess the equipment and personnel performance and licensee actions in response to the reactor trip.

The licensee has determined that the cause of the reactor trip was the inadvertent closure of a main feedwater heater inlet isolation valve, which resulted in the partial loss of feedwater. The licensee believes that the valve closed when the switch for the valve operator was bumped. This switch type has been the subject of operating experience information regarding the sensitivity to bumping.

The licensee's investigation has determined that during the transient, reactor vessel water level reached the point where the steam lines were partially flooded. Apparently, the high pressure coolant injection system did not trip as designed on high reactor vessel water level. Operators did not recognize that the safety relief valves had opened because the tailpipe pressure switches did not actuate due to the valves passing water. Later review of transient data found that all of the safety relief valves operated satisfactorily. Followup testing of five safety relief valve pilot assemblies at Wyle laboratory determined that the assemblies operated satisfactorily.

The licensee's event review team is continuing to investigate the cause

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for the failure of HPCI to trip on high reactor vessel level and the problems experienced when restoring RCIC to operation following the high reactor vessel water level trip.

The unit remains in cold shutdown.

Contact: C. Rapp
(404)562-4674