



Point Beach Nuclear Plant
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NPL 2000-0052

January 27, 2000

Document Control Desk
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Mail Station P1-137
Washington, D.C. 20555

10 CFR 50.73

Ladies/Gentlemen:


DOCKET NO. 50-266
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 1999-014-00
CONTAINMENT UPPER HATCH OUTER DOOR VENT VALVE FOUND OPEN
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report 1999-014-00 for the Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 1. This report is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as, "any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications." This report describes the discovery of an open outer door vent valve in a containment access airlock.

New commitments are identified in the corrective action section of this report by italics.

Please contact us if you require additional information.

Sincerely,



A. J. Cayia
Manager,
Regulatory Services & Licensing

Enclosure

CWK/tat

cc: NRC Resident Inspector
NRC Regional Administrator
NRC Project Manager
PSCW
INPO Support Services

JE22

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-6 F33), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT

FACILITY NAME (1)

Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

05000266

PAGE (3)

1 of 4

TITLE (4)

Containment Upper Hatch Outer Door Vent Valve Found Open

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
12	28	1999	1999	014	00	01	27	2000		05000
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
										05000
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
										05000

OPERATING MODE (9)	N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)			
		20.2201(b)		20.2203(a)(2)(v)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)
POWER LEVEL (10)	100	20.2203(a)(1)		20.2203(a)(3)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)
		20.2203(a)(2)(i)		20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71
		20.2203(a)(2)(ii)		20.2203(a)(4)	50.73(a)(2)(iv) OTHER
		20.2203(a)(2)(iii)		50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v) Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A
		20.2203(a)(2)(iv)		50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME
Charles Wm. Krause, Senior Regulatory Compliance Engineer

TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
(920) 755-6809

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).	X	NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
	X					

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On December 28, 1999, the outer door vent valve in the 66 foot containment access air lock was discovered to be in the open position. The valve was immediately shut. An investigation determined that the air lock was last used for a containment entry on December 24, 1999, and it was probable that the vent valve was open for that four day period. During that time the inner door was properly closed therefore containment integrity as defined in the Technical Specifications (TS) was satisfied at all times. However, with the vent valve open the outer door was considered to be inoperable and the provisions of TS LCO 15.3.6.A.1.d.(1) that require the operable inner door to be locked within 24 hours was not met. This event is reportable as a condition prohibited by TS. There was no safety significance to this condition since containment integrity was maintained throughout the event.

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Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1	05000266	1999	- 014	- 00	2 OF 4

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

Event Description:

On December 28, 1999, at approximately 1330 CST, an auxiliary operator at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP) Unit No. 1 noticed that the outer door vent valve in the 66 foot containment access air lock was open. The air lock was not in use and the outer door was locked; however, under these conditions the vent valve should have been shut. The auxiliary operator closed the vent valve and notified the control room. A condition report was initiated (CR 99-3319) and an investigation conducted to determine when the valve had been left open.

Since one of the two doors in the personnel air lock was properly closed, containment integrity was maintained as defined in Technical Specification (TS) 15.1.D. However, during the time that the outer door vent valve was open, we concluded that the outer door would have not fulfilled its safety related function to maintain a leak tight boundary and; therefore, the outer door was considered to be inoperable during that time that the vent valve was opened. Under these circumstances, the provisions of TS 15.3.6.A.1.d.(1) would be applicable for one air lock door being inoperable. For one door inoperable, this LCO requires the following; (a) verify the operable door is closed in the affected air lock within one hour, AND (b) lock the operable door in the affected air lock within 24 hours, AND (c) verify the operable door is locked closed in the affected air lock once per 31 days. Although the outer door was locked following the last previous use of this air lock, the inner or operable door was not locked within 24 hours. Accordingly, we have determined that this event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by the TS.

Cause:

An apparent cause evaluation of this condition has been completed. This evaluation included interviews of personnel on January 5, 2000; and a review of records documenting containment access. This evaluation established that the last containment entry via the upper air lock occurred on December 24, 1999, for the purpose of obtaining containment air samples. The recollection of the individuals involved in that containment entry was that the outer hatch vent valve had been shut upon leaving the containment. The recollection was supported by a completed sign off for this step on the applicable plant form. However; since the evaluation of the event could not determine any other reason for the hatch to be used, and we have no reason to suspect a willful mis-positioning of the vent valve, we have concluded that the personnel who used the hatch on December 24 forgot to close the vent valve, or did not close the valve properly.

Corrective Actions:

Upon discovery of this condition, the outer hatch vent valve was immediately shut and the control room notified.

Short term corrective actions included revision of the containment entry/exit form to include a second check for the closing of the hatch vent valve when exiting containment.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

Long term corrective actions will include the evaluation of the containment entry/exit process for overall clarity and consistency. This corrective action has been initiated under a separate condition report (CR 99-2181) and will be tracked to completion through the licensee's corrective action program.

Component and System Description:

Containment air locks form part of the containment pressure boundary and provide a means for personnel access during all operating conditions. The doors are interlocked to prevent simultaneous opening. During periods when the containment boundary is not required to be operable, the door interlock mechanism may be disabled, allowing both doors of an air lock to remain open for extended periods when frequent containment entry is necessary. Each air lock door has been designed and tested to certify its ability to withstand a pressure in excess of the maximum expected pressure following a DBA in containment. As such, closure of a single door supports containment integrity. Each of the doors contains double gasketed seals and local leak rate testing capability to ensure pressure integrity. To effect a leak tight seal, the air lock design uses pressure seated doors (i.e., an increase in containment internal pressure results in increased sealing force on each door).

Each containment structure at PBNP is equipped with two air locks. Each air lock is required to be operable. For the air lock to be considered operable, the air lock interlock mechanism must be operable, the air lock must be in compliance with the Type B airlock leakage test, and both air lock doors must be operable. For the purposes of this section, 'airlock door' includes the door itself, equalizing valve, operating mechanism seal, and door seals. The interlock mechanism allows only one air lock door of an air lock to be opened at one time. This provision ensures that a gross breach of containment does not exist when containment is required to be operable. Closure of a single door in each air lock is sufficient to provide a leak tight barrier following postulated events. Nevertheless, both doors are kept closed when the air lock is not being used for normal entry into and exit from containment. TS 15.3.6.A.1.d. allows entry and exit to perform repairs on the affected air lock component. If the outer door is inoperable, then it may be easily accessed to repair. If the inner door is the one that is inoperable, then a short time exists when the containment boundary is not intact (during access through the outer door). The ability to open the operable door, even if it means the containment boundary is temporarily not intact, is acceptable due to the low probability of an event that could pressurize the containment during the short time in which the operable door is expected to be open.

Safety Assessment:

Since one door of the containment airlock was operable and shut at all times, containment leak tight integrity was never compromised. Therefore, the health and safety of the public and the plant staff was not impacted by this event. This event did not constitute a Safety System Functional Failure.

System and Component Identifiers:

The Energy Industry Identification System component function identifier for each component/system referred to in this report are as follows:

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

Component/System

Identifier

Containment Leakage Control System	BD
Reactor Containment Building	NH
Air Lock	AL
Valve, vent	VTV
Door	DR

Similar Occurrences:

A review of recent LERs over the past three years identified the following related events involving containment penetrations:

LER NUMBER

Title

LER 301/1999-004-00	Failure to Enter Containment Penetration LCO Constitutes a Condition Prohibited By TS
LER 266/1998-018-00	Missed Surveillances For Appendix J Testing Of Containment Electrical Penetrations
LER 266/1997-003-00	Spare Containment Penetrations Not Leak Tested In Accordance With Tech Specs