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1	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
2	NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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4	MEETING: VOLUNTARY INDUSTRY INITIATIVES IN
5	LIEU OF REGULATORY ACTIONS
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7	U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
8	One White Flint North
9	Room O-8-B-4
10	11555 Rockville Pike
11	Rockville, Maryland 20852-2738
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13	Tuesday, December 21, 1999
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15	The above-entitled meeting commenced, pursuant to notice, at
16	8:30 a.m.
17	PARTICIPANTS:
18	G.E. (GENE) CARPENTER, NRR
19	R.A. HERMAN, NRR
20	DEE JUBB, Westinghouse
21	NOEL DUDLEY, ACRS
22	GARY VINE, EPRI
23	ALEX MARION, NEI
24	DAVE MODEEN, NEI
25	BRIAN SHERON, NRR
	PARTICIPANTS: [Continued]
AI	BILL RECKLEY, NRR
RI E	L JIM SHAPARER, NRR
& A\$	BOB PALLA, NRR S
00 A1	I JACK STROSNIDER, NRR
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1 DENNIS DAMBLY, OGC 2 MELVIN FRANK, Scientech 3 CHARLES BRINKMAN, ABB CE Nuclear Power 4 DEANN E. RALEIGH, SERCH, Bechtel Power 5 MEENA KHANNA, NRR 6 W. H. BATEMAN, NRR 7 TIMOTHY COLLINS, NRR 8 BILL DEAN, NRR 9 JOE COLACCINO, NRR 10 MARIE POHLDA, NRR 11 BARRY WESTREICH, OE 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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[8:30 a.m.]

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RI EY & AS OC MR. CARPENTER: Good morning. I am Gene Carpenter. I am the Lead Project Manager in NRR here for the BWR Vessel and Internals Project work that we have been doing, which is a voluntary industry initiative.

Today is the third meeting that we have had on voluntary industry initiatives. The first one was held about a year ago in Chicago, in September. The second one was held approximately six weeks ago now, also in Chicago. This is the follow-on for that.

Basically what we are doing here is we are going to be talking about what is a voluntary industry initiative, what the Staff can do to quantify how we handle voluntary industry initiatives, and what the public and specifically NEI would like to tell us that they would like us to do about voluntary industry initiatives. This was at NEI's request that we go ahead and have this follow-up meeting. Before we get through with introductions and everything, I would like to do one housekeeping chore. There is a sign-in sheet going around someplace -- if everybody would make sure that they please sign in. Whoever needs a copy of that, please let me know at the end of the meeting.

The meeting is being transcribed, so we will have a copy of that available to you shortly electronically. I don't think that there is anything that is going to be proprietary said today, is that correct? No. Very good.

Again, my name is Gene Carpenter. Introductions -- introduce yourself.

MR. HERMAN: Bob Herman.

MR. SHERON: I am Brian Sheron.

MR. STROSNIDER: Jack Strosnider

MR. VINE: Gary Vine from EPRI.

more detail about the concept involving voluntary industry initiatives.

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We are hoping today that we can have an open and candid discussion. It's really important for us to come to some understanding in terms of definitions of some of the terms and definitions of some of the elements of this concept. We are hoping that we can leave today's meeting with an understanding or better understanding of NRC expectations relative to the application of voluntary industry initiatives within the regulatory process, and feel that if we achieve that understanding we will be able to move forward in a complementary fashion.

I do have to tell you that upon reading SECY 99-063, there were a number of concerns with the content of that SECY paper and I don't know if the NRC is interested in some comments on it, but the basic concerns stem from consistency in terms of our understanding of regulatory decision-making and how that would play out in the voluntary initiative space.

So I would just suggest to you that if NRC perceives any benefit in NEI submitting comments on that SECY paper we would be more than happy to do so.

Alternatively, we could save that effort and focus on commenting on the Federal Register notice of the Staff's proposal.

MR. HERMAN: Just to comment, Alex, on that, that paper before the SRM was issued by the Commission, I believe was sent to NEI and comments were received from NEI by certainly one of the Commissioners and incorporated in the SRM is what our understanding was.

MR. MARION: Comments were not submitted to that SECY paper.

Anyway, be that as it may, there's an opportunity for us to interact and develop an understanding.

Let me just begin with --

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$ SHERON: Could you just expand on what you mean by an understanding of --

MR. MARION: Well, a number of aspects of the SECY created

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RI EX & AS some concern from the standpoint of the perception that NRC desires to use voluntary industry initiatives as an alternative to the more rigorous decision making process involving the fact that -- that reading the words and that's one of the reactions.

MR. SHERON: You saw the paper that was sent on the new generic communications. I forget the SECY number. Jim, if you could help me -- because I think that these are very closely tied, that's why, in my mind.

My concept is that the industry did not like the generic letter approach and I am not -- we can discuss the question of whether you thought it was inappropriate backfitting, the use of 50.54(f) or not, but in my mind the issue was the industry did not like the generic letter approach and there were some drawbacks to it, okay, because a lot of times generic letters were not applicable to every licensee and in terms of what they were asking for.

The thought was that before we go off and just issue a generic letter saying send us 5000 reams of information or whatever on some subject and the like, we felt it would be better to first identify what is the technical concern that the Staff has and to present that to the industry and to give the industry an opportunity to decide whether they wanted to voluntarily address that concern.

The reason is you can address it probably in a much more efficient manner if you basically get to do it from the start, as opposed to just responding to a generic letter. You may have risk assessments for example that can come in and say this is only a problem for this class of plants and not for this class and that's why. You may say, gee, I understand you problem but I've got a better way to address this. That's fine. Okay.

But the idea was to give the industry a cut at it. In other words, we are telling you what the concern, the safety concern, and it

RIII EX & ASS OCI is not just frivolous in the sense that every time everybody dreams up I got a problem let's go run to the industry and have them spend a jillion dollars on it. That's not the case.

We consider the threshold for bringing something up to the industry about as the same threshold as for issuing a generic letter, the thought being that if the industry declined the opportunity to take something on as a voluntary industry initiative we would probably pursue the next step, which would be a generic letter. Our feeling is that this would pass the threshold, and right now the threshold is before the Staff goes off and initiates a generic letter, they bring it before the NRR Executive Team and they make their case, and if the Executive Team concludes that basically the generic letter is the appropriate way to go with the issue from a safety concern as well as procedural aspect, then the Staff is given the go-ahead to prepare it.

Recalling that generic letters go through a CRGR review, they go out for public comment draft, and ultimately before they are issued they go to the Commission, okay? -- so that is kind of the whole process that we use generic letters for and the whole idea is that if we are willing, if the Staff believes that the issue is such that we would be willing to pursue that process, then we would first raise it to the industry and give them the opportunity to come back and say we understand what your problem is, your technical concern, and we are willing to go off and address it and come back to you with a proposed resolution.

That in a nutshell is what I envision as the voluntary initiative process.

MR. CARPENTER: And we have had some success with that in $^{
m L}$ the past, specifically with the BWR Owners Group in the Vessel Internals $^{
m Project}$ that we have come to them with several issues that we had $^{
m S}$ I considered raising generic letters to.

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MR. SHERON: I think we have line cracking too. I think with the materials reliability --

MR. CARPENTER: HF1 cracking, barrel back bolts, et cetera. We brought that to the industry and the industry, instead of taking it on as a generic letter they took it on as a voluntary industry initiative, and it has been working quite well.

MR. HERMAN: I think the other piece of it was the 109 piece that was in there, the discussions of that. That was a binning type of thing for whether or not something is -- we were looking at things whether or not they were within the design basis or outside of the design basis was one set of considerations that were discussed in terms of trying to bin the issue, whether there was any regulatory concern about the issue at all, and those type of things were tied to what kind of involvement and what type of commitment there may have been depending on what the issue was.

That was basically the only use of the 109 type of stuff in the whole thing, and I think the other thing that was agreed upon at one of the earlier meetings that Steve Floyd attended was that things that turn out to be questions of public safety, you know, the highest threshold, are outside of the box and what was in the box were things that passed 50.109 in terms of being justifiable, things that were compliance related but I think everything Brian said in terms of the rest of the process, that was part of the process too.

MR. VINE: Can I respond to Bob's comment?

SECY 90-63 talks about backfits in two contexts. One is the binning process and the other is in the regulatory decisionmaking process and there are two references in the SECY to the latter.

Now I don't have any problem with the former, namely how you use the backfit rule to bin various types of initiatives. I think the problem with the SECY as it relates to the backfit rule is in the other

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two references where you basically go through a logic that says that if an issue comes up, that if the industry volunteers to do something then the NRC doesn't have to do any backfit analysis.

Then the issue moves forward with whatever action the industry takes and moves into enforcement space without ever doing an analysis to determine whether or not there was a significant safety issue involved.

If you dissect the words in those two locations in the SECY it is almost as if the onus is put on the industry to do the backfit analysis to determine whether or not we should be doing something under the criterion of the backfit rule.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ MARION: Yes, but Brian made it clear that that wasn't the intent.

MR. VINE: Right. That's what the words say.

MR. SHERON: A 50.54(f) letter, and this is where we probably part company in terms of interpretation, and we parted company when we had our meeting with Winston & Strawn and we basically agreed to disagree.

When you read a generic letter, and probably with the exception of the charcoal filter testing paper, which we agree was a backfit and it was a compliance backfit, most if not all generic letters do not require anything, but we do question.

If we have a question on whether or not a Licensee remains in compliance with a regulation because of new information that has come to light, then basically what we do is we ask you to provide information as to why you, the Licensee, believe you are still in compliance with the regulation in light of new information.

It doesn't say you have to change anything or do something different.

Now most Licensees go "aw, rats" and say, you know, I can't

really justify -- because we lay out our information. We say we have all this information that seems contrary to the fact that you are complying with the regulation, but given all this data and this information, we need you to tell us why you still think you comply.

Well, most Licensees will go yeah, you're probably right, or, you know, I can interpret it that way, and they will go and they will fix whatever they've got to fix, and they call it a backfit. It is not a backfit.

The Licensee has the option to come in and argue and say here is why I believe I still comply with the regulations in light of all this information.

If a Licensee, however, takes on a backfit -- I'm sorry, not a backfit but in lieu of a generic letter, where we raise an issue and we say, gee, we have some new information here. We think that it raises a question as to whether or not Licensees comply with the regulations. We would like to turn that over to the industry as a voluntary initiative. The industry comes back and says we are going to propose some new inspection program or whatever, okay? -- and we are going to inspect this or whatever and we are going to monitor it more closely, and that way we will make sure we stay in compliance.

Then the inspectors go out and they say, gee, you didn't do an inspection the way you said you were, okay? Well, we would interpret that as that inspection was needed to maintain compliance with the regulation, and if you didn't do it then we're raising the question of compliance.

MR. HERMAN: I am not even sure that you would ever get that far. I mean you never get to that -- let's take the Duke program for example of how it was implemented.

There were commitments on the part of the Licensee that said we are going to follow the programs. They came up with inspection

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programs, flaw evaluation programs, and alternative type repair programs, okay? They're all part of that.

The way that got implemented is the inspection procedures and the flaw evaluation procedures got put in the Appendix B program at the sites, and I mean that is the extent of the regulatory end of it is it is not any different than any other NDE procedure or any different than anything else --

MR. SHERON: What was said was that if a Licensee --

MR. HERMAN: It is how it is implemented.

MR. SHERON: -- implements the BWR VIP programs, topicals or whatever, we would consider that as acceptable compliance with the regulations.

Now we did not say, gee, if you don't do it we are going to cite you, okay? What we said is that if you do it that way, no questions asked. That is acceptable compliance. If you don't do it that way, we may challenge. We may ask questions as to why it continues to meet the regulations.

The Licensee may have a very good program, an alternative program, and we may say good, we agree, you still meet the regulations. We also may say no, we don't think that does it. In other words, it increases our level of questioning, you might say.

If somebody says I've got a program that has been approved by the NRC, we are following it -- it's done. You know, there's no questions. If somebody says they want to do something different, that doesn't mean you are not in compliance. It just means we may have to scratch the surface a little bit deeper, that's all.

MR. HERMAN: I think what we have done in the past is we $^{
m L}$ have had all kinds of levels of how formal we have gotten in terms of commitments on how the programs have gone.

There was a Westinghouse program on control rod drive

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mechanism housings where they had some severe fabrication cracks. The Westinghouse Owners Group addressed that program. The fact is we met with the regulatory response group to kick it off, so it went all the way through our process before the thing ever started.

They basically came up with some voluntary inspections. We had some discussions at one point about how far you needed to go, how much inspections you needed to do. There were some statistical arguments made, some risk arguments made on the thing, and basically it was put to bed based on what I will call a risk-informed decision in terms of statistics, deterministic stuff and risk, and that one was done without a commitment.

I think what we are looking to do in developing the process on what the Commission asked for, at least in our view, was that we define the process, how you kick something off, and try to do these things consistently. That is part of what the process development is intended to do.

MR. MARION: I understand all that, and the concepts seem to be fundamentally straightforward, and I am hoping that we can work out the details, but before we get into the details, let me just make a couple comments.

Generic letters have been a necessary tool of the NRC. The thing that we have always argued about or held lively discussions with the NRC about was the scope and magnitude of the problem and the regulatory basis for the action being requested in the generic letter.

I submit that if we don't clarify those specifics, we are going to have the same kind of lively discussions as we move through this process, so we really need to get this understanding established, and we are talking about use of the compliance exception.

 $$\operatorname{NRC}$, as Gary indicated, we believe the NRC is responsible for the burden of proof to demonstrate the explicit regulation that

needs to be addressed for Licensees to understand what NRC expectations are relative to information being provided.

MR. SHERON: Let me submit to you, okay, that the NRC, if anything, has probably erred in the sense that we have issued 50.54(f) letters that have done nothing more than ask for information under 50.54(f), which is a different standard than 109, but, trying to be nice guys, we used the words "compliance exception" and that is purple letters, purple words, gets everybody excited.

We probably shouldn't have done it.

The only one where we did it or I will admit is on the charcoal filter testing. We had enough evidence in front of us from our own studies that basically said if you use the current standard you are not in compliance, period. The case was made and that is why when we said in that paper that the current standard that people were using, the 1979 -- whatever it was -- was no longer acceptable, that was a backfit, because we said it doesn't matter what you are doing now, you must -- if you are using that standard you must do something different. That was a backfit and we went through and we took a hard look and we said yeah, we had done enough studies and we believe we had passed the burden of proof test that said if you use that we cannot guarantee -- we have enough evidence to show that a Licensee will most likely not comply with Part 100.

I mean we can argue whether or not you think that is significant enough --

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ MARION: Yes, but we are not here to discuss that. I would suggest we move on.

MR. SHERON: What I am saying is that most 50.54(f) letters N
L did not impose a backfit. They made have used the word "compliance exception" -- it was probably wrong to do it -- because if you read the S
I words, they don't say you must do something different.

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MR. MARION: Okay. I would like to move on.

One more point I wanted to make about generic communications and I agree with you completely that the generic communication process and how it is used in dealing with voluntary industry initiatives is the nexus or the connection between the two, and I would suggest that maybe some time in the future we have a meeting to discuss the comments we submitted on the generic communication process back in May because fundamentally what we were trying to do was work through all of the confusion that we have that the Licensees have in understanding why the NRC is pursuing a particular communication product versus another one and what is their expectation -- do they want action? Do they want information? Are they just communicating information?

I think we need to have an open discussion on those concepts because to clarify those understandings in the generic communication process is the same objective we have relative to understanding how you want to apply voluntary industry initiatives.

We need to understand how it all fits together, okay, and that is very important.

MR. SHERON: Yes, I mean I would just -- for example, we brought up at the last NRR/NEI Senior Management Meeting the question of the switchyard vars, okay? We said we were going to propose that as a voluntary industry initiative, and we'll lay out in that letter exactly what the regulatory concern is with regard to compliance and the like, and now the question is that what can the industry come back and show to us as a program or something that gives us assurance?

In other words, we are not saying that every plant is not in compliance. What we are saying is that based on what we saw at Calloway we don't think that plants have enough information to assure they remain in compliance.

For example, if they don't monitor what kind of vars, what

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kind of megawatts or whatever they are cranking through the switchyard, they don't know that if their plant drops offline they are not going to see some unacceptable dip in the offsite voltage, so we are saying that somebody is not in compliance but we are raising the question of, gee, this is something that we never really thought of and it may be a product of a deregulated industry. What can the industry propose that would give us assurance that the plants will remain in compliance with GDC-17, or at least have knowledge or are monitoring something so that they have enough knowledge to say I continue to comply with GDC-17?

That is all it's going to say.

MR. MARION: And that is perfectly fair, except I would suggest, maybe not in this case -- you probably have the letter ready to go out -- but I would suggest in the future a meeting to discuss the problem and magnitude, because once we get through that discuss and reach an understanding then it becomes very clear what the NRC needs to do and also very clear what the industry can do to help in some complementary fashion to deal with the problem. That is very important.

I think the record speaks for itself in demonstrating how successful those early interactions are, so I would just offer that for future consideration.

MR. HERMAN: I fully agree with you on that and I think on a lot of the issues that have been what I will call hardware-related type issues where you find something broken, that is exactly what has happened. I would anticipate as part of the process that will develop that part of the process will be to have a communications meeting before you issue any paper, because we have generally done that on almost everything we have ever been involved in.

We have done the same thing with the discussions. One of the discussions in the stakeholder meeting that you were at, Alex, that were relevant to the whole thing was those kind of things that come up

because of a problem -- you find something broken, okay, and you address something broken.

The other kind of issues were problems that maybe step outside of the design basis, that pass the 109 backfit, things that I will call -- I won't call them exactly programmatic but things that you might be able to put on your plate at the beginning of the year and say this is an area we are interested in -- severe accidents, whatever it is, okay, and that would be the subject of a once a year or twice a year meeting that was suggested by Mike Tuckman at Duke Power. We thought that was a really good idea, to do it for planning purposes -- both in terms of us, in terms of the industry, and in terms of talking about resources, so I think there's two bins of stuff.

One is stuff that you know about, that you can plan for in the beginning of the year and say these are going to be the things that are on the plate for initiatives for the year and then those other things that happen because you will find something during the year. That is what we anticipate anyway, and that is what I think is going to go in the process.

MR. MARION: Yes, from a process point of view, it seems to make sense at this particular point. Now whether it really is effective over the course of a year or two we will just have to wait and see, because a lot of issues come up and you need to meet with the industry to engage them all right away, and so there are going to be a number of things that you can't plan and prepare for, but we still have to be responsive.

Let me just -- you brought up hardware issues. They are the easier ones to deal with, because that is straightforward. You can $^{
m L}$ develop data. You can do inspections, provide results, et cetera.

MR. MODEEN: Alex, I am not even sure that is necessarily true. I guess the examples Staff has cited so far are the ones that I

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AIVI RIII EY & ASS OCI would call the significant issues that, yes, it is easy to reach agreement early on that there is an issue to be dealt with, but I am dealing with several of them that we flat out have disagreements as to whether or not the issue warrants that attention.

We agree it warrants the dialogue and evaluation and discussion, and the thing when we get in the details is whether or not -- okay, what if we get to the endpoint and we disagree on the significance, and we are not looking to volunteer for anything. That is --

MR. MARION: You're one step ahead --

MR. MODEEN: I'm sorry.

MR. MARION: That's all right --

MR. SHERON: That's all right. If you guys go off, for example, and do a risk study and you come back and show us that from a risk standpoint an issue is a no, nevermind, that's okay.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ MODEEN: It's hard to get to the no, nevermind gradation sometimes --

MR. SHERON: But if there is a compliance issue, and a lot of times I will admit that may be a problem -- something may be very low on a risk scale, but there is a compliance issue. Well, to me that says maybe I ought to change the regulation.

If I have got a regulation that is requiring you to do something that makes no sense from a risk standpoint, it is down in it and it is costing you a lot of money, something is wrong with the regulation. We need to know that. That is something else you can bring to us. That is Option 3 of 99,300.

MR. VINE: What you've said here, I think, is kind of I reassuring because you've described a process where there is going to be a lot of communication, and where you're going to make the case when you I go to the industry and say, we'd like you to consider this as a

volunteer industry initiative.

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You're going to make the case that shows why there's a regulatory concern, what the compliance issue is.

And the problem with the SECY is that it says that as long as the industry steps up and does something to address a concern -- without any analysis of the backfit considerations -- that the NRC would never even have to go through those considerations; that's what the SECY says.

So, it basically lays out a process where by if the staff comes to an industry group, and the industry groups says, sure, we'll do that, that no one would ever do any of that analysis, and then you would end up in a situation, according to the SECY, where there's enforcement action taken against a voluntary industry initiative and compliance with that, without ever having gone through the rigorous process.

MR. SHERON: All right, first off --

MR. VINE: You said we're not going to do that.

MR. SHERON: Well, first off, I would argue that if it's a true backfit, safety enhancement backfit, we would probably have already done the backfit analysis before we came to the industry. We're not just going to walk in and say, gee, we think it's nice if you paint your containments pink or something, okay, without having done a backfit analysis, okay?

We're going to have the backfit analysis in our back pocket, and we're going to be able to say, you know, we think you need to do this, and here's why, okay?

We'll give you the opportunity to see that, all right? And if we come in with a compliance, we'll explain that to you; we'll explain why we think it's a compliance, okay?

And, you know, that's the one where you say, gee, we're not going to do that, all right, then, you know, staff has to fish or cut

RIII EY & ASS OCI bait, you know, which, as I said, we would have most likely have already concluded this, we'd have risen to the level of a 5054, okay?

MR. HERMAN: One of the other things that, again, was discussed in the last stakeholder meeting, was the threshold for kicking off initiatives, and who on the NRC side was going to be the kicker-offer, okay?

And if you looked at the Commission paper, there were some discussions in there, should that be a Commission responsibility? Should it be an EDO responsibility? Should it be an Office-level responsibility?

I guess where we would come out right now is that we think it's probably ET Office level as about probably appropriate for doing it, because that's what we have traditionally done in the past.

I mean, I can't just imagine that any staff member is going to get on the phone and call up Alex and say, Alex, I haven't talked to anybody above me in the organization, but I'd really like to have a meeting with you on this issue because I think I need to do this.

I mean, it's just not going to happen that way, and the process is not going to be defined that way.

I mean, I just don't think how we'd ever get to that point without it going up through the management chain anyway.

MR. MARION: I would suggest that the EDO level might be appropriate. The reason I say that is because the more formalized industrywide actions that are undertaken by NEI, are undertaken with the buy-in of the chief nuclear officers.

And when that occurs, we traditionally have sent in the letter to the EDO, apprising him of that decision, et cetera.

Now, we intend to still do that in the future on those kinds of actions that are taken through the NEI process.

I'm just offering that as a point of information, relative

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to our thinking on the way this has been done in the past.

MR. VINE: But this gets us right into the issue of how do you define an initiative? What you just said would never happen, this informal communication between a staff who has a concern and the industry.

In fact, it goes on all the time. And in many cases, it goes on in a very healthy way, where you have staffers with information or concerns, and they share it with a group that's working on that issue.

And that interaction is healthy because it improves the guideline documents that we're working on at EPRI or wherever, an owners group, and as long as it doesn't rise to the threshold of becoming subject to enforcement action, that's healthy.

So I think that the trigger you're talking about where the formal request from NRC management to the industry to do something has to take place, is on this question of whether you're going to take enforcement action.

We do a lot of voluntary guideline efforts that remain voluntary; that don't get into inspection and enforcement, where the interactions with the staff are healthy.

MR. SHERON: There is going to be no inspection before the process works through. For example, let me give you an example, okay?

The way I envision it is, okay, the staff gets a concern like the Varge issue, let's take that one, okay?

First off, we raised it and we gave you heads-up at the meeting, okay? If you guys want to have a meeting on it, okay, before we send out a letter to you asking you to take it on, that's fine; we'll be glad to do that, okay?

But, you know, whether we have the meeting or not, okay, we would send you a letter, basically asking you to take this on as an

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Now, how you respond is kind of your business, okay? You could say either, no, we disagree with you; or yes, we'll take it on; or, gee, we don't think that this is something that's appropriate for NEI to do. Okay, you need to deal with owners groups or you need to deal with individual utilities or something like that, whatever it is.

At this point, there's still nothing with enforcement, okay, at this point. Now, if you come back and tell us to pound sand or something, all right, then we've got to scratch our head and say, gee, do we want to continue to pursue this or what, okay?

You'll obviously give us your arguments, why you either don't think it's an issue, okay, and the like. If we agree with you, we'll go, gee, yes, we didn't think of that; that's right. The matter is dead; we'll drop it, okay?

If after we read your letter we don't agree with your assessment, okay, then our next step is to go, let's say, with a Generic Letter.

That Generic Letter then goes through a process that includes the EDO Office, as well as the Commission, okay?

So there's -- and the CRGR and possibly the ACRS, so it's a very, very formal review process that gets it before that letter ever comes out in final form. Because, remember, even when we do the Generic Letter, okay, unless it's something that is of super high priority, okay, it's going to come out for public comment anyway, and you're going to get a shot at it, all right?

And most likely there's going to be nothing with enforcement until it's a done deal, okay, until we finally decide to go out formally N $_{
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At which point then, okay, I think there's been ample communication.

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MR. HERMAN: I think we need to say something a little more about the enforcement issue. And as to the word, discussions, again on enforcement at the last meeting, and what the scope of things might be, one of the things that was said at the last meeting -- and, Bill jump in -- we've discussed this before with our inspection people.

And we've discussed it with OGC and OE, in terms of what falls where in terms of enforcement. And the understanding that we have after talking with the legal staff -- and, Gene, correct me if I get it screwed up because I don't know it that well -- if something gets adopted into an Appendix B type of program, that's what I'll call business as usual type of enforcement.

If a licensee adopts something in an Appendix B program, to handle inspections, evaluations, and they become procedure types of things that are in an Appendix B program, they're subject to the normal Appendix B program.

NEI agreed with that the last meeting, the both of the owners that were running the voluntary group, Mike Tuckman agreed with it, Lou Sumner agreed with it. And that's pretty clear-cut.

Where you get into the cloudier issues, are what's the enforcement base? Where are you from an enforcement viewpoint? If I get into something that's outside of the design basis, there's an industry commitment to do it.

And I think the true answer to that is what you've got is a commitment to do it, and if the industry changes its mind, then what you've got is a changed commitment, okay?

If the staff won't say anything above that, well, the discussions we had with our legal staff, if we want to fish rather than L cut bait, then it's incumbent upon us to write an order to do whatever it takes to put it into place in terms of what the regulations are.

And I don't think it's very confusing in terms of

RIII EY & AS enforcement at all. I think that's the position that we're going to write down, and I don't think you guys disagree with that.

MR. MARION: No. We made the point in September that the implementation of initiatives really is part of the threshold in terms of inspection and enforcement, because if the implementation fall within the Part 50 scope, i.e., Appendix B, then what's the issue, okay?

MR. COLLINS: It shouldn't be called a voluntary program.

MR. MARION: Right, once the licensee decides to implement it. But the fact is that elements of an initiative may fall within that scope while other portions of an initiative may not, okay?

But that's why it's really important to have these kinds of discussions so we understand what is and what isn't within the regulatory scope.

And we found, once we get that understanding, the rest is easy.

MR. HERMAN: But, again, what the original title of VSI-13 was this piece of it. It originally -- it's now the Use of Industry Voluntary Initiatives in the Regulatory Process.

It used to be Voluntary Initiatives in Lieu of Regulatory Actions. And I think if you're in lieu of regulatory actions, that type of definition, then it's pretty clear, you know, what's the Appendix B stuff.

You're developing the program, but it's basically still that when you're done with it, it's an Appendix B-type commitment.

MR. VINE: Let me ask you a hypothetical question about this Appendix B example: Let's say we have an issue that NRC is concerned about and industry is concerned about because it has some impact on performance?

But it doesn't meet the criteria. You know, you can't show that there's a clear compliance case; you can't show cost/benefit

RIII EY & ASS OCI improvement. But the industry is still interested in dealing with the issue because it has some performance implications.

So the industry takes it on as a voluntary industry initiative, even though it doesn't meet the backfit rule. What incentive -- and they go through it, wide industry participation and so forth.

What incentive would the industry have in putting it in an Appendix B program if that gets them into enforcement space when, in fact, it's being handled properly as an industrywide initiative without putting it in an Appendix B program?

MR. HERMAN: I don't know what the threshold of it is.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ SHERON: There's no requirement that it be an Appendix B, period.

MR. COLLINS: But that's one of the understandings to establish on the front end.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ HERMAN: There were different bins of commitments. We used a different example.

I think the one we used was something related to badging.

Did the industry want to do something relative to badging to make people get onsite, off and on.

And our discussion was that they can put that in place; it's the industry's program, they do what they want. If they want to talk to us and get some input on it, fine, but it's their program.

I wouldn't even say that there would necessarily be a commitment associated with a program like that.

MR. MARION: You brought up the point, Bob, about the change in title of this effort. Could you go over that again, please? Could N L you go over what it's being called now as opposed to --

MR. HERMAN: It's what's on the Commission paper. It's the Use by Industry of Voluntary Initiatives in the Regulatory Process.

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RII EY & AS MR. MARION: Okay.

So we're no longer considering it as an appropriate substitute for regulatory action? One of the things that I wanted to talk about was the perception of that terminology.

MR. HERMAN: It can be. I think it's -- a regulatory action can be rulemaking. A regulatory action can be a Generic Letter, or a regulatory action can be an information notice, or whatever the new forms are that we've got out there.

There is still a broad -- or it might be having a meeting with somebody. Well, not having a meeting, but I think this is just supposed to be broad to cover the waterfront.

MR. CARPENTER: Specifically what we said in SECY 99-063, is that the staff has concluded that the current regulatory framework does not preclude implementation of voluntary industry initiatives, and that such initiatives, except in cases where adequate protection is concerned, can be accepted in lieu of, or complementary to regulatory actions.

MR. HERMAN: And an example outside of that was, I think, a good example was -- I'm trying to think of one. We developed a Reg Guide and NEI really provided a guideline document for the Reg Guide.

MR. MARION: Implementation, station blackout. I mean, there was a whole slew of them.

MR. HERMAN: Depending on what the item is.

MR. COLLINS: I don't see those as voluntary. If there's a rule out there that says you've got to do something, I don't see that as voluntary. I see that as an industry program, I don't see that as a voluntary initiative.

Let me describe what I see as truly a voluntary initiative: A couple of years ago, we had a shutdown rule proposed.

The staff went through the entire backfit analysis, okay?

And they concluded that a cost/beneficial enhancement was clearly justified by the analysis, okay?

Went up to the Commission and the Commission said, no, it looks like what the industry is doing is sufficient, okay, to cover that.

So now, in effect, you've got voluntary actions by the industry that are a substitute for putting that shutdown rule in place, okay?

Now, when a situation like that comes up again, what's the incentive for the staff not to put in place, that rule?

You're asking what's the incentive for putting something under an Appendix B program, what's the staff's incentive for not going forward with a rule?

They've gone through the backfit analysis that says it's cost/beneficial, but the industry says it's not an adequate protection issue, it's cost/beneficial and we'll put in place, a program instead of that rule, okay?

Now, what's our incentive when we don't have any enforcement tools now because there's not a rule out there? What do we do in the oversight process? What do we do in the --

You know, the Commission told us in the SRM on the shutdown rule, monitor through inspection and other means. And that, to me, put this type of meeting together.

It's like how do we do that? Right? The industry is saying, we're going to step forward and take care of all of these issues; you don't need to put the rule forward, okay?

So we says, okay, we'll let you do that, but now where are N $^{
m L}$ we in monitoring, enforcement, oversight space?

MR. HERMAN: We discussed that with Bill Dean earlier, okay? And one of the things that we said is that the inspection activities

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that are going to go out there are going to be part of the new inspection program.

And the new inspection program can look at things that are within the rules or outside of the rules in terms of risk significance. And if somebody went out and looked at a shutdown risk program at a plant, and decided that what was being done was a program that wasn't addressing the issue, and there was a question of risk, it could be brought back here.

The action would be --

MR. SHERON: What would happen is that they would come back and, you know, the Commission says do it by inspection or other means, which could be monitoring, all right?

Now, if the inspectors come back and say, hey, you know, gee, the industry said they were doing all these wonderful things during shutdown, and they're not doing it, okay?

I'd be the first one to sit down and say, okay, let's send back up the Commission paper and tell the Commission, Dear Commission, remember all those wonderful things that the industry said they were doing voluntarily? They're not, okay?

Therefore, we recommend that you implement this rule. Okay?

That's how we would proceed? Okay?

It's the same thing, okay? Now, if we found that there was something going on out there that was flagrantly violating the regulations, that might be an inspection issue and enforcement, all right?

But if it's something where we don't have a regulation in place, okay, but we're relying on a voluntary industry initiative, and N we find out that the industry isn't true to their word in doing it, then we go back to the Commission and say, hey, guess what? These guys lied S I to you. All right?

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And then we take the appropriate regulatory action, which may be a rule.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$ COLLINS: I think everybody recognizes that's not the cycle we want to ge into.

MR. SHERON: Exactly.

MR. COLLINS: I'm asking, what can you guys do to assure us that we don't get into that cycle?

MR. MARION: I think the shutdown is a good example. Having been involved in it in the first cycle when it went to the Commission, I didn't appreciate the philosophy of substitution which is still problematic to me.

I think that as I recall, the arguments that industry was using, or the basis that industry was using was performance. Bob mentioned shutdown risk management programs. I submit that's the wrong place to look.

Anything somebody puts together in terms of a guideline, whether it's EPRI's -- and EPRI had a piece in that particular effort to support the industry; we had a piece at NEI, and INPO had a piece.

None of those documents were developed for purposes of being used during inspection activities. That is a separate question that we need to talk about and resolve in the future.

And the thinking was, look at the results in terms of the events that hopefully would not occur while a plant is in a shutdown condition. We think that over the years that kind of speaks for itself.

And compare it to what it was like when this was first brought up. There has been significant improvement.

If this is an area that warrants further discussion, maybe $^{
m L}$ we need to talk about it in the future. But right now, our observation is that the process within the NRC played out, and the decision was made S $^{
m L}$ not to pursue regulatory action.

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And this came up at our meeting in September. I forget, but one of the NRC staff people brought it up, and I said, well, help me understand why is it still an issue within the NRC staff if the decision was made not to proceed?

Is there something that we don't understand?

MR. COLLINS: It's the SRM because the staff is supposed to monitor through inspection and other means.

MR. MARION: Okay.

MR. COLLINS: That's why for the staff it's still an issue. How do we do that? I thought that's what this -- a big part of this -- when I say voluntary initiative, that's the only voluntary one I'm hearing.

The other ones I hear are all compliance. You're undertaking a program to me that's a specific regulatory requirement. In this case, the regulatory requirement was not put in place specifically because of the credit we gave you for those actions.

MR. HERMAN: But I think there's a difference, okay?

MR. COLLINS: There's a big difference.

MR. HERMAN: There is a difference in the programs, but I don't think you can characterize the first one as a voluntary program, too, because they're writing the rules of what the program would be that they want to implement, rather than us handing them a generic letter and specifying what we wanted done in the program.

To me, that's a big difference.

MR. COLLINS: Ultimately there's a requirement that's got to be met that's on the books. In the case of shutdown, the requirement was not put there specifically.

MR. HERMAN: We said there's definitely two different ones. But, I mean, one of the things that came down in the Commission guidance was a discussion about guidance should address how plants that don't

fully commit to a particular voluntary initiative, they're not subject to related enforcement action will be handled.

So that's part of the things that we've been asked to develop by the Commission. It's in the SRM.

MR. MARION: One of the suggestions that I was going to make a little bit later on in our discussion is that as we move forward and thrash out this process and reach these understandings, maybe what we need to do is ask the Commission to take a good, hard look at what's being proposed.

I submit that, you know, you have a new set of Commissioners involved now than you had when this decision was made, et cetera, and the thinking and expectations on their part may be entirely different.

But I offer that just for your consideration.

MR. HERMAN: The process for the paper, Alex, that we've go right now is, we're supposed to get it upstairs in May to the Commission.

MR. MARION: Right.

MR. HERMAN: They're supposed to come back with an SRM on it. What we're planning to do and what we said all along is, what we'd like to do is, and what we're probably going to ask the Commission as part of the paper, is that we'd like to get your view, get the SRM, and then what we'd like to do is have a public meeting before implementation.

Mike Tuckman suggested that at the last meeting, and thought that was a good idea.

MR. MARION: Okay.

MR. VINE: Can I address Tim's example and move it back to N $^{
m L}$ Brian's comment, too, about the industry lying to you about committing $^{
m L}$ to something and not doing it.

MR. SHERON: I didn't.

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MR. VINE: Or whatever. The reality is that in the way most of these scenarios will play out there will be extensive dialogue between the industry and the staff on what exactly the technical solution should be.

So, when the industry commits to something, you will have already agreed that in principle, if you do that, it's good enough.

And what will likely happen if you find that some utilities aren't measuring up, is that it's down into the level of interpretation of -- I met the intent of this, but not the letter of the law of this, and those kinds of questions that always come up.

And those have to be worked out on an individual plant basis, if there are disagreements on what was intended.

It's very clear that utilities don't want EPRI, NEI, or INPO getting into the process of enforcing regulatory matters. They believe that we ought to be helping developing the guidance, and when it comes to matters of compliance, those are really up to the NRC.

The other point I wanted to make was that was we talk to executives about this issue, take the example of the shutdown rule: There are some utility executives who would say it is sufficient if the case has clearly been made that there's a rulemaking that's justifiable in the case that you cited, that it's sufficient for the industry to develop that program, get it accepted, and then make commitments on individual dockets and by that means commit the industry to something that you could enforce.

There are other utilities who say, no. The only acceptable process, even if the industry assists in defining an adequate program, to get to enforcement space, you must have a regulatory basis for that.

And it has to -- you have to go through the rulemaking process, even if -- and that rulemaking process might be pro forma. It might just simply be something that endorses the industry initiative as

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MR. SHERON: I'll give you an example: Severe accident procedures, there's no regulatory requirement for it. The industry voluntary said, we will do that.

We said fine, we will kind of monitor and watch and see if they're doing it, okay?

And presuming that they're all doing it in an acceptable manner, okay, then that's good, we don't need to promulgate a regulation. Nobody's going to come out and inspect, and if they don't find some procedure at a plant, is going to run around and pull out the ticket book and start writing a ticket, okay?

They're going to come back and say, guess what we didn't find at such and such a plant? And if we get too many of those, we're going to go, gee, the industry said they were going to do this, but they really didn't do a good job, and then we'll have to decide, do we need to do something more in regulatory space like promulgate a rule, for example, all right?

But that's an example of something that is not a requirement. It was an industry initiative, okay, and we're monitoring it, okay?

This is as opposed to if the industry comes in, if we raise an issue of compliance, all right? We've got some new information and we don't think you're complying, for example, steam generators, okay? All right?

If somebody is out there inspecting the bobbin coil, all right, and you know darn well that thing ain't going to pick up $^{
m L}$ circumferential cracks, all right?

You know, yes, you may cite them against Appendix B, all right, because they're not using the appropriate methods, all right?

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MR. HERMAN: Inadequate procedures.

MR. SHERON: Yes, and the like. And even though that might be voluntary in the sense that, no, I don't need a rule that says thou shalt use such and such a type probe or whatever, but it may be a voluntary initiative that follows an NEI guideline, all right?

If they're not following it, okay, and we don't think that it meets Appendix B, that may be something that we would cite.

MR. HERMAN: The other piece of it is, let's say you have a voluntary program like Brian was describing, outside of the regs and the area Tim's talking about, and a licensee says it's committed to do it, and then says I don't want to do it anymore and take its commitment away for that issue?

At that point, there is guidance in terms of what you do in terms of the backfitting. There was a Commission paper that went up following this one that says that if you want to look at things again from a backfit perspective in terms of whether you want to go forth with rulemaking or whatever, if it justifies it, that there's a position that just came down.

I don't remember the SRM number, but how much credit you have to give for voluntary actions if somebody changes from those actions. It was the paper up from Research. It came back with an SRM and they re-described the process again.

That's also out there, and we're going to incorporate that. It was part of an SRM.

MR. MARION: You're talking about crediting a regulatory analysis?

MR. HERMAN: Yes.

MR. MARION: Okay, all right.

MR. COLLINS: Let me ask a question, though. Say the inspection people are out and they're monitoring an activity like

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shutdown where we decided not to put regulation in place.

And they conclude that the licensee X is not following the type of guidance that we thought was in place.

Do you think it's appropriate for him to write in a formal NRC inspection report, the discussion of that issue? Is that the appropriate place?

MR. MARION: I don't think that's a fair question. I would go back and ask the question, why is the inspector looking this area, given that the decision was made by the Commission, not to pursue regulatory action? I understand the point.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$ COLLINS: They'll go monitor by inspection and other means.

MR. MARION: I think -- how can we understand what your expectations are relative to monitoring industry activities in this area? Maybe that's the thing that needs to be discussed.

MR. DEAN: Let me weigh in a little bit about the inspection program and where it comes from in terms of a shutdown. We have developed a specific inspection procedure on shutdown activities which embody a number of the concepts that were contained in the NUMARC guidance that we endorsed and that the Commission recognized as being something that would enhance performance in this area and thus we didn't need rulemaking.

And they told the staff to go and monitor that.

We would take issue that we would find looking at shutdown activities, and we would process them through the significant determination process, and ascertain what the significance is.

And the end result may or may not be that there is a N L violation. But if it's not a regulatory requirement, then it's judged on the merits of its significance and not on the merits of whether it's S L necessary an initiative that the industry said they would do or a

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regulatory requirement or whatever.

We look at the significance of the issue.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ COLLINS: That would be written up in an inspection report?

MR. DEAN: That would be written up in an inspection report.

MR. SHERON: That makes a lot of sense.

MR. MARION: That makes a lot of sense, but I would still -- I hope I don't get in trouble for saying this, but if direction comes from above that makes the job difficult, I hope you look for ways to try to get that clarified or something.

If you don't have an understanding of what the expectations are from the Commission, it makes it more challenging for us to have an understanding, whereas the NRC is the organization that it's coming from, if there is a disconnect of some sort.

MR. HERMAN: One of the things that we did say at the last meeting was that the enforcement and the inspection on this was going to be consistent with the new Commission policy on doing inspections, and it was going to be basically the risk-significant policy that's this thick and just went out.

MR. MARION: All right. Before we go on to other topics, let me just make one point very clear. Our executives don't want -- I can tell you this from a standpoint of NEI activity in this particular area -- their expectation of us is not to become an extension of the NRC. They have no problem in us reaching an understanding on how we can do something to complement NRC's activities.

Historically it has been shown that rulemaking is a great catalyst for bringing the industry and the NRC together, okay? -- and we L come together under rulemaking issues, which are relatively straightforward. Everybody has an understanding what we are trying to S L do and they are easy to address, but it is all these other things that

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take more time and I like the point about open, frequent dialogue and I think we just agree from our perspective we will commit to you to have open, frequent dialogue on these issues in the future, but we are very focused on the concept of complementary action on our part as opposed to a substitute for regulatory action on the part of the NRC.

One reason is the public perception that an industry organization or some element of the industry is doing something that the NRC cannot do otherwise. Whether it is true or not, it is the perception and I just feel obligated to bring that up because it works against -- once that perception is out there in the public it creates problems not only for the NRC but also for the industry, so I am suggesting we need to be very careful about these interactions in the future.

MR. VINE: Well, it could be a false impression about you abdicating role here that you shouldn't be abdicating.

MR. MARION: We are real sensitive to that. That's why the number of times we said, well, if you have done a regulatory analysis and have a basis for a decision then go forward with the decision. That was never meant to be confrontational, but it was meant to be if you have already decided that you have to do something, then don't let us --

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ SHERON: We did that, for example, on the charcoal filter testing.

MR. MARION: Right.

MR. SHERON: We decided we needed to issue that letter.

MR. MARION: Right.

MR. SHERON: There may be issues in the future where for
example if we think there's a compliance problem a lot of times when we
L issue a generic letter we will ask you to say what you are doing -- you
know, while you are solving, figuring how to deal with the issue, we may
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L use words like if you agree with us, what are you doing in the interim

to bring yourself into compliance? And it could be a number of things you could put.

For example, if it is in fire protection, you could put temporary fire watches or something -- some compensatory measure. That's fine.

Now if we bring the issue to you in the form of a letter, it is not a generic letter. It doesn't say you must answer by such and such a date, but if we send you a letter that says here's the issue, all we are doing is we are trying to get away from being prescriptive, all right, by saying you must answer this, you must answer it in 60 days, you must tell us what you are doing to bring it -- blah blah blah blah -- you know, the whole drill.

Without being very prescriptive, the voluntary initiative is we have got a problem. You understand what our technical and our regulatory concern is. Now can the industry come forward and propose something, all right, that addresses this issue, and the Staff is willing to look at it and work with you, as opposed to in a very prescriptive sense writing this letter which hits you over the head.

That is all it is. It is saying in essence -- in the old days we would have sent you a generic letter, no questions asked, but now we are going to send you a letter which says here is the issue, we would like you to come to us and tell us how you would like to address it, how you think you should address it properly, and let us not be the ones that are prescriptive that say answer this in 30 days or 60 days and tell us this and that and the other things.

That is really the way I envision it.

MR. HERMAN: Again, in the SRM though the directions are as L the Staff develops guidelines it should not underestimate the importance of public confidence. It must be clear to the public that substituting S I voluntary initiatives for NRC regulatory action can provide effective

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and efficient resolution of issues and will be controlled and monitored so as to ensure plant safety is not compromised and doesn't represent a reduction in NRC's commitment to safety and sound regulation.

So we have got to address that part of going back to the Commission with a paper. The other piece of that, there are a couple of things that do come up as questions when you do that. There certainly is a question of noticing and of public participation.

One of the things is if we are going to put out a generic letter, we would have given the public an opportunity to comment when it is noticed. I think we are going to have to propose something that gets some kind of public participation in the process. The other thing --

MR. SHERON: Maybe your response, the program you propose in response to, say, a letter asking for a voluntary initiative. We put that out for public comment and say here is the issue, here is what the industry proposed, does anybody have any comments on it.

MR. HERMAN: The other thing that turns out to be difficult in terms of giving the public sufficient information to be able to make a judgment about what is going on, and one of the things that we ran into the VIP program early-on when we were doing that is a lot of the things are paid for by the industry and there's value in what they are doing and they are proprietary.

Getting the right balance in a proprietary and a nonproprietary document to provide sufficient information to be able to let the public participate in the process by maybe not seeing everything that is being paid for to develop something but enough to know what is going on, and that came up with license, using the VIP documents for the license renewal. There had to be a rewrite to expand some of that to put it in the process and to allow participation so it is not easy.

MR. MARION: I think that is a very important element of this but I would suggest that there be focused concentration on ensuring

that the public understands NRC's regulatory decision-making. You have got to start there, and then the details of what documents are used to form the basis for those decisions are a separate issue but the process is the kind of thing that we are trying to get an understanding on ourselves relative to this particular topic.

MR. SHERON: You know, as part of your response to a voluntary initiative, you may have to -- for example, if you agree there is a concern that needs to be investigated, you may have to propose some interim actions. Each licensee has agreed to do the following -- for example, post a fire watch or do some extra inspections or something in the interim until we resolve the issue.

This is the same kind of thing that we would probably go after in a generic letter -- but you may have some better insights that say, well, only certain plants need to do that or something, okay? But that still allows us to sit down and say, yes, the licensees still comply with the regulations because they have agreed to the following in the interim, but that is voluntary.

MR. MODEEN: I want to come back to something I think Tim raised that is kind of interesting. You used two examples -- what really is a voluntary initiative and, first, take steam generators, for instance where -- and obviously we have been in a lot of places since 1993 -- but ultimately the industry two years ago decided that based on everything we learned through that interaction that, gee, we needed to what we needed to do from a standpoint of what was put forth in NEI 97-06 and move forward with that, continue the regulatory interaction, but meanwhile we thought we needed a certain level of performance, et cetera, at the plants, then we continued the dialogue.

That was a voluntary initiative -- in my mind -- that we committed to each other, the utilities, but not specifically to the Staff at that time, but to inform the Staff that we took that action.

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I think as Tim was indicating, okay, that is a VII there.

Then we continued the process, recognizing though that the tangents to specific compliance issues, regulatory requirements of things -- for instance, many people's tech specs said you could get by with -- or not get by but you could have a 500 gallon per day leakage in a steam generator. Well, we were holding ourselves to 150 GPD -- the right thing to do.

Ultimately we came to the conclusion that, hey, a license change back incentive -- we ought to reflect it in the licensing basis of each of these plants to have that tighter thing and we are moving forward with the Staff on that.

At the point that we execute that, assuming we get the package in and get agreement, et cetera, I would tend to agree with Tim that, gee, that is no longer a VII. I mean we are really saying, hey, guys, everybody's got to change their licensing basis, and it makes it much clearer again, these follow-on activities, the inspection activities, the enforcement activities.

I think the thing that kicked off GSI-13 and the SECY that you then put forward is really a recognition that, hey, instead of these false starts on throw out a draft generic letter until you get a ton of comments back that put us back in a do-loop and then we really start the hard dialogue. We are looking for process and we have done a lot better I think the last three, four years to have that process early on and perhaps, as I think Tim had maybe suggested, this VII thing unless we really get it nailed down as to when it is a VII and when does it transition to something else like is there a need for regulatory action or the nexus to that regulatory action, we might avoid some of our concerns where we thing we are kind of going around the backfit at times and other playing loose with it.

MR. SHERON: A lot of this VII was in response to the

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industry complaints.

MR. MODEEN: Oh, yes, and we are not here saying that a lot of the dialogue and the early communication, the opportunity to propose things, is bad. I mean we appreciate that. We are spending a lot of resources on it, but we are still tripping over implementation at the licensee -- I'm sorry, I just wanted to contrast that with another example.

For instance, in fire protection, where I'm working and circuit failures, you know, it really was very evidence through the early part of '97 and what we thought was very clear direction from the Staff and guidance in SERs, et cetera, that, gee, compliance looked like "x" -- and it was also just as clear to the Staff that compliance looks like "y" and so we got to the point and agree I think last summer through that workshop that, okay, let's set that aside and say what is the significance of this issue? Let's work through that based on risk. Let's get better technical data, et cetera, and let's figure out the right. We are still working through that.

But then just yesterday we had a meeting on this. It was real clear again that there's many in the Staff that think because we said we would work through this with the Staff and have that dialogue that we have already say, yes, we agree, there is a real safety issue here and something has got to be done and ultimately -- and, gee, when are you going to get it finished?

It is like, well, now wait a sec, we are still in the VII part that kind of says let's have the dialogue, let's figure out what the right thing to do is, see if we can come to agreement, and if we can, great -- if we can't, well, then obviously you have your process and we deal with it accordingly.

MR. HERMAN: But when you are talking about generic letters, I guess to me a generic letter is not a rule. A generic letter in and

AND RICEY & ASS OC ATT by itself is not an enforceable document. If we go out with something under 50.54(f) and we get an inadequate answer, then again the onus is on the NRC to come up with what is a legal action which is to write an order or take other actions, so from that perspective when there is really not that much of a difference I don't think between a licensee doing something, say under a VIP program and responding to a generic letter, the main difference to it is the front end of the program where the licensee has his destiny in his own hands or the industry does in terms of providing input on what goes into the program there that they want to institute.

Okay -- I think in either case the NRC has the option to look at it and say is it adequate in terms of meeting the safety regulations and if it doesn't, you know, the avenue is always open in terms of further actions.

I don't see that there is that big a difference.

MR. MARION: Let me ask a question. If the issue is one of compliance with the regulations, why should the action be voluntary?

MR. STROSNIDER: I think part of what we keep missing here is these are voluntary industry initiatives in lieu of regulatory action.

MR. HERMAN: In some case. Some may not.

MR. STROSNIDER: In some cases, but in the issue of there's a compliance issue, the NRC can certainly take regulatory action. If nothing else, we could take enforcement, but if there is a generic concern, for example, does it make sense to start going off and citing one plant at a time, or do you go off and say, look, we think there is a compliance issue here and can the industry address this issue without us N L having to go off and take some other action, as in the generic letter of something like that.

MR. RECKLEY: Another thing to consider is compliance is not

always worth, not even rarely, black and white.

MR. STROSNIDER: That's my point.

MR. RECKLEY: The means of compliance might warrant a voluntary industry initiative in lieu of a Regulatory Guide or some other action, and the efficiency gained from the Staff and the industry agreeing on the means of compliance is still justified in the use of the term voluntary industry initiative.

MR. SHERON: The whole idea, Alex, was to respond to the industry's concerns about generic letters. If you guys don't want to take it on as a voluntary industry initiative, then the next step in the process is generic letter.

I mean the Staff has to address its concerns. We just can't raise a concern and then just let it drop or something, okay? But the idea was if the industry wants to basically be able to control its destiny a little better without getting hit over the head with a hammer called the 50.54(f) letter that says do this, this, this, this in this order and everything, but rather go off, study the issue, come back, and say give us what you believe is the best way to address the issue, and that's fine. We are giving you that opportunity.

All I can say is if you don't want to avail yourself of it, we just dig into the toolbox and get the next biggest hammer.

MR. MARION: I would just offer we'd like the opportunity to discuss these issues with you in the future --

MR. SHERON: We would be willing to do that. We will give you a heads-up before we intend to engage you with any voluntary industry initiative proposals.

If you want to have a meeting beforehand, to better $^{
m L}$ understand what the issue is and the like, we will be willing to do that and the like and get your insight on it.

MR. MARION: Now generic communications have come up a

number of times and I touched on this earlier.

We sent in comments to the proposed generic communication process that is right now in effect, and if you will look at those comments from the standpoint of understanding the process and what the expectation is when these communication products are issued, those are the same kind of questions and issues we have with this, so we need to come to grips with this in terms of NRC expectations how this plays out in inspection/enforcement space, et cetera, but it all comes down to what is the regulatory requirement, the explicit regulatory requirement, what is the problem.

Once we get through that, then it becomes very clear what NRC's role may be or what industry's role may be, but we need to create that dialogue and continue with that.

One example I would like to bring up to just kind of facilitate some thinking about the process is air-operated valves.

David and his folks have been meeting with the NRC for some time and the NRC approached the Owners Groups to develop something to deal with NRC's concerns relative to AOV performance and the Owners Group did that, and the product that was developed by the JOG was brought to NEI for possible action that could range from doing nothing with it or making it part of a formal industry initiative and anything you could mention in between.

We looked at that and had some discussions, a lot of discussions, with the Owners Groups as well as with INPO and concluded it made a lot more sense for this thing to be picked up by INPO. That apparently created some consternation on the part of the Owners Groups as well as I believe on the part of the NRC Staff.

NRC Staff still thinks that something more needs to be done $$\operatorname{MR}$.$ MODEEN: They are looking for the commitment --

MR. STROSNIDER: Just to fill in that little gap, okay, when

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ANN RIL EY & ASS OCI ATE there was a GSI on this issue we went to ACRS and closed this GSI. Part of the logic for the closure referenced the AOV JOG program and that it was going to address some of the technical issues in the GSI, so ACRS said, fine, go close it with that understanding.

MR. MODEEN: And then why was the second letter -- I mean the first letter for closing the GSI didn't, hopefully didn't say any words about the industry committing to a job program doctrine that the industry hadn't committed to.

MR. STROSNIDER: I am not sure. I would have to look at the letter, but the presentation and the understanding from what I understand from a discussion with ACRS was, yes, we understand that there are some issues here that need to be developed. The Staff has confidence they are being addressed because of the industry initiative in the AOV program. That was addressing some of these issues.

Now how that was articulated, how well that was articulated in the close-out letter I would have to go look at it, but that is part of what is driving that.

MR. COLACCINO: The thing about that, and you're right, in the first close-out the letter back to the Staff on May 14th, that that was not articulated, but in a July -- what also is happening this time was the first public meeting, which was on June 3rd, I believe, between -- the NEI public meeting presenting to the public the JOG program document.

At the time of the June 3rd meeting the status of whether the program would be implemented, put forth as a voluntary industry initiative, was not decided at that point. NEI had said that we did not know -- we were still deciding what that was going to be.

The second letter from the Staff came out on July 2nd and so at that time we said -- the Staff said that they were working with the industry, they had this program that they were working on. They also

referenced ASME work and then it was not until -- so the Staff sent that out. They didn't say specifically that the industry was going to undertake it, but they did say that we were going to work with the industry and if the industry didn't take adequate action then the NRC would take regulatory action as appropriate.

That was on July 19th. NEI sent a copy of the program to the NRC saying -- and that was the further discussion that it would not be undertaken as an industry initiative.

MR. HERMAN: This is a perfectly good example of I think why we need uniformity in the process for putting generic letters in place.

MR. MARION: Absolutely.

MR. MODEEN: I'm sorry I brought it up. I'm sorry -- I've got to add one thing to Joe's comment though that is very important, because I am the one that made the closing remarks on June 3rd and unfortunately we didn't have a transcript, but I will give you my talking points.

We knew on June 3rd that we did not want or we were not seeking regulatory credit in accordance with SECY 99-063, and that was the bottom line of the wrap-up conversation there, so understand the letter did not come out because we were not sure at that point whether NEI would issue it, the Owners Groups would issue it, or INPO, but it was very clear that we weren't looking to elevate this to an initiative that we would ask everyone to do.

MR. HERMAN: But this sure was not an emergency issue and this sure was something that would have fell into the ranks of the kinds of things that you might put at the plate at the beginning of the year --

MR. MODEEN: Oh, yeah -- a perfect example. I mean that's why we wanted to discuss it.

MR. HERMAN: I just want the context to be accurate, that's

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MR. MARION: The reason I brought it up was because that it's an interesting example that will help us thrash out the process, because the story continues.

ASME is developing a code case, okay? That code case is going to get factored into some future edition of the code. It is going to be picked up by 50.55(a) and become a regulatory requirement.

Now we are going to argue about this thing until that happens and until it is implemented, so I submit let's look at this as a case study and try to figure out what can we do to remove those barriers to progress in reaching a common understanding of what complementary action we need to pursue because the perception is NRC went to the Owners Group -- and I am not being critical, let me just give you an optical perception to the extent my optics are working properly -- NRC went to the Owners Group to extract a commitment. They got the commitment, okay?

The Owners Groups couldn't deliver because they are not set up to make commitments or do anything of that sort on the part of their membership. That is in their bylaws.

They come to NEI and say, hey, here is the situation. NRC wants us to do something with this. NEI is the right organization to deal with it, et cetera,

We looked at it. We couldn't find the problem that it was trying to solve. We said, well, wait a second. It makes sense -- it's a good practice. Doesn't it kind of fit into INPO's activities? So we forwarded it to INPO and INPO factored that into their programs -- adequate and sufficient from our perspective.

Staff is still not -- appears not to be satisfied. You got this ASME code case process that is playing out. There has to be a better way.

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That is the reason I identified the example.

MR. STROSNIDER: There may well eventually be some additional technical discussions with regard to this issue, but it is an excellent example in terms of the process and what is the understanding from the parties involved on how this thing is going to be used and why it is important and what the Staff is intending to use it for, the industry's perspective on the same solutions.

MR. HERMAN: But I think we have to get the process thing straight again, okay?

Number one, I think some Owners Groups do make commitments on behalf of their members if it is for a single item. Certainly the VIP did in terms of --

MR. MARION: It is not a Owners -- the industry put forth a separate thing to deal with this.

MR. HERMAN: They chose to pick EPRI to manage it.

The other thing with code cases, code cases are voluntary. The other thing on updating of the rules -- the process that we are going to in terms at least of discussions of nonmandatory updating of the rules. It seems to me that if it went into the code it again would be voluntary if we get to the point of saying that we are not going to be updating 50.55(a), so those are all voluntary actions too.

MR. VINE: Could I make a couple comments about the AOV issue, since we are kind of beating up on it?

The first comment is specific to something I said at the beginning of the meeting. I think one of the problems with the AOV issue is we never sat down and talked about the issue and its significance and we never went through the process of determining is there a cost beneficial change that can be made here that meets the backfit test? Is there a compliance issue here?

We just bypassed that and went to the industry working on

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the issue in a technical sense without ever addressing upfront what should have been looked at.

The second comment kind of goes along with that, which is kind of an EPRI perspective.

When we put together an advisory group on a particular issue, we bring the technical experts to decide what the right solution to that problem is, whether it is VIP, whether it is mid-voltage circuit breakers, whether it is a maintenance guide on some item that is of interest to you or of interest to the utilities. We don't bring in licensing experts.

We bring in the technical experts and virtually all of these programs that are coming through EPRI and most of the ones coming through the Owners Groups are being developed on the basis of what is the right thing to do overall, holistically, for this particular functional area or system or whatever, both in terms of safety, improved performance, economics. It is an integrated package of what is the right thing to do that is so convincing on the merits of the effort that every utility would want to do this because he is going to come out better.

It is not just selectively looking at fixing something that is of concern to the NRC, so when we put a program together like that and then without licensing expertise involved in its creation and writing the words right so that they can be somehow used in a regulatory process, you end up in a situation where we have, first of all, oftentimes created a guideline document that was written from the beginning to be a voluntary document and not an enforceable document.

Second, it was an integrated package to deal with both $^{
m L}$ economics and safety and everything else all together. This is the cookbook, guys, on how to do it best. Then you bring this into a S $^{
m L}$ regulatory space and you are in a situation where -- how do you decide

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I mean how do you decide that?

MR. HERMAN: I guess I would have to take a little exception to your characterization.

There's clearly some things that EPRI put out, say implementation of the Check Works programs that the Staff wasn't involved in, okay? -- and the ASME wasn't involved in and nobody has looked at it in terms of being an enforceable document. That is certainly written as a guidance document -- it is written very loose, in my opinion, perhaps too loose.

On the other hand, if I take the VIP documents, they are developed by a technical committee. They are sent to each of the VIP owners for their approval before they come to the Staff. They come into the Staff. We basically write an SER on them as if they are a topical.

They go back to the owners. The owners comment on what we have put in our SER and then we issue a final SER once we have taken a shot at the industry comments, so I think there is a broad scope of how things can be implemented, okay?

You can look at it upfront. Those documents for all practical purposes are pretty close to Section 11 where no rules exist for BWR internals.

MR. VINE: But they go beyond what would be required to meet the regulations.

MR. STROSNIDER: I think you make a good point. Perhaps

L part of the difficulty here is we agree that a lot of these programs are

developed -- you know, we like the technical work that is going on. We

I like it so much we want to see everybody do it.

I think that's what you are pointing out is, well, you know, there may be some things in there --

MR. VINE: In enforcement space -- then we don't create these things for them to be turned into enforcement doctrines.

MR. STROSNIDER: All right, but this gets back to the process, where if in fact you go off and you have an initiative which is strictly to look at, from the industry perspective, improving economics, efficiency, et cetera, fine. There's nothing safety-related. You are going to maintain safety but you are going to go make things run better.

MR. VINE: But that's idealistic. There's always safety and economic implications --

MR. STROSNIDER: Sure.

MR. VINE: -- to all of it.

It depends on what drives it. If it's being driven not by a safety issue, but by economics or something and it's a benefit to the industry, fine. But if there's an issue in there, if there's a nugget of a safety issue, something that NRC does have concern with, something that is perhaps enforceable or that should be regulated.

The process needs to identify what that is, and that's what we're talking about. Your example is good from that perspective. When you start off on this initiative, I think what we're all talking about is let's understand the scope of the initiative, understand which part of it is within the regulated purview, all right, and what it's intended to address.

And we need to have that understanding up front, because I think in a lot of this the scope gets broader, and the staff looks at it and says, yes, those are really good things to do, and the next thing N you know, well, that's part of the issue we trying to address and it perhaps gets bigger and then that's part of your concern.

So, but it's all about understanding right up front, what

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are the issues that are going to be addressed? And if you add some additional things as part of developing this program because they're of benefit to the industry, fine.

But, you know, that's not necessarily our interest.

MR. VINE: When we wrote the water chemistry guidelines, we did not intend for them to be regulatory enforceable documents, yet they're referenced in the steam generator initiative, and making that decision --

MR. STROSINDER: And I would just, in response to that, just suggest that the industry, NEI, and EPRI might want to consider, depending upon what purpose some of these things are being developed for, all right, you might want to put them more in the form of procedures that a plant could implement.

And I understand that plants want to develop their own procedures. So there -- you can only go so far with it, but, yes, we run into these guidelines. Bob suggests, well, some of them are kind of loosely written.

How does it get proceduralized? Ultimately, some of this stuff, when we try to credit it in regulatory space, it becomes difficult because of the way it's written.

MR. HERMAN: But the example you just provided is maybe one that's worth a little discussion, okay?

Environmental effects on crack growth rates are very important issues. Most of the documents that have come out for deciding how quick something is going to crack is related to what the environmental conditions are that the component is operating in.

You're talking about internals, you're talking about piping,

L you're talking about the rest of it. Most of the testing and most of

the crack growth rates are dependent on people working within the

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L envelope of what maybe is in the water chemistry guidelines.

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MR. VINE: I'm not saying that water chemistry should be totally out of the regulations, but I'm also saying that you can't take the entire document and treat it as an enforcement document, either.

You have to look at it and selectively say what are the -what's the essence of this industry initiative or guideline document or whatever it is that is essential to the safety case? And there may be a half a dozen items in there that are important enough to rise to that level of this the piece that involves a commitment to the regulatory.

The rest of them are commitments within the industry to each other.

MR. CARPENTER: If the licensee is coming and saying we are using the EPRI water chemistry guidelines, and that is part of our solution to this problem, then obviously that brings it into the purview of what we look at.

MR. VINE: I would submit that we have to be very careful in not setting up a process that does that, because that is inviting abuse. We need to be rigorous here and set up a process that allows you to selectively identify or jointly selectively identify those features of an overall industry program that are essential to the regulatory case.

MR. HERMAN: But if I were doing the crack growth case that we were talking about, okay, and I was trying to ensure that I was operating within the bounds of the test data or within the bounds of whatever I was doing, I think the people that -- your side, when you wrote the document, 14 -- VIFF-14 on crack growth rates or the ones to be applied to other areas -- that you could specify whatever you wanted out of those documents to support the crack growth rate arguments and be specific.

If you choose to reference the documents, don't blame us for

RI EY & AS MR. VINE: I agree.

MR. MARION: I think the point is the documents were not written with the objective of supporting inspection.

MR. SHERON: You need to take a first cut and identify what you think are the things that are absolutely necessary to say comply or meet a regulation, okay?

MR. MODEEN: In fact, the lesson learned on --

MR. SHERON: If we agree with them, then that's fine. You should identify them right up in the front of that document, okay? There should be some sort of a forward to the document that identifies and says, you know --

MR. MARION: Then we'll get an NRC endorsement if we did that.

MR. HERMAN: But this is a perfectly good example. If you came in with something and we didn't like it, you'd sure hear about it, either as part of RAI or part of the response in the SER.

MR. MODEEN: In fact, the practical lesson learned from field usage -- and I'm going to go back to the steam generator because I think it's playing out a little further and more clear, is that the underlying EPRI guidelines that certainly weren't written initially thinking of some formal industry initiative, they're in a two-year update cycle -- more frequent if necessary.

Several of those that are now in the update cycle, secondary water chemistry, I think is the first one that's gone through that, is that we've done, the industry has done a better job going back there and flagging, hey, these are the key pieces relative to supporting the formal industry position, making it nice and clear, and then here's this other stuff that --

Honestly, when you know up front, as he was saying, what you're trying to do with the thing, it's easier to try to address that

sort of thing.

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steam generator space to maintain the flexibility in these industry-developed guidelines, and not lock it into tech specs or even -- so that -- I think we worked out a solution where licensees can make

changes in that as things evolve on their own.

But we've got to sort of back into some of these things,

MR. STROSNIDER: We worked very hard, for example, in the

In fact, some of our earlier documents trying to address the steam generator issue, you know, we had -- I can't remember if it was in the draft tech specs or in the Reg Guide -- but, you know, we had tried to do, number one, you need to have a water chemistry program.

All right, and number two, it ought to address critical parameters, but we didn't try to put any specs on it, we didn't try -- and we left that basically to the guidelines.

Like I said, that was some of the early stuff. And then as this thing evolved, I would hope -- I think we've got a success story in that one, all right?

But that's -- but it all comes back again to process, what it's going to be used for, and having the communications up front so that when these things are developed, we understand how it's going to fit into the regulatory process, if at all.

But if it does, you know, where does it fit in and how is it

MR. CARPENTER: There is something to bear in mind here. It's that just because there is something that's presently in the regulatory process, it doesn't mean that it has to stay there.

Again -- and I apologize for continuing to use the VIP, but it's the only voluntary industry initiative that we really have experience with -- they came in and they told us that they didn't think

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We disagreed with them initially, but they came in and they gave us a good technical argument for it, and they're not doing it now.

So that's a place where you can do a win/win on getting something that is not technically safety significant taken out and saving the industry a lot of money.

So this can be a process that can do a lot of good things here.

MR. VINE: We're pretty proud of the initiative. I mean, it's been a success story, we agree with that.

But as I said, there's been an element of trust here, because there are a lot of things that we put in that program that go beyond the regulatory requirements; that go beyond what would be a compliance issue; that go into the areas of good practices and those kinds of things.

And I think it would be a huge disincentive for the kind of progress we want to see here, if we try to sweep every little good practice into something that's enforceable.

If you do that, you're going to discourage the industry from collecting and disseminating good practice information as part of an overall initiative.

So we have to have this threshold of what in an initiative is important enough to be -- to get into the inspection and enforcement cycle.

MR. CARPENTER: Let's also make sure that we understand that even though the industry, per se, the BWR fleet, has committed to N L following the BWR VIP guidance, even before we, the staff, approve it, if they come into us -- for instance, Plant A comes in and they say, you S L know, we've got an outage coming up, and we know that we committed to do

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X, Y, and Z, of the VIP program, but we just can't fit it into our outage this season. It's not a regulatory requirement and we're going to defer that.

We say, well, okay, you defer it. We don't have a technical or regulatory hook to make you do that; it's something you voluntarily do. What are you going to do next time?

And they come back and they tell us what they're going to do next time? So, it's not like we're going to come out and bash somebody over the head.

MR. HERMAN: But the implementation of those of programs let's talk a little about just what happened, actually, and not in specifics.

But early on when there were questions about cracking internals and cracking shrouds and whatever, okay, the first question of the whole thing was, well, what's the safety significance of it?

And the whole game plan for doing that whole program was based on a risk assessment and a qualitative systems review to rank which items to get at in what kind of an order.

Okay, so I think that program, although the inspection things and flaw evaluations things are deterministic, the foundation of what was to be done was certainly risk-based in the first place, and it was systems-based in terms of importance.

And the problem is that if you don't do some of those things, you can get injunctive issues that you start getting into performance-based regulations. I mean, you get into these things if you don't have an argument in terms of, say, a structural integrity argument in terms of components.

Then you can get into what I'll call more esoteric systems-type arguments in terms of multiple failures of things, synergistic effects.

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Those are all part of the process, too, and $\operatorname{\mathsf{--}}$

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$ STROSNIDER: We keep going round and round on BIFF and BIFF is the one that's working.

[Laughter.]

MR. STROSNIDER: So the question we ought to be asking ourselves is why does it seem to work pretty well? I think part of this discussion that Gene was just going through is, I think it works pretty well because we had enough -- and there was good technical work, first of all.

But putting that aside, we had enough discussion that I think both the industry and the NRC understand how this thing fits into the process.

And basically we took advantage of existing processes, which is something that we said back in the meeting in Chicago that in this voluntary initiative framework, we want to use existing process to the extent possible.

The management system is an example of that. These are commitments, licensees know how to interact with the staff in terms of if they want to change commitments, and that's been working, and that's fine.

So I think when we look at this, we say, well, you know, what are some of the lessons we can learn to help make things work?

That's one of them and I think that's an important thing, that we try not to invent new processes, but try to fit.

If you look through that list of things that we need to address in these voluntary initiative protocols, you know, was we go through that list, we ought to try to take advantage of and not reinvent some of these things that we've already worked out.

MR. HERMAN: And they don't ever show up in any of the process development issues to start with on either side.

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But the thing that makes the VIP work is there is utility management oversight at the vice president level on that program, and there is high attention to it on the NRC level.

The technical grunts go do their thing, and before it goes out and becomes policy and before both sides commit to it, there's a buy-in by management on both sides that this is an adequate way to go after these things, and both people make commitments in terms of what they're going to do and they both stick to them.

I think that makes this kind of stuff work better than anything else.

MR. MARION: Also, it helps to find problems when you do inspections. I mean, let's be realistic. I'm relating back to the head nozzle cracking issue where inspections were done and they couldn't identify anything.

So I suggest that contrasted to the basic differences, and not so much the bodies involved in technical expertise, as what was coming out of the inspection results.

MR. CARPENTER: That's another example where we had proposed to the industry that they do a voluntary industry initiative. The industry decided that they didn't see the need for that, and we went ahead and put out a generic letter anyway.

So the process does work. And on that note, if I might suggest, we've been at this for about a hour and a half now. How about we take about a ten-minute break and then resume for a final two hours.

MR. SHERON: What else do we have to do?

MR. MARION: We have a preliminary conceptualization of a flow chart that the three of us put together, primarily with Gary Vine N being the primary individual helping us.

When we reconvene, I'd like to let Gary walk you through this.

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MR. MODEEN: I don't think that we have more than a half hour for some of the process protocol issues, and it relates to that chart.

[Discussion off the record.]

[Recess.]

MR. CARPENTER: Is there anyone else who would like copies of the meeting attendance sheets?

[Show of hands.]

MR. CARPENTER: Hopefully we have enough.

MR. SHERON: I'll stick this out for about 30 minutes and if you guys need to keep going, keep going.

MR. MARION: Let me try to summarize a couple of key point: Number one, we really support the concept of NRC being an objective, strong, credible regulator. And we don't want to --

[Laughter.]

MR. MARION: Good, I'm glad to hear that. We don't want to get involved in anything that would cast doubt on that.

We talked about the perception idea and substituting for regulatory action, so we're kind of sensitive to that. I think the industry, through NEI and other industry organizations, has demonstrated an ability to solve problems in a direct manner.

Hopefully, the NRC has been satisfied where industry has pursued something in a complementary fashion. And I think that success in itself suggests that we look forward to opportunities where we can determine a complementary relationship; it's very important.

And we made the point earlier about open discussion, once the issue is identified; the importance of getting an understanding of $^{
m L}$ the regulatory requirements and expectations; problem definition, et cetera.

We need to be careful because NEI does not want to be

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perceived as an extension of the NRC in any process, in any way, shape, or form, and I don't think that would serve the NRC's interests either.

But more importantly, to go back to the earlier discussion, NEI will not inspect the industry and will not enforce the industry to any kind of guidance that NEI may develop, whether it's just a guideline document or if it's part of a formal industry initiative.

MR. MARION: I thought you guys had a process, whereas if 80 percent vote for something --

MR. SHERON: We do.

MR. MARION: Would you have process where the chief nuclear officers agreed to take a certain position on a policy matter, or to implement a particular guideline that we may develop, et cetera?

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$ SHERON: My understanding is that that's a binding commitment.

MR. MARION: That's a binding commitment within the industry.

At best, we identify a schedule by which that implementation will be completed. We'll gauge the level to which that schedule has been satisfied, but we will not go out and inspect or enforce. We'll communicate with the chief nuclear officers, get the information, request the information.

If they come back and say, yes, I implemented this -MR. SHERON: Well, what does mean? If NEI writes a letter
and says that the industry has agreed to, for example, adopt and
implement a certain NEI report, all you're saying is that, gee, that's
what they told us.

MR. MARION: Hopefully, as a result of the discussions we've had on this concept of voluntary initiatives, we will also tell you in our interactions, that certain aspects of that guideline may fall within

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NRC's regulatory scope.

MR. SHERON: Yes, but what I'm worried about is that you're not telling me. You can't make a commitment for every licensee.

MR. MARION: Right.

MR. SHERON: You're going to go out and ask every licensee to make a commitment.

MR. MODEEN: Brian, let me give you an example: For instance, you haven't asked us to do that on like steam generators, although we're working on something we think everyone will adopt and then you probably have that count.

In the case of severe accident management, I think a lot of the history and the footprint and all that, all the money spent, we actually were asked by the staff, although after we informed you or I guess it was Bill Russell, by letter, that, yes, the industry voted binding commitment, et cetera, we were asked by the staff, gee, we would appreciate it if every licensee would put it on the docket. We created a template and everyone did in that case.

So obviously there is some flexibility that, depending upon the situation, the need, or otherwise, we generally haven't done that. Again, that's been a letter from us.

I think the bigger point, as Alex is saying, we are not the policeman for a formal position; we are the communicator of it, and we also periodically --

MR. SHERON: It's very important, okay? I'm not asking you to go out and enforce and say, you know, we've inspected every licensee and we've guaranteed that they're all doing this.

But I need to understand what it means when you come forward $^{
m L}$ and say that every licensee has adopted something. For example, your Y2K guideline.

We've been running around advertising to the Congress and

the public that all the utilities have agreed to follow that, okay?

Based on your -- what you're telling us, I mean, now it has to have some credence. You have to have some credibility when you make a statement.

If we go out and find out that there are licensees playing fast and loose, saying, we never agreed to that, or whatever, you know, then you have no credibility.

We can't -- you know, anything you write into us would be like, well, that's nice, but --

MR. MARION: We understand, we recognize that, and we take that action and those kinds of communications to the NRC very seriously from that perspective. We fully understand.

However, if that particular initiative topic requires some kind of regulatory commitment, and you folks make that clear, then one of the things we could do is encourage licensees to submit something on their docket that says we will do this or portions of this guideline, whatever the case may be.

But we need to get that understanding right up front so you're not disappointed at the tail end of the process, and we're surprised because you've got a new expectation you've given us.

And we've done them both ways over the years.

MR. HERMAN: But it really needs to get defined up front. Let me give you an example, okay?

If I took the inspection guidelines and the flaw evaluation guidelines and considered what I had as a commitment to doing something on some schedule, but not to follow what's in the document, okay?

I mean, the documents -- a VIP type of thing for doing flaw evaluation is very specific stuff. I mean, it's to the point of N $^{
m L}$ brushing something to do a visual exam, versus not brushing it.

It's coming up with uncertainty values on measurements with agreed upon methods. And those aren't loose, I'm going to go out and

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make a commitment in terms of everybody is going to meet Y2K.

I mean, it's not the same ball park. They need to get defined in the process of what needs to be defined.

And if you can't reach that and if you can't get commitments that an owner is going to follow that program, I don't see where we have any other alternative, other than go out and write regulatory documents.

MR. MARION: Okay.

MR. STROSNIDER: Just for the record, though, I want to make it clear that the Y2K guideline were a little bit more substantive than that, too.

[Laughter.]

MR. STROSNIDER: From a Y2K point of view, there was a lot of detail in that guidance.

MR. HERMAN: We'll find out.

MR. MARION: Let me go back to the point we made earlier about concerns with the SECY paper on this topic, as well as some of the language in the SRM.

Fundamentally, if NRC believes regulatory action is appropriate, then pursue regulatory action. We've had this discussion from time to time.

That, we think, is NRC's fundamental statutory responsibility. We think an aspect of that that's been very beneficial to both the NRC and the industry is, at the time you get your thoughts together on what the issue is and what your options are, if you want to talk about it, we're available to discuss it with you.

We demonstrated in the past that there are things that we can do that can help deal with the problem, okay? So that communication $^{
m L}$ is very important.

From the standpoint of applying voluntary industry initiatives in the regulatory process or giving credit for voluntary

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industry initiatives in the regulatory process, I think there's probably a very limited set of initiatives that fall within that scope.

We could decide to undertake an initiative tomorrow on something that utilities may decide to implement under their Part 5 program, whether it be under Appendix B or under the maintenance rule or whatever.

That puts it within NRC's regulatory scope. So I submit that that's the arena where inspection and enforcement takes place.

Inspection and enforcement are going to be two points that are going to be discussed extensively on the front end of the process, unless we have a clear understanding of the problem and the regulatory requirements and expectations.

And sometimes we may not have a sufficient understanding on inspection and enforcement until the initiative is developed, the documents are thrashed out and people get a better sense of implementation. I just offer that for your consideration.

MR. STROSNIDER: Let me make sure I understand something you said there. If I heard you right it was that if the NRC concludes that there is a need and a basis for taking regulatory action, that we should take regulatory action.

All right, that's opposed to pursuing the voluntary initiative. Now, let me -- and to understand that, if we, for example, conclude that here's an issue that warrants a generic letter and we put it through our generic letter process, and whether it's compliant or whether it's cost-beneficial, but we put it through 51.09 and say this is a legitimate generic letter.

Would you prefer that we put that generic letter out, or L that we come to the industry and say, before we put this generic letter out, here's the issue, and do you want to take it on through a voluntary S I initiative in lieu of the generic letter?

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MR. MARION: I would prefer a public meeting to discuss the merits of the issue, to make sure we understand what the NRC concerns are, and you understand what our concerns may be relative to the problem.

I think we ought to agree to do that right up front when one of these issues are identified. And if NRC has already done the background work to support a regulatory analysis, then one of the questions we're going to raise -- and we've done this in the past -- is, well, if you can justify it, then why don't you go forward with regulatory action?

Fundamentally, that's the expectation of the NRC as a regulatory agency.

MR. STROSNIDER: I understand that, but I think I'm asking a little different question, which is, what is your preference? Would you prefer to see the generic letter come out the door, or would you prefer -- if we went all the way to that point, and said, before we issue this generic letter, let's go let the industry take a shot at it on their own?

MR. SHERON: We're doing this, Alex, because we've heard so many complaints about the generic letter process. Oh, gee, we don't like you citing 50.54(f) because, you know, it says, you know, you know, tell us what why we shouldn't bend, fold, or spindle or mutilate your license or something. And, gee, you guys never do that, you know?

Yes, the reason we do it is because most of the times, licensees pay heed to the generic letter, okay? If a licensee came back and said, sorry, we're not going to do this, okay? We might bend, fold, spindle, and mutilate their license with an order, all right?

But the point is that we heard nothing but complaints about the industry from the utilities, okay? Gee, all we get is these generic letters from the vice presidents, the plant managers, okay?

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The objective here is, good, let's engage the industry right up front, okay, and let them come back and tell us what they think, okay, is the right response, within certain bounds, okay?

I mean, obviously it's not a blank check, just as you know, it's not a problem, we'll let this thing ride for a five years, okay?

That's not the point. We're going to express to you what the concern is, what we think the urgency might be, okay, and the like, all right?

But the idea is to let the industry look at the issue and say what do we think is the appropriate response that we can do that makes sense?

MR. STROSNIDER: But I think your concern -- and let me say what -- let me state what I think it is and you tell me if I'm right.

I think your concern is that if we just talk about voluntary industry initiatives, that you're going to be getting a letter every other week from NRC saying here's another initiative, and that it won't have --

If you look at the generic letter process as an example, it has the controls of 51.09 and our committee for review of generic requirements, and there's a process, all right?

And correct me if I'm wrong, but I think maybe part of your concern is that if we just talked about voluntary initiatives without going through that process, we're just going to send these saying address this, address this, address that without some level of involvement.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ VINE: The concern gets to the way you worded the question.

I think the right answer to your question is that it's not

an either/or; that it's both. That when there is an issue that's appropriate for the industry to take a look at and develop guidelines for, we'll do that, whether there is a regulatory problem or whether it's just an economic issue.

The question is, if the issue that you are concerned about has safety significance to the level of the backfit rule, then what I think we would prefer to see is a -- and we'll show you this in the flow chart -- is a parallel process where the industry takes on the job of studying the issue, defining what the appropriate action should be, getting your approval to those as the appropriate approach.

And then if you're satisfied with that, and you don't see a need to go in and get into enforcement action, then we're done.

But if enforcement action is required, then you have to have a regulatory basis for that, and the regulatory basis ought not to be just an industry guideline document turned into a regulatory requirement.

MR. STROSNIDER: We're mixing some things in here in my mind, because --

MR. MODEEN: One clarification before we get in there. I think from the discussion of that in the past, is the concern that -- and we definitely want the communication up front -- but if we get to the point that the solution, however we have crafted it, really requires either a new regulatory requirement or what we view as a new regulatory position, well, then we believe the NRC process has to be followed to establish that whether it's adequate protection, cost/benefit under 109 or whatever that might be.

That's really the thing where we don't want to --

MR. SHERON: You're forgetting what I said before, okay? If it's a backfit, if it's a true cost-enhanced backfit, okay, that has no underling regulatory basis, all right, for example.

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Then, first off, I'm not going to come to you and ask you to do it unless I've got in my back pocket, you know, a 51.09 analysis that says I can justify this.

It's a pretty high threshold to cross, okay? So, you know, and I can't even remember too many things in the past, okay, where we've come to you and said, we have a cost -- a safety enhancement that's cost-beneficial, okay?

Compliance is a different thing, all right? And I'm saying that I look at the vessel head, okay? Again, it was an issue where we could come out with a generic letter and just tell every licensee, tell us what you're going to do to inspect your vessel heads?

And I can have 103 plants out there or whatever it is, inspecting vessel heads. Or we can go to the industry and say we've got a concern, and the industry comes back and says, good, we're going to propose to you, a program.

Everybody doesn't have to inspect; we're going to sample, we're going to bid them, okay, in terms of some category and the like, and we're going to do representative samples. And it's going to save the industry a hell of a lot of money, all right?

And you can do that in other areas where we have a problem. Rather than us going out and beating each individual licensee over the head with a hammer, the industry can come back and propose a program that samples or whatever, all right, and doesn't cost.

So there are big cost savings that we see with voluntary industry initiatives.

MR. MODEEN: I was afraid Jack was saying, gee, I think you just told me I don't want to do anything with VIIs and this type of thing.

MR. STROSNIDER: I think that what I heard was that if we go to the point of saying we've got a backfit analysis, whether it be

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MR. MARION: No, a public meeting to discuss and understand. Basically, if you've done all the legwork, then why would we want to prevent you from carrying forward with your mission.

MR. SHERON: We've done the legwork, okay, where we can put out the usual generic letter that says send in gobs of information, justify your existence.

MR. MARION: You keep talking about how we don't like generic letters. The thing we don't like, fundamentally is to use them to impose new regulatory positions without a sound basis. If you look at the generic letters and the comments that we've provided in the past, that's where we've been arguing.

MR. SHERON: Alex, I will agree to disagree on that point.

MR. MARION: But I would suggest, since we brought up generic communications, we've got to come to closure on your new generic communication process. The same issues apply in your use of voluntary initiatives -- understanding and clarity and expectations, and we've got to find a way to get through all this.

MR. STROSNIDER: Just not to go too far off, when you talk about generic communications, because you brought that up earlier, you're talking just generic letters, or are you talking about information notices?

MR. MARION: Yes.

MR. STROSNIDER: Are you talking about risks? Are you talking about the whole --

MR. BATEMAN: I'd just like to get one thing on the record here. My sense is that with these voluntary industry initiatives, one of the flies in the ointment is this concept of inspection and

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enforcement.

What I hear is that your position is that if the NRC wants to inspect and enforce something, they need to pursue the regulatory process with whatever it might be.

On the other hand, if the NRC is willing to establish a voluntary industry initiative, your expectations are that the NRC would not inspect and enforce, by definition, because it is a voluntary industry initiative, unless it reached some threshold of noncompliance that we'd, I guess, have agree upon what that is.

But if it didn't meet that, there would be no NRC inspection and enforcement. And so I think we're kind of at an impasse here in that the Commission has asked us to investigate and report back to them in a Commission paper.

At least one aspect is, how do we relate enforcement to voluntary industry initiatives? I think we're at a point where you guys are saying, if you're going to give us a voluntary industry initiative, you're not going -- we don't think it's right that you inspect and enforce.

And if you want to inspect and enforce, then go through rulemaking and do it.

MR. MARION: That's why I posed that question.

MR. BATEMAN: We've got to figure out how we're going to get around this.

MR. MARION: If it's a compliance issue, then how can the voluntary initiative be voluntary.

If it is a compliance issue, then inspection and enforcement should be clear.

MR. STROSNIDER: I keep coming back to these things are not voluntary.

MR. MARION: Right.



MR. STROSNIDER: They're voluntary initiatives in lieu of the NRC -- of a regulatory action.

I mean, we can come tell you to do it, or you can recognize.

MR. MARION: I'll tell you right now, leveraging a potential generic letter is counterproductive. I think the greatest successes have been had where we haven't tried to be heavy-handed, and tried to focus on the technical issues as they relate to the current regulatory requirements and get that understanding.

So, I would suggest that we proceed.

MR. VINE: Let me try to answer those questions again. It's part of the chart here.

MR. MARION: It's covered by this, Gary.

MR. VINE: Yes, okay.

MR. MARION: Isn't it?

MR. VINE: Yes, let's go through this, and then I'll make the point. But what's going to be very clear is that it's not an either/or; that we're not saying that if you have a clear case of an issue that clearly meets the backfit criteria, that we aren't going to establish and industry initiative.

We're going to do that, and all we're saying is that when it comes time to establish inspection/enforcement procedures, you have to go through a regulatory process in addition to --

MR. BATEMAN: You don't want us coming and inspecting and enforcing against what you've done.

MR. VINE: Our full-scope guidelines. Maybe we sit down together with our guidelines and figure out what portion of those are appropriate for inspection and enforcement.

That's what this chart basically shows. and I think we've talked about so many of the points here that I'm not going to belabor each and every box.

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But conceptually what it says is that when an issue comes up from whatever source, that one of the first things we do is, we end up in a joint public meeting that really goes over the issue, and not just to understand it technically, but also to understand the implications in terms of safety and cost, what are the likely options that we might consider or you might consider, so you have a big picture of the whole thing, all the way to some likely endpoints in terms of whether or not this is ever going to rise to the threshold of backfit criteria, whether or not we're going to end up with inspection/enforcement at the end of this or not.

It's an overall, big-picture look at the issue up front and early.

After you have that, then the industry is going to take on a process to decide whether or not it wants to undertake an initiative.

If the issue is so straightforward that there's no value-added and the industry is sitting down and working through our consensus process, then -- and a regulatory requirement that just says do X is what everyone agrees needs to be done, then we don't have to do this.

But if it's an issue where there's some real value-added, and the industry is grappling with the issue for awhile, building some consensus on what the appropriate actions might be, then we're going to come down this side and do some things.

They could come in a variety of different formats. There could be some voluntary guidelines that could rise to more formal levels of commitment and so forth, depending on the significance of the issue.

But I want to reiterate something I said earlier: The $^{
m L}$ significance of the issue is not determined solely by its regulatory significance.

There are very significant issues that NEI has taken on, and

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they even had 80 percent votes on, that have no regulatory significance. They have to do with economics, they have to do standardization in the industry to get things done consistently.

So there are a lot of things that we're going to take on, independent of whether or not the NRC --

MR. STROSNIDER: And we have identified, I think it was Definition 4 where you talked about --

MR. VINE: Option 4.

MR. STROSNIDER: Option 4, industry initiative, in some cases it might require some NRC cooperation in terms of if we need to change, but we recognize that that goes on, and I think we were trying to accommodate that.

MR. MODEEN: Our Personnel Access Data System required some things to interact with the staff to make sure we could do it.

MR. SHERON: The first thing you need to do on this is that you need to have a dotted line from the issue identified, over to NRC evaluates against adequate protection.

We're not fooling around, you know, set up a meeting and have a discussion. If we have a safety issue that comes up that's important, that's adequate protection, we're going to take action right away.

MR. MARION: This could be, depending on the issue, could be a brief heads-up at the one of the EDO meetings that we have periodically, and say, oh, by the way, we've come across this and we're going to pursue regulatory action. We've made the case; you'll see it.

MR. SHERON: If it's important, we can get an order out here in a day.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ MARION: We don't you want to schedule a public meeting in that kind of situation.

MR. HERMAN: I really think we need to pursue this a little

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RI EY & further before we get into this, okay?

If you took the issue on the CRDM mechanisms, okay -- I'm not talking about the ones on the stub tubes; I'm talking on the mechanism issue.

There was a problem found on a plant that had a very large flaw in it, okay?

MR. VINE: That's the Prairie Island problem?

MR. HERMAN: That's the Prairie Island problem. It didn't meet the criteria in terms of safety margins, okay?

Nobody knew how it got there, why it got there, whatever, okay? And it was something that something had to get done pretty quick on that thing.

I don't think it was an adequate protection issue, myself.

If you looked at it from a risk perspective, it would be important because it could be a small loca, but on the other hand, probability, I don't know.

If I get into this process and you say, well, that's pretty clear-cut, go write a generic letter, if I start at that point in time to write the generic letter, I have no choice to write that generic letter any way but say go out and inspect the fleet at the next refueling outage, if I have a justification to make it go that long, okay?

What we ended up with was a program that was interactive with the industry. We did some inspections, the industry proposed some other things along the road like at statistical approach to it and the rest of it.

And I think there was one big benefit to the industry by $^{
m L}$ doing it the way we did it, versus us issuing a generic letter. And I think --

MR. STROSNIDER: I would just make one comment about it. I

think maybe we do have options other than say go inspect everyone. You know, we can write a generic letter that says come back and tell us what corrective action you're going to take with regard to this issue.

And maybe the response is an integrated program.

But to get to your process here, to get to your chart, I guess actually it does answer one my questions.

 $\label{thm:condition} You really don't like generic letters because that's not on here anywhere.$

MR. VINE: This is a simplified version.

MR. STROSNIDER: But to be serious about it, though, it gets back to the question I asked earlier. Where do you see the generic letter fitting into this?

I think that's --

MR. VINE: I'll explain that as we go along.

I want to make one more point about the open communication at the top. It's not necessary to say that the staff has to have done a thorough backfit analysis before we have that discussion.

If there is an issue that comes up that your management believes or the industry's management believes has the potential of being a significant issue, but we're not yet sure what tests it might or might not meet in terms of safety significance, or where it sits in the regulatory scheme of things, but it's likely to be something that we need to air and discuss, we have the meeting.

You don't have to have all the answers before you have the open discussion. I think we've sometimes made the mistake of not having the discussion early enough, and there are some fundamental misunderstandings about the issue that result in the different paths we take.

Having this up-front meeting, even without all the answers, is probably worth having. Then if there are some holes, you identify

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them and go and find the answers to them.

Anyway, as you come down the left-hand side, what we're suggesting is that the NRC at some point -- and maybe you do this to some degree before you have the public meeting -- but at some point, you have to go through the rigorous process of looking at protection and the 51.09 criteria and determine whether or not the particular issue triggers those criteria.

If they trigger the criteria, then you come down a path that really splits and does two different things: One is, it talks about rulemaking.

The other is that it talks about there being an industrywide initiative. And whether there or not there is, there are certain things we'll do if the industrywide initiative does go forward.

You will notice that those are parallel paths.

MR. SHERON: That should be a decision point there, okay?

Does the industry agree? If the industry doesn't agree, okay, then you get this arrow that goes off here that says generic letter, big hammer, and the rest.

MR. VINE: But even if we agree that rulemaking is appropriate because it's a clear compliance issue, that doesn't mean that all these values that you've talked about of the industry taking the issue on in terms of consensus-building, the analysis, basically working the issue to have a proposal we're ready to live with, shouldn't take place anyway.

Those values still occur in a case where you ultimately have to go to rulemaking. So that's why I keep arguing that there's a parallel path there where we're still going to look at it in terms of coming up with what we think the best solution to the issue is.

And then you can embody that in either a rulemaking activity or a generic communication. The reason generic communications don't

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show up on this more simplified list is that there's still, I think, within the industry, some disagreement as to whether or not it's appropriate to include a generic letter in this process, if, in fact, the criteria are triggered.

I think a lot of the industry and utility execs believe that if you've triggered these criteria of either adequate protection or 51.09, that you have to go to rulemaking, and not just issue a generic letter.

MR. SHERON: No, see, that's where we disagree.

MR. VINE: That's a fine point.

MR. SHERON: Triggering 51.09 is compliance, okay? And that's where we get into this disagreement.

We write out generic letters a lot of times, okay, that basically question compliance.

MR. VINE: Right.

MR. SHERON: And you guys disagree and you claim that's a backfit.

MR. VINE: Right.

MR. SHERON: And we've had this one out, okay? We interpret this entirely different.

MR. VINE: This process will work, whether or not we agree on that particular point or not. That is the whole essence of this.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ MARION: There will be times when we agree and times when we don't.

MR. VINE: Right.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ MARION: But we still want to talk about it and try to work it out.

MR. SHERON: What I'm saying is that there is no arrow going off saying, disagree-generic letter or staff does their thing; industry does their thing.

MR. HERMAN: I'd like to see a clarification that says where it says 51.09 criteria, a paren that says compliance exception or justified backfit.

MR. MARION: We would like you to take a look at this and give us comments. You can send us a markup or call us. This is just a preliminary conceptualization of the process as we see it. Have a good holiday.

MR. SHERON: Thank you.

MR. VINE: Before we get to the bottom box on the left-hand side, let me just follow through the criteria-not-triggered line.

In many of these cases, there will still be an industry initiative of some kind at a guideline level or whatever.

And the commitment in this process, of course, is that the industry is going to keep you informed and show you what we're doing, even if those criteria are not triggered.

And that deals with this piece of the case that we were talking about before where if you don't -- if you can't meet the backfit criteria, or you don't really see a need for taking enforcement action, but you really want to be satisfied the industry is doing the right thing, this process takes care of that.

It shows -- keeps the NRC fully informed of what we're doing and the progress we're making on dealing with that particular issue.

And if you're satisfied with the voluntary nature of that, where there's no enforcement process, but there is industrywide participation, then we're home free on those cases.

MR. BATEMAN: That's where the rub comes.

MR. HERMAN: Let me make a comment. I don't think this is $^{\rm L}$ one iota different than what was proposed in the criteria. I wouldn't get down -- with the criteria not triggered department, that was the $^{\rm S}$ I last item that we had on the list.

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The other ones would all trigger the criteria.

MR. VINE: Okay, let's do this: You're questioning the -- I'll answer the question.

If you look at SECY 90-63, again, there are two places -- and this gets back to my comment at the beginning -- where what the letter -- what the SECY says is that if an issue is identified, there will be no regulatory -- no backfit analysis required.

The NRC does no backfit analysis if the industry goes ahead and does what you want them to do.

MR. HERMAN: I think what you heard is that --

MR. VINE: Well, I heard from Brian something entirely different; that you will do that analysis and you will tell us what you found, which is not what the SECY says.

MR. STROSNIDER: This is what I asked earlier. If your concern was that you expected that sort of analysis before any issue is determined to be an industry initiative or requested to be an industry initiative --

MR. VINE: It doesn't have to be determined at the very beginning. It only has to be determined before we get into enforcement space.

The industry is going to move ahead and deal with the issue technically.

MR. HERMAN: I think what Brian told you earlier is that the process for getting something in to being an industry initiative, would be running it up the chain, at least through the Office level.

Prior to doing that, it's got to have at least some
expectation, if not a full-blown analysis, that either the thing is a

Compliance issue or it is something that's an adequate protection issue,
or it's a safety enhancement.

I don't think it would get to you unless people had at least

made a preliminary determination.

MR. STROSNIDER: But I think what they're saying is that that is not consistent with what the SECY says.

MR. VINE: The SECY doesn't say that.

MR. STROSNIDER: Point understood.

MR. HERMAN: We put it in the process.

MR. VINE: When we sat down to decide how to deal with the issue, we looked at an NRC flow chart, and that's how we got the idea of doing this flow chart.

We sat down and checked all the references, and one of the references you cite on background is SECY 97-303. And in there, there's a flow chart on how you deal with voluntary industry initiatives.

And it starts at the top, issue identified; industry comes in -- it's very simplified. Staff determines whether it's acceptable or not, whatever the industry has proposed.

And it moves down to what it calls NRC followup activities.

And SECY 97-303 defines followup activities as tracking, inspection, and enforcement.

And this SECY identifies followup activities with those same three words. So, that's a process where the 51.09 considerations never even enter the picture.

It was issue identified, industry volunteers to do something, go to enforcement. And that's why we decided to take --

MR. HERMAN: I think you have to take into account, the very first SECY, 97-033, probably was put together by RES, whose probably not into licensing every day.

And some of the things may have got put in the second paper. $^{
m L}$ I think the intent of what will go in the process will be certainly the screening you asked for in terms of how it fits in the 109 thing.

I thought that was clear enough in the paper. I guess it

RI EY & AS wasn't.

MR. STROSNIDER: I think there's an interesting point here, because the concern that I keep hearing you express is with regard to enforcement. You know, that 51.09 type analysis or however you want to characterize it, needs to be done before the NRC goes off and inspects and enforces against any this stuff.

And I agree with that, all right, that, you know -- I'm a little curious as to why that's perceived as a big problem. I wouldn't expect to go out and be able to pick up a whole lot of violations that read contrary to this voluntary initiative.

You know, they're usually cited against something other than that. But to get to the bigger picture in terms of this process, what I'm curious about is if you don't think -- we need to think about the question of at what point does that sort of 51.09 analysis happen?

To me, enforcement is way down in this process. That's implementation.

 $\label{thm:process} \mbox{What I'm questioning is, at what point up earlier in the} \\ \mbox{process does it need to happen?}$

Some of this preliminary discussion you're talking about, I think is to get a handle on some inputs that could be used in terms of cost/benefit, in terms of compliance, in terms of those things to make this determination.

And that determination might well -- you know, some for of, is this -- and we talked in the paper about we need to define an initiative that we're proposing, does it fall into the bin of compliance? Does it fall into the bin of cost-beneficial?

Is there an analysis that goes with that before this thing $^{
m L}$ ever becomes a legitimate issue to be addressed?

Or if it doesn't pass some sort of evaluation, does it just -- do you throw it out, or does it perhaps fall into that Category 4,

which is, yes, there are some good things here to do that would, you know, enhance good practice, and that the industry might want to take it on on their own?

So, I'm not arguing that this sort of evaluation needs to be done; in fact, what I'm questioning is, does it need to be done sooner?

MR. BATEMAN: Right, but the point is this says while the industry is evaluating the technical aspects of the issue, we're evaluating the regulatory aspects of the issue.

MR. MARION: I do think the two things work in parallel, and we know when the technical resolution is come up with, we already know at that point, is this a legitimate regulatory issue, or is it just effectively an economic issue?

MR. BATEMAN: Yes, but the industry may not want to go off and spend any resources developing a technical resolution to this problem if it's not a legitimate regulatory issue.

MR. MARION: In which case you've got to do that earlier.

MR. BATEMAN: My sense is the Commission wants to have a regulatory hook in voluntary industry initiatives. We've got to get by that some way.

Maybe we recommend to them that having an enforcement hook in voluntary industry initiatives isn't mandatory.

MR. MODEEN: I guess I come back to -- you should have that hook if the backfit criteria or adequate protection are triggered.

MR. BATEMAN: I said this earlier. If it fits the existing process. You do not want to modify -- we don't want to invent a new enforcement and inspection process. We don't want to modify the existing one.

What happens is that in the case of the BWR VIP -- we come back to that example again -- the safety evaluations that we're writing say this is an acceptable way to satisfy Appendix B, all right? And you

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can go through the criteria and say, yes, you found cracking and you need to take corrective action.

All right, what the staff is saying is that we've looked at this and this is an acceptable corrective action. That doesn't say the licensee can't do something else.

But if they choose to do something else, we may come out and inspect it, and we may ask the question, how does this satisfy various criteria?

All right, we've tried to keep it in the context of a well-defined, know process, all right, and that's just one example.

When you come through this thing, when you go through an analysis, a 51.09 analysis, you ought to be able to fit to here's the regulatory hook, based on the 51.09 analysis. And that's what you inspect and enforce against.

MR. MARION: What about NEI 97.06? How does that fit here? How does that fit here?

MR. BATEMAN: You go back and look at the SECY papers we've written, we've laid out compliance arguments in terms of meeting the licensing basis for the factors of safety and for leakage during accident conditions, et cetera.

The one twist that came in there that we had to acknowledge was that our own licensees' tech specs didn't really address these issues effectively.

So the NRC acknowledge that the tech specs we had approved really didn't get there all the way either.

MR. MARION: So the sooner the NRC approves the tech specs proposal, then the real hook will be in the implementation of those tech specs.

The question was asked by you folks in one of our more recent meetings, what are the enforcement aspects of this? Do you guys

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think you're going to be able to enforce against these guidelines, because if you think so, we're going to back out of this because we didn't write our guidelines from the point of view of enforceability.

MR. MODEEN: Yes, and we think we've worked through that, and as I mentioned, as we were updating the lower tier guidelines, we're flagging the pieces that are specifically relevant to the overall initiative, plus we've addressed it in the --

I mean, one reason we came to the conclusion, although two years ago we really didn't want to modify tech specs, said, you know, they're so inconsistent with current practices and our formal position, we really need to bring it up to date.

If I could just point one other thing, though, you asked how do steam generators fit, and if you remember back five or six years ago, one of the issues we were looking at is, well, what about thermal induced steam generator tube rupture?

And there, you're into, gee, that's a new staff position, obviously, and can you make the case? No, couldn't make it generically; yes, things come up like Calloway's sleeve and electrosleeves or something to deal with that case-by-case, but here we also went through the process and concluded that, no, rulemaking wasn't required because there really wasn't the basis to establish a new position, and our initiative doesn't address it.

That's a fallout that kind of gets thrown by the side, and we didn't know that in 1993. We had to take awhile.

MR. HERMAN: Obviously things like steam generators or paristeam generators clearly are covered under 50.55(a). There's a code case out there for doing the sleeves. The margins that are there are N there as part of the original designs.

MR. MODEEN: I'm not trying to argue.

MR. STROSNIDER: We've been through all that in the details

of working this thing out. But, again, when -- I think one of the reasons that this appears to be on a success path is that we tried to fit all this within an existing framework.

We agreed that the tech specs needed to be improved, all right? And that's a generous thing. The NRC staff told the Commission that the tech specs really didn't do what they were supposed to do. But we agreed they needed to be approved, so there are tech spec amendments that are going to come in.

In terms of the guidelines, we agreed that if we have the technical requirements manual that says you need to have a program, then you can go off and develop that program and incorporate those guidelines in plant procedures or however the plant sees fit, like they do with any other program, all right?

But then when you start looking at it in terms of enforcement, all right, we're looking in terms of tech specs?

Any other enforcement that would happen with a good program would probably be Appendix B, and those are the same issues that we deal with in any other maintenance program or anything else that's going on. Industry guidelines are used all the time in those.

So we tried to put it into the same framework. All right, again, not inventing something new that, here's some new enforcement approach where, you know, we're going to try to hold people to, you know, an industry guideline document. We, in fact, tried to avoid that completely.

MR. BATEMAN: But, Jack, I'm not clear in my own mind -- and you guys asked the question -- if I'm an inspector, because I was an inspector for ten years before I got into this end of the business, and I'm out walking around your site, and I'm looking at what you're doing with your steam generators.

And I see you're not following a guideline, what am I as an

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inspector going to do?

MR. MODEEN: I don't know exactly what you'd be looking at.

MR. BATEMAN: Well, that's probably not the way we want to go in the new oversight process. I think one of the action items we still have is relative to the more performance-based, risk-informed inspection processes. We agreed we need to now look at steam generators.

And where he starts is with the performance criteria and three key areas. And then he drops.

MR. MODEEN: Say there was some reason why I got into loca, and failed to meet 3-delta-P two times in a row or whatever.

So I go out and start looking to see what you guys are doing, and I see you're not following some of your guidelines. Are we saying here, Jack, that we've agreed that the inspector can't enforce against this kind of an issue because it's a voluntary industry initiative? I think that's what you guys want.

MR. VINE: If you go to the bottom line of this chart, you'll see where I think the industry has to make some adjustments, as well as the NRC, to make this really work the way it should.

And one of the adjustments we have to make is, we have to be a bit more formal as we develop guidelines to decide what we think is appropriate for inspection and enforcement.

Now, part of that is going to come out naturally in the new oversight process where you've got a risk-informed, performance-based approach to decide what goes in the baseline.

But part of it's going to 959 be our job, too. And right now, we've put a lot of stuff in these guidelines that are simply good $^{
m L}$ practices that have no significance in terms of being critical to compliance with the regulations.

They're simply there because it's a good place to put them

along with everything else to help these guys do the best job they can.

And we don't want to discourage that.

So the only way out of this box is to do what we show at the bottom of this chart. As we develop these comprehensive, full-scope initiatives and guideline documents, that we take the time to decide what I worded here as NRC and industry joint determine the minimum subset of specific actions and/or performance-based standards that address the adequate protection or triggered backfit criteria.

What is this -- this is kind of a necessary versus sufficient question. What are the necessary elements of that initiative, that broader initiative that meet this?

And those are the pieces of that guideline document that have to be committed to the NRC, either in whatever process we use, whether it goes on individual dockets or whatever.

The broader scope is either going to remain voluntary or in some cases, as you follow through this chart -- and this is an important distinction because the more complicated flow chart really describes how the industry goes through its process.

And there are a lot of factors that determine whether or not the industry makes a commitment to a guideline, independent of the NRC side, just within our own process.

And it's very rare that the industry makes a formal commitment to itself, but sometimes it does, to follow a guideline. There are a couple of cases: One that had no regulatory was access authorization; one that does have regulatory significance is the steam generator issue where the commitment was made before we got through a final determination of what really is appropriate in the regulatory arena.

But the industry will have its own bases for deciding whether or not to make a formal commitment. And sometimes through the

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process, there will be a formal commitment to the full scope of those guidelines, but that full scope commitment is made to the industry by the industry to itself, not to the NRC.

What the commitment is to the NRC is, again, to that carefully defined scope that's appropriate for the triggered criteria.

MR. STROSNIDER: I think what you're saying makes perfect sense. I guess the -- it probably should be a separate discussion, but I'm also a little curious as to what drives the concern.

Like I say, I don't think we're out siding against commitments. If anything, you know, deviation from commitments, and I don't think we're doing much of that anymore; we've got a new commitment control process.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ MODEEN: I came here when NUMARC was -- much like Alex and from some of the post-

TMI, and we were still kind of reeling from the imposition through the communication process of what were either new positions or seemed like requirements but really weren't et cetera.

You know, all that has changed dramatically during the last ten or 11 years. I think, again, in some of the things Gary was pointing out in the SECY document, there was this concern that, gee, if we're not careful, we're going to lose the discipline in that process, that either one established a new position or established a new requirement.

Brian wants to keep focusing on just compliance issues, but we see others, you know, since we don't always agree on compliance exception characterizations and things that really do look like new requirements and positions.

MR. STROSNIDER: I agree that we do need to be clear in the guidelines that we develop here that these issues of what's -- how this -- how a particular initiative is going to be treated within inspection

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and enforcement space needs to be clearly identified.

And we had that as one or two of the topics that need to be discussed. If nothing else, the guidelines need to say there needs to be -- it needs to be written down someplace that this is the part of this that is necessary to comply with a certain regulation, and the rest of this is good practice or whatever.

So that needs to be captured, and we agree with that.

MR. VINE: Part of the issue, in answer to your question about what the concern is, you have to kind of take a step away from the arena that you guys deal with and that NEI deals with all the time where there is a sophisticated understanding of both the technical and the licensing side of all these issues.

There are lots of industry groups out there, special issue groups. There are owners groups, there are all the EPRI committees.

We don't have that sophistication on the licensee side. All these groups are really focused on one thing only, and that's doing the right thing.

And they're vulnerable if you set up a process that is -that could be abused, to sweeping a lot of stuff like good practices,
into enforcement.

And even though that won't happen when you're developing an NEI guideline, I think the process you set up has to be rigorous enough so we can go to the utility execs and say this is good enough so that one of these groups that just wants to do the right thing isn't going to get trouble on the licensing side.

MR. HERMAN: I think that you've got to recognize that the Commission -- the industry is a bunch of big boys. And when they have

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significant issues, I can't believe that they are going to be that naive as to not have management oversight of what they're doing.

To have a thought that a technical group is going to go out there and do their thing, and cut a deal with the NRC on this is what we're going to do to address an issue, without having oversight of relevant utility management, to me, is totally naive.

And it's absolutely --

MR. STROSNIDER: I don't think --

MR. VINE: But why not have a rigorous process.

MR. STROSNIDER: I agree with what you said. I mean, take yes for an answer. This needs to be well defined in enforcement, inspection, compliance space.

The protocols, the guidelines, need to say how that's going to happen.

MR. BATEMAN: In terms of doing that generically, it might be, to the extent -- in these up-front get-together's on each one of our individual issues, that we make the decisions at that point, what's going to be --

MR. STROSNIDER: That's right. What we're trying to do here is put together a process. And as we just discussed, for different initiatives, all right, they're going to fall into different bins in terms of what's driving them, and what the compliance is, et cetera.

And from a process point of view, all right, what we need to do is make sure we've got a step in here where we all agree that that's going to be defined and how it's going to be defined.

Is it going to be written down? Is it going to be sent to NEI? And does NEI distribute it to the industry? And the industry N L looks at it and says, yes, we understand it, we agree with it, and it comes back, and everybody has a mutual understanding.

So, because -- and we will try as hard as we can to make

this thing general so that it will capture all the different situations that could come up.

Actually, I'd say take yes for an answer. I think I understand the issue and that we need to make sure that we address those issues of inspection and enforcement; that there's a process here for make sure that we characterize it.

MR. BATEMAN: Jack, am I clear now that any -- that in terms of voluntary industry initiatives, we're going to need to address inspection and enforcement? We're only talking about those initiatives that relate to adequate protection, 51.09.

MR. VINE: That's the basic foundation for that. Or are we really talking about things that maybe don't meet that threshold, but yet we still -- like, I don't know if BWRVIP would meet that threshold.

MR. STROSNIDER: I think that's part of the concern that's raised here.

MR. VINE: Part of it does; part of it doesn't.

MR. BATEMAN: I'm not sure that we've come to that agreement in this meeting that we've had, that that's going to be the basic foundation. We're going to be limited to considering inspection and enforcement only for those issues, or are we really still back where we were before where for some yes, for others, maybe?

MR. STROSNIDER: We have to work out and come back to the flow chart idea here, which is always, I think, a good idea. Start with what we had in the SECY.

We identified four different definitions, all right. And so we said here's four different areas in which could bin voluntary initiatives.

Now, if you started with those four, at some point, all right, then you come down with each one of those. It's a more detailed chart.

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AND RIII EY ASS But one of those was, here's industry initiatives that enhance good practice that have no regulatory compliance or backfit at all. And when you follow that down and you get to the box that says how do I treat this in inspection and enforcement space, you basically say, this thing had nothing to do with complying with the regulations.

It doesn't need to be inspected; it doesn't need -- it's not going to be enforced against.

Now, there's another one over here that says if we identified a compliance issue, and when you come down on that one and you get to the box on how do you inspect and enforce, the process is, you need to identify very clearly what regulation or requirement it is that you have to comply with, all right, and how does that fit into the oversight process?

- MR. BATEMAN: You can say Appendix B.
- MR. STROSNIDER: It may be Appendix B in some cases --
- MR. BATEMAN: My understanding is that that isn't the concept that they're presenting here. Well, one is to be able to say that they didn't follow their procedure, but therefore it's in Appendix B, but it doesn't meet the proof test here of being an adequate protection, or 51.09.
- MR. HERMAN: It's not just 51.09; it's a compliance exception to 51.09.
- MR. STROSNIDER: Let me ask the industry the question then. What Bill is suggesting is that there is no enforcement against Appendix B. I think what I heard is -
 - MR. BATEMAN: I don't know.
- MR. STROSNIDER: I think what I heard is that you need to N
 L some clear understanding of what you're doing that's satisfying Appendix
 B, versus what you're doing as what I'll characterize as good practice.

And do we have agreement, I think, with the industry in BWR

Appendix B.

VIP space. We had discussed this at public meetings with regard to why are we writing these safety evaluations? What's the purpose of these?

And we talked around that and we concluded that, well, this is really something that we're saying is an acceptable way to satisfy

Now, if you push hard on those reports, there is some stuff in there which I'm sure if we came out and cited you against Appendix B, you'd say, wait a minute.

MR. VINE: Not in the spirit of the --

MR. STROSNIDER: And Appendix B, unfortunately, always has those shades of gray in it and we're not going to fix that here.

But in general we said this is an initiative which has elements in it that satisfy Appendix B, all right? It's not 50.55(a); it's not some GDC. It's not this; it's not that, it's Appendix B.

MR. MARION: The key point is that you had a discussion with industry to reach that understanding and agreement.

MR. STROSNIDER: Yes.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ MODEEN: They may not be hard to do, Alex, up front, before you ever get down --

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ STROSNIDER: In some issues it's going to be easier than others.

MR. MODEEN: It's the same thing in doing a regulatory analysis. You might have an inkling of it, but you may not have it till you --

MR. STROSNIDER: It will be hard to do, but we need to force ourselves to do it up front.

MR. VINE: Or at least have a tentative answer to the $^{
m L}$ question.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.\ STROSNIDER:$$ We didn't start dealing with this issue as hard as we should have on the VIP initiative until we were already down

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the road writing some of these safety evaluations.

Senior management said, why are we writing the safety evaluations? Why are spending all these resources looking at this? What's the point here? What's the regulatory nexus?

And that's when we started thinking about it and we had the discussions and we came to a mutual understanding.

MR. HERMAN: I'll go back to where I think we are in terms of enforcement, again. And I agree with you that you need to do it up front, et cetera.

That is clearly compliance, okay? It's things that are within the design basis, and typical compliance type of approach to things.

This is things like severe accidents that if you'd ask me, the only basis for enforcement the NRC has is to write an order if we're dissatisfied with what's going on at the site.

There's not citing against Appendix B for this kind of a thing.

This is the other stuff, and this is adequate protection that is outside of the scope of the thing.

And I don't think there's a problem with the definitions.

MR. MARION: We talked earlier about the terminology in terms of the substitute for regulatory action. We also talked about generic letters.

And whether we want a letter or not, we've got to resolve the generic communication process. Clearly you're thinking of generic letters as one way of communicating the agreements and understandings relative to these voluntary industry initiatives.

MR. VINE: Can I talk to some points on Bob's slide? Let me take the bottom one first about adequate protection.

The point on adequate protection is worded differently in

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different parts of SECY 90-63. On statement that is correct is that -[Laughter.]

MR. VINE: I said that wrong. I'm sorry. Where in the SECY it says that if there is an adequate protection issue, the NRC must address it. That's a true statement.

There is another place in here that says if there's an adequate protection issue here, it cannot be dealt with the voluntary industry initiative.

That's not true because if there is an adequate protection issue, there's an interest on the part of both the NRC and the industry in fixing it, and the industry will likely propose some things.

But you can accept or reject those. You have to take regulatory action, but the industry is not prohibited from proposing some solutions.

MR. HERMAN: I think you're misinterpreting what was meant.

I think what was meant is the definition that if things are a regulatory

-- are an adequate protection issue, it's our responsibility.

MR. VINE: Right.

MR. HERMAN: The way for addressing that issue might be something like a complementary guide from the industry.

MR. VINE: On the first bullet, within the design basis, I'd again get back to the statement of consideration of the backfit rule.

It's not just that if it's within the design basis, I'd again get back to the statement of consideration of the backfit rule.

It's not just if it's within the design basis that it's automatically a compliance issue. If this is just a new interpretation of what the design basis requires, that does not qualify as a compliance issue. It has to be a new finding of fact as opposed to a new interpretation.

MR. HERMAN: That's in the eye of beholder, that one.

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MR. VINE: I understand. But it's an important distinction.

MR. STROSNIDER: I just want to make a point, and you may have some more to say here, Gary, but I just want to make the point that we would encourage comments on these definitions, all right?

We'd encourage comments on these definitions in the context of how they fit in the rest of the process, okay? I think the SECY paper, some of the earlier definitions tried to follow the logic of 51.09 much more explicitly, all right?

Now, I said earlier we need to make sure we're making use of existing processes, et cetera, bringing design basis into this when we're off having all these discussions about what the design basis is.

You know, you may have some comments on that.

MR. VINE: Right.

MR. STROSNIDER: Whether you think that's good or bad, or that you think paralleling 51.09 makes more sense.

But I think, in general, the point here is that we do know there are some different categories of voluntary initiatives, and we need to come to some agreements on how we define what they are and the process by which we deal with each of those will be somewhat dictated by what the nature of the issue is.

MR. VINE: And the points on the second and third bullets, I guess, are pretty obvious. The second bullet point would be that justifiable as a safety enhancement is, of course, as defined by the 51.09 process.

And the third bullet is certainly the industry will take on these issues because of the savings involved. But those initiatives don't meet the 109 criteria, and therefore we're not into any kind of N L inspection/enforcement space on the third bullet.

MR. HERMAN: That's on another slide somewhere.

MR. VINE: I guess another point on that last area is, in

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the SECY you have the four bins that you create based on the definitions in 51.09.

There is one bin that's kind of missing, and it's a very important bin. The first three bins all have to do with either adequate protection or issues that clearly fall within the 51.09 criteria.

And the fourth bin is of no regulatory interest.

There is this middle area that we really need to deal with, and that is issues that are of real concern to the staff, but don't meet the criteria.

That's what this whole center piece of this flow chart is all about, items that don't meet the criteria, but you still have concerns about them or some members of the staff have concerns about them.

And this whole process is to show you what the industry is doing with those on a voluntary basis. After all, VII -- we forget the word, voluntary, in here.

The crux of this ought to be what the industry is doing on a voluntary basis to deal with those issues, and we'll keep you informed. But there is no way that inspection/enforcement come into play in those areas, unless you go through the more rigorous process at the bottom.

MR. BATEMAN: Well, I thought we had just agreed that in those multitude of areas where the staff has concern, that there's -- as you just characterized, but that we may not want to totally give up all of our enforcement rights, and that we would agree in up-front discussions for each one of these voluntary initiatives, where those areas would be.

My sense is -- and maybe we're off base here. Maybe the NRC $^{
m L}$ is off base, but my sense was, we're going to have more than a few voluntary industry initiatives.

I seem to get the sense you think there's only going to be a

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RI EY & AS very few voluntary initiatives.

MR. VINE: There are lots of them that fall below the threshold of formal SIAC commitments. There are things that are going on all the time in the owners groups at EPRI that are developing guidelines where we're taking staff input.

But they don't rise to the level of meeting the 51.09 criteria.

MR. HERMAN: But I think the difference is that if we have this process up front, okay, these may not get formalized in this protocol in that process. Either they're kind of in the bottom or there is something that will make it on the top for the 1.09 criteria, and they're just outside of the more formal approach.

MR. MARION: It seems to me there are fundamental concepts. I'm really getting sensitive to continually bring this up.

There are comments on the generic communication process. What we tried to do is get down to basics.

What is your expectation with these various products? And we're here talking about basics again.

What is the basis for your expectation of inspecting and enforcing voluntary industry initiatives? I submit that there are two fundamental bases for your expectation:

One is the 51.09 criteria, very disciplined, rigorous process; the other is, if a voluntary industry initiative is implemented by a licensee within your 10 CFR Part 50 regulatory framework.

It could be like the VIP where they implemented it under Appendix B. That's fair game for inspection and enforcement.

And those are the two fundamental concepts, the way we see $^{
m L}$ them. And I would ask you to consider that. Anything else outside of $^{
m L}$ those two, I'd have difficulty rationalizing in my mind.

Is there some other consideration?

MR. STROSNIDER: I agree with what you say, okay. To give a bigger picture of what our considerations in establishing what this framework is, all right, I'll come back, and I think there was some discussion earlier in the meeting: maintaining safety and 51.09.

MR. MARION: Absolutely.

MR. STROSNIDER: Reducing burden. Part of what we're trying to accomplishing by doing this, we think, is to reduce burden on the industry, all right?

And I can go through the list: Public confidence, you know, we need and Bob was talking earlier about we need to have some steps in here about how are we going to allow other stakeholders to have input and to see what's -- keep them informed and see what's going on.

Efficiency and effectiveness, also when we go through this process, we want to make sure that we've got the minimum number of boxes so that it's efficient and that we're working on the right thing.

So, from the big picture, we come back to our four outcome goals. But what you said, Alex, I don't think anybody would disagree with in terms of implementation; that they're going to fall out in those area.

MR. HERMAN: I think that second one that's up there falls in that other category. It's really not --

MR. MARION: Maybe we need to get back to articulating these fundamental concepts as part of the process. I can tell you, people are reacting to terms, substitute for regulatory action. People are reacting to --

MR. HERMAN: How about some --

MR. MARION: It's outside the design basis, well, if it's $^{
m L}$ outside the design basis, then what's the issue?

MR. HERMAN: How about providing some alternate wording?

MR. STROSNIDER: We're interested in feedback. There is a

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set of definitions in the SECY. This was some more recent thinking that reflects some 51.09. It's got some other ideas in it.

MR. HERMAN: This is only one slide out of the process.

MR. STROSNIDER: I'm just talking about the definitions.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ MARION: We'll take that as an action and provide you with some comments.

MR. CARPENTER: What is your definition of what is a voluntary industry initiative? This is what we thought it was. What does the industry think it is?

MR. HERMAN: If you want to provide a revised definition for these things, we're perfectly amenable to doing it. We might probably revise them anyway, based on today's discussions.

But I sure would like to have it writing.

MR. MODEEN: Yes, that's a great idea, and we've got some things. But I think just in light of that, I'm not going to give you the definition, but again I keep -- I think Tim raised an interesting thing again.

When you transition from voluntary to otherwise, then my sense is most of the reasons, issue groups and NEI and EPRI, when we have the interactions with the staff, it's to try to figure out what's an acceptable way to resolve the issue, whatever the issue is or the concern?

And we get to the end of that process and we figure out where does it fit in regulatory space? Well, oftentimes, you kind of lose that voluntary. The industry initiative was to help go figure out what the right solution was.

Well, then maybe we get to the endpoint and we say, gee, $^{
m L}$ it's not longer a VII. I mean, when I get this license change package $^{--}$

MR. MARION: It's Roman Numeral VII.

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 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ MODEEN: Yes, Roman Numeral VII. It's no longer a VII from that piece.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.\ \operatorname{STROSNIDER}\colon$}$ I mean, I keep coming back to -- and I'm going to make two comments on that.

All right, we keep dropping off the part, in lieu of regulatory action. Where we talk about substitute there, that's what we're talking about doing.

That was our concept, and we're open to discussion and comments on that. We clearly would have to explain that to our other stakeholders, that in lieu of our putting out a generic letter, as an example, we're going to rely on this industry initiative, all right?

But the other thing is, so, when you look at that and you say, well is that really voluntary, well, it's -- the only thing is that it's voluntary that you're going to do that as opposed to have us send out some generic communication or whatever form it takes.

And if we have something which meets one of the 51.09 backfit criteria, all right, then clearly, you know, we could take that action and it's not voluntary. You've got to bring yourself back into compliance or you've got to do the cost-beneficial enhancement or whatever.

But the one category that in the SECY paper definition at least, or in here, things that are just outside NRC interest, purview, those are voluntary. You can go do it if you want; we don't care, fine.

We may have to support you on some of those things. It may require a change in the regulations, some change in the code or whatever.

MR. HERMAN: Would you think that that first definition $^{
m L}$ could be improved by adding for issues within the design basis and triggering the 10 CFR 51.09 criteria? We would have no problem adding S $^{
m S}$ I that.

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AMI RIII EY & ASS MR. VINE: The problem is that you're talking at this from the NRC's perspective. The industry has a lot of initiatives that aren't linked to a regulatory requirement.

And you almost have to define voluntary industry initiatives in some groupings or categories. There this type and there's this type and there's this type.

MR. BATEMAN: It's my sense from this meeting that your position is that a voluntary industry initiative is not something that the NRC could otherwise regulate. You don't want a voluntary industry initiative to be something that's a substitute for a regulatory action. You said that earlier.

If there is a regulatory action that we feel we need, we ought to go do it through rulemaking or whatever, not turn it over to you guys instead of doing that.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ MARION: We still may do something, but you then embody that.

MR. VINE: We still may do something, but you still expect us to do something in a regulatory perspective -- in the mode of thinking that, hey, we could do something from the regulatory view position, but we're not going to because you guys are volunteering to do something in lieu of that.

I think we're still disconnected there.

MR. HERMAN: We've turned it into the cup is half full or the cup is half empty.

MR. MODEEN: If I could, I guess it's part of this in lieu of that's maybe hanging things up. I ultimately -- everything we've done that would initiate a formal industry position, ultimately there is N L some regulatory action and that might be that you accept the solution that the industry identified.

And so I think we've very much onboard on a lot of these

things, early and often, and let's not just get the generic letter thrown out there, but let's work on the issue and figure out the process.

Oftentimes it's easy to come to the solution; other times it's very difficult, but we eventually come to some solution. And then there really is a regulatory action.

I may not be anything more than under the new Regulatory
Information Summary Letter, acknowledging that here was the issue, here
was the concern, there is the outcome, this is what's agreed to be done
or something like that.

That's opposed to, gee, you had to do a GAL asking everybody for action when we're not trying to get right to that piece. But it just seems like ultimately the staff does need to take some sort of action.

MR. CARPENTER: The bottom line question here is, which would you rather have take place? We, the staff, come out and tell you what it is we think you need to do, or you, the industry, come back to the staff and say here is the issue that you have identified or that we've identified, and these are the things that we want to do? And we, the staff, say, yes, that's good enough.

MR. HERMAN: But they're saying to back off on enforcement effects.

MR. VINE: We're saying it's the latter with one caveat. And the caveat is if it rises to the level of 1.09, you guys need to take additional action over and above our voluntary actions to codify what is necessary for inspection and enforcement.

MR. STROSNIDER: There are a couple of issues bouncing N L around here. And I think one is that the main thing that NRC was trying to address when we started working on this was the issue of generic S L letters, 51.09 compliance, and how do we deal with issues in that arena.

We did acknowledge that there are other industry initiatives that fall outside of all that. But I think you've raised a whole different question of a whole different set of initiatives and whether we want to put them in this process or not.

To try to think of an example which is maybe -- EPRI has programs to develop improved repair methods for components, whatever it is.

Now the NRC, we are not out there saying, gee, you need to improve repair methods in order to satisfy -- to comply or for any of these other reasons, but it is something that you want to do.

The NRC is involved in it. You come in, periodically brief us when you are working on these various methods. Maybe at some point if they find themselves in code cases or whatever, you would like us to endorse them, and we have got a role in that, but you have got a whole lot of initiatives going on which are not directly related to maintaining compliance or 51.09 type activities.

What you are saying is you don't want to be held -- that every one of those things doesn't' result in something that is enforceable. Now in some cases it does and the example I picked perhaps, a repair on a primary system component, is --

MR. HERMAN: Is an alternative repair.

MR. STROSNIDER: -- is an alternative repair, a new repair method. Maybe it does, but I am sure there's other examples you could give where it doesn't. It's just practice in the plant. You mentioned water chemistry before.

We try to stay out of the issue of secondary water chemistry in steam generators. I think rightfully so.

MR. HERMAN: But design of mechanical repairs that are clearly alternatives under 50.55(a)(3), those are clearly regulatory actions under an existing rule.

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AI RI EY & AS MR. STROSNIDER: But nonetheless, just to make the big picture point that there is a set of industry initiatives out there and EPRI probably is doing a lot of these, a lot of this type of work which is not of interest in the context of 51.09.

MR. COLLINS: I would like to go back to Bill's point though -- I mean Bill's point in the shutdown rule again.

Remember when we did the shutdown rule backfit analysis that says cost beneficial safety enhancement. The Commission said yeah, but it looks like the industry is already putting into place most of the things that the rule would require, and if we codified it that's going to add the additional burden of being in the regulatory process.

Why should we add that additional burden to the industry to accomplish the same level of safety we have already got? That's basically the Commission's thinking, so they say don't put the rule out there, but they say in the SRM however you have proven that this would be a cost beneficial enhancement in terms of strict regulatory space. How are we going to assure that the industry continues to do these things that we have given them credit for, for making this decision? So the SRM says figure out a way to do inspection -- I don't know if they said enforcement or not in the SRM --

MR. HERMAN: Inspection.

MR. COLLINS: Inspection, okay, and so I think that part of the question, I don't see that that is necessarily being addressed here. How do we do that inspection part of the process where we have gone through the cost benefit analysis, shown that this would be a justified regulation. In the interests of unnecessary regulatory burden it says we don't need to put this in place formally. Now how do we keep the monitoring processing, which would be there --

MR. STROSNIDER: I'm glad you brought up that example -- [Laughter.]

AI RI EY & AS MR. HERMAN: Let me try -- because we talked about that with the enforcement people, and what you are talking about is inspecting something that isn't clearly -- that isn't a regulation.

MR. COLLINS: Right. That is the problem.

MR. HERMAN: Well, I'll give you the answer that we got and we got it from the lawyers -- same thing. I think you heard it from Dean earlier this morning. It is within the current scope of what that new regulatory program is -- if it is risk significant they are going to look at it.

MR. MARION: Right. Events, not the program processes or anything like that -- the events that occur while the plant is in that condition.

MR. HERMAN: I am not sure whether that's right. What Bill said is they go out and look at what somebody is doing for severe accidents and if somebody is not doing anything, they would come back and say they are not doing anything, and I think what Brian said was that it would come back to Headquarters and then you decide it's time to write an order or not write an order.

There is no enforcement there. What it is is go out and either put the rule in place or write an order. I think that is where you stand on this stuff. Do you guys disagree with that?

MR. MARION: No, I thought it was kind of interesting, the perspective that Tim offered relative to the dilemma the SRM has created for the Staff. It's the first time it was brought to my attention and it is an interesting program. I am curious about your solution.

[Laughter.]

MR. STROSNIDER: When you take it to the point of justified $^{\rm L}$ a backfit under 51.09 and then you say, okay, but we are not actually going to do that, we are not actually going to change the regulation or $^{\rm S}$ whatever, and then you try to inspect and enforce against it, you have

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got a disconnect.

staff.

MR. HERMAN: But that was a particular issue that was discussed at an enforcement meeting that we did internally with OGC and OE. Tim, I think you were at the meeting, the early one, and you know, what I think I conveyed was the position that came out of our legal

MR. STROSNIDER: Well, sure. You always have the option of coming -- of the region coming back to Headquarters and saying this is what we have observed, do we want to revisit the process, and do we want to issue -- take some action at this point because we are not happy with what it going on, but that is not inspection and enforcement. That is a different process.c

MR. HERMAN: That is rulemaking.

MR. BATEMAN: I would like to clarify something, a conclusion I think I have come to. I just wrote it down here. It says it is not clear to me if NEI wants us to do a voluntary industry initiative if it is in lieu of a regulatory requirement.

That is kind of the gist I got out of it, so if that is the case, then what is a voluntary industry initiative.

MR. MARION: That is the question I asked you earlier. [Laughter.]

MR. BATEMAN: We laid on the table what we thought a voluntary industry initiative is. You guys said nah -- because what we said -- what we thought a voluntary industry initiative would be would be something that would be in lieu of a regulatory requirement. Now you are saying no, we don't want voluntary industry initiatives of that type, so therefore I am confused as to what the heck a voluntary industry initiative is.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ HERMAN: Let me try -- since I think we have about killed this --

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MR. MARION: We will send you a comment letter.

MR. HERMAN: That is what I was going to say, and specifically what I would like, I think I would like to see in the comment letter is address that. You have that from the last meeting. What we are going to do as part of the meeting summary is include our comments on this and put them in the meeting summary.

Does that sound like a vehicle of getting them to you? We can do it that way.

MR. MARION: We value that too for purposes of discussion interaction, so give us your comments and feedback.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ HERMAN: Well, we were going to stick it in the meeting summary.

MR. MARION: That's fine. Anything else?

MR. STROSNIDER: I think the other thing is that whether it is in your -- whenever, however you want to get this to us, if you want to send us a letter as a result of this meeting, or in response to the Federal Register notice, that's probably the best way to do it.

Again, to come back to the big picture, you know, we were trying to take on an initiative here, an NRC initiative --

MR. MARION: Voluntary --

MR. STROSNIDER: -- where we thought that we could come up with some mechanism again for reducing unnecessary burden and having a more efficient, effective process. Maintaining safety is a given in what we are going to do here, but that is really what we thought we could accomplish.

We need your perspective on those kind of questions like if
we come to a conclusion that we could issue a generic letter based on

L compliance or whatever, from the industry's perspective, is it better
for us to go ahead and issue that letter given that we have had upfront

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I discussions on what it is we are trying to accomplish and how we will

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accomplish it, or is it better that we not issue it and have discussions about the industry taking on that action without having the letter in hand? Again, we are trying to accomplish what is a more efficient process for doing this.

It may be that, gee, once we get to the point if we have enough upfront discussion, and everybody agrees that, yes, there is a compliance issue here, and maybe the generic letter helps somehow, maybe you want to tell us yes, put the letter out -- given that it has gone through the right process.

If that is the answer, okay. We need your feedback because we are trying to make things better.

MR. MARION: It starts with taking that generic communication process to its fundamental form. Same issues. Take a look at that letter. It is like deja vu all over again -- and I quote Yoqi Berra.

MR. HERMAN: Okay, but what we would like to agree that we have at least agreed to is that we have agreed that early in the process development one thing that will be in there will be a meeting between NRC and NEI and at that point we will have gone to the point to do the best job we can in terms of running things through our internal process and characterizing things in terms of 109, adequate protection, or whatever other criteria -- you know, those type of criteria, to bring it at the meeting.

It is not a final determination, but we will do that upfront and that will be the starting point.

- MR. STROSNIDER: For NEI and other stakeholders.
- MR. HERMAN: Yes, it is a public meeting.
- MR. MARION: You mentioned the Federal Register notices.
- MR. CARPENTER: Yes, anybody who would like a copy of that, see me after the meeting.

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For those in the audience who would like to participate and send in comments, yours are more than welcome also.

MR. STROSNIDER: I understand. I think the way this is working now, the guidelines go into the Commission on the 24th. Those are guidelines we propose to put out for public comment.

MR. CARPENTER: We will have the comments out after the Commission gets it.

MR. HERMAN: After the Commission does it.

MR. STROSNIDER: That's what I said. We are telling the Commission this is what we propose to put out for public comment.

MR. CARPENTER: Yes.

MR. HERMAN: Give us your input.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ STROSNIDER: Yes -- and the Commission agreed that we should put these out --

MR. MARION: I would encourage you to release the SECY at the time that it is developed and forwarded to the Commission, because fundamentally you are trying to articulate a process by which you are going to inspect and enforce voluntary initiatives developed by the industry, and I think it is proper for them to request -- to have an opportunity to comment on what you are recommending before the Commission decides.

MR. STROSNIDER: That's what this says, but -- the point I was trying to made though is there's a relatively short timeframe, January 15th I guess, which isn't on there, of 14th did you say?

MR. VINE: The 15th, so we would like to have this thing and the best recommendation we could send up in term of having industry and stakeholder input -

MR. HERMAN: I would say we could deliver them by the end of January perhaps, but I think if it starts dragging much later than the $^{
m L}$ end of January, very early in February, then it is going to give us real problems in terms of getting the paper ready.

MR. STROSNIDER: The point I was going to make is that is

not the end of the discussion. This is so we can put together the proposal to go up to the Commission, get their feedback, and then there will be another round of discussion on this, but we want to send up something that reflects the main issues and some of these things we were talking about are very fundamental and so that kind of input -- we would really like to have that so we can reflect it.

MR. HERMAN: Even if we don't come to agreement on the issues, okay, at least we can provide both sides in the paper.

MR. STROSNIDER: We said back in Chicago and I would reiterate that the ultimate voluntary initiative is for the industry to come in with the framework for the voluntary initiatives. I mean we are open to the --

MR. MARION: That's a start.

MR. STROSNIDER: -- to that degree that if NEI on behalf of the industry wants to say here is a straw man, whether it is in the form of a flow chart or whatever level of detail you think you can support, we are interesting in soliciting that kind of input.

MR. HERMAN: Just one other thing before we wrap up. We did go through the Staff and one of the other things we were asked to do in terms of looking at this whole process was see the interest in other places. We did go through it with the other offices and at this stage of the game it is mostly NRR interest.

MR. MODEEN: One thing I almost brought up and then didn't -- when you were talking about what is the right place to do the 51.09 evaluation of backfit or otherwise and maybe you can get a sense but then you'd do it in more detail later. The thing that occurred to me is when you look at things like the GSIs that we are involved and industry is involved with Research, looking at performance or otherwise and one of the issues we are trying to scope out, and the Staff is too, so is what is the significance of that issue? What is the value gained

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taking some sort of actions?

I would think there are some lessons perhaps in also the interactions that the industry has had with RES in addition to our focus on --

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ HERMAN: Let me -- Research is interested in what is going on.

MR. CARPENTER: NMSS --

MR. HERMAN: NMSS doesn't feel that they have enough groups -- cohesive groups -- to be able to do things generically. I think that is really why they --

MR. CARPENTER: And just to summarize for a moment what we are doing here in the immediate future, as we said, is we are trying to gather up all the comments from the public so that we can put together a draft guidelines.

If anybody would like to have a meeting at some point after we get the comments in and have had a chance to digest them, please let us know. We will go ahead and try to arrange a meeting at the earliest possible date to get yet more comments in on the guidelines before they are completely drafted and put through the concurrence chain.

Something else that we are also going to be doing is putting up a webpage on the NRC Home Page that will have all of this information available for instant reference so that you don't have to go out and try to find it.

That will include the meeting summary from today's meeting and from the previous meetings that we have had, the slides, and whatever else that we are working on at the time that we can share with the public.

MR. HERMAN: But that is going to be somewhat bureaucratic to be able to get that because our process now requires us to go up through what level?

ANN RIL EY & ASS OCI ATE MR. STROSNIDER: 18th.

MR. BATEMAN: Bureaucratic?

[Laughter.]

MR. HERMAN: The other thing to keep in mind is that process that we have developed at your request in terms of meetings, it presents a problem with the timeframe for the things we have got up here if we get comments to be able to schedule a meeting because of the noticing

It is almost, what, three working weeks or three calendar It is a long time.

MR. STROSNIDER: Well, if you let us know early, we can notice meetings, and we don't like to cancel meetings, but we can notice them and if it doesn't materialize, then that is easier to do than to do

MR. HERMAN: If you really think that you really want to have one before the stuff goes upstairs, let us know pretty soon, and then we will do that.

MR. MARION: We will probably want one.

MR. HERMAN: Okay.

MR. MARION: I will give you a call.

MR. HERMAN: Maybe think about what a date is.

MR. MARION: Let me just make one observation. extremely important, because if it is not done right, it is going to have a chilling effect across the industry on future activities that elements of the industry or EPRI or Owners Groups, NEI, are going to do, so we have to put forth the time and effort to get it done right and make sure that we understand what the ground rules are.

That is what we have been talking about today, with some of this fundamental concepts, and the sooner we can thrash that out, the better off we will be in terms of the road to success.

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E: & MR. HERMAN: Agreed.

MR. STROSNIDER: We have a commitment to the Commission, all right, and of course that is important for us to meet.

On the other hand, if there's input from industry and stakeholders that there needs to be more discussion, there needs to be more something -- for example, if the industry wanted to develop some guidelines in this area and that is going to take more time, I think, you know, you could probably go to the Commission and say this is how the discussion has progressed and we will give you a status report. There is more to come later. We think it is appropriate because there's an initiative to go off and develop this.

With good reason we can adjust this, but it is important from our perspective to meet our commitments to the Commission, so absent something like that, we are going to sit down, take a shot at writing this --

MR. HERMAN: This is the third external stakeholder meeting and I think we understand what your issues are somewhat, okay, but I think to get them down and make sure that we have got the essence of what is bothering you, I think we need to get them in writing.

MR. MARION: You have a number of suggestions that are directly applicable to this, and that is the comments we have provided on the generic communication process.

MR. STROSNIDER: We'll be happy to look at it.

MR. MARION: Okay. Anything else?

[No response.]

MR. MARION: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. We have appreciated the opportunity and we will submit comments on the FRN, et L cetera.

I think the meeting was productive in terms of talking about some of the issues but we need to work through them.

I would like to wish you all a happy holiday. MR. STROSNIDER: Yes, thank you very much and happy holiday to everybody. [Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the meeting was concluded.] ANN RIL EY & ASS OCI ATE