

December 23, 1999

Carolina Power & Light Company
ATTN: Mr. James Scarola
Vice President - Harris Plant
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
P. O. Box 165, Mail Code: Zone 1
New Hill, NC 27562-0165

SUBJECT: INSPECTION PLAN FOR SHEARON HARRIS

Dear Mr. Scarola:

On December 6, 1999, the NRC staff reviewed the performance of Shearon Harris as reflected in the performance indicators and inspection results in order to integrate performance information and to plan for inspection activities at your facility from January 3, 2000, through July 31, 2000. The purpose of this letter is to inform you of our plans for future inspections at your facility.

We have not identified any areas in which you crossed a performance threshold. Therefore we plan to conduct only baseline inspections at your facility over the next seven months. However, the results of a triennial fire protection inspection are still under review and may involve further inspection.

Enclosure 1 details the scheduled inspections that will occur from January 3, 2000, through July 31, 2000. The inspection plan is provided to minimize the resource impact on your staff and to allow for scheduling conflicts and personnel availability to be resolved in advance of inspector arrival onsite. Routine resident inspections are not listed due to their ongoing and continuous nature. The last four months of the inspection plan are tentative and will be revised at the end-of-cycle review meeting.

Enclosure 2 contains a historical listing of plant issues, referred to as the Plant Issue Matrix (PIM), that were identified during the pilot plant inspection program period. The PIM includes items summarized from inspection reports or other docketed correspondence between NRC and Carolina Power & Light.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR).

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2

If circumstances arise which cause us to change this inspection plan, we will contact you to discuss the change as soon as possible. Please contact Brian Bonser at (404) 562-4560 with any questions you may have regarding this letter or the inspection plan.

Sincerely,

(Original signed by B. Bonser)

Brian R. Bonser, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No.: 50-400
License No.: NPF-63

Enclosures: 1. Shearon Harris Inspection/Activity Plan
2. Plant Issue Matrix

cc w/encs: (See page 3)

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3

cc w/encls:

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4

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HARRIS
Inspection / Activity Plan
01/01/2000 - 07/30/2000

Units	Inspection Activity	Title	No. of Staff on Site	No. assigned to Procedure	Planned Dates Start	Planned Dates End	Inspection Type
	OLB	- REACTOR SAFETY	3				
1	IP 71114.01	Drill and Exercise Inspection		3	01/10/2000	01/14/2000	Other Routine
	EB	- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTION	2				
1	IP 2515/143	Shearon Harris Spent Fuel Pool (C and D) Expansion		2	01/24/2000	01/28/2000	Safety Issues
	PSB	- SAFEGUARDS	1				
1	IP 71130.01	Access Authorization		1	02/14/2000	02/18/2000	Other Routine
1	IP 71130.02	Access Control		1	02/14/2000	02/18/2000	Other Routine
	PSB	- RADIATION SAFETY	1				
1	IP 71121.02	ALARA Planning and Controls		1	03/06/2000	03/10/2000	Other Routine
	PB4	- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTION	1				
1	IP 2515/142	Draindown During Shutdown and Common-Mode Failure (NRC GL 98-02)		1	04/17/2000	04/21/2000	Safety Issues
	MB	- REACTOR SAFETY	1				
1	IP 71111.08	Inservice Inspection Activities (I,B)		1	04/24/2000	04/28/2000	Other Routine
	PSB	- RADIATION SAFETY	1				
1	IP 71121.01	Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas		1	04/24/2000	04/28/2000	Other Routine
1	IP 71121.02	ALARA Planning and Controls		1	04/24/2000	04/28/2000	Other Routine
	MB	- REACTOR SAFETY	3				
1	IP 71111.02	Changes to License Conditions and Safety Analysis Report (M,B)		1	05/01/2000	05/05/2000	Other Routine
1	IP 71111.17	Permanent Plant Modifications (M,B)		2	05/01/2000	05/05/2000	Other Routine
	PB4	- PROBLEM ID & RESOLUTION	3				
1	IP 71152	Identification and Resolution of Problems		3	06/05/2000	06/09/2000	Other Routine

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Revised Oversight Process PLANT ISSUE MATRIX

By Cornerstone

Region II
 05000400 - HARRIS 1

Date	Source	ID	Type	Cornerstone	Significance Determination	Item Title Item Description/Significance
10/09/1999	1999006-01	NRC	NCV	Barrier Integrity	Green	<p>FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE THAT AN A (1) GOAL WAS EXCEEDED.</p> <p>The licensee failed to take appropriate corrective action under 10CFR50.65 (a)(1) when a maintenance rule (a)(1) performance goal was exceeded for the Target Rock Position Indication performance monitoring group in system 9001, containment isolation valves. The established goal of no more than one failure in 18 months was exceeded on June 11, 1999, but was not recognized by the licensee, and appropriate corrective action was not taken until another functional failure occurred on August 17, 1999.</p> <p>This issue was characterized as a Non-Cited Violation and was determined to have low risk significance because failure of the Target Rock position indicators did not prevent operators from determining valve positions, and other more time-consuming methods were available. Second, the failure to recognize that a maintenance rule goal had been exceeded did not affect the ability of any valve to operate.</p>
07/17/1999	1999004-01	NRC	NCV	Barrier Integrity	Green	<p>MODE 4 ENTRY AND SUBSEQUENT UNIT OPERATION WITH AN INOPERABLE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION</p> <p>Operating the unit with valve 1CC-176 inoperable and taking no action to comply with Technical Specification (TS) Action requirements during the period from November 24, 1998, through December 6, 1998, was a violation of TS 3.6.3, Containment Systems.</p> <p>For approximately 11 days the licensee operated the unit with an inoperable component cooling water system containment-isolation valve. The subject valve isolates component cooling water flow to the reactor coolant drain tank heat exchanger and the excess letdown heat exchanger. The scenario requiring the use of valve 1CC-176 to shut in order to contain a radioactive release was estimated at E-14/year, a relatively low risk significance and was a green inspection finding. The system piping is a closed loop inside containment and is neither a high-energy line nor a bypass leakage path. The failure of the valve to close would be indicated in the control room. Emergency procedures require operators to verify valve closure and manually close valves which did not close automatically. During the subject period the valve could be shut from a manual handswitch on the main control board.</p>
07/17/1999	1999004-02	NRC	NCV	Barrier Integrity	Green	<p>FAILURE TO DEMONSTRATE THE OPERABILITY OF CONTAINMENT-ISOLATION VALVES PRIOR TO ENER</p> <p>Failure to perform an adequate cycling test and verify the isolation time of valve 1CC-176 and failure to verify the isolation time of valve 1CC-202 prior to entering Mode 4 on November 24, 1998, and the subsequent entry into Mode 4; was a violation of surveillance requirement TS 4.6.3.1 and TS 4.0.4.</p> <p>The licensee's program to implement this surveillance did not consider the fact that a portion of the containment isolation valves could not be fully tested from the control room handswitch. As a result valves 1CC-176 and 1CC-202 were not adequately tested to meet the TS surveillance requirement prior to entry into mode 4. For risk significance see item 1999004-01.</p>
07/17/1999	1999004-03	NRC	NCV	Barrier Integrity	Green	<p>FAILURE TO IDENTIFY AND CORRECT CONDITIONS ADVERSE TO QUALITY (2 EXAMPLES) (SECTIONS 40</p> <p>Failure to promptly identify and correct a test deficiency during a surveillance test on November 22, 1998, and failure to correct the causes of the failure of valve 1CC-176 to shut during a surveillance test on December 6, 1998, were two examples of a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action.</p> <p>The first example involved failure to use the corrective action program to document a test deficiency which identified that there was a problem with valve 1CC-176 prior to entry into mode 4. The second example involved a failure to correct the causes of the 1CC-176 inoperability which would have allowed the event described in item 1999004-01 to reoccur without being identified by post maintenance /surveillance testing. For risk significance see item 1999004-01.</p>

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Revised Oversight Process PLANT ISSUE MATRIX

By Cornerstone

Region II
05000400 - HARRIS 1

Date	Source	ID	Type	Cornerstone	Significance Determination	Item Title Item Description/Significance
11/23/1999	01014-99273	Licensee	VIO	Physical Protection	Green	<p>Failure To Comply With The Regulations In 10 CFR Part 73 and The Provisions Of The Harris Physical Sec</p> <p>Four Examples of a GREEN finding related to access authorization were identified. The examples included: (1) Failure to review and evaluate background information for persons granted unescorted access, (2) Continuation of the granting unescorted access authorization, (3) Failure to maintain original data on which the licensee granted unescorted access authorization for five years, and (4) Failure to log safeguards events within 24 hours of discovery.</p> <p>Since it was determined that the individuals granted unescorted access would have been granted access if the background information had been actually verified, the significance of the violation, under the NRC significance determination process was determined to be a GREEN finding. Although the violation was identified by the licensee, due to the failure to restore compliance within a reasonable time a notice of violation is warranted.</p> <p>This item was closed by letter dated 11/23/99 (EA 99-273) and documented in inspection report 50-400/99-007.</p>

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Revised Oversight Process PLANT ISSUE MATRIX
By Cornerstone

Legend

Type Codes:

AV	Apparent Violation
FIN	Finding
NCV	NonCited Violation
URI	Unresolved item
VIO	Violation

ID Codes:

NRC	NRC
Self	Self-Revealed
Licensee	Licensee

AVs are apparent violations of NRC Requirements that are being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. However, the NRC has not reached its final enforcement decision on the issues identified by the AVs and the PIM entries may be modified when the final decisions are made.

URIs are unresolved items about which more information is required to determine whether the issue in question is an acceptable item, a deviation, a nonconformance, or a violation. A URI may also be a potential violation that is not likely to be considered for escalated enforcement action. However, the NRC has not reached its final conclusions on the issues, and the PIM entries may be modified when the final conclusions are made.