



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-373

LASALLE COUNTY STATION, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 138
License No. NPF-11


1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment filed by the Commonwealth Edison Company (the licensee), dated August 6, 1999, as supplemented on November 15, 1999, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the enclosure to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of the Facility Operating License No. NPF-11 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 138, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days. Implementation of this amendment shall include the relocation of certain technical specification requirements to the appropriate licensee-controlled documents as described in the Licensee's application dated August 6, 1999, and its supplement dated November 15, 1999, and evaluated in the staff's safety evaluation attached to this amendment.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Anthony J. Mendiola, Chief, Section 2
Project Directorate III
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: December 21, 1999

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 38

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-11

DOCKET NO. 50-373

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain a vertical line indicating the area of change.

REMOVE

3/4 6-35
3/4 6-36
B 3/4 6-4a

INSERT

3/4 6-35
3/4 6-36
B 3/4 6-4a
B 3/4 6-4b

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

3/4.6.4 VACUUM RELIEF

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.4 All suppression chamber - drywell vacuum breakers shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

- a. With one suppression chamber - drywell vacuum breaker inoperable for opening, restore the inoperable vacuum breaker to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.
- b. With one suppression chamber -drywell vacuum breaker inoperable and open, within 4 hours close the manual isolation valves on both sides of the inoperable and open vacuum breaker. Restore the inoperable vacuum breaker to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.4.1 Each suppression chamber - drywell vacuum breaker shall be:

- a. Verified closed at least once per 14 days.
- b. Demonstrated OPERABLE:
 1. At least once per 31 days and within 12 hours after any discharge of steam to the suppression chamber from the safety-relief valves, by cycling each vacuum breaker through at least one complete cycle of full travel.
 2. At least once per 18 months by verifying the force required to open the vacuum breaker, from the closed position, to be less than or equal to 0.5 psid,

*Surveillance Requirement 4.6.4.1.a is not required to be met for suppression chamber - drywell vacuum breakers that are open during Surveillances or for suppression chamber - drywell vacuum breakers that are functioning for pressure relief during normal and off-normal plant operations.

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

BASES

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (Continued)

with the control room, at the valve controls, (2) instructing this operator to close these valves in an accident situation, and (3) assuring that environmental conditions will not preclude access to close the valves and that this action will prevent the release of radioactivity outside the primary containment.

Surveillance Requirement 4.6.3.6.a verifies leakage through any one main steamline is ≤ 100 scfh, not to exceed 400 scfh for all four main steamlines, when tested at $\geq P_1$ (25.0 psig). The transient and accident analyses are based on leakage at the specified leakage rate. The leakage rate for main steamlines through the isolation valves must be verified to be in accordance with the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. A Note has been added to this Surveillance Requirement requiring the results to be excluded from the total of Type B and Type C tests. This ensures that leakage rate for main steamlines through the isolation valves is properly accounted for in determining the overall primary containment leakage rate. The Frequency is required by the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

Surveillance Requirement 4.6.3.6.b test of hydrostatically tested lines provides assurance that the assumptions of UFSAR Section 6.2 are met. The combined leakage rates must be demonstrated in accordance with the leakage rate test at a frequency in accordance with the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

3/4.6.4 VACUUM RELIEF

The Containment Vacuum Relief System consists of four (4) suppression chamber - drywell vacuum breakers. These vacuum breakers are provided to equalize the pressure between the suppression chamber and drywell to maintain the structural integrity of the primary containment under conditions of large differential pressures. The vacuum breakers are outside of primary containment and form an extension of the primary containment boundary. Two local manual butterfly valves, one on each side of the vacuum breaker, are provided as system isolation valves should the vacuum breaker fail open.

For the vacuum breakers to be operable they must be capable of relieving pressure, however, they are required to be closed except during testing or when the vacuum breakers are performing their intended design function. Due to the relatively low differential pressure setpoint, the vacuum breakers may lift to relieve pressure differential seen during normal and off-normal conditions. This includes surveillance testing or actual operations where heat is added to the Suppression Chamber (i.e., Reactor Core Isolation Cooling and Safety Relief Valve testing) that ultimately raises the pressure in the suppression chamber, or other conditions that impact the temperature and pressure in the suppression chamber or drywell. The resulting differential pressure between the suppression chamber and the drywell, if greater than the setpoint, will be relieved by the momentary opening of one or more vacuum breakers and does not cause the valve to open for an extended period of time. The vacuum breakers provide assurance that the drywell-to-suppression chamber negative differential pressure remains below the design value, and the requirement for the vacuum breakers to be closed

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

BASES

VACUUM RELIEF (Continued)

ensures that by-pass leakage between the suppression chamber and the drywell is minimized should a Loss of Coolant Accident occur.

Only three (3) suppression chamber - drywell vacuum breakers are required to perform the pressure relief function. Therefore, in the event that one vacuum breaker is inoperable operation may continue for up to 72 hours provided that the manual isolation valves are closed on each side of any inoperable and open vacuum breaker.



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001**

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-374

LASALLE COUNTY STATION, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

**Amendment No.122
License No. NPF-18**


- 1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:**
 - A. The application for amendment filed by the Commonwealth Edison Company (the licensee), dated August 6, 1999, as supplemented on November 15, 1999, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;**
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission;**
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;**
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and**
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.**
- 2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the enclosure to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of the Facility Operating License No. NPF-18 is hereby amended to read as follows:**

(2) **Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan**

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No.122 , and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days. Implementation of this amendment shall include the relocation of certain technical specification requirements to the appropriate licensee-controlled documents as described in the Licensee's application dated August 6, 1999, and its supplement dated November 15, 1999, and evaluated in the staff's safety evaluation attached to this amendment.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Anthony J. Mendiola, Chief, Section 2
Project Directorate III
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: December 21, 1999

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 122

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-18

DOCKET NO. 50-374

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain a vertical line indicating the area of change.

REMOVE

3/4 6-38
3/4 6-39
B 3/4 6-4a

INSERT

3/4 6-38
3/4 6-39
B 3/4 6-4a
B 3/4 6-4b

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

3/4.6.4 VACUUM RELIEF

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.4 All suppression chamber - drywell vacuum breakers shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

- a. With one suppression chamber - drywell vacuum breaker inoperable for opening, restore the inoperable vacuum breaker to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.
- b. With one suppression chamber -drywell vacuum breaker inoperable and open, within 4 hours close the manual isolation valves on both sides of the inoperable and open vacuum breaker. Restore the inoperable vacuum breaker to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.4.1 Each suppression chamber - drywell vacuum breaker shall be:

- a. Verified closed at least once per 14 days.
- b. Demonstrated OPERABLE:
 1. At least once per 31 days and within 12 hours after any discharge of steam to the suppression chamber from the safety-relief valves, by cycling each vacuum breaker through at least one complete cycle of full travel.
 2. At least once per 18 months by verifying the force required to open the vacuum breaker, from the closed position, to be less than or equal to 0.5 psid.

*Surveillance Requirement 4.6.4.1.a is not required to be met for suppression chamber - drywell vacuum breakers that are open during Surveillances or for suppression chamber - drywell vacuum breakers that are functioning for pressure relief during normal and off-normal plant operations.

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

BASES

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (Continued)

This specification provides assurance that the PCIVs will perform their designed safety functions to control leakage from the primary containment during accidents.

The opening of locked or sealed closed containment isolation valves on an intermittent basis under administrative control includes the following considerations: (1) stationing an operator, who is in constant communication with the control room, at the valve controls, (2) instructing this operator to close these valves in an accident situation, and (3) assuring that environmental conditions will not preclude access to close the valves and that this action will prevent the release of radioactivity outside the primary containment.

Surveillance Requirement 4.6.3.6.a verifies leakage through any one main steamline is ≤ 100 scfh, not to exceed 400 scfh for all four main steamlines when tested at $\geq P_1$ (25.0 psig). The transient and accident analyses are based on leakage at the specified leakage rate. The leakage rate for main steamlines through the isolation valves must be verified to be in accordance with the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. A Note has been added to this Surveillance Requirement requiring the results to be excluded from the total of Type B and Type C tests. This ensures that leakage rate for main steamlines through the isolation valves is properly accounted for in determining the overall primary containment leakage rate. The frequency is required by the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

Surveillance Requirement 4.6.3.6.b test of hydrostatically tested lines provides assurance that the assumptions of UFSAR Section 6.2 are met. The combined leakage rates must be demonstrated in accordance with the leakage rate test at a frequency in accordance with the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

3/4.6.4 VACUUM RELIEF

The Containment Vacuum Relief System consists of four (4) suppression chamber - drywell vacuum breakers. These vacuum breakers are provided to equalize the pressure between the suppression chamber and drywell to maintain the structural integrity of the primary containment under conditions of large differential pressures. The vacuum breakers are outside of primary containment and form an extension of the primary containment boundary. Two local manual butterfly valves, one on each side of the vacuum breaker, are provided as system isolation valves should the vacuum breaker fail open.

For the vacuum breakers to be operable they must be capable of relieving pressure, however, they are required to be closed except during testing or when the vacuum breakers are performing their intended design function. Due to the relatively low differential pressure setpoint, the vacuum breakers may lift to relieve pressure differential seen during normal and off-normal conditions. This includes surveillance testing or actual operations where heat is

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

BASES

VACUUM RELIEF (Continued)

added to the Suppression Chamber (i.e., Reactor Core Isolation Cooling and Safety Relief Valve testing) that ultimately raises the pressure in the suppression chamber, or other conditions that impact the temperature and pressure in the suppression chamber or drywell. The resulting differential pressure between the suppression chamber and the drywell, if greater than the setpoint, will be relieved by the momentary opening of one or more vacuum breakers and does not cause the valve to open for an extended period of time. The vacuum breakers provide assurance that the drywell-to-suppression chamber negative differential pressure remains below the design value, and the requirement for the vacuum breakers to be closed ensures that by-pass leakage between the suppression chamber and the drywell is minimized should a Loss of Coolant Accident occur.

Only three (3) suppression chamber - drywell vacuum breakers are required to perform the pressure relief function. Therefore, in the event that one vacuum breaker is inoperable operation may continue for up to 72 hours provided that the manual isolation valves are closed on each side of any inoperable and open vacuum breaker.